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Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to examine the implementation of Indonesian rice policy 
at the regional level during the period 1970-1984. Two programs have been analysed: 
the rice intensification (Bimas) and the village unit cooperatives (KUD) programs. The 
results of the programs and their impacts on the farmers are analysed. Also, the 
responses of farmers to the two programs are described.
However, this thesis is particularly aimed at analysing the work of the local 
government officials and the machinery at the kabupaten down to village levels. Since 
the local government is the main agency of the central government in implementing its 
rice policies, as well as other development programs, the role of this local apparatus is 
crucial in the implementation process of the policy. The local government officials are 
the lower level instruments of the central government, and they are subject to heavy 
political control from the centre. This thesis examines the impact of this control upon 
local-level rice policy implementation.
The analysis of rice policy implementation at the regional level in Indonesia, 
indicates that the success of the government in achieving certain objectives of the policy, 
and its failure to achieve others are not merely caused by administrative problems, but 
are particularly due to the priorities given by the central government to certain policy 
objectives, and by the pattern of relationships between the central and the local officials.
In other words, the implementation of rice policy has been more affected by 
political factors than by administrative problems. Hence, while this thesis gives 
attention to the administrative problems, its focus is mainly on the political factors 
affecting the implementation process. The influence of political factors is illustrated by 
five local studies in Malang Kabupaten in the last two chapters.
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Glossary of Indonesian Terms and Abbreviations
AMPI Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia (Youth Organization 
for Indonesian Reformation).
Bimas Bimbingan Massal (Mass Guidance in Rice Planting).
BGR Bimas Gotong Royong.
Bimas Yang Disempurnakan
Improved Bimas.
BULOG Badan Urusan Logistik (Logistic Body).
BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia.
BRI UDES Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa (Village Unit Bank).
BPB Bimas Pola Baru (New Pattern of Bimas).
BKO Badan Kontak Organisasi (Body of Contact Organization).
BPLPP Balai Pendidikan dan Latihan Penyuluhan Pertanian 
(Educational and Training Centre for Agricultural Extension).
BAKO BIMAS Badan Koordinasi Bimas (Coordinating Body of Bimas).
Binagram Pembinaan Program (Programming Development Section at the 
Cooperatives Office).
Binor Pembinaan Organisasi (Organization Development Section at 
the Cooperatives Office).
Binus Pembinaan Usaha (Business Development Section at the 
Cooperatives Office).
BUUD Badan Usaha Unit Desa (the Business Body of Village Unit).
Bappeda
BPH
Badan Perencanaan Daerah (Regional Planning Body).
Badan Pemerintahan Daerah (Regional Executive Body).
BPD Badan Pertimbangan Daerah (Local Advisory Body) CPNS
Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil (Candidate of Government Civil 
Servants).
Dinas Daerah technical offices of regional government.
Diperta Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan, (Food Crops Agricultural 
Office at regional level).
Dolog Depot Logistik (Logistic Office at Province Level), branch of 
Bulog.
DPD Dewan Pemerintah Daerah (Regional Executive Council).
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Assembly).
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People’s 
Representative Assembly).
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DPRGR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong (”Gotong Royong” 
People’s Representative Assembly at the National Level).
DPRDGR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Gotong Royong (”Gotong 
Royong” Regional Representatives Assembly).
Dwi Fungsi ABRI The Dual Function of the Military in military and non-military 
activities.
Golkar Golongan Karya, a government-backed party.
GBHN Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outline of State 
Objectives).
Humas Hubungan Masyarakat (Public Relations).
IKIP Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (the Institute of 
Teaching and Educational Science).
Inmas Intensifikasi Massal (Mass Intensification].
Insus Intensifikasi Khusus (Special Intensification).
INKUD Induk Koperasi Unit Desa (Centre of Village Unit Cooperatives) 
at National Level.
Instansi the Central or Regional Governments Offices.
Ipeda Iuran Pembangunan Daerah (Contribution for the Regional 
Development), a kind of tax.
INPRES Instruksi Presiden (President Instruction).
Jupen
KOLOGNAS
Juru Penerangan (Information Specialists).
Komando Logistik Nasional (National Logistic Command).
Kelompok Tani
Kontak Tani
Farmers’ Group.
Contact Farmers.
Tani Maju
KOPERTA
Progressive Farmers.
Koperasi Pertanian (Agrigultural Cooperatives).
Kanwil Kantor Wilayah (Ministerial Office at Province Level).
Kandep
KNPI
Kantor Departemen (Ministerial Office at Kabupaten Level).
Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (National Committee of 
Indonesian Youth).
Kantor Koperasi Cooperatives Office at regional level.
Kredit Candak Kulak Small Credit for villagers.
LKMD Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Institution of the Village 
People Endurance).
LAKU Latihan dan Kunjungan (Training and Visit), an activity of 
Agricultural Extensionist (PPL).
MPBP Musyawarah Pembina Bimas Propinsi (Conference of Bimas 
Managers at Province Level).
MPBK Musyawarah Pelaksana Bimas Kabupaten (Conference of 
Kabupaten Bimas Implementers).
Muspida Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Conference of Regional 
Leaders).
Muspika Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan (Conference of Kecamatan 
Leaders).
IX
Masjumi
MPR
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, a modernist Muslim party.
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative 
Assembly).
MPRS Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly).
NU Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Muslim party.
Panca Usaha Tani Five-fold way to better farming.
PT. PUSRI Pupuk Sriwijaya (Sriwijaya Fertilizer Company).
PKK Pendidikan Keseiahteraan Keluarga (Education of Family 
Welfare).
PPK Pusat Pelayanan Koperasi (Centre of Cooperative Service).
PAU Pusat Administrasi Usaha (Centre for Business Administration).
PGRI Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Teachers 
Association)
PHBP Pembina Harian Bimas Propinsi (Executive of Bimas Managers 
at Province Level).
PHBK Pelaksana Harian Bimas Kabupaten (Daily Implementers of 
Kabupaten Bimas).
PUSKUD Pusat Koperasi Unit Desa (Centre of Village Unit Cooperatives) 
at Province Level.
PKL Penyuluh Koperasi Lapangan (Cooperative Extension Service).
Perda Peraturan Daerah (Regional Law).
PPS Penyuluh Pertanian Spesialis (Agricultural Extension Specialist).
PPM Penyuluh Pertanian Madya (Senior Agricultural Extensionist).
PPL Penyuluh Pertanian Lapangan (Agricultural Extension Service).
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, an Islamic Based party.
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, a Nationalist Based party.
Pepabri Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia (Association of the Retired Army Members).
Primkopad Primer Koperasi Angkatan Darat, the Army Cooperatives 
Organization.
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PNI. Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party).
Peperda
Repelita
Penguasa Perang Daerah (Regional War Authority).
Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year Development 
Plan).
Rapimwil
Rendemen
Rapat Pimpinan Wilayah (Meeting of Regional Heads), 
conversion of milled rice from stalk padi.
SPPB Surat Perintah Pembayaran Bimas (Letter of Bimas Credit 
Disbursement).
SP BIMAS Satuan Pembina Bimas (Controlling Body of Bimas).
SESDALOPBANG Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan (Secretary of 
Development Operation).
XSPBP Satuan Pembinan Bimas Propinsi (The Province Body of Bimas 
Managers).
SPBK Satuan Pelaksana Bimas Kabupaten (The Kabupaten Body of 
Bimas Implementers).
Sekwilda Sekretaris Wilayah/Daerah (Secretary of Region).
SK Mentan Surat Keputusan Menteri Pertanian (Decision of Minister of 
Agriculture).
SK Gubernur Surat Keputusan Gubernur (Decision of the Governor).
SK Bupati
Satlak Bimas Desa
Surat Keputusan Bupati (Decision of the Bupati).
Satuan Pelaksana Bimas Desa (The Village Body of Bimas 
Implementers).
Sub-Dolog Sub-Depot Logistik (Branch of Logistic Office at Kabupaten 
Level).
TRI Tebu Rakyat Intensifikasi (Sugar Intensification Program.
UDKP Unit Daerah Kerja Pembangunan (Development Unit Area).
WILUD Wilayah Unit Desa (Village Unit Area).
VVKBPP Wilayah Kerja Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian (Work Area of the 
Office of Agricultural Extension Service).
XVKPP Wilayah Kerja Penyuluhan Pertanian (Work Area Agricultural 
Extension Service).
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1CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
This thesis examines the implementation of government policies at the local level 
in Indonesia. Rice policy, which involves rice intensification programs (BIMAS, 
Bimbingan Massal, Mass Guidance) and the rural cooperatives program (KUD, 
Koperasi Unit Desa, Village Unit Cooperative) has been chosen as a case study for this 
purpose. Many studies have been made on rice policy in Indonesia, both macro and 
micro studies. Most macro studies are focussed essentially on rice policy implementation 
at the national rather than the local level; and they explore, for example, one or two 
aspects of the policy such as its historical background and marketing aspect of the 
policy.
One of the macro studies on rice policy is Mears’ two books. His first book, ”Rice 
Marketing in the Republic of Indonesia,” was published in 1961. As mentioned by its 
title, this book examined primarily the marketing system of rice in Indonesia since the 
colonial period up to 1959. This was ”to provide a better understanding of the 
organization of rice marketing in Indonesia, the agencies involved in distribution and the 
problems related to these activities.”*
Mears’ second book, ”The New Rice Economy of Indonesia,” (published in 1981) 
examines the changes that occurred in the rice marketing system during the period 
1950-1980. As Mears points out:^
Since the late 1950s when the Indonesian marketing scene was last studied 
comprehensively, and especially after 1965, many changes have taken place in 
Indonesia affecting the trade and flow of paddy and rice from farm to 
consumer. Changes in the relative importance of markets in the channels of 
rice trade and in rice processing and distribution were stimulated from many 
inter-related and inter-acting agronomic, economic, social and political changes 
within the Indonesian economy and the world outside. As a result, the ”new”
1979 rice economy is much different from that of the 1950s.
Mears noted that these changes above occurred particularly at four levels: at farm
*Leon A. Mears, Rice Marketing in the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta: The Institute for 
Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economic University of Indonesia, 1961, p.xxix.
^Leon A. Mears, ”The New Rice Economy of Indonesia.” Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University 
Press, 1981, p.3.
2level where the highly fertilizer-responsive rice varieties and varieties developed at the 
International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines were adopted; at the rice mill 
level where small rice mill units tended to be used extensively, while large mill units 
tended to decline in number; at the market structure and distribution channels; and 
through changes in the storage arrangements. While these two books provide the details 
necessary to understand rice marketing, they were written from the national perspective 
and lack any analysis of micro-level problems or the implementation of policy at the 
local level.
A historical analysis of rice policy in Indonesia is presented by C. Peter Timmer. 
In his article, ”The Formation of Indonesian Rice Policy, A Historical Perspective,”^ 
Timmer summarise rice policies of the Dutch government, which were then continued by 
Sukarno’s and Suharto’s governments, through the establishment of various marketing 
institutions and through the implementation of its rice intensification programs. This 
work also analyses the impact of rice policy on the larger rice economy, the efficiency of 
rice policy in achieving its overall objectives, and the welfare impact of policy upon the 
population within the rural and urban sectors. Although this work has enriched our 
understanding of rice policy in Indonesia, it too is a macro study, and its analysis ended 
in 1971; thus, more recent and more important developments in rice policy are still 
unexplored.
Most of the micro studies of Indonesian rice policy, on the other hand, examine 
particular aspects of the social or economic impact of that policy, such as the impact of 
agricultural mechanisation upon farmers’ incomes in certain areas, changes in rice 
harvesting methods, the decline in labor absorption in rice production, changes in rural
®C. Peter Timmer, "The Formation of Indonesian Rice Policy, A Historical Perspective.” in 
Gary E. Hansen fed), Agricultural and Rural Development in Indonesia, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1981, p.40.
^On the impact of rice policy upon the larger rice economy, Timmer concluded that rice policy 
in the period 1967-1971, was successful in increasing rice production as well as consumption level. 
However, the 32 per cent increase in per capita consumption, "did not stem entirely from 
increased income.” C. Peter Timmer, Ibid., p.40. On the second problem, Timmer asked why 
self-sufficiency in rice was not achieved in 1970-1971 by paying a higher rice price? This was 
caused according to him, by some internal and external contraint. Externally, the constraint was 
the very low price of rice in Southeast Asia, while internally there was an administrative weakness 
where BULOG had been unable to maintain rice prices above the floor price. From the welfare 
point of view, Timmer noted that there was a decline in per capita calorie consumption. Two 
possible causes for this are the possibility of bad statistical data, and the decline in rural income.
3credit systems etc, but here again, they do not tell us much about the actual working of 
government policies or the machinery of implementation.
It is obvious therefore that our understanding of the working of the local 
bureaucratic institutions, as the main agencies implementing rice policy, is very limited. 
Hansen tried in 1973 and 1974 to analyse the role of the bureaucracy in the 
implementation of rice policy. In his 1973 work on ”The Politics and Administration of 
Rural Development in Indonesia: The Case of Agriculture,”® he examined the 
implementation of Bimas and Bimas Gotong Royong (BGR) programs, which, according 
to him, faced many administrative difficulties at that time, some of which were later 
overcome.
Among his various conclusions, Hansen writes that many cases of mismanagement 
of Bimas and BGR programs were caused by the policy-making process which involved 
only a small number of individuals around President Suharto, bypassed many ministers, 
and thus suffered from a lack of evaluation. Hansen seemed to believe that the 
difficulties arose from the lack of public support for the program. According to him:
...goals and programs were formulated within a context of limited 
institutional participation. Policy determinations were not the product of 
covert institutional conflict within the public bureaucracy or of overt demands 
and pressures expressed by political and voluntary associations. Therefore, 
while the program was inaugurated by its makers in a mood of great 
expectation, it did not begin with widespread institutional or public support.
In his second work, published in 1974, "Rural Local Government and Agricultural 
Development in Java, Indonesia,”8 Hansen again examined some of the institutional and
8Among the writings on this subject are: R.S. Sinaga and W.L. Collier, ” Social and Regional 
Implications of Agricultural Development Policy,” Paper presented at Southeast Asian 
Agricultural Economics Association Meeting, Balikpapan, November 3-4, 1975; Yusuf Saefudin, 
"Sistim Perkreditan di Pedesaan DAS Cimanuk: Studi Kasus di 6 Desa Contoh SDP-SAE,” 
Working Paper at Lokakarya Sejarah Sosial-Ekonomi Pedesaan, Cipayung, January 22-24, 1979; 
A.T. Birowo and W.L. Collier, "Employment and Income in Villages on the North Coast of 
Java,” Bogor: SAE, March 1974; Yujiro Hay ami and Anwar Hafid, "Some Observations on the 
Changes in Rice Harvesting Systems in Java,” Bogor: SAE, 1979; W.L. Collier, "Labor 
Absorption in Javanese Rice Cultivation,” Background Paper for Technical Meeting on Labor 
Absorption in Agriculture, Bogor, June 11-13, 1981; W.L. Collier et.al., "Social and Economic 
Aspects of Rice Based Cropping Systems in the Coastal Wetlands of Indonesia,” Bogor: SAE, 
1981; Faisal Kasryno, "Konsekuensi Mekanisasi Pertanian di Indonesia,” Proceedings of a 
Workshop jointly sponsored by the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development- 
Directorate General for Food Crops-International Rice Research Institute, July-August 1983.
®Gary E. Hansen, "The Politics and Administration of Rural Development in Indonesia, The 
Case of Agriculture,” Research Monograph Series, Berkeley, California: Center for South and 
Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, April 1973.
^Gary E. Hansen, Ibid., p.46.
8G.A. Hansen Rural Local Government and Agricultural Development in Java, Indonesia, 
Ithaca: Rural Development Committee, Center For International Studies, Cornell University 
Press, 1974.
4political changes that had occurred over the period 1950-1974. He writes, among other 
things, that in the period 1950-1965, rural officials were heavily involved in politics and 
thus often involved in conflict among themselves. Political parties too, although they 
were able to penetrate into the villages, were unable to bridge the gap between party 
leaders and peasants, apart from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Political 
conflicts among the parties and the challenges from peasants organized by the PKI 
toward agricultural development programs, resulted in stagnation of the programs in the 
1960s.
He notes of the post-1965 period that local civilian and military authorities became 
the main actors in regional politics. While peasant resistance towards agricultural 
development programs may have been effectively reduced, the local administration was 
overtaxed by the massive program, and suffered from both a lack of resources and lack 
of trained staff. Because the government itself had no capacity to reach down effectively 
beyond the kabupaten level, and thus solve this problem, a village unit scheme was 
established.
These two works of Hansen have certainly enriched our knowledge of the early role 
of bureaucracy in implementation of rice policy. However, his discussion in these two 
books focusses mainly on the pre-1974 period when Bimas, especially the BGR, program 
experienced a series of disasters, as well as some degree of success in gaining general 
acceptance of the new technology among the peasants. Also, his analysis was focussed 
primarily upon province level.
Apart from that, the discussion of BUUD/KUD in his second work was a macro 
analysis, in which the stress was put, among other things, on the weaknesses generally 
found in BUUD (Badan Usaha Unit Desa, The Business Body of Village Unit), such as 
the use of coercion against farmers in its activities to purchase padi, and the fact that 
most BUUD lacked funds to make padi purchases. Also, since these books were 
published in the early 1970s, they did not cover the more successful development of rice 
policy after 1974, which shows great improvements and changes. Moreover, these two 
books did not discuss implementation of rice policy at the micro level; thus our 
knowledge about the implementation process at the kabupaten down to village levels is 
still limited.
This thesis is a study of the process of policy implementation which is becoming 
increasingly widely recognized as a crucially important part of policy studies. As an 
implementation study, it will seek to answer the problem: ”Why did it happen this
®This name was first used for the village unit coperative before it was changed to be KUD.
5way?” It will not just stop at the question: ” What happened?” which is the typical 
question raised by policy impact studies. Specifically, this thesis seeks to address the 
following questions:
1. How are rice intensification programs and rural cooperatives (KUD) 
implemented at local level?
2. How do local government officials, at kabupaten down to village levels, 
actually work in order to implement the programs?
3. What are the major obstacles to the implementation process of rice 
intensification programs and the KUD?
4. Why have those obstacles arisen?
5. What are the responses of farmers toward the programs?
6. What are the responses of policy makers and local bureaucrats toward the 
farmers’ responses?
Because this is a study of policy implementation, it is important to clarify at the 
outset what I mean by public policy.
Public Policy Defined
The meaning of public policy has been interpreted variously and there is no single 
satisfactory definition of it, most definitions being influenced by the demands of the 
particular problem an analyst wants to study and the approaches or models he uses. We 
can detect, however, that there are at least two principal views. The first is the opinion 
of analysts who simply equate public policies with government actions. They tend to 
take the view that all actions of government can be regarded as public policies.
R.S. Parker in his article, "Policy and Administration,” has made a list of 
definitions of public policy. According to one of those definitions, public policy is ”a 
particular objective, or set of principles, or course of action, which a government adopts 
at a given period in relation to some subject or in response to some crisis.” In another 
definition it is explained that public policy is.
A particular area of government activity as a subject for comparative and 
critical study, embracing different actions and principles and analysing their 
likely causes and results in terms of some detached discipline of thought such as 
economic, science, or politics.
Dolbeare, "The Impact of Public Policy,” (Political Science Annual, Vol.5, 1974).
■^R.S. Parker, "Policy and Administration.” in R.N. Spann and G.R. Curnow (eds), Public 
Policy and Administration in Australia: A Reader, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons Australasia 
PTY, LTD, 1975, p.144.
^Ibid., p.144.
6On the other hand, Thomas R. Dye simply defines public policy as all choices or 
actions taken by governments. For him, public policy is "whatever government chooses 
to do or not to do.”4^ Similarly, Edwards and Sharkansky suggest that public policy 
is:**
What governments say and do, or do not do...It is goals or purposes of 
government programs...The important ingredients of programs...The 
implementation of intention and rules.
The second opinion is that of analysts who give special attention to policy 
implementation. These analysts can be further divided into two camps, i.e. those who 
view public policies as government decisions which have certain goals or purposes, and 
those who consider them as having predicted consequences. Representing the first group, 
Nakamura and Smallwood refer to public policy in terms of its three environments: the 
formulation environment, implementation environment, and evaluation environment. 
For them a policy is characterized by the fact that it involves all of these three 
environments. It is ”a set of instructions from policy makers to policy implemented that 
spell out both goals and the means for achieving those goals.” *
On the other hand, some analysts simply emphasize the fact that a policy consists 
of a series of decisions or actions. Thus, Pressman and Wildavsky define public policy as 
”a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences.” If X is done 
at time t-1 then Y will result at time t-2. If the government, for example, provides a 
million dollars on a program then facilities will be built as the means of realizing it.
Although definitions of public policy can be divided into two principal views, one 
common feature can be drawn from them, that is, that public policies are actions or 
decisions made by government. The word "public” here implies that public policies can 
be contrasted with the private policies of individuals and groups. Thus, even if decisions 
of private individuals or organizations have consequences for the public as a whole, they 
are not public policies.
On the contrary, however, some governmental decisions are of quite a different 
kind; that is, they are not policy decisions. They may be exercises of patronage, or 
routine appointments, or promotions or one-off applications of government authority 
with no "policy” implications at all. The decision to appoint Mr. X as director of the * 14 15
^Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, Englewood, Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978, p.3.
14George C. Edwards III & Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament, San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman, 1978, p.2.
15Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, The Politics of Policy Implementation, New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980, p.31.
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974, p.xiv.
7government central bank, for example, is not public policy if it is based solely on the fact 
that he is the son in-law of the president or prime minister. Such a decision could, 
however, be public policy if it was part of a deliberate scheme to make appointments on 
the basis of skills and ability.
Public policy must also possess certain objectives that are meant to be achieved. 
The objective of a policy of protection, for example, is generally to help the development 
of domestic manufacturers. In addition, a public policy should normally embody 
guidelines about how to achieve such objectives specifically. Generally, however, public 
policies do not lay down elaborate details about how objectives are to be attained. In 
my opinion, public policy thus consists of both a particular set of decisions by a 
government to achieve certain objectives and also the guidelines necessary to attain 
those objectives mainly in the form of government regulations and decrees.
In the study of public policy we need, therefore, to consider three distinct 
processes, i.e. the formulation, implementation, and evaluation process. The formulation 
process refers to the process whereby public policies are made, that is, a process in which 
"inputs” are fed into the policy-forming mechanisms of a government and become 
ingredients or raw materials upon the basis of which decisions that are to be taken. Such 
decisions are made by the "legitimate” or formal policy makers, or in the words of other 
authors: the authorities.*^
Implementation Studies
This study is about the implementation of government policy at the local level in 
Indonesia. It is assumed that once a policy is formulated a further process follows, i.e. 
implementation of it. Various definitions of implementation are found, but all of them 
seem to be directly associated with policy goals or objectives determined during the 
formulation process of policies. Implementation is then regarded as a process by which 
the policy goals are to be achieved. Pressman and Wildavsky discuss this point in 
greater detail when they write:*®
Implementation, to us, means just what Webster and Roget say it does: to 
carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete. But what is it that is being 
implemented? A policy, naturally. There must be something out there prior to
*'The "legitimate”, according to Nakamura and Smallwood is "people who occupy positions in 
the governmental arena that entitle them to authoritatively assign priorities and commit 
resources.” Nakamura & Smallwood, op.cit., p.31. With a similar meaning, the authority is 
simply defined as "those who have the chief means of physical force in the country at their 
disposal.” Roy Forward, Public Policy in Australia, Melbourne: Cheshire, 1974, p. 1. Although 
the number of people included in positions of authority is different from one country to another it 
can be concluded that they are those who occupy the executive, legislative and judiciary positions 
in the governmental arena.
*8Pressman and Wildavsky, op.cit., pp.xiii-xiv.
8implementation; otherwise there would be nothing to move toward in the 
process of implementation. A verb like "implement” must have an object like 
"policy”... When policy remains a disembodied objective, without specifying 
actors or the acts in which they must engage to achieve the desired result, there 
is no implementation to study.
Van Horn and Van Meter suggest that policy implementation "encompasses those 
actions by public and private individuals (groups) that are directed at the achievement 
of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions.” Therefore, according to them, the 
study of policy implementation examines "those factors that contribute to the 
realization or non-realization of policy objectives.”* 20
Policy implementation should be differentiated from policy impact. The study of 
policy impact deals with the consequences of policy decision, or in other words, it 
searches for answers to the question of what happens as a consequence of the 
implementation of a policy.2* An implementation study can itself highlight some factors 
determining policy impact. Thus, following Dolbeare, as mentioned above, the impact 
studies typically ask "What happened?” Whereas implementation studies ask ”Why did 
it happen this way?”22 23The evaluation process of policy itself is often not carried out 
seriously, especially in most developing countries, because of lack of qualified staff, or 
because formal procedures for evaluation are often not clearly established.
Implementation studies are a newly developed area of public policy investigation. 
Much of the emphasis has previously been directed at policy formulation and it has been 
assumed that the bureaucracy just "carries out” policies as a completely detached, 
impartial instrument of government. A serious attempt to construct a theoretical 
analysis has only been undertaken since the 1970s. Pressman and Wildavsky consider, 
in their book ” Implementation,”2* that implementation means getting things done. 
Their book is based on a case study on the Economic Development Administration 
(EDA) project to produce jobs for the unemployed in Oakland, California, which they
*°Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A 
Conceptual Framework.” Administration Society, Vol.6, No.4, February 1975, p.447.
20Ibid., p.448.
2*According to Lineberry, policy impact analysis looks at the consequences of a policy 
implementation and examines the "relationship between means applied and end achieved.” R.L. 
Lineberry, American Public Policy: What Government Does and What Difference it Makes, 
Harper & Row, 1977, p. 104. Do services for passengers increased after a policy of public transport 
renovation? Do poor people have better housing as public housing policy is implemented? Cook 
and Scioli point out that impact analysis centres on the question of what policy causes as opposed 
to the study of what causes policy. T.J. Cook and F.P. Scioli Jr., "Impact Analysis in Public 
Policy Research.” in K.M. Dolbeare (ed), Public Policy Evaluation, SAGE, 1975, pp.95-96.
22K.M. Dolbeare, "The Impact of Public Policy.” op.cit.
23 •,op.cit.
9take as an example of how not to get things done. Although they do not provide a 
model of the implementation process, their observations provide some key elements that 
might be included in any such model.
Among the key points of analyses found in their work is their stress on the 
importance of organizational machinery in implementing policies. The EDA project had 
involved various intermediaries during the implementation process, and these had 
produced a complexity of joint actions which had the effect of destroying the 
implementation process. Therefore, much attention had to be given to the creation of 
organizational machinery for executing a program.
They also stated that continuity of leadership, and simplicity of policies are two 
important factors contributing to implementation success. The statement of Pressman 
and Wildavsky that too many intermediaries will hamper policy implementation 
deserves special attention for its relevance to the case of rice policy implementation in 
Indonesia. The various aspects of rice policy have involved many agencies, and this has 
created problems of coordination and cooperation.
Simplicity of policies can also be regarded as a high-priority desideratum in a case 
such as rice policy implementation in Indonesia. As Pressman and Wildavsky point out: 
”The fewer the steps involved in carrying out the program, the fewer opportunities for a 
disaster to overtake it. 4 Also, implementers with a low level of capability need simple 
directions to understand the policy objectives and the means of achieving those 
objectives. Furthermore, continuity of leadership is also a crucial factor for successful 
implementation of rice policy. It is needed to maintain the smooth running process of 
implementation which is probably disturbed by any change in leadership.
In 1975, Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn presented their theoretical 
model on implementation processes, ”The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual 
Framework.” By their definition of implementation, as cited above, the two authors 
stressed that "the implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives 
have been established by prior policy decision.” The emphasis of their analysis is on 
the human and psychological factors that influence the behavior of actors within the 
implementation arena.
Their analysis distinguishes the policy and its performance, and they present six 
variables in their models which shape the linkage between the policy and performance. 
The six variables are: Standards and Objectives of policy; Resources; Interorganizational
24Pressman and Wildavsky, op.cit., p.147. 
25Van Meter and Van Horn, op.cit., p. 448.
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communication and Enforcement activities; Characteristics of the Implementing 
agencies; Economic, Social and Political Conditions; The Disposition of Implementers; 
and Performances.^®
By the ”characteristics of the Implementing Agencies”, Van Meter and Van Horn 
refer to those characteristics of administrative agencies that affect their policy 
performance. They propose six characteristics that may impinge on an organization’s 
capacity to implement policy. These include: 1. the competence and size of an agency’s 
staff; 2. the degree of hierarchical control of sub-unit decisions and processes within the 
implementing agencies; 3. an agency’s political resources (e.g. support among legislators 
and executives); 4. the vitality of an organization; 5. the degree of ”open” 
communications i.e. networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical 
communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons 
outside the organization within an organization; 6. the agency’s formal and informal 
linkages with the ” policy making” or ” policy-enforcing” body.^
While this model has enriched our understanding about the policy implementation 
process, it suffers from various weaknesses. In their criticism of this model, Sabatier and 
Mazmanian suggest that this model can only be applied to programs aimed at 
distributing goods and services, but it neglects the large number of programs which are 
intended to regulate the behaviour of private actors. They also consider the model as 
"essentially amorphous categories rather than variables that can be easily 
operationalized.”
^Standards and Objectives of policy elaborate on the overall goals of the policy decision while 
policy resources "may include funds or other incentives in the program that might encourage or 
facilitate effective implementation.” Such standards and objectives should be understood by 
implementers and hence their clarities and their communication to implementers are important. 
Enforcement by superiors is needed in order to guarantee that implementation has been conducted 
in the right way. There are two kinds of enforcement that can be used, i.e. technical advice & 
assistance, or positive and negative sanctions. Ibid., pp. 464-470.
^The economic, social and political conditions that influence the implementation process can 
be clarified by several questions like: "Are the economic resources available within the 
implementing jurisdiction (or organization) sufficient to support successful implementation?; To 
what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the 
implementation of the policy in question?; What is the nature of public opinion, how salient is the 
related policy issue?; Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?; What is the 
partisan character of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization); Is there partisan opposition 
or support for the policy?; and to what extent are private interest groups mobilized in support or 
opposition to the policy?” The disposition of implementers has also an important influence on the 
success of implementation. Three elements of implementers’ responses: cognition-direction- 
intensity- are considered by the authors as possibly affecting their ability and willingness to 
conduct the policy. A policy will be unsucessfully implemented if the implementers are not in full 
compliance with the policy. The policies will fail to implement if implementers reject the goals of 
the policies. Finally, "those holding intense negative preferences may be led to outright and open 
defiance of the program’s objective.” Ibid., pp.472-473.
^®PauI Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework 
of Analysis.” Policy Studies Journal, Special Issue 1980, p.540.
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Yet this model distinguishes three elements which need to be considered separately 
m the analysis of rice policy implementation in Indonesia: resources, enforcement 
activities, and economic, social and political conditions. The resources (government 
funds and other incentives) are critical for the policy’s success, and lack of resources will 
hamper the achievement of rice policy objectives. The Indonesian government made 
available substantial funds from its annual budgets and from bank credits in the early 
1970s to get the Bimas program established. Shortage of funds has never been a serious 
constraint upon the implementation of the rice policy.
The enforcement activities (positive or negative sanctions, and technical advice 
and assistance) are also required in order to guarantee that rice policy has been 
implemented in the right way. Although enforcement activities are often used effectively 
in some developing countries, they are often also applied excessively, which then creates 
anxiety among the subordinates towards their superiors and from target groups towards 
the government. This will give rise to subservience among local implementers in respect 
of their superiors, which will reduce local initiative; and it will tend to reduce the 
effectiveness of public supervision over policy implementation which is needed if its 
success is to be ensured.
As far as economic, social and political conditions are concerned, the former is 
simplified by the authors as meaning simply the economic resources available to support 
the implementation process, which must be considered a factor to be given attention in 
examining the implementation of rice policy to ensure the availability of the resources 
during the the implementation of the policies. The social condition, i.e. the nature of 
public opinion, has to be taken into account in any analysis of the responses of farmers 
toward the government rice policies. And finally, the political condition, i.e. the attitude 
of elite groups towards the policies, is crucial if we are to see how the attitude of 
Indonesian bureaucratic elites towards rice policy implementation has developed.
Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood in their book "The Politics of Policy 
Implementation,” take the view that there is no sharp distinction between the two types 
of activities implied by the words policy formulation and policy implementation because 
actors involved in both arenas can make interventions within each arena. They divide 
the policy process, as mentioned above, into three environments: policy formation, 
policy implementation, and policy evaluation environment. "Within each of these 
environments there are a variety of arenas where actors interact.” The policy
*®The policy formation environment is mainly occupied by "legitimate” policy makers, e.g. the 
president, Congress, governors, state legislators, etc. and nongovernmental individuals or groups 
that are capable of influencing these policy makers. They are interest groups, powerful 
constituencies etc. cp.cit., pp.22-23.
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implementation environment is occupied by various actors, depending on the type of 
policy under consideration. They are policy makers, formal implementers, intermediaries, 
lobbies and constituency groups, recipients and consumers of policies, the media, and 
evaluators. 0
The authors see these three enviroments as tied together in a policy system 
through communication and compliance. The existence of communication is especially 
important between environment I (policy formation) and environment II (policy 
implementation). Failure of communication will result in unsuccessful implementation. 
Such failure can occur because of garbled messages from the senders, misinterpretations 
by the receiver, system failure in terms of transmission breakdowns, overload, "noise,” 
and inadequate follow-through or compliance mechanisms.
As betw'een these two variables, we can say that in Indonesia, compliance is the 
most crucial variable to take into account in any effort to analyse rice policy 
implementation. Compliance is needed in order to force the local officials to carry out 
policy instructions properly. Compliance, however, is not a guarantee that all policy 
objective will be achieved successfully. Excessive compliance may be successful in 
achieving one of the objectives of policies, but it may fail to achieve the other. This is 
because the local officials, on the one hand, lost their autonomy or capacity to take 
necessary decisions appropriate to local conditions; and on the other hand, it will create 
a situation in which the local officials utilised coercion against target groups in order to 
carry out instructions from above.
At the same time as the publication of Nakamura and Smallwood’s book, George 
C. Edwards III published his work, "Implementing Public Policy.” His main questions 
were: What are the preconditions for successful policy implementation, and what are 
the primary obstacles to successful policy implementation? To answer these questions, 
Edwards identified four variables that influenced the implementation process, i.e. 
communication, resources, dispositions or attitudes, and bureaucratic structures.
1 Communication is crucial, since implementers must know what they are supposed 
to do. "Orders to implement policies must be transmitted to the appropriate personnel, 
and they must be clear, accurate and consistent.” Furthermore, lack of resources will
^®The actors involved in the policy evaluation environment include policy makers and policy 
implementers, i.e. those "who engage in planning, projections, oversight, or monitoring 
activities.” In addition, actors in the environment may include social scientists or other scholars 
and interest groups who have no prior connection with both policy formation and policy 
implementation, op.cit., p.23.
■^George C. Edwards III, Implementing Public Policy, Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Quaterly Press, 1980, p.10.
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result in ineffectiveness of implementation. The disposition or attitude of implemented 
is translated as the wish by or agreement of implemented to conduct the policies. ”If 
implementation is to proceed effectively not only must implemented know what to do 
and have the capability to do it, but they must also desire to carry out a policy.”"*^
Finally, bureaucratic structures can also have a pervasive impact on the 
implementation of policies. Implementation can be thwarted because of deficiencies in 
bureaucratic structure. Edwards focuses on two dominant characteristics of 
bureaucracy, i.e. the use of routinized behaviours or standard operating procedures, and 
fragmentation or the dispersal of responsibility for policies among many organizational 
units. In this context, Edwards quotes the speech of President Carter:****
There are too many agencies, doing too many things, overlapping too often, 
coordinating too rarely, wasting too much money - and doing too little to solve 
real problems.
These two variables may be used to analyse the implementation of rice policy in 
Indonesia, although some modifications of them should be made. In Indonesia, it is a 
fact that the wishes of local officials in carrying out policies are not always given 
attention by the centre. For these local officials there seems to be no other choice but to 
carry out the policy instructions from above.
The bureaucracy itself, especially the local bureaucracy, is the most important 
variable in implementation of rice policies, although here we need to take into account 
the fact that the Indonesian bureaucracy is rather differently structured from those of 
other countries, because it is an inheritance from the tightly controlled system of 
regional administration established by the Dutch, which had no close parallel in any 
other colonial system. The differences can be seen in the structure, appointment system 
for local officials, and in the culture that shapes the attitudes of the local bureaucrats in 
their relations with superiors and the central government. Other variables will be 
discussed below.
Implementation Studies in the Third World
The four books discussed above, however, relate to the implementation process in 
Western countries, especially the USA. Implementation studies on Third World 
countries provide a distinctly different picture from that of the Western countries. The 
differences are not found merely in the implementation process but also in some of the 
types of policies undertaken in the socio-political contexts, and in formulation and 
evaluation of policies. Policies in the developed countries are mostly of the incremental
32Ibid., p.ll. 
ZZIbid., p.134.
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type, whereas in the developing countries, many policies tend to be more sweeping and 
ambitious because they are intended to bring about major developmental and social 
reforms. 4 It is generally recognized that incremental policies are easier to implement 
than more radical and sweeping ones.®®
In the formulation stage of policies, the role of governments in developing 
countries is dominant. This is because the legislative body is weak (or weakened); 
political parties do not function as agents of interest articulation but more as a means 
for elites to control the masses, and interest groups are ineffective in collating the 
demands of particular groups or constituencies.®® Hence, the formulation stage does not 
involve many factions and is not a place where the reconciling of conflicting interests 
and pressures occurs.
Policies in the developing countries are seldom the result of demands and pressures 
from competing interest groups or political parties.®' Often the policies are determined 
by the government without consultation with the legislature or target groups.® This 
tendency is enhanced by the fact that many regimes in those countries have an anti­
party attitude and take the view that their participation in the formulation of policies is 
either illegitimate or inefficient.
Whereas in Western countries, policy debates generally occur during the 
formulation stage, the opposition to policies is most commonly expressed in developing 
countries during the implementation process.4® This makes implementation studies in 
those countries particularly interesting. In addition, in most Western countries, the 
failure of policies or programs does not always occur at the implementation stage: the 
failure and faults can often be traced back to the formulation stage. In Third World 
countries, however, most of the obstacles tend to be found during the implementation
®4Y. Dror, Public Policy-making Reexamined, San Francisco: Chandler, 1968, pp. 89, 
109-110.
®®Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process,” Policy Sciences, Vol.4, No.2, June 
1973, p.199.
®®Merilee S. Grindle (ed), Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980, p.16.
®7James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political 
Science Review, 63, 1969, p.1142.
®®Thomas B. Smith, "Evaluating Development Policies and Programmes in the Third World," 
Public Administration and Development, Vol.5, No.2, 1985, p.133.
®®M.S. Grindle, op.cit., p.17.
4®T.B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process,” op.cit., p.198; and M.S. Grindle, op.cit., 
p.15.
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process. * According to Smith:*
In translating these policies into programmes and projects during the 
implementation phase there is immense slippage: many policies remain only 
symbolic statements by political leaders or laws on statute books, while others 
that are implemented achieve little of what was originally expected.
There are various reasons for this situation: lack of resources, the bureaucracy’s 
lack of capacity to implement policies effectively, inadequate management systems, 
inefficiency etc. The different pictures of the policy process in the Third World have 
resulted in different analyses of that topic. Here I will discuss two types of analysis 
presented by Smith and Grindle.
In 1973, Thomas B. Smith presented his version of the policy implementation 
process in his work, "The Policy Implementation Process.” In constructing his model, 
Smith approaches the policy process from the perspective of social and political changes. 
"Governmental policies are designed to induce changes in society.” This means that 
through policy implementation, old patterns of interaction and institutions are abolished 
or modified and new patterns of action and institutions are created.
On the basis of this view, Smith defines government policy as "deliberate action by 
a government to establish new transaction patterns or institutions or to change 
established patterns within old institutions.” Furthermore, "policy formulated by a 
government, then, serves as a tension-generating force in society,” and "while the 
policies are implemented, tensions, strains and conflicts are experienced by those who are 
implementing the policy and by those affected by the policy."**’
There are four components or variables that set up the tension-generating matrix: 
the idealized policy, the implementing organization, the target group and evironmental 
factors. In the idealized policy is included the formal policy;*6 the type of policy, the 
program, and images of the policy. The target group consists of those "who are required 
to adapt new patterns of interaction by the policy.” The environmental factors are * 5
**Thomas B. Smith, op.cit., and Grindle, Ibid.
*^Thomas B. Smith, "Evaluating Development Policies and Programmes in the Third World,” 
op.cit., p.135.
*^For discussion of this topic, see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964; Dennis A. Rondinelli, Planning Development Projects, 
Stroudsberg, P.A.: Hutchinson and Ross, 1978; Milton J. Esman, "Development Assistance in 
Public Administration,” Public Administration Review, 40, September/October, 1980.
UIbid., p. 200.
i5Ibid., p.202.
*®i.e. the formal decisional statement, law, or program that the government attempting to 
implement.
*'i.e. complex or simple; organizational or non-organizational; distributive, re-distributive, 
regulatory, self-regulatory, or emotive-symbolic.
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” those factors which can influence or be influenced by the policy implementation.” These 
can include different cultural, social, political and economic conditions.*®
The implementing organization is, in most cases, a unit of the government 
bureaucracy. Here three factors should also be considered: the structure and personnel, 
the leadership of the administrative organization, and the implementing program and 
capacity. The terms structure and personnel of the implementing organization refer to 
the stability of the structure and the qualifications of the personnel who must implement 
the policy. An unstable administrative organization and unqualified personnel may 
reduce the capacity to implement. The leadership of the administrative organization 
refers to the style and nature of the leadership; while the implementing program and 
capacity refers to ”the intensity and care taken to organize for the implementation and 
to the general capacity of the organization to meet the objectives of program 
implementation.”
Smith presented his model of implementation in a systemic form. When a policy is 
being implemented, interaction within and between the four components results in 
discrepancies and tensions. The tensions result in transaction patterns, i.e. non- 
permanent patterns related to the goals or objectives of a policy. The transaction 
patterns may or may not result in the establishment of institutions. "Feedback in the 
form of relieved tensions or increased tension is introduced back into the tension 
generation matrix from transaction patterns and institutions.”®^
Grindle in her book, "Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World,” 
presented a rather different model of policy implementation which focusses on three 
components of policy: policy goals, implementing activities, and outcomes. It is the 
task of implementation to allow the goals of public policy to be realized as outcomes of 
government activity. The general process of implementation, in Grindle’s opinion, 
begins only when general goals and objectives have been specified, when action programs 
have been designed, and when funds have been allocated for the pursuit of the goals.
Implementation activities are influenced by the content and context of policy. The 
content of policy includes six variables: the interests affected, the type of benefits, 
extent of change envisioned, site of decision making, program implementors, and 
resources committed. The context of policies has three variables: power, interests, and 
strategies of actors involved; institution and regime characteristics; and compliance and 48 49 50 *
48 Ibid., p.205.
49Ibid., p.205.
50Ibid., p.203.
®*Grindle, op.cit., p-7.
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responsiveness. All these variables affect the outcomes.
Our Approaches to Policy Implementation in Indonesia
The various books mentioned above and the two models presented by Smith and 
Gnndle have identified for us some of the factors or variables affecting the success and 
failure of policy implementation process in the Third World. Because the books and the 
two models were made from various cases in the Third World without reference to 
Indonesia, some of these variables may or may not be relevant to the analysis of the 
policy implementation process at the local level in Indonesia. Other factors should, 
therefore, be added to provide a comprehensive understanding about policy 
implementation in Indonesia.
There are nine factors which need to be analysed in the implementation of rice 
policy in Indonesia: the local government and type of regime; responsiveness; 
accountability; continuity and seriousness of supervision; the central government’s 
priority of policies or programs; bureaucratic personnels; resources; coordination; and 
rewards and sanctions.
It is important, however, to clarify at the outset the difference between policy and 
program since this study limits itself to program implementation in two cases. The task 
of implementation, according to Grindle (cited above), is to establish a link ”that allows 
the goals of public policies to be realized as outcomes of governmental activity. 3 This 
task needs a "policy delivery system,” in which "specific means are designed and pursued 
in the expectation of arriving at particular ends.”®1*
Hence, action programs, are established that aim to achieve the ends stated in the 
policy. There are in practice difficulties in distinguishing clearly the term policy and 
program, and they are sometimes used interchangeably. To overcome this problem, it is 
important, according to Grindle, to consider implementation as a general process of 
administration that "can be investigated at the specific program level.””® Thus, the 
success or failure of policies can be evaluated "in terms of the capacity actually to 
deliver programs as designed and in turn, overall policy implementation can be 
evaluated by measuring programs outcomes against policy goals.”3® * 53 * * 56
^Grindle, Ibid., p.ll.
53Grindle, Ibid., p.6.
™Ibid., p.6; and Van Horn and Van Meter, op.cit., p.446.
33op.ctt., p.7.
56Ibid., p.7.
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In many developing countries, local government (although different in system and 
’structure) is the primary organization given the task of implementing various government 
policies or programs. This is because local governments in these countries are extensions 
of the central government, while other agencies are weak, or are simply not given 
responsibility to implement government policies or programs.
One variable affecting the performance of local government in carrying out 
government policies or programs is the type of regime under which the local government 
exists; the type of regime affects the policy process. Studies of policy implementation in 
both Western,®^ and in developing countries,®® suggest that regime structures have 
shaped the policies and their outcomes, according to whether they are democratic, 
authoritarian, or more or less open systems of government. In Western liberal countries, 
the autonomy of local officials is greater than that of their counterparts in developing 
countries. However, this autonomy sometimes hampers implementation of policies because 
local officials can ignore federal policy directives.®®
This autonomy also allows differences in perspectives, e.g. about whether a program 
is important or not. Pressman and Wildavsky’s book describes in detail how differences 
in perspectives about the importance of the EDA project in Oakland became one of the 
factors behind the failure of the project.®® Fragmentation can also become a feature 
within Western bureaucracies. This is because responsibility for policies is dispersed 
among several organizations, and in this context the local implementing authorities may 
be encouraged to mirror the fragmentation of views prevailing at the national level. This
‘Pressman and Wildavsky, op.cit; and J. Murphy, "The Education Bureaucracies Implement 
Novel Policy: The Politics of Title 1 of ESEA, 1905-1972,” in A.P. Sindler (ed)., Policy and 
Politics in America: Six Case Studies, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1973.
®®Grindle, op.cit.
®®Nakamura and Smallwood, Hid., p.61.
®®Pressman and Wildavsky, op.cit., pp.48-51; 94-98.
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fragmentation, sometimes, also hampers the implementation process.
In most developing countries, especially those where the military holds the power, 
the local governments have less autonomy and are more dependent upon the centre. This 
is because many local goverments are dependent financially upon subsidies from the 
centre, and the appointment of local officials is usually made by the central government. 
This situation affects the attitude of local officials in carrying out their jobs and in 
implementing the policies of the centre. Policy instructions from above, although they 
may conflict with other policy objectives, or simply give priorities to only one objective 
while ignoring others, will easily be carried out by local officials.
While instructions from above are easily executed, however, there is a tendency for 
the local bureaucrats simply to ignore the problem of responsiveness to the interests of 
target groups as one of the factors in the success of implementation, provided that the 
high priority policy targets are achieved. In theory, the local officials should be responsive 
to the interests of those who become targets of the programs, since this is needed not only 
so that the aspirations of the target groups will be understood, but also in order to obtain 
their support and participation.6^
The accountability of subordinates to superiors is also a crucial variable in the 
implementation process. Accountability must be provided by the subordinates, e.g. 
through regular reports to their superiors or by accountability to a local representative 
body; but the problem is how far these reports describe the real situation about the 
implementation of a policy. In countries where coercive power is regularly applied against 
subordinates, reports may include some which just make the superiors happy and tend to 
conceal the real facts that may threaten the careers of the subordinates.
Continuity and seriousness of supervision is another variable relevant to the success 
or failure of policy implementation. Effective supervision is needed in order to prevent the 
subordinates from deviating from policy objectives, and to minimize mismanagement. It is 
frequently reported that implementation of policies in various developing countries has 
been hampered by corruption on the part of local bureaucrats which occurred partly 
because of weaknesses in the supervision of program implementation.* 63
In addition, the priorities of programs determined by the centre affect the attitude 
of the officials who implement them at lower levels. Local level officials generally tend to
6*Edwards, op.cit., pp.142-143.
®2por discusion of responsiveness in policy implementation see J. Montgomery, Technology and 
Civic Life: Making and Implementing Deveopment Decisions, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
1974; D.K. Emmerson, The Bureaucracy in Indonesia, Cambridge: MIT Center for International 
Studies, 1974.
63G. Myrdall, The Challenge of World Poverty, New York: Pantheon, 1970.
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give more attention to programs given priority by the centre, not merely because these 
programs are more important than the others, but also because high-priority programs 
usually offer greater material incentives.
One of the crucial variables in the implementation process is an adequate number of 
personnel with appropriate qualifications in the relevant bureaucratic organization. 
Unskilled personnel or shortages of personnel will adversely affect a program’s success, or 
slow down the implementation process. Furthermore, policy implementation is also 
affected by availability of resources. Although different writers on policy analysis differ 
on the definition of what exactly is meant by ”resources”, they seem to agree that lack of 
resources may result in program failure. For the purposes of this study, the term 
” resources” here refers to funds, incentives and facilities (transportation, equipment and 
buildings) that might encourage and facilitate effective implementation.
Where the implementation process involves various institutions, there must be 
mechanisms to facilitate coordination among them, since lack of coordination will hamper 
the achievement of policy objectives. Furthermore, the involvement of a large number of 
agencies requires mechanisms which allocate rewards and sanctions. Rewards 
(promotions, material incentives etc.) are needed to maintain the spirit of personnel in 
carrying out their tasks, while any reduction of incentives may have the effect of slowing 
down the implementation process.
Sanctions, on the other hand, are needed to prevent the implementing officials from 
refusing orders in such a way as to result in inconsistencies in policy objectives. Neustads 
points out that orders are not self-executing: they require the presence of an action­
forcing mechanism. 5 Sanctions, are classified by Etzioni into three types: normative, 
renumerative, and coercive.* 66 These should not only be stated clearly but must also be 
applied consistently. Unclear sanctions will diminish the prestige of superior officials, but 
will not prevent mismanagement occurring during the implementation process.
These nine factors affecting good public policy implementation which have been 
stressed in the literature are all relevant in some degree to the study of how rice policy 
has been implemented in Indonesia. However, none of them is alone of sufficient 
importance to be regarded as a major explanatory variable in the assessment of the 
success or failure of the country’s rice policy at different times. The whole process of rice
64yan Meter and Van Horn, as mentioned, stated that resources include funds or other 
incentives, while Edwards considers qualified and sufficient staff, relevant and adequate 
information, authority as well as facilities, as important resources for the implementation process.
65r. Neustads, Presidential Power, New York: John Wiley, 1960, p.18.
66A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, New York: Free Press, 
1961, pp.5-8.
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policy implementation in Indonesia has in fact been more greatly influenced by various 
factors which can be called political in character than by purely administrative criteria. 
By this I mean that whereas the more purely "administrative” principles of good public 
policy formulation and implementation give priority to such objectives as effectiveness in 
the prompt execution of the policies laid down by the government, accountability, 
responsiveness to the interests or views of the target groups and to continuous supervision 
of subordinate-level implementation by an organization capable of exercising some 
independent authority over them, the kinds of considerations that I refer to here as 
"political” in character are those which subordinate these essentially administrative 
principles to the requirements of power maintenance, in the case of the central 
government, or of power aggrandizement, in the case of lower-level officials. In the 
various accounts of kabupaten-level implementation of rice policy which I give in 
Chapters Five to Seven, we will see that local political considerations have very often 
been major determining factors behind the success or failure of rice policy implementation 
in the different regions. Ill other words, behind the principles of good public 
administration mentioned above (pp. 17-19), many kinds of localised political pressures 
have also come into play.
One of the most important of these political factors which have to be taken into 
account has been the strong commitment of the Suharto government since 1967 to 
achieving self-sufficiency in foodstuffs through the increase of rice production. Suharto 
was determined to avoid the kind of public unrest that arose towards the end of the 
Sukarno period because of the failure of the Old Order government to fulfil the basic 
economic needs of the people, especially for an adequate rice supply. The legitimacy of his 
government, in its early years, was insecurely founded until he was able to show that 
inflation had been brought under control and the economy restored to health.
I do not mean to imply that President Sukarno did not make any effort at all to 
increase rice production. As is shown in Chapter Three, his government did try to 
undertake various rice intensification programs, but for various reasons which need not 
concern us here, they all failed to achieve an increase of production sufficient to meet the 
nation’s rising demand for rice. Consequently, rice imports were increasing rapidly in the 
mid-1960s, at great cost to the economy. Certainly, one of the factors behind the 
weaknesses of rice policy before 1967 was the low priority Sukarno gave to economic 
issues of this kind, rice policy in particular being given strong government support only 
on rare occasions. Sukarno might have been aware that Indonesia faced serious economic 
problems, but he did not consider them to be of such immediate political importance as 
the problem of national integration. Until the decade of the 1960s, questions of national 
integration were the main problem facing all governments in Indonesia, as we will see in
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Chapter Two. It was only then that the various regional rebellions could be brought to an 
end. Sukarno’s achievement in maintaining national unity and overcoming regional 
separatism must be seen as perhaps his greatest service to the Indonesian nation, 
although that objective was achieved at the expense of economic decline and disastrous 
inflation.®'
The first steps taken by Suharto, therefore, soon after he took over presidential 
power, were directed towards restoring political and economic stability simultaneously, 
and particularly to bringing to an end the almost endemic inflation of the 1960s. His 
efforts to stabilize the political situation were carried out inter alia through the 1970 
reorganization of the military command structure and, as as we will see in Chapter Two, 
of regional government. Another important measure taken by the Suharto government to 
enhance the political legitimacy of the Orde Baru (”New Order”) regime was the holding 
of general elections in 1971 (in contrast with Sukarno’s refusal to hold elections after 
1959). However, the holding of elections did not in itself win full acceptance for his 
government since there were many protests that the government-supported party, 
Golkar, had used excessive intimidation and pressure to win the elections.
A second aspect of the Orde Baru government’s stabilization policies consisted of 
the much greater efforts now made towards resolving the country’s economic problems 
than had ever been the case under Sukarno. This was apparent from the beginning of the 
Suharto government in 1966-67 in its policies to curb inflation (of which increasing food 
productin was a vital part), then in its new approach to rice policy in 1967-1968, i.e. in 
the introduction of the Rumus Tani rice-fertilzer price ratio, the Bimas system, and the 
HYVs. The high priority it gave to investment of scarce capital in agriculture from the 
government budget under the First Five Year Development Plan (Repelita) was also a 
clear indication of the importance attached to agricultural development, especially to the 
increase of rice production, which the government had made one of the principal 
objectives of its economic policies in the earliest years of the regime. It was hoped that by 
increasing rice production, rice price stability could be achieved at levels acceptable to 
both producers and consumers.
®^”At the end of 1965 the consumer price index (1958=100) had stood at 36,347, with prices 
seven times the level of the previous January. Inflation spiralled in 1965 at a rate of 594% as 
against 135% in 1964 and 128% in 1963. The index of real income for labourers in Djakarta 
(1958=100) stood at less than 40; the money supply rose over 1965 from Rps 675,107 million to 
Rps 2,582,014 million.” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 13, 1969 as quoted by J.M. van 
der Kroef, Indonesia Since Sukarno (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971), p.40. A year later in 
1966 the consumer price index rose to 267,276, inflatin rate was 635% while the money supply had 
been Rp 21,024,000 million. Ibid, p.40 and see also Anne Booth and Peter McCawley, 
"Perekonomian Indonesia Sejak Pertengahan Tahun Enam Puluhan,” in A. Booth and 
P. McCawley (eds), Ekonomi Orede Baru (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p.5; Stephen Greenvile, 
”Kebijaksanaan Moneter dan Sektor Keuangan Formal,” in A. Booth and P. McCawley (eds), 
ibid., p.140.
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For this reason, the government undertook various initiatives in the early 1970s to 
implement its rice intensification programs and to improve the rice marketing 
arrangements through the establishment of village unit cooperatives (KUD) (see Chapter 
Three). The various B1MAS rice intensification programs and the cooperative 
organizations proved to be successful in increasing both rice production and the 
procurement of a marketable surplus by BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik, Logistic 
Body) the important new marketing organization. On the other hand, there was much 
controversy over the extent to which other objectives of its rice policy program, such as a 
more equal distribution of income among farmers and creation of effective village 
cooperatives, were also achieved. The shortcomings in those aspects of policy indicate 
that although its production target was achieved, the other objectives of the government’s 
overall policy have not been pursued very vigorously. We will see how the government 
gave high priority to efforts to increase rice production through the involvement of 
various government authorities and local governments in rice intensification programs, 
whereas control over rice distribution and marketing was simply left to the discretion of 
one or two agencies (see details in Chapter Three). In all this, the internal bureaucratic 
politics operating within and between various government agencies had great influence on 
the ways in which priority was given to one or other of the government’s various stated 
objectives, as set out in Broad Outline of State policies (GBHN, Garis-Garis Besar 
Haluan Negara).
Before we go any further, it is necessary to say something more about the changing 
political system under the Orde Baru regime, since this has provided the all-important 
context within which public policies have had to be formulated and implemented. Since 
the Indonesian political system under the Orde Baru is in some respects quite unique, we 
cannot properly understand the working of the country’s administrative machinery or its 
policy-making processes without reference to some of the key characteristics of the 
political system as a whole.
The first feature of the Orde Baru political system has been the ”depoliticization” 
of society which has been carried out very effectively since the early 1970s. This 
development is particularly important in comparison with the highly politicized character 
of the system during the entire Sukarno period, when political upheavals disrupted both 
administrative and economic performance very seriously. This process of depoliticization 
resulted from the adoption of various military-political concepts embraced by the Armed 
Forces leadership during the period of liberal democracy (1950-1959), when the latter 
shared with President Sukarno the view that it was necessary to abolish or reduce the 
number of parties in order to end ideological conflicts among political parties threatening
24
national unity.®® The Suharto government therefore introduced various political 
measures embodying their ideas. The government, for example, took steps in the early 
years of its power to intervene in the internal affairs of the political parties. When 
Parmusi (a new Muslim party set up in 1967, later merged into the PPP) organized its 
first party conference to elect a president, Suharto refused to accept a former Masjumi 
leader as chairman of Parmusi, as proposed by the conference, and forced the party to 
accept a chairman proposed by the government. Subsequently, the government involved 
itself frequently in the determination of political party leaders and in screening the 
parties’ candidates for general elections.
In addition, the government later issued a regulation reducing the number of 
political parties from ten in 1971 to three in 1973. The Muslim parties were reorganized 
into PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), while the nationalist parties, the Christian 
and the Catholics parties were fused into PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia); the other 
party is Golkar. At the same time, the government issued an order prohibiting the 
political parties from carrying on any activities below the kabupaten level, an 
embodiment of the ” floating mass” doctrine. This was actually a most important step to 
cut off the basis of party support in the village areas, at the same time giving an 
advantage to Golkar, because whereas the other two parties had no right to establish 
branches at kecamatan and village levels, Golkar was able (under government 
instructions) to utilise local government officials, who were coordinated under the 
government civil servants’ organization, Kokarmendagri and later Korpri, and military 
organizations at those levels to fill the gap left by the political parties. It is easily 
understandable that on the basis of this strategy Golkar has been able to obtain a 
majority of votes in all later general elections, except in some areas where the Muslim 
party (PPP) has traditionally had strong support, as in Madura and Aceh.
The screening of party candidates and the intervention of the government in party 
affairs have reduced the power of the political parties in both national and local 
representative councils (DPR and DPRD); the majority of DPR and the DPRD members 
are now made up of people owing loyalty to the government. This situation has been 
further aggravated by the system of election and appointment of the DPR and DPRD 
members. Indonesia’s election law is based on the method of Proportional Representation
®°For detail of this matter, see George McT. Kahin (ed), Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1963); Yahya A. Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer Dalam 
Politik di Indonesia 1945-1966 (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mad a University Press, 1982); Herbert Feith, 
The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1964); Daniel S. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957-1959 (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1966).
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with a List System of candidature. These methods, which were proposed by the political 
parties themselves in 1967 (when the DPR discussed the elections law), have in fact 
boomeranged upon the parties, because their numbers were not only reduced as a result, 
but they have lost their links with the masses.
Under the present electoral system, voters give their votes to political parties, not 
to candidates. Party headquarters in Jakarta have the power, subject to consultation with 
the government’s screening authorities, to select the candidates and to determine the 
placement of candidates in each electorate (either the province or kabupaten as a whole). 
Hence, in most cases the candidates are not known personally by the voters. The loyalty 
of the candidates is directed more towards their party leaders and the government rather 
than to the people in their electorates, since their position in the representative councils is 
more dependent on the former than the latter. It is understandable, then, that most of the 
DPR and DPRD members do not feel that they are directly accountable to the people 
they supposedly represent.
In addition, the government stipulated that only 360 out of the total 460 DPR 
members would be elected at the general elections. One hundred of them are appointed by 
the President, most of them from the military. Hence, even though Golkar, through its 
’’bulldozer" campaigns, won the majority vote in the three elections (1971, 1977, and 
1982) the position of the government’s supporters in the DPR was further secured 
through the appointment system. In the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR, the 
highest organ of state which has the tasks, among other things, of defining the broad 
outline of state policies and to elect the President), the appointment system has also 
resulted in total domination of the Assembly by the government’s supporters. The total 
number of MPR. members is 920, with all members of the DPR (460) doubling as MPR 
members, while the rest (460) are appointed by the President. Since 100 of the DPR 
members are themselves appointed, the total number of those who are appointed rather 
than elected to the MPR is 560 (253 of them representing regions and professional 
groups).69
69it. William Liddlc, "The 1977 Indonesian Elections and New Order Legitimacy”, in South 
East Asian Affairs, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), p.124.
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Under this system it can be easily seen that the MPR and the DPR are title more 
than mere rubber stamps for the government. In this respect, the government has had no 
real obstacles in the determination of state policies and in manipulating the support of 
the MPR to maintain Suharto as the President over his four five year terms. A similar 
situation is also found in the local representative councils (DPRD), where appointment of 
one-third of the UPRD members has also resulted in domination of the councils by 
Golkar and the military, making them also mere rubber stamps of the local executive, 
which are in turn dominated by central government personnel (see Chapter Two).
As a part of the overall depoliticization of the society and political system, the 
Suharto government has also implemented since 1978 a program of indoctrination courses 
on the state ideology, Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution, known as the P-4 program. 
All segments of the population must follow these indoctrination courses, particularly 
members of civil service. This has been one of Suharto’s strategies for reducing political 
conflicts on the basis of ideology, which has also had the effect of strengthening the 
government’s power over individual officials. Later, in 1984, Suharto successfully forced 
all political organizations to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideology (azas tunggal), 
thereby further confining the scope of political debate since speakers must be careful not 
to risk the accusation of repudiating Pancasila.
All the developments described above show that President Suharto has been able to 
concentrate enormous power within the hands of his government. There is, of course, still 
a lot of bureaucratic politics and in-fighting, in the form of struggles for power between 
the technocrats and the military leaders; but this has not greatly disturbed Suharto’s 
ultimate control over the state administration. Some challenges to the regime have, of 
coure, been launched from time to time in the form of open criticisms by the "Group of 
50” ex-ABRl officers, for instance, and on matters dealing with human rights and the 
unequal distribution of economic wealth; but all this opposition has been easily overcome. 
Apart from all the above strategies developed by Suharto, the oil boom of the 1970s has 
given the regime an enormous increase in the funds available to it for use as a basic prop 
to its power. Public funds have been used, for example, to manipulate the support of local 
officials (see Chapter Two). Thus it can be said that since 1978 Suharto seems to have 
had no real rival as national leader and such ample financial resources at his disposal for 
patronage purposes that his power is unchallenged.
However, the impression of unrivalled, monolithic power is valid mainly for the 
centre but is less true of the kabupaten and the kecamatan authorities. Although it is 
true that the centre has the ability to keep local officials ultimately dependent upon its 
political and financial backing for them, the fact is that the central government does not
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really have any effective capacity to exercise close supervision over the work of the 
regional pamong praja, a corps of local government officials which really carries out the 
day-to-day administration at the local level, or to ensure that they follow accepted 
principles of sound public administration or to make them more responsive to the 
interests and demands of the target groups beneath them.
The central government has been successful in eliminating party politics, but not 
the pressure group politics that goes on constantly among the local pamong praja and 
village officials (see Chapters Six and Seven). It is an undisputed fact that officials at 
these two levels of local government have wide opportunities to manipulate various 
government policies and the funds derived from the central government agencies for their 
own personal ambitions and benefits in all sorts of ways (as will be clarified in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven), without much fear of effective supervision or reprisals from their 
superior authorities.
This inadequacy of supervision from the central government has also resulted in a 
situation in which the local government officials are able to concern themselves only with 
some of the central government’s policy objectives at the expense of others, so long as 
they do not deviate too far from the main targets determined by their superiors. For 
example, so long as production of rice is increased, in accordance with the targets set by 
higher levels of government, and so long as the KUDs seem to be functioning as 
prescribed, the local officials do not have to worry too much about other aspects of rice 
policy such as the distributive or equity goals. For the same reason, it seems that they are 
willing to ignore or distrust principles of good public administration for the sake of not 
creating any dissatisfaction in the minds of superior officials (an attitude epitomized in 
the term, Laporan ABS - i.e. "Asal Bapak Senang”, or ”As you wish, Sir”), or of avoiding 
opposition and resistance from their subordinates. For example, if they intervene against 
a corrupt KUD official, they are likely to create further difficulties for themselves, so they 
make an essentially political decision not to intervene just to eliminate the corruption 
unless it is absolutely essential to do so. In other words, the principles of good 
administration are frequently sacrificed to the demands of political expediency, even (or 
especially) at this level.
The fact that officials give most attention to the requirements of their superiors - 
and ultimately to the central government - but tend to ignore the interests of various 
subordinate elements in society who could be regarded, according to public administration 
theory, as the target groups to whom they should be responding, is a very important 
feature of the Orde Baru political system. This feature is different from that in Western
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democratic countries in which policy implementers are generally required in various ways 
to be responsive to the interests of their target groups, e.g. because elected politicians are 
likely to be sensitive to complaints from the latter. However, what has been described 
above is not unique to Indonesia. The fact that the governments and their subordinate 
officials must make choices between the various policy objectives they espouse and 
respond to pressures or complaints from various quarters is observable in nearly all 
political systems. Also, the fact that governments show little concern to increase the 
responsiveness of officials to the demands or interests of ordinary people below them is 
characteristic of many developing countries. But the unique feature in Indonesia is the 
position and role of the pamong praja at the regional level. No other developing country 
has anything like such a powerful bureaucratic mechanism reaching down to the grass­
roots level. Hence, the internal politics of the pamong praja itself are extremely important 
in the implementation of government policies of all kinds, because it is almost impossible 
for the central government to exercise effective supervision over it, due to the limitations 
of skilled human resources available to it. The lower-level pamong praja officials are 
virtually immune because they are, in the last resort, indispensable to the working of the 
entire system of government in Indonesia.
The Setting
The problems of policy implementation mentioned above will be discussed with 
reference to Malang Kabupaten, one of the 29 kabupatens in East Java province. Java 
is the primary source of rice in Indonesia, and East Java is the main supplier of rice to 
the commercial market. Java produced about 60 per cent of the total rice production in 
Indonesia in 1983. East Java province itself produced 32.3 per cent of the total rice 
production in Java in 1983, slightly less than West Java. But its production is well 
above the levels achieved by Central Java, and has increased impressively since 1971, 
more rapidly than West Java (see Table 1-1 on page 29).
Malang is one of eight rice surplus kabupatens in East Java producing more than 
300,000 tons of rice in 1983. This was one of several reasons for choosing this kabupaten 
as the object of this study. The other seven kabupatens are Kediri, Jember, 
Banyuwangi, Pasuruan, Ngawi, Bojonegoro, and Lamongan (see Table 1-2 on page 30).
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Table 1-1: Rice Area and Production in Java, 1971-1983:
(million hectares and tons)
Year West
Area
Java
Prod
Central
Area
Java
Prod
East
Area
Java
Prod
Java
Area Prod
1971 1.8 6.2 1.3 4.9 1.2 4.6 4.4 16
1972 1.7 5.9 1.3 4.5 1.2 4.7 4.3 16
1973 1.9 6.7 1.3 5.0 1.3 4.9 4.6 17
1974 1.8 6.6 1.3 5.1 1.3 5.4 4.7 18
1975 1.9 7.0 1.3 5.0 1.3 5.4 4.7 18
1976 1.8 5.5 1.2 3.7 1.3 4.4 4.5 14
1977 1.7 5.1 1.2 3.8 1.3 4.5 4.4 14
1978 1.9 5.8 1.4 4.5 1.4 4.9 4.8 16
1979 1.8 5.9 1.3 4.1 1.4 5.2 4.6 16
1980 1.9 6.6 1.3 5.2 1.4 6.1 4.8 18
1981 1.9 7.9 1.4 5.8 1.5 6.9 5.0 21
1982 1.8 7.4 1.3 5.8 1.5 7.1 4.7 21
1983 1.8 7.8 1.3 6.1 1.5 7.1 4.8 22
The speciality of Malang lies in the fact that although nearly all of the area in this 
kabupaten is dry land (tegal), it has still been able to become a rice producing 
kabupaten. The area of the dry land is 126,773 hectares, while sawah area is only 57,167 
hectares. Plantations cover an area of 28,389 hectares, while the total area of the 
kabupaten is 375,325 hectares.®^
This kabupaten is located approximately eighty kilometers to the south of 
Surabaya (the provincial capital), and this location was a factor in the choice of Malang 
Kabupaten as the object of this study, for it can be assumed that the further a region is 
from the centre of administration, the harder it is to supervise the implementation of 
policy. This kabupaten is surrounded by Blitar and Kediri Kabupatens on its western 
side; by the Kabupatens of Jombang, Mojokerto and Pasuruan to the North; by the 
Kabupatens of Probolinggo and Lumajang in the east, while to the South is the Indian 
Ocean. There are 31 Kecamatans under the kabupaten administration, which include 16 
kelurahan and 397 villages.
A third reason for choosing Malang Kabupaten was the high population density 
and the economic strength of this area. The population of Malang Kabupaten increased 
by 1.6 per cent annually between 1970 to 1982. The total population in this kabupaten 
in 1982 was 2,068,348 (see Table 1-3 on page 31). Population densities are high in this
' 0 Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka, 1982, pp.4-5.
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Table 1-2: Rice Areas and Production in Kabupatens of East Java, 
1979-1983: Thousand Hectares and Tons
KABUPATENS 1979
Area Prod
1980
Area Prod
1981
Area Prod
1982
Area Prod
1983
Area Prod
Pacitan 25 48 27 71 28 87 28 87 28 91
Ponorogo 37 132 37 168 43 196 42 221 44 220
Trenggalek 17 65 15 59 18 85 15 69 16 76
Tulungagung 32 113 27 111 33 149 28 129 29 135
Blitar* 44 174 45 195 46 212 45 219 48 238
Kedirl* 49 198 56 267 57 287 57 306 59 318* *
Malang* 69 279 64 293 72 344 70 329 68 346**
Lumaj ang 62 253 54 221 57 239 61 287 57 270
Jember 108 473 117 543 124 615 122 619 124 615* *
Banyuwangl 124 548 111 559 121 606 113 595 113 587**
Bondowoso 41 158 41 176 49 231 44 216 43 211
Situbondo 28 124 31 143 32 151 34 172 34 163
Probolinggo* 47 190 46 195 49 228 49 236 48 225
Pasuruan 58 245 60 286 60 278 59 305 63 331**
Sidoarjo 38 159 39 186 38 191 36 192 35 186
Mojokerto* 42 188 41 195 42 204 40 204 42 215
Jombang 54 222 54 262 56 282 52 269 53 275
Nganjuk 49 183 52 253 54 259 51 257 52 271
Madlun* 36 138 40 181 48 237 46 240 47 245
Magetan 30 113 35 159 35 170 33 174 36 183
Ngawl 70 234 72 312 76 355 74 369 74 376**
Bojonegoro 65 188 70 252 73 323 76 347 73 342**
Tuban 49 131 54 159 58 194 54 201 54 207
Lamongan 85 250 93 385 96 437 98 457 98 452**
Gresik* 53 187 56 215 56 229 52 231 52 232
Bangkalan 31 86 31 82 32 88 32 92 33 101
Sampang 23 53 25 77 27 84 28 95 28 103
Pamekasan 16 34 17 40 19 50 18 53 18 55
Sumenep 18 50 19 66 19 69 20 79 19 77
* including Kotamadya (city)
** The eight kabupatens produce above 300,000 tons in 1983
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Various Issues.
kabupaten, 652 per sq.km in 1980,®® although this is not the highest in East Java.
The economy of Malang Kabupaten, like that of many other kabupatens in 
Indonesia, is based mainly on agriculture. The largest part of the regional income of this 
kabupaten comes from the agricultural sector. In 1981, the agricultural sector, together
^ Kantor Statistik Propinsi Jawa Timur, Potensi Desa Propinsi Jawa Timur, Sensus 
Penduduk 1980, p.l.
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Table 1-3: Population of Malang Kabupaten, 1970-1982
Year Number
(000)
% Increase per 
annum
1970 1,704
1971 1,761 3.3
1972 1,776 0.9
1973 1,796 1.1
1974 1,799 0.2
1975 1,822 1.3
1976 1,877 3.0
1977 1,891 0.7
1978 1,908 0.9
1979 1,924 0.8
1980 1,991 3.5
1981 2,054 3.2
1982 2,068 0.7
Source: Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka, 
1982, p.29
with animal husbandry, forestry, and fishery provided 59.4 per cent out of the total 
regional gross domestic product (PDRB) of Malang Kabupaten. Food crops provided 
43.3 per cent out of the total PDRB in that year. In addition to rice, Malang 
Kabupaten also produces various other agricultural commodities, cassava and corn being 
the two most important; others are sweet potato, peanut, and soybean.
However, although the agricultural sector produced the majority of regional 
income, it does not mean that prospects are bright for all farmers in the kabupaten. 
The Statistical Office of Malang Kabupaten reports that the number of farmers’ 
households which own less than 0.50 hectares of land has increased by 19 per cent 
between 1973 and 1980 (from 48.7 per cent to 67.7 per cent).
During that period, the proportion of farmers’ households which owned the land 
they cultivated decreased by 1.4 per cent (from 81.8 per cent in 1973 to 80.4 per cent in 
1980). This was actually a small decrease, but data from the statistical office show that
72'Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, "Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Kabupaten Malang 
Atas Dasar Harga Konstan, Tahun 1976-1981.” Mimeo, No Year.
73 The number of farmers’ households increased by 3.4 per cent p.a. from 204,035 in 1973 to 
260,016 in 1980. Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, ”Penggunaan, Luas Tanah, dan Angkatan 
Kerja Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Malang, 1980-1981.” Mimeo, p.3.
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the number of landless labourers increased between 1973-1980 by 5.8 per cent (from 4.2 
per cent to 10.0 per cent).^ However, we should doubt the reliability of the data 
because an estimate of landlessness by Booth and Sundrum indicates a generally higher 
percentage of landlessness in Java as a whole.
Using three different approaches, the two authors suggest that the landlessness in 
Java in 1971 was 40.5 per cent (calculated on a percentage ratio of farms to rural 
households); or 30.9 per cent in 1971 (estimated on the basis of employees in agriculture 
as a percentage of total workers); or 16.0 per cent in 1973 (calculated on the basis of 
percentage of agricultural households not operating land).
Whatever the results of these estimates, it can be assumed that landlessness in 
Malang Kabupaten should show a higher percentage than that revealed in the kabupaten 
figures mentioned above. Yet, these figures throw some light on the consequences of the 
new rice policies applied in this kabupaten during the 1970s, insofar as they constitute 
some evidence of an increase in landlessness; this is especially significant in view of the 
fact that one of the objectives of the government’s rice policies was to increase the 
wealth of the farmers generally.
Some kecamatans in Malang are plantation areas; plantation crops provide the 
second largest component of regional income after foodstuffs for the kabupaten, 
providing 10.4 per cent out of the total regional gross domestic product of Malang 
Kabupaten in 1981. The plantation sectors produced 6.6 per cent out of the total 
regional gross domestic product of this kabupaten in 1981; smallholder crops were 3.8 
per cent in that year.^
The plantation crops are sugar, coffee, coconut, kapok, cloves, and vanilla. Sugar 
cultivation has been practiced there since the last decades of the 19th century; sugar 
factories were set up in Sempalwadak (1889), Krebet (1896), and Kebonagung (1905).^ 
Even before sugar, coffee cultivation was started around 1800 when this commodity was 
first planted in Kecamatans Dinoyo, Batu and Ngantang.
The choice of Malang kabupaten as the focus of this study was also influenced by
74 Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, "Penggunaan, Luas Tan ah, dan Angkatan Kerja 
Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Malang, 1980-1981.” Ibid., pp.1-4.
75 Anne Booth and R.M. Sundrum, "Income Distribution in Indonesia: Trends and 
Determinants,” in J.J. Fox et.al.,(eds). Indonesia: Australian Perspectives, Canberra: 
Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1980, p.469.
^ 'Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, Ibid.
77 Personalia en Verdere Gegevens Betreffende de Suikerindustrie in Nederlandsch-Indie, 
Jaargang 1930-31, Surabaya, No Year.
^ Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat II Malang, ” Konsep Dasar Pengembangan Daerah Tingkat II 
Malang.” Unpublished Official Document, 1977, pp.10-11.
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the fact that Malang is quite heterogeneous, with urban centres as well as some 
relatively prosperous and quite poor areas. The urban centres are well developed with 
commerce, industry and tourism all being long established. The kabupaten is a 
mountainous area with a relatively cool climate throughout the year. Local tourists from 
Surabaya and from surrounding kabupatens come for the weekend to Malang. Trades, 
hotels and restaurants constitute the third largest sector producing regional income for 
Malang Kabupaten, providing 10.2 per cent out of the total PDRB in 198l|f® On the 
other side, however, some kecamatans are poor regions compared to some other 
prosperous kecamatans. The contrast of these two kinds of region gives rise to a problem 
about the impact of rice policies in those areas; do such differences call for differences in 
method in the implementation of rice policies?
Methodology
The data for this study were obtained through observation, interviews in depth 
and library research. Interviews were conducted on an unstructured basis with 
questionaires used only for guidance. I stayed in Malang intermittently for seventeen 
months, from May 1983 to September 1984. During this period I also visited two other 
kabupatens: Kediri and Jember for purposes of comparison. In those two kabupatens I 
concentrated on interviews with the Bupatis and some kabupaten officials handling the 
implementation of Bimas and KUD programs. Several visits were also made to various 
villages and KUDs in those two kabupatens.
In Malang itself, I visited most areas of the kabupaten, but in order to make the 
research more manageable, I confined my research to only five kecamatans: Tumpang, 
Jabung, Pakisaji, Kepanjen, and Sumberpucung, in each of which I spent between two 
and three months. These kecamatans were chosen on the basis of the division of the poor 
and prosperous regions. Kecamatans Tumpang and Jabung are two kecamatans in 
north Malang, and they, especially Jabung, represent the poor kecamatans in terms of 
rice production and economic conditions compared to three other kecamatans in south 
Malang (Pakisaji, Kepanjen and Sumberpucung).
In Malang Kabupaten, I had various interviews with the Bupati, the Sekwilda 
(Sekretaris Wilayah/Daerah,’ regional secretary), some Heads of Sections in kabupaten 
offices especially those with the tasks of implementation of the Bimas and KUD 
programs, such as the Head of the Economic Section. The Head of the Government 
Section in the office was also interviewed for background materials on political problems 
in Malang. Interviews were also held with the Head of the Kabupaten Planning Body 
(Bappeda), and in particular with the Head of the Kabupaten Agricultural office
Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, op.cit.
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(Diperta), a person who has responsibility for the daily activities of Bimas; others 
included the Head of the Cooperatives office, who is responsible for the implementation 
of the KUD program; the Head of Subdolog (Sub Depot Logistik, the branch of the 
Logistic Office [Dolog]) who has responsibility for rice purchasing for the national 
stockpile and for maintaining the floor price of rice: various staff members in these 
offices were also interviewed. I also had discussions with lecturers in the Faculty of 
Agriculture, Brawijaya University in Malang.
At the kecamatan level, the five Camats were interviewed as well as their staff, 
particularly those who had tasks involving implementation of the Bimas and the KUD 
programs. Interviews were also conducted at this level with the Mantri Pertanian 
(Head of Kecamatan Agricultural office), extension workers (PPLs), PPMs (Penyuluh 
Pertanian Madya, Senior Extension Worker), several village headmen and chairmen of 
farmers’ groups, and all the chairmen of KUDs in the five kecamatans and some of their 
staff. In each kecamatan, 25 to 30 farmers were interviewed.
At the province level, I held interviews with the Head of the Provincial 
Agricultural Office (Diperta Propinsi)’, the Secretary of the Bimas organization (Satpem 
Bimas Propinsi) and some of his staff; and the Head of Dolog and some of his staff. In 
Jakarta, interviews were conducted particularly with officials of the Ministry of 
Agriculture; with staff members of the national organization of Bimas (BAKO BIMAS), 
including the deputy chairman of the organization; and with some officials of the 
Ministry of Cooperatives and the national logistic office (BULOG). I also visited Bogor 
for interviews with some researchers in the Agro Economic Survey (SAE) who had 
conducted research over several years on implementation of Bimas and KUD programs.
The secondary data for this thesis were collected from various sources: the BPS 
(Biro Pusat Statistik, Central Bureau of Statistics), and the library of LIPI (Lembaga 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) both in Jakarta; the library of Agro Economic Survey in 
Bogor; from the Statistical offices at the province and kabupaten levels; from the library 
of the Faculty of Agriculture Brawijaya University in Malang; and from various offices 
involved in implementation of Bimas and KUD programs at the provincial, kabupaten, 
and kecamatan levels. Library research was also, of course, conducted in the libraries of 
the Australian National University and the National Library of Australia in Canberra.
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CHAPTER 2
Local Government in Indonesia: Its Structure and Power
This chapter examines the problems of central-local relationship in Indonesia. 
Local government units in Indonesia include the province (headed by the Governor), the 
karesidenan (now the area of Pembantu Gubernur headed by the Resident, now the 
Pembantu Gubernur), the kabupaten (headed by the Bupati), the kawedanan (now the 
area of pembantu bupati headed by the Wedana or the Pembantu Bupati), the 
kecamatan (headed by the Camat), and desa or kelurahan (headed by the Lurah, 
village headman). Problems of central-local relationships reflect the political system or 
administration of the country, which also affects the implementation of government 
policies at the local level and their results. This is because local government agencies in 
Indonesia have a crucially important role in determining how various government 
policies will be implemented, including rice policies.
The development of the centre-regional relationship in Indonesia shows that the 
key issue ever since 1945 has been: how much autonomy can or should be given to the 
various local government authorities, and to which ones? The history of the central- 
local relationship indicates that only once have the regional bodies succeeded in 
obtaining substantial autonomy for the regions, in 1957-1959; but after that, the central 
government has tended to strengthen its power and control over the regions steadily and 
considerably.
The tendency towards centralization actually started from the time the republic 
was proclaimed in 1945, when the central government of the Republic of Indonesia 
sought to assert its authority over the numerous local struggle groups which were trying 
to seize power from the Japanese or the Dutch and Allied forces. However, the trend 
towards powerful central government control over the regions became more marked after 
President Sukarno issued Presidential Decision (Penetapan Presiden) No. 6/1959.
That decision negated the previous local government law No. 1/1957, which can be 
considered the only governmental measure that ever gave real autonomy to the regions. 
The replacement of Law 1/1957 constituted a starting point in the decline of regional 
power, the fall from power of local representative assemblies (DPRD, Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah), the reduction of power of political parties in those 
assemblies vis-a-vis the pamong praja, and the strengthening of central government
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authority over the regions. The theme of this chapter then, is the development of 
central-local relationship in Indonesia, with stress being put mainly on the period of 1974 
and afterwards. But we must first summarize the main steps in the earlier development 
of the local government system.
Law 22/1948
The first constitution of the new republic, the 1945 Constitution, stated in article 
18 that respect would be given to regional autonomy. Autonomy here refers to the 
division of power between the central and local or regional governments and in this 
context "deals with fields which had been surrendered to the regions and thus fell 
completely within their competence. Politically, article 18 was intended to achieve 
three objectives: to meet the demand of the regions for management of their own affairs; 
to refute foreign opinions inclined to accuse the new republic of being a facist state 
created by the Japanese colonial rulers and to emphasize the fact that Indonesia was a 
"democratic” country; and to reflect the wishes of the founding fathers of the new 
republic to abolish the autocratic and centralized character of the Dutch colonial 
system.
The first law on local government, Law 1/1945, was issued on November 23, 
1945,4 but because of the revolutionary struggle being waged against the Dutch and the 
Allied forces at that time, it was in practice not able to be implemented, and in 1948 it 
was replaced by Law 22/1948. The latter turned out, however, to be only provisional in 
nature because soon afterwards the transfer of power from the Dutch created a need for 
a new basic law on local government. This was because at the same time as this law was 
due to come into effect, another local government law, SIT 44/1950, was enacted for the 
regions in Eastern Indonesia. Thus, there were two systems of local government law, and 
hence a need to make one law prevail for the whole of Indonesia.
The hope of the founding fathers to abolish the image of an overcentralized system 
of government was not apparent in Law 22/1948, mainly because of the attitude of the
4The Pamong Praja is a new name for the former Pangreh Praja which meant "rulers of the 
realm.” This was the indigenous Indonesian corps of officials in the Dutch local government. The 
Governor the Resident, the Bupati, the Wedana, and the Camat were the foremost pamong 
praja officials at their respective levels. The other part of the Dutch civil service which consisted 
of Europeans was named Binnenlandsch Bestuur.
^John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local 
Administration, 1950-1960, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1963, p.161.
^Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-jakti, "The Political-Economy of Development: The Case of Indonesia 
under the New Order Government, 1966-1978.” Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 
1981, p.134.
4The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan Pemerintahan Daerah di Negara Republik Indonesia, Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1967, p.55.
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central government itself which sought to strengthen its power over the regions. There 
were, of course, some improvements added in Law 22/1948 to give the impression that, 
in theory, the law was designed to provide more autonomy to the regions. This could be 
seen, for example, in a stipulation in the law that the regional head was to be appointed 
by the central government from two to four candidates elected and proposed by the 
regions. In this respect, the law acknowledged the principle of election, something that 
was not laid down in Law 1/1945.
In practice, however, this regulation was not applied because the central 
government often used a loophole in the law providing that appointment of the regional 
head could be made outside that procedure. Although this stipulation was designed to 
be used only in the transitional period, it was in fact used continuously until 1957, when 
Law 22 was superseded by Law 1/1957. In using this loophole, the central government 
then appointed its own officials from the pamong praja corps, so that the regional heads 
were those who represented the central government.
In addition, the system of supervision stated in the law laid down clearly the 
power of central government over the regions. Moreover, the law was also structured so 
that the three levels of regional autonomy, the province, the kabupaten, and the desa, 
were hierarchically arranged to facilitate supervision by the central government. This 
meant that the province had power of supervision over the kabupaten which, in turn, 
supervised the lower regions.®
Furthermore, during the period 1948-1957, it was a fact that the central 
government deliberately delayed the transfer of many duties to the regions.^ And 
finally, implementation of autonomy was also hampered by lack of budgetary resources 
on the part of the local government, although the government eventually issued financial 
law No. 32/1956 with the aim of improving the Financial condition of the regions. Yet, 
demands for more autonomy were constantly voiced by the political parties, which then 
became involved in a series of debates with the government over the preparation of 
drafts of a new law on the subject.
Article 28/6, for example, laid down that all regional laws (peraturan daerah) must be signed 
by the regional head and that he had the power to cancel or delay decisions of local councils if 
they were considered by him to conflict with higher legislation or with the public interest.
^Fuller details on this matter can be found in Legge, 1963, op.cit., pp.28-40.
^J.D. Legge, 1963, Ibid., p.46; Gerald S. Maryanov, "Decentralization in Indonesia: Legislative 
Aspects,” Ithaca: Cornell University, Mimeo, 1957, p.56; The Liang Gie, op.cit., Vol.IL, pp.65-66; 
J.D. Legge, Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell 
University, Interim Report Series, 1957, p.51.
®The Liang Gie, Vol. II, Ibid., pp.96-84; M.D. Dris, "Taxation in Indonesia”, Ekonomi dan 
Keuangan Indonesia, XI, No. 8-9 August - September, 1958, p. 526; Douglas S. Paauw, "The 
Role of Local Finance in Indonesian Economic Development." Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, VIII, No. 1, January 1955, pp.20-23; Douglas S. Paauw, Financing Economic 
Development: The Indonesian Case, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960, pp.333-335.
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Law 1/1957
Law 1/1957 was issued on January 18, 1957, after a long series of debates between 
the government (at that time the Ali-Roem-Idham Cabinet, a coalition of three big 
parties: PNI-Masjumi-NU) and the opposition parties, which were struggling for more 
autonomy for the regions. The debates focussed on problems about the degree of control 
to be retained by the centre, and the method of control to be executed. This included the 
problem of the regional head’s position: whether he was to be appointed or elected. 
The stipulations in the law on these matters can be depicted as a victory for the political 
parties in their debates with the pamong praja and the Ministry of Home Affairs for 
influence over government policy.
The victory of the political parties in their struggle for more local autonomy was 
clearest in the changed status of the regional head. In this law, the regional head was to 
be elected by the DPRD; and the central government’s power in this sphere lay only in 
its right to ratify the results of the elections. The regional head now was no longer to be 
a chief executive, as the Bupati and Governor had previously been, but merely an elected 
chairman of the executive council (DPD, Dewan Pemenntahan Daerah).19 The power 
of the regional head was also reduced. He had no power to ratify decisions made by the 
DPRD as in Law 22 and lost his coordinating power.
Furthermore, the regional head should be responsible to the DPRD, which had 
power to discharge him and also to appoint and discharge members of the DPD. Yet, at 
the local level there were still two distinct and competing poles of authority: one was 
represented by the central government and the pamong praja, the other was the regional 
government structure epitomized by the DPRD. This was because there was still a 
competition for prestige between the members of the pamong praja corps (the Governor, 
the Bupati etc.) and the regional head, who was now to be elected by the DPRD under 
Law 1/1957.
However, the parties’ demands for the abolition of the pamong praja corps were 
successfully adopted by the central government, when a Ministerial Regulation was 
issued on December 5, 1957 to transfer gradually the power of the pamong praja to local 
authorities.9 * 11 The implementation of this decision was carried out by moving the 
Bupatis from their offices to the Resident's office and the vacuum in the Bupatis’
9The Liang Gie, op.cit., Vol.II, pp. 113-138; J.D. Legge, 1963 op.cit., pp.104-130; J.D. Legge, 
"Experiment in Local Government 1950-1959.” Australian Outlook, Vol.13, No.4, December 
1959, pp.273-284.
19DPD was the Executive Council of the Region, headed by the regional head. Its function was 
to conduct the day-to-day activities of local government, and execute the decisions of the DPRD. 
The Liang Gie, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.133-134.
11J.D. Legge, 1959, op.cit., pp.282-284.
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position was filled by the Patih (Chief Secretary of the Bupati). The office of the 
Wedana was also abolished. This decision was strongly opposed by SSKDN (Serikat 
Sekerja Kementerian Dalam Negeri), an association of pamong praja although open 
rejection of the decision occurred only in East Java and Yogyakarta.
Elections for the regional heads were then conducted by the DPRD, but in fact 
many members of the pamong praja won those elections. The results of the elections 
showed that people still trusted the skill and charisma of the pamong praja, and they 
also provided a chance for the central government to maintain its influence in the 
regions. As Legge points out:*3
...these officials, though elected by representative councils and loyal, 
presumably, to those councils and to their parties (most of them were of PNI) 
might be expected, by and large, to possess at least the cast of mind and 
general represented local interests, but they would still possess an experience in 
administrative difficulties, which could be important in political leadership.
In 1958, a draft bill was prepared to give effect to the Ministerial decision, but it 
could not be passed into law, because the plan was interrupted by the Presidential 
Decree to return to the 1945 Constitution in July 1959.*4
To provide limitations on the power of local authorities, however, the supervision 
system of Law 22/1948 was adopted, i.e. that although the regions had the right to 
manage all their "household” affairs, they were not permitted to make decisions on 
matters that had been stipulated by higher legislation. The centre also still possessed 
supervisory power which was divided into preventive and repressive powers.
The victory of political parties over the central government, however, was only 
short lived. Law 1 was only able to be implemented in Java, since its implementation in 
the outer islands was hampered by regional rebellions in West Sumatra and North 
Sulawesi in 1957 and 1958. The rebellions were stimulated by various factors, such as 
the dissatisfaction of military commanders in the outer island towards internal 
organization of the army;*® the suspicion of the outer islands, especially of the main 
export regions, that government expenditures were not equally distributed between Java * 13 14
*^J.D. Legge, 1963, op.cit., p.127.
13J.D. Legge, 1963, Ibid., p.128.
14J.D. Legge, 1959, op.cit., pp.282-284.
*®By preventive supervision it means that the higher government (Minister of Interior for the 
first level regions, DPD of first level for the second level regions, and the DPD of the second level 
for the third level regions) had a right to ratify decisions of the lower regions, while the repressive 
supervision was a right to delay or cancel the decisions made by the lower regions if such decisions 
were considered in conflict with the higher legislation or with general interests. This was similar to 
stipulations in Law 22/1948, article 28/6.
*®Donald W. Fryer, "Economic Aspects of Indonesian Disunity”, Pacific Affairs, XXX, 3, 
September 1957, p.195.
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and the outer islands and that foreign exchange earned by the export regions was not 
being fairly distributed and tended to benefit mainly Java;*' the overcentralized system 
of the Indonesian government;*® and the policy of appointing Javanese pamong praja 
officials to top jobs in the local government in the outer islands, all of which led to 
criticism about the emergence of "Javanese Imperialism”. *® In addition, other political 
factors that led to the rebellions have been well summarized by Feith:
conflicts of economic interest came to the fore also on the issue of regional 
autonomy. The development of the crisis may be traced in good part to the 
slowness of the central government in granting the regions significant local 
autonomy or the taxing powers which would enable them to promote 
development on the basis of their own resources. It may be traced also to the 
inefficiency of the administrative system, overcentralized and cumbersome as it 
is. A further contributing factor was the apprehension felt in the islands outside 
Java - which the election of 1955 had shown to be strongholds of the Masjumi 
(and to a lesser extent the Socialist and Christian parties) - at the increasing 
strength of Communism in Java and the permissive attitude of the government 
and President Sukarno toward it.
In an attempt to settle the conflict, President Sukarno sought to strengthen the 
position of the central government and to answer the rebel challenge both by military 
force and, later, by reorganization of the regional government structure. The president 
himself was basically not satisfied with the parliamentary system under the 1950 
Provisional Constitution, because he considered it a factor hampering the achievement of 
national unity, since the parties seemed to strive only for their own interests and not for 
the broader national interest.
In early 1957, Sukarno introduced his idea of setting up a cabinet involving all four 
major parties (Masjumi, NU, PNI and the PKI),* 2 * * ** and establishing a national council 
based on functional representation.22 It was hoped that functional representation would 
provide some sort of channel for the expression of the broadest possible common will. In 
addition, he also introduced the idea of Guided Democracy which was envisaged by him 
as a more ideally democratic system for Indonesia than liberal democracy that had been 
conducted under the Dutch-imposed 1950 Provisional Constitution.
*7John D. Legge, 1963, op.cit., pp.235-236.
*®Gerald S. Maryanov, op.cit., p.57.
*®Gerald S Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem, Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1958, p.41.
2®Herbert Feith, "Indonesia” in George McTurnan Kahin (ed), Government and Politics of 
Southeast Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959, p.225.
2*Masjumi was a modernist Muslim party banned in 1960, NU was a traditionalist Muslim
party, PNI was a nationalist party, and the PKI was the Indonesian Communist party.
22Details can be found in George McTurnan Kahin (ed), Major Government of Asia, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1958, pp.563 ff.
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The regional rebellions were successful in their demand for the overthrow of the 
Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, but they failed to achieve greater autonomy for the 
regions.2^ The fall of the Ali cabinet was followed by the declaration of a "state of siege 
and war” by Sukarno and the nomination of an extra-parliamentary Djuanda cabinet. 
This marked the beginning of defeat for the political parties and foreshadowed the 
strengthening of central control over the regions and the influence of the army. The state 
of emergency reduced the freedom of the local authorities who lost in power rivalries 
against the regional war authority (PEPERDA, Penguasa Perang Daerah) established 
to handle the situation during the state of emergency.* 24
At the end of 1958 Sukarno returned to his idea of Guided Democracy first 
proposed in 1957,25 and to the need to control the activity of political parties and the 
simplification of the party system. At the same time, he put forward an additional 
proposal to return to the 1945 Constitution, which was considered both by him and the 
army leadership as the most effective means to achieve all the above-mentioned ideas. 
However, the idea of returning to the 1945 Constitution failed to get the agreement of 
the Constitutent Assembly, established through election in 1955. So, in July 5, 1959, 
Sukarno made an arbritrary decision to declare the return to the 1945 Constitution and 
to abolish the Constituent Assembly by a presidential decree.
Further political developments reflected the decrease of the strength of the 
political parties at that time, both in Jakarta and in the regional assemblies. In the 
Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Sementara) set up in mid-1960, the political parties had only minority representation.26 
The representatives of regions and functional groups were appointed by the President. 
Thus, it was obvious that a majority of the council was in the hands of those who 
supported the president.
2^Cabinets in the period 1950-1957 were: The Natsir cabinet (Masjumi), The Sukiman-Suwirjo 
cabinet (coalition between Masjumi and PNI), The Wilopo cabinet (PNI), The Ali 
Sastroamidjojo-Wongsonegoro cabinet (coalition between PNI and Partai Indonesia Raya), The 
Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet (Masjumi), and the Ali Sastroamidjojo-Mohammad Roem-Idham 
Chalid cabinet.
24The Peperda was led by the regional army commander and its members included the regional 
head, members of the DPD, and the regional commander of police. J.D. Legge, 1963, op.cit, 
p.205; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982, p.153.
25U. Sundhaussen, Ibid., pp.103-104.
26On the basis of Presidential Regulation No.12/1959, membership of the council was 270 
parliamentary members who represented political parties, 94 represented the regions, and 200 
were representatives of functional groups. J.D. Legge, 1963, op.cit., p.208 (footnote).
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Presidential Edict No.6/1959
Sukarno considered Law 1 as one of several factors behind the emergence of 
political unstability; hence, he wanted to create a strong central leadership over the 
political parties at the local government level, in order to ensure political stability in the 
regions and to facilitate the implementation of Guided Democracy. To implement this 
idea, Law 1 had to be replaced, and on September 9, 1959, Presidential Edict No.6 was 
issued to rearrange the local government system.
The declaration of the edict and the changes it brought marked a substantial 
defeat for the political parties. Whereas Law 1 had provided that the regional head 
should be responsible to the DPRD, in the edict it was determined that he was the sole 
administrator of the region without any obligation to be accountable to the DPRD, 
which also lost its power to discharge the regional head. The regional head was not 
henceforth to be elected, but appointed by the central government from among 2 to 4 
candidates proposed by the DPRD. In addition, he was now designated as a central 
government official, which ensured that he was subject to control from Jakarta.
Thus, the regional head, although he was still said to be a regional official, was 
primarily a representative of the centre. As laid down in Law 22 and Law 1, the edict 
also stated that the regional head was vested with the power to delay decisions of the 
DPRD which were considered to be in conflict with higher legislation or the national 
interest. A wide loophole in the edict also enabled the government to appoint the 
regional head not only from among the pamong praja but also from the ranks of the 
armed forces and police.
In order to reduce the influence of the political parties, the edict stipulated also 
that the regional head and members of the BPH^® should be free from party affiliations.
^There was a stipulation in the edict that the legislative council had two chances to propose 
its candidates but if there still no candidates who fulfilled conditions for appointment as regional 
head as determined by the government, the government then had a power to appoint its own 
man..The conditions were actually very vague, among other things that candidates should have 
ability and experience in governmental affairs. This was a clever tactic of the government in 
achieving its own idea of a strong leadership in the regions. By giving the DPRD a chance to 
twice propose the candidates for regional head, the government gave the impression that it 
allowed some place for local aspiration as well as an opinion that in the cases where there were no 
cadidates fulfilling the preconditions, it was just the mistake of the DPRD in not proposing the 
right man.
^®The position of the pamong praja itself was revived; even positions of the Resident, and the 
Wedana which had formerly been abolished on December 5, 1957 were now reestablished. By 1960 
many of the pamong praja were reappointed as regional heads. J.D. Legge, 1959, op.cit., p.282; 
Legge, 1963, op.cit., p.128.
^®This presidential edict replaced the former DPD with BPH (Badan Pemerintah Harian). 
The BPH was not similar to the DPD since it was designated only as a group of assistants to the 
regional head, just like the position of cabinet ministers to the president in a presidential system 
of government, instead of being servants of the DPRD.
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This condition forced them, especially the members of BPH, to choose whether or not 
they would accept such appointments by releasing themselves from party affiliations. In 
fact, most former members of DPD chose to accept appointment. This gave proof of the 
strength of Sukarno’s influence and the weakness of party ties among the civil servants.
Another government action to strengthen its power over the regions was taken in 
1960 by suspension of the DPRD members elected in 1957 by replacing them with a new 
nominated Gotong Royong Council (DPRDGR).3® The DPRDGR membership was to be 
50 per cent of political parties representatives and another 50 per cent of members from 
the functional groups. In this case the intention of the centre to reduce the influence of 
local party representatives was very obvious. For the first level regions, members of the 
DPRDGR from the functional groups were chosen by the Minister of the Interior from 
nominees proposed by the Governor. Members of the second level DPRDGR would be 
chosen by the Governor from nominees proposed by the Bupati. The structure of the 
DPRDGR did not just limit the political manoeuvres of the political parties at the 
regional level, but also severely reduced the power of the representative body vis-a-vis 
the executive.
In 1964, President Sukarno made a further decision that also strengthened military 
authority in the regions, as well as central control, by the establishment of the Pantja 
Tunggal (Leadership of Five) at the regional level;31 this was shortly after the abolition 
of martial law and the PEPERDA in the previous year. One reason behind the 
establishment of the Panca Tunggal (later MUSPIDA) was to provide for the 
implementation of Sukarno’s idea of collective government on the basis of the gotong 
royong principle; another reason was the successful lobbying of the armed forces to widen 
its political influence in the regions in order to curb the influence of the Communist 
Party at local level.
The Panca Tunggal had a role in the decision-making process in which decisions, 
especially those related to political and security matters, were taken by the regional 
head together with the local army and police commanders.32 One reason behind its 
establishment, as seen by an Indonesian writer, was that it was an attempt to put the
3®At the national level the DPR resulting from the election was replaced by the DPRGR; and 
the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly) was replaced by 
MPRS (Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly).
Sl'pjjg panca Tunggal was a successor of Catur Tunggal. This was a collective system of local 
leadership which included the regional head as Chairman, and as members were Commanders of 
Regional Military and Police, Prosecutor and Chairman of National Front, a federation of 
political parties in both national and regional levels which generally tended to be dominated by 
the Communist party.
32Since the Panca Tunggal was a successor of Catur Tunggal, it was assumed that the role of 
these two bodies was similar. On the role of Catur Tunggal, see U. Sundhaussen, op.cit., p.175.
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regional head simply as an instrument of the center and to subject regional forces to 
strict political control.” 33
Law 18/1965
After the declaration of Presidential Edict No.6, there were some critics who 
argued that changes in the local government system should have been made through a 
law which would have had to be approved by parliament, and not merely enacted by a 
Presidential Edict. Hence, the central government took the initiative in establishing a 
committee in 1961 headed by Soeroso to formulate a new local government law. After 
long debates in the DPRGR, a new law 18/1965, was finally enacted on September 1, 
1965. This law, however, made no substantial changes and essentially continued the 
basic principles of the centralized system found in the Presidential Edict No.6.
The intention of the centre to continue to maintain firm control over the regional 
governments remained apparent in this law, although some points indicated that the 
political parties were still trying to voice their demands. Among the points won by the 
parties was the abolition of the stipulation in Presidential Edict No.6, that the regional 
head and members of the BPH were prohibited from becoming members of political 
parties. Through this new stipulation, it can be seen that even under Guided 
Democracy, the political parties still had some room to influence the local government 
structure, particularly by trying to increase their power through the BPH and the 
regional secretary.
However, other stipulations in connection with the position of the regional heads 
strongly indicated the idea of a centralized system. Nearly all points on the position and 
power of the regional head in Presidential Edict No.6/1959 were also adopted in this 
new law. As in Presidential Edict No.6, the new law designated that the regional head 
was an organ of the central government, and he was to be appointed by the central 
government. Also, the regional heads in the province and kabupaten had power to delay 
implementation of local DPRD decisions if they considered them contrary to the higher 
laws.
Furthermore, as in the Presidential Edict No.6, the regional head was not 
accountable to the DPRD, but merely reported to the body at any time he was asked to 
do so by the DPRD, or at any other time he wished; but he could not be discharged by 
the representative body. The idea behind this stipulation was to make the local structure 
parallel with that of the central government. This was seen as creating governmental 
stability in regions on the same basis as in Jakarta.
33Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, op.cit., 1981, p.139.
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In addition, although it was stated in the law that the regional head was an organ 
of the centre as well as the region, it was also laid down that he was to be a central 
government official who would be responsible to the President through the Minister of 
the Interior. Hence, the strong position of the regional head in relation to the regional 
representative council resulted in an attitude that he acted more as a representative of 
the centre than of the region. This indicates the determination of the central 
government to maintain their power over the regions. Some authors therefore described 
the law as still having what they called a "colonial flavor”.
Law 5/1974
One month after the declaration of Law 18/1965, political turmoil occurred when 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) tried to topple Sukarno by a coup in October 1, 
1965; so it can be said that the law had no chance to be applied. The political turmoil 
reduced the power of Sukarno drastically in a few months, and the political balance was 
changed when the PKI was banned and the army then emerged as a new political power 
holder. After 1965, the power of General Suharto was strengthened, and in 1967 Sukarno 
was formally replaced by Suharto. The new government then faced three demands 
regarding the local government system: the abolition of Law 18/1965, democratization of 
local government, and a bigger financial sharing for the regions.
During the early years of the Suharto government, in order to safeguard the 
republic from political chaos and to strengthen its political position, the army needed 
the support of other political parties (especially NU and PNI) especially in those regions 
which were, for several years, still under pressures from elements sympathetic to 
Sukarno and the PKI. Therefore, when the party representatives in the MPRS and 
DPRGR demanded the broadest autonomy for local government authorities, the army 
went along with that demand at first.
The demand was expressed in 1966 when the MPRS issued decision No. 
XXI/MPRS/1966 providing for the broadest autonomy to the regions and calling for the 
reconsideration of Law 18/1965: this was an expression of the popular demand 
expressed in the MPRS, but in practice it was never carried out. In order to implement 
the decision the government soon after proposed in the DPR three draft laws, i.e. on the 
position and relationship between the central government and regional governments, a 
draft law on swatantra regions, and one on (administrative) deconcentration.
34-pjie Ljang Gie quotes terminology used by Legge in ” Problems of Regional Autonomy in 
Contemporary Indonesia,” op.cit., 1957, p.3 where he discussed the weaknesses of the law. The 
Liang Gie, Pembahasan Undang2 1965 No. 18 Tentang Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan Daerah, 
Yogyakarta: Fakultas Sosial dan Politik, 1969, p.40.
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In 1969, the government issued Law 6/1969 stating that Law 18/1965 was no 
longer valid, although a new law to replace it had still not been worked out, after 
various debates in the national parliament which resulted in deadlock between the 
demands of the political parties for a greater degree of power for the local assemblies, 
closer to the Law 1/1957 position, and the insistence by the government representations 
that this was administratively and financially impossible. Furthermore, local demands 
for greater financial sharing were also revived; and the government answered these 
demands through various policies and subsidies (a problem which will be explained 
later).
Under Suharto, the military then further strengthened their political power 
considerably. Various basic changes were made in political ideology and political 
structure. One of the important steps taken by the Suharto government was replacement 
of the state ideology of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy) with the so-called 
Pancasila Democracy. The Pancasila Democracy was described as an idea to create 
harmony among various political forces in the country and to try to avoid antagonism 
among them. As Suharto pointed out:^
...It is very idealistic if in application of the Pancasila Democracy the balance 
between individual and public interests, between the interest of groups and 
national interest, and between interest of the whole people and the state can 
always be achieved and given attention. If there is a problem, however, in 
which there is a conflict between the individual and the public interests, 
between the group and the national interests, we should sincere and with 
voluntary and good spirit victimize the personal or group interests for the 
public and national interests. This is the principle and just law of the Pancasila 
Democracy.
Political harmony, which means, as mentioned above, that antagonism among 
political powers should be minimized, is said to be an essential requirement for achieving 
political stability which is needed in order that development programs can be 
implemented. In order to achieve political stability, the government then embarked upon 
several important steps towards reconstituting the political structure. The first of these 
was the general elections held on July 3, 1971 to replace the provisional DPRGR and 
MPRS. In this election, the use of Golkar as a kind of government party, with strong 
backing from the military and pamong praja, was a significant and highly successful 
innovation, since it destroyed the old power bases of the former political parties at both 
the national and (in most cases) the local level. Ever since then, Golkar has been a 
crucial instrument in the hands of the government authorities, especially at the local 
level.
^President Suharto speech in August 16, 1967, quoted from Albert Widjaja, Budaya Politik 
dan Pembangunan Ekonomi, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982, p.95.
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Another change was carried out later by the reduction of the number political 
parties from ten to three in 1973. The nationalist-based political parties and two 
Christian and Catholic parties have been grouped into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(PDI) Indonesian Democratic Party) while the religious based parties have been reunited 
to be Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). The 
government itself, as mentioned above, supports the Golongan Karya (Golkar).
The new MPR resulting from the 1971 elections then issued decision No. 
IV/MPR/1973 on the Garis-Garis Besar Hainan Negara (GBHN, Broad Outline of 
State Objective) in which, in the clause on regional government, it was stated that 
autonomy for the regions should be ”a real and responsible autonomy (Otonomi yang 
nyata dan bertanggung jawab) which guarantees the development of regions and would 
be implemented together with deconcentration.”3® This represented a significant shift in 
emphasis from the earlier MPRS decision No.XXI/MPRS/1966 providing for the "widest 
possible autonomy.” The decision also cancelled the three drafts of laws proposed to 
implement decision of MPRS No.XXI/MPRS/1966, because they did not conform with 
the newly proclaimed concept of autonomy.
With the statement that autonomy for regions should be a ”real and responsible 
autonomy,” the new concept abolished the words "broadest autonomy” put forward in 
the previous MPRS decision. The reason behind abolition of the words was the 
government’s fears that any effort to provide a broad autonomy for regions would 
reopen the possibility of political instability such as had occurred during the period 
1957-1960 when Law 1/1957 was in forced.* 37 With the new definition of autonomy, the 
meaning of the concept was narrowed, giving an impression that all decisions and 
actions taken by the regional authorities were limited and had to be made within the 
boundaries of their "responsibilities" to the centre. This argument was strengthened by 
an official statement stating that autonomy was more a duty than a right of the regions, 
i.e. they had a duty to help to facilitate implementation of the government development 
programs.38 The strict meaning and limits of that responsibility itself were vague, but 
only the central government had the power to interpret it, according to its own needs.
Furthermore, in the new concept the government determined that the provision of 
autonomy did not merely stress its democratic aspect but also the need to harmonize it 
with state objectives, i.e. to achieve efficiency and productivity at the regional 
government level. In practice, it seems that the central government gave far more stress
36Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat No. IV/MPR/1973 tentang Garis-Garis 
Besar Haluan Negara. Lampiran: Naskah Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara Bab IV tentang 
Pola Umum Pelita Kedua, Sub C tentang Aparatur Pemerintah, angka 2.
37C.S.T. Kansil, Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia, Jakarta: Aksara Baru, 1976, p.167.
38C.S.T. Kansil, Ibid., p.167.
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to the achievement of efficiency and productivity of local government rather than to the 
democratic aspects of the concept of autonomy. Apart from that, the new concept stated 
that the "deconcentration” principle (i.e. of administrative responsibilities for program 
implementation) was no longer considered simply as a complement to decentralization, 
but was to be conducted together with it. The word "deconcentration” was later defined 
in Law 5/1974 as the "delegation of authority from the centre to its officials in the 
regions.”39
This talk about the "deconcentration principle” was actually not much more than 
verbal gymnastics, disguising the real intention of the central government to strengthen 
the centralization of the system, because by delegating authority to the central 
government’s officials in the regions, the deconcentration principle did not amount to 
any real modification of the centralization principle. The interplay between the 
government and the political parties during the preparation of Law 5/1974 will be 
examined below, while the implementation of the law will be clarified later.
During the preparation of the law, debates between the government and the three 
political parties occurred on various issues; but only the debates on the most important 
issues will be examined here. It seems that basically the government wished to achieve 
two objectives in the debates, i.e. to maintain a strong position for the central 
government and national leadership, as well as to maintain a strong regional executive 
authority, as had been done in Presidential Edict No.6/1959 and Law 18/1965. Hence, 
most of the features of the system of local government under Guided Democracy were 
taken over in the draft of Law 5/1974. Thus, there were no really significant changes 
made in the new law, and hence it can be assumed that there were few major differences 
of opinion between Sukarno and Suharto about local autonomy and the local 
government system. Both of them supported the idea of a highly centralized system of 
government.
On the issue of representatives or democratic features of the local goverment 
system, for example, both the PDI and PPP urged that this aspect should be stressed in 
the Jaw. The Golkar and military factions, on the other hand, while paying lip service to 
that aspect, were of the opinion that it had to keep watch for the possibilities of 
extremism and liberalism. Even the title of the law gave rise to some debate. The PPP 
and the PDI factions wished to use just the traditional title of the law, i.e. Pemerintah 
Daerah or Pemerintahan Daerah (Local Government). However, the military and the 
Golkar factions supported the idea of the government that the title should reflect the 
three elements of decentralization, deconcentration and medebewind (cooperating 
administration), simultaneously.
39Law 5/1974, article 1, point f.
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These three principles had to be carried out at the same time because, according to 
the military and the Golkar factions, there were various activities that could not be 
transferred to the regions, and various other activities which could not be conducted 
merely by the central government and so needed the assistance of the regional 
government. For these reasons, the title of the law was then determined simply as the 
Basic Law on Government in the Regions (Pokok-Pokok Pemerintahan di Daerah). This 
implied that the law not only regulated the local government but also the activities of 
the central government in the regions.^® On the other hand, this title gives an 
impression that the existence and autonomy of regional governments are now abolished 
or reduced, and they are established merely as a part of the central government.
The debates between PDI and PPP on the one side, and Golkar and military 
factions on the other, involved also the problem of the regional head’s position. The 
government wanted the regional head to be the sole administrator (Penguasa Tunggal) 
of the region, as in Law 18/1965; hence institutions like DPD or BPH were not further 
needed. The military and Golkar factions supported that proposal on the ground that 
establishment of the DPD or BPH would create complications in the structure of local 
government. The PPP and PDI, however, regarded the abolition of the former BPH and 
the DPD as a reduction of the opportunities for the local assemblies to continue to exert 
some influence on the executive arm of the government at the regional level.
To maintain the democratic principle of local government, both parties suggested 
that the regional head should not be determined as the sole administrator in the region, 
but should be flanked by a collective form of leadership body. Hence, both parties 
suggested that the re-establishment of the former DPD or the BPH was strongly needed. 
The compromise finally achieved on this was that there would be a Badan
Pertimbangan Daerah (BPD, Local Advisory Body) in regions, but with very weak 
41powers.
Apart from that, the government proposed that the regional head should be 
selected and appointed by the government, and did not require election by DPRD. The 
military faction reminded the parliament of the old practices that had occurred during 
the 1950-1959 period when there was great political instability due to conflicts among 
various political powers in and out of the DPRD. This situation had to be prevented;
Tambunan, Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No.5 Tahun 1974 tentang Pokok-Pokok 
Pemerintahan di Daerah, Latar Belakang Beserta Proses Pembentukannya, Bandung: 
Binacipta, 1974, pp.7-8; and also Josef Riwukaho, ” Prospek Otonomi Daerah dalam Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia,” Mimeo, Yogyakarta: December 19, 1979, p.35.
^The BPD, differs from the former DPD, and is not an executive council. It also differs from 
the former BPH. The tasks of BPD are limited to providing suggestions to the regional head and 
do not involve governmental activities handled by the regional head.
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hence this faction put more stress on matters to do with the "mentality” and ideology of 
the candidates rather than just on formally defined qualifications like age, educational 
level, experience etc. Candidates for office had to be "screened” regarding their 
suitability on these vague grounds, before being allowed to stand, and the screening 
bodies have since had considerable arbitrary power in this respect.
According to the PPP faction, the regional head ought to be elected by the DPRD, 
but his formal appointment could be carried out by the government. This was based on 
the argument that a regional head is someone who should have a mandate from the 
people in his region. As Chalik Ali of this faction said, the province should have a 
government from and by "the people in the region and that the DPRD should both 
nominate and elect the governor.”* 4* The PDI faction agreed with this opinion of the 
PPP, but for another reason, i.e. that in the provision of real and responsible autonomy 
there should be confidence and recognition on the part of the central government that 
the region possessed the maturity and responsibility necessary to choose its own leader.
The consensus which was then achieved mentioned that before the nomination of a 
candidate by the DPRD, this body should take the initiative in conducting a meeting4^ 
to ask for agreement from the government for the candidates proposed (between three to 
five candidates). After the approval of the government had been expressed, the DPRD 
would propose two of these candidates to be selected by the President (for the Governor) 
or by the Minister of the Interior (for the Bupati). The effect of this procedure has 
been that the DPRD will be very reluctant to propose any candidate who is likely to be 
rejected by the government; so if it is to exert any influence at all on this process of 
selection, it will naturally be inclined to select candidates known to be acceptable to the 
higher authorities. In practice, the DPRD is only a rubber stamp of the regional head. 
This will be clarified at greater length below.
As in Presidential Edict No.6/1959 and in Law 18/1965, it is laid down in article 
22 Law 5/1974 that the regional head should give a statement of accountability 
(Keterangan Pertanggungan Jawab) to the DPRD at least once a year, or at any other 
time; but he cannot be discharged by the DPRD. Both parties had previously proposed 
that the regional head should be responsible to the DPRD and he could be discharged by 
that body. The government, on the other hand, maintained that local government in 
Indonesia should be a reflection of the central government in which the President is the 
highest authority, and not responsible to the DPR, only to the MPR.
42Eastern Economic Review., "Debating Regional Autonomy.” June 17, 1974, p.17.
4**The meeting is conducted with the Minister of the Interior for candidates for Governor, and 
with the Governor for candidates for Bupati.
44A. Tambunan, op.cit., pp.17-18.
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Thus, the regional head should be the highest authority in the region without any 
need to be responsible to the DPRD. This was, of course, an imitation of the ideas of 
Sukarno during the era of Guided Democracy. The military faction then added a 
proposal that explanation of the accountability of a regional head to the DPRD would 
be necessary in accordance with the regional head’s obligations to the body. The 
government succeeded in carrying through its proposals against the views of the political 
parties.
Implementation of Law 5/1974
Twelve years after the declaration of the law, one still hears various complaints 
about difficulties in the implementation of decentralization legislation, while on the 
other hand there is a strong tendency towards centralization. The complaints are based 
on three main factors. First, obstacles to the implementation of decentralization are 
caused by the structure of the local government itself on the basis of Law 5/1974. 
Second, the imbalance in financial equilibrium between the centre and the regions still 
exists, under which the amount of central government subsidy is still much bigger than 
the real income of the regions. Third, there is no will at the centre to transfer more 
autonomy to the regions because of, among other things, the central government’s fear 
of a return of political instability similar to the regional conflicts which occurred during 
the period 1957-1960; and no one in the regions has any real capacity to demand greater 
autonomy.
The functions of the regional head, the procedure of his selection and appointment, 
and the question of who he should be responsible to all give rise to an impression that he 
is more a central government organ in the region than a representative of the region 
itself.^® As a representative of the region, the regional head is vested by the law with 
the powers and functions to give leadership to the region (article 22). In this respect, 
the regional head is an organ of the region who is supposed to represent local aspirations 
and strive to achieve those aspirations. On the other hand, as mentioned above, article 
79 of the law states that the regional head also functions as the head of an 
administrative area, the province or the kabupaten. In this position, he is an agent of the 
central government in the region, representing the interests of the centre.
The position of the regional head as an agent of central government has also been 
enhanced by the appointment of many military officers as regional heads. Since the 
military has such a strong position in the political arena in Indonesia, opportunities for 45
45Ibid., pp.18-20.
46gee aiso Irene Tinker & Millidge Walker, "Planning For Regional Development in 
Indonesia,” Asian Survey, Vol.XIII, No.12, December 1973, p.1103.
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military officers to become regional heads have been opened widely through the so-called 
Dwi-Fungst ABRI system (the Dual Function of the Military in military and non­
military activities). To implement this dual function, there is a Kekaryaan ABRI 
section in the Ministry of Defence and Security, which handles nomination of military 
officers to be regional heads as well as to other non-military positions.
The strong ties between the military and the Golkar majority faction in most 
DPRD ensure that candidates from the military generally have the greatest chance to 
win any election for regional head. This explains why during the nomination of regional 
heads we encounter such terminology as co/on kuat (strong candidate) and co/on 
pendamping (flank candidate), the former meaning someone who is strongly backed by 
the central government (either proposed by Golkar or by the army) and who therefore 
has a great chance of being elected by the DPRD, the latter (usually more than one) 
being those who are nominated simply to fulfil the requirements laid down by law that 
there should be more than one candidate; but in reality they have almost no chance of 
being elected.
The penetration of the military into the civilian administration itself can be traced 
to a situation prevailing since the birth of the New Order government in which there was 
an effort by the military to set up a territorial organization which parallels the civilian 
bureaucracy at every level. These military structures are linked to the civilian 
structure through the MUSPIDA (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, regional leadership 
council) at the province and kabupaten levels, and with MUSPIKA (Musyawarah
^'See also, "Sebuah Selingan (Mungkin Juga Pelajaran) dari Riau,” Tempo, September 14, 
1985.
^°ln 1967 the four separate ministries were reunited into one Defense and Security Ministry. 
Two years later, in 1969, the Indonesian territory was divided into six territorial commands, 
KOWILHAN (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan), i.e. Java-Madura, Sumatra and Sulawesi under 
the army Maluku, Irian Jaya and Nusa Tenggara under the navy, and Kalimantan under the air 
force. The army itself had previously sixteen area commands called KODAM (Komando Daerah 
Militcr) at the level of province, but in early 1985 they were reduced to ten by reuniting some 
KODAMs. Especially in Java in each former Karesidenan area there is KOREM (Komando 
Resort Militer). At kabupaten level there is KODIM (Komando Distrik Militer) and KOGAR 
(Komando Garnisun) for each metropolitan area. At kecamatan and village level there are 
KORAMIL (Komando Rayon Militer) and BABINSA (Bintara Pembina Desa) respectively. The 
police have also established a similar territorial organization starting from the province down to 
kecamatan level. At the province level, the police have KODAK (Komando Daerah Kepolisian) 
and POWILTABES (Polisi Wilayah Kota Besar) for each capital city of province. At the 
kabupaten and municipality there are POLRES (Polisi Resort) and POLRESTA (Polisi Resort 
Kota). At kecamatan level there is POLSEK (Polisi Sektor).
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Pimpinan Kecamatan) at the kecamatan level.*® Although their role is not now as 
conspicuous as during the 1960s, the regional heads still call upon them on some 
occasions when their intervention is needed.
The limitations upon regional autonomy are also increased by the fact that the 
central government has never really made any serious effort to resolve the difficult 
problem of financial equilibrium between the central and the local government. The first 
efforts made to improve the financial condition of regions in the era of the New Order 
government occurred in 1967 when the Governors of provinces, at a conference in Solo 
(Central Java), demanded that 30 per cent of total government revenues be allocated to 
their regions each year.
The central government responded to the demand by introducing the ADO 
scheme, which entitled export-producing regions to a proportion of 10 per cent of their 
foreign exchange earnings. This was generally considered an effort to minimize 
opposition from the richer exporting regions,as well as an effort to stop smuggling and 
unauthorized levies which were then commonly levied by the regions simply to finance 
their administration; but it provided no real help to the poorer non-exporting regions. In 
1968, a series of debates on central-local financial problems occurred in the DPRGR, 
where the political parties demanded allocation of 50 per cent of the central 
government’s income for the regions. The central government refused any such demand 
and cancelled any further debate on the subject; this was the last debate on the
K 1matter.
The decentralized ADO scheme was replaced in 1970 by a more highly centralized 
scheme known as SPP-ADO (Sumbangan Pemerintah Pengganti ADO, Government 
Grant in Lieu of ADO). In the same year, the central government introduced the 
INPRES programs (Instrukst Presiden, President Instruction) as a type of central 
government grant to finance development projects in regions. These two types of grants 
were then redefined as a kind of direct grant (bantuan langsung) from the central 
government to the regions; these have since become the biggest item in the regions’
*®The MUSPIDA consists of the regional head, the local army and police commanders, local 
prosecutor and the local judge, while the MUSPIKA consists of the Camat, and Commanders of 
Army and Police at the kecamatan level. The tasks of those bodies are defined as embracing all 
security affairs in the broadest sense of the term. However, President Decision No. 10/1986 
decided to abolish the position of MUSPIDA’s chairman which was previously occupied by the 
local army commander. This new decision issued because there was a problem in which many was 
local army commanders in fact have a lower rank (Colonel or Brigadier General) than the military 
Governor (Major General or Lieutenant General). This gave rise to a reluctance among the 
commanders to lead an organization where some members have higher rank than themselves. In 
"Giliran Pak Gubernur,” Tempo, March 22, 1986, p.14.
^®Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, op.cit., pp.147-148.
"^Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Ibid., pp.148-149.
development budget. The strong financial position of the central government was 
enhanced by the oil boom during the 1970’s which enabled the centre to act as Santa 
Claus in its relations with the regions.
In regional budgets there are two categories: the development and the routine 
budgets, with most of the revenue in each coming from central government subsidies. In 
Kabupaten Malang, the subsidies from the central government for the routine budget 
amounted to around 69 per cent (on average) of the total revenue of the kabupaten in 
the period 1979-1983, while subsidies for the development budget constituted 100 per 
cent of the total, (see Table 2-1 on page 46).
Table 2-1: Amount of Subsidies for Malang Kabupaten, 1979-1983
(million Rupiah)
Year Resources Routine Development
Budget Budget
1979/80 Centre Rp 830 Rp 1,230
Malang Rp 694 Rp —
1980/81 Centre Rp 1,221 Rp 1,201
Malang Rp 729 Rp 5
1981/82 Centre Rp 1,809 Rp 1,584
Malang Rp 776 Rp
1982/83 Centre Rp 1,909 Rp 1,857
Malang Rp 636 Rp —
1983/84 Centre Rp 1,751 Rp 1,400
Malang Rp 963 Rp --
Source: Keterangan Pertanggung Jatvaban Bupati Malang, Various Issues; and
Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah Rutin dan Pembangunan 
1983/1984, Kabupaten Malang.
Various officials in other regions have noted that although the locally-mobilized 
portion of their regions’ revenue has increased in the last ten years, the increase has still 
not become as much as half of the local budget. In Aceh, for example, the revenue was
^Discussion of kinds of subsidies for regions- can be found in Hariri Hady et.al., "Model 
Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat-Daerah.” Working Paper on Seminar of Regional Economy and 
Finance, between Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior, BAPPENAS, LPEM of University of 
Indonesia, and ILGS of University of Birmingham, Jakarta: 1-6 September 1980, pp.1-3.
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increased by 15 to 20 per cent during the period 1975/1976 to 1984/1985, but it is still 
only about 15 to 20 per cent of the total regional budget of the province. In 1980/1981, 
the locally-mobilized revenues of Aceh were Rp 4.2 billion while the government 
subsidies, including the INPRES subsidy amounted to Rp 21 billion. In 1983/1984, the 
revenues increased to Rp 6.1 billion, but the subsidy was also increased to Rp 36 billion.
In West Sumatra an increase of income also occurred, but the amount of subsidy 
needed also increased, so that the subsidy has always covered 87 per cent of the total 
budget of the region. In an undeveloped province such as Nusa Tenggara Barat, the 
subsidy was as high as 97 per cent of the total budget; and in most regions the central 
government subsidies, including the INPRES subsidy, amounted to between 65 to 97 per 
cent in 1980/1981.53
While the demands of the regions for a greater share of financial resources remain, 
the problem of financial equilibrium between the centre and the regions has not yet been 
resolved satisfactorily. Central government officials still maintain their opinion that any 
action directed towards transferring the management of financial resources to the regions 
will simply create a wider gap between the rich and the poor regions, and they see this 
as a threat to the unity of the nation.
Apart from that, central government officials still have doubts about the ability 
and trustworthiness of local officials in administering regional financial resources: in 
particular they suspect that autonomy will simply increase the opportunities for 
corruption among the local officials. This suspicion may have some basis in fact, 
although as a generalization it can hardly be applied to all local officials. Moreover, this 
suspicion is seen as exaggerated by regional officials who counter with the accusation 
that without financial autonomy, too many chances for corruption are merely given to 
the central government officials. In addition, it seems that by refusing to improve the 
financial ability of regions, the centre is just trying to make the regions more dependent 
on it. In this situation, it is easier for the centre to dominate and control local affairs in 
order to ensure stability and loyalty in the regions.
The tendency towards centralization is also apparent in the planning and 
implementation of development programs. In planning the development programs the 
central government tends to ignore the DPRD almost entirely. This can be seen even in 
the preparations of development programs. Most of the preparations are conducted 
through meetings (Rapat Kerja) between Ministers and the Governors or between the 33
33Anne Booth, "Efforts to Decentralise Fiscal Policy: Problems of Taxable Capacity, Tax 
Effort and Revenue Sharing.” Paper prepared for Colin Mac Andrews (ed), Centre-Periphery 
Relations in Indonesia, forthcoming, pp.15-23; and Kompas, "Desentralisasi Harus Mencakup 
Bidang Keuangan.” November 6, 1984.
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Governors and the Bupatis, usually without the participation of the chairman of the 
DPRD. Instead of being flanked by the chairman of the DPRD, the Governors were 
accompanied by the chairman of BAPPEDA at their meetings in March 1984 in Jakarta, 
for example, not by the DPRD I chairman as their local government partners.®^ This 
was due to the fact that the DPRD rarely takes initiative in making development 
planning proposals. However, some members of the DPRD in Malang Kabupaten 
explained that they were simply reluctant to make any proposals because very often 
their proposals were not given any attention by the Bupati at all.
In the implementation stage of development programs, it is a fact that nearly all 
the decisions are made by the central government, even when they involve only small 
projects such as the development of public toilets. This situation is admitted in a speech 
of the Minister of the Environment, Prof. Emil Salim:®®
Many decisions should actually be transfered to regions...e.g. decisions on the 
choice of materials for building construction; on determination of project 
locations; on forestation; on development of facilities such as public toilets, 
mineral water channels; and rural electrification.
All these considerations give rise to the impression that the government puts much 
more stress on implementation of the centralization principle than on any real 
decentralization. Also in the implementation of central government projects such as 
INPRES in the regions, the emphasis on centralization is obvious. The INPRES projects 
are not implemented by the technical offices of the regions (dinas-dinas) but by the 
vertical offices of the central government there.
The tendency toward centralization has a connection also with the weakness of 
DPRD vis-a-vis the executive in the regions. As mentioned above, the law itself has 
given a dominant position to the regional head over the DPRD. In addition, various 
external factors have also pushed the DPRD into a disadvantageous position. A study of 
the position and authority of regional executive and representative bodies conducted by 
the University of Gadjah Mada and the Ministry of the Interior, for example, found that 
the role of the Golkar Development Council (Dewan Pembina Golkar) in the regions is
54p Suwarno "Gubernur Masih Lebih Sebagai Birokrat.” in Kompas, March 15, 1985. 
55prof Emj] Salim, "Proses Pengambilan Keputusan Perlu Makin Didesentralisasi.” Kompas, 
September 22, 1985.
®®Sutrisno Harinoto, "Mengapa DPRD Kurang Bersifat Vokal.” in Kompas, November 7, 
1984.
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dominant and this affects the attitude of the DPRD members toward the council.
Moreover, since the DPRD is dominated by Golkar, the assembly has become, as 
mentioned above, merely a "rubber stamp” for decisions made by the executive. The 
domination of Golkar in the body is made possible by the prohibition upon the other two 
parties to conduct political activities below the kabupaten level or to set up their 
branches at village level. Thus, their ability to recruit supporters in rural areas has been 
severely reduced. Golkar, on the other hand, is able to strengthen its position in the 
rural areas through the village government apparatus.
This situation emerged because there is a government instruction ordering that all 
government functionaries must support Golkar. And although there is no direct 
prohibition for them to become involved in political parties, if any such involvement 
becomes known to their superiors, it will threaten their careers. These direct and 
indirect pressures upon both government officials and the rural people have also been 
applied so as to secure Golkar majorities in the DPRDs. This instruction and the 
political pressures have badly reduced the ability of the other parties to voice the 
people’s aspirations. The only channel for these aspirations, then, is Golkar itself or 
government employees at the local level.
It can thus be summarized that efforts to introduce wider autonomy for the 
regions have been hampered by various factors, and present-day developments in 
Indonesia even show a tightening of control by the centre over the regions. There are 
two factors responsible for this development. Firstly, it is the wish of the government, 
under both Sukarno and Suharto, to ensure political stability for the country as a whole 
and to minimize the opportunities for overt regional resistance to its policies in any 
form. Under Sukarno, that stability was needed simply to maintain the unity of the 
republic, because for more than a half of the Sukarno period, stability was disturbed by 
regional rebellions that threatened national unity.
Under Suharto, national unity is no longer under threat, but the idea still persists 
that political stability is an essential condition for executing development programs. To 
facilitate their implementation, the loyalty of the regions to the centre is needed; so any
^The council has a dominant role not only in the processes of candidacy, selection and 
appointment of the DPRD members from Golkar faction, but also in determining membership of 
the DPRD commissions and even in the decision making process of the body. The regional head 
is the chairman of the council in his region and since the Golkar has always a majority of seats in 
most regions in Indonesia, the power of the regional head over the DPRD is obvious. See "Hasil 
Penelitian Kedudukan dan Kewenangan Lembaga Eksekutif dan Lembaga Legislative Daerah 
(Suatu Studi tentang Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Penampilan Politik Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah),” Unpublished Provisional Report by Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan of 
the Ministry of Interior and Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Universitas Gajah Mada, 
1983, p.6.
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possibility for the emergence of regional conflicts should be minimized. Both Sukarno 
and Suharto have learnt from history that political parties have played a key part in the 
emergence of regional conflicts and even in creating political chaos, such as was carried 
out by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) when it attempted a coup d’etat in 1965.
Therefore, the reduction in the number of political parties and the limitation of 
their activities, especially in rural areas, are two of several steps taken to ensure political 
stability. At the same time, the appointment of central government officials and officers 
of the army as regional heads are the other steps to achieve the loyalty of local 
government administrations to the centre. A second factor is that local initiatives to 
develop local leadership and to strive for more autonomy are limited. The reason for this 
can be traced to the loss of power by the political parties in the regions, and also to the 
loss of desire by rural people to participate in political affairs because of direct or 
indirect pressure upon them from the government to avoid involvement in politics, 
except to support Golkar.
The implication of the above situation for the implementation of rice policies is 
that we should not expect to find the DPRD playing much of a role in influencing the 
way it is carried out, or in assessing its effectiveness, even though rice policy is a very 
important matter for local leaders. It is seen mainly as an administrative and planning 
problem, not one on which local opinion is formally consulted.
The pattern of central-local relationships described above creates a high degree of 
dependence by the regions upon the centre; it also creates a habit of subservience among 
local officials toward central government officials. This subservience also affects the 
implementation of rice policies, and the consequences of this attitude will be clarified in 
the other chapters.
59
CHAPTER 3
Indonesian Rice Policy Since Independence
Rice is the primary food for most of the Indonesian people. Any shortages or 
increases in its price are therefore considered very serious problems affecting economic 
and political stability. It is not surprising, therefore, that the government development 
program puts primary stress on efforts to increase the production of rice through various 
rice intensification programs and to stabilize the rice price. The objectives of rice policy 
in Indonesia can best be seen, therefore, in the ways it has been expressed in the various 
development plans.
The rice policy of the New Order government is merely one part of its more 
general development policies, as expressed in the various Repelita (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five Year Development Plan). During Repelita I 
(1969/1970-1973/1974), the general objective of the government’s development policies 
was the stabilization of the economy; and in this framework, the primary aim of the 
government’s rice policy was to increase rice production. In this period, a new rice 
purchasing authority, BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik, Logistic Body) was set up, 
amongst other things, to regulate distribution of rice to military members and 
government civil servants, as well as to stabilize the rice price.
In addition, new rural cooperative organizations (BUUD/KUD) were established 
during the Repelita I period in 1973, although these had not been anticipated in that 
form in the original 1969 formulation of the plan. Ostensibly the new rural cooperative 
organizations were to help farmers in marketing their rice and in obtaining production 
inputs, and to assist the government in distributing such inputs to farmers. Under 
Repelita II (1974/1975-1978/1979) another important policy goal was added, namely to 
give priority to a pattern of economic growth in which the problems of job opportunities 
and the increase of farmers’ incomes would be resolved. Rice production increase and 
stability of the rice price were still regarded as important, of course. But for reasons we 
shall notice below, levels of rice production fluctuated considerably during the Repelita 
II period, and it was a time of relatively low overall increase.
In Repelita III (1979/1980-1983/1984), the objectives of government development 
policy were expressed more in terms of the Trtlogi Pembangunan, i.e. 1- equity, or the 
more equitable distribution of the benefits of development; 2- continued economic
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growth; and 3- a sound and dynamic national stability. Various measures were proposed 
as the means to achieve such equity, but those that related specifically to rice policy 
were: a) fulfilment of basic needs, especially for staple food; b) more equitable 
distribution of incomes, especially in rural areas; c) increased rural employment and job 
opportunities; d) increased opportunity to undertake agro-business, especially among the 
economically weak groups (golongan ekonomi lemah) and among women; and e) 
spreading food production more widely throughout the country.^
The effort to increase rice production itself is one of the three basic aims of the 
Suharto government’s rice policy which is linked with the two other main purposes, i.e. 
to maintain the stability of the rice price and to provide a sufficiently attractive price for 
farmers. The third objective was first given attention in the introduction of the Rumus 
Tani (Farmers’ Formula) in 1968, and was later expressed in the introduction of the 
floor and ceiling price policy operated by BULOG in the 1970s. For a long period 
Indonesian rice prices had been low relative to the world price (at prevailing exchange 
rates). Hence rice cultivation for commercial sale was not as attractive to farmers as it 
should have been.
The Suharto government has made a more determined effort than the Sukarno 
government ever did to ensure that the rice price was adequate to stimulate increased 
rice production by the farmers. This chapter will discuss rice policy in Indonesia, with 
the stress being given to the period after the emergence of the Bimas program in 1965. 
Although rice policy has various aspects, I will be dealing here mainly with the efforts 
made to increase rice production through various rice intensification programs. The rice 
price policy, as mentioned above, will also be given attention. The government’s policy 
on village cooperative (KUD), which is also connected to its broader rice policy, will be 
discussed in the final section.
Rice Policy in the Colonial Period
During the Dutch colonial era, the main interest of the government regarding rice 
was to maintain adequate supplies and keep the price of rice as low as possible, in order 
to keep the wages of labourers working on Dutch plantations also low. Because the 
Dutch colonial economy was based on exports of commercial crops to the world market, 
the government considered plantations as the key sector of the economy. Hence, the 
colonial government had an interest in ensuring cheap labour on plantations. To achieve 
this objective it was important to keep the rice price as low as possible since rice was a
^Leon A. Means, 1981, op.cit., p.386.
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primary consumption item of the labourers.
Table 3-1: Production and Imports of Rice from Foreign Countries, 
1860-1940, Five Yearly Averages (1000 metric tons)
Year Production in 
Java k Madura
Import 
Java k
to
Madura
Imports to 
Outer Islands
Indonesia
1860-1864 4
1865-1869 - 1 - -
1870-1873 - 30 - -
1874-1878 - 62 24 86
1879-1883 - 112 54 167
1884-1888 - 21 46 67
1889-1893 2,341 60 69 130
1894-1898 2,557 107 79 185
1899-1903 2,646 160 153 312
1904-1908 2,829 152 159 311
1909-1913 2,958 321 234 555
1914-1918 3,091 353 292 645
1919-1923 2,962 287 172 459
1924-1928 3,645 219 318 537
1929-1933 3,510 227 323 550
1934-1938 3,870 44 239 283
1939-1940 4,322 23 171 193
Source: W.M.F. Mansvelt & P. Creutzberg, Changing Economy in Indonesia, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, p.18
* Figures are accounted from data on pp.61-62 of the same book.
The decision to permit imports of rice at a time of scarcity in 1863 can be regarded 
as the first clear expression of this policy. As Java became more dependent on such 
imports (and on the availability of shipping to maintain them), the colonial authorities 
found it necessary to intervene in the market in World War I to ensure supplies (see 
Table 3-1 on page 53). Later, when the depression created serious balance-of-payments 
problems, the government again had to intervene in 1933, but this time with quite the 
opposite purpose, to restrict imports (and in so doing to check a further decline in the 
price of rice).
^J.A.C. Mackie, "The Indonesian Economy, 1950-1963,” in Bruce Glassburner (ed), The 
Economy of Indonesia, Selected Readings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, p.16; Leon 
A. Mears and Sidik Moeljono., "Food Policy” in Anne E. Booth and Peter McCawley (eds)., The 
Indonesian Economy During the Suharto Era, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981., 
p.23.
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Table 3-2: Rice Exports from Java to Outer Islands and Foreign 
Countries, 1931-1939 (1000 metric tons)
Year Outer Islands Foreign Countries
1931 30 11
1932 17 7
1933 27 8
1934 55 6
1935 42 7
1936 102 12
1937 64 19
1938 75 9
1939 197 12
Source: Mansvelt &. Creutzberg, Ibid., p.19.
During the 1930s, Java became a major exporter of rice to the outer islands (see 
Table 3-2 on page 54). When World War II broke out in 1939 and the prospect of rice 
shortages loomed again, the government established the Sticting Het 
Voedingsmiddelenfonds (VMF, Food Supply Fund) to "foster production, to stockpile 
food reserves, and to distribute rice and other foodstuffs in case of emergencies.” These 
efforts, which were abandoned during the war, then continued, under various new names 
but in similar form, during the Sukarno period.
The Sukarno Period
In the earliest years of independence, agricultural activities were still impeded by 
the damage done during the Japanese occupation, and the struggle for independence. In 
particular, irrigation facilities were in a very bad condition. This resulted in lower yields 
per hectare, so that levels of rice production were lower in the early 1950s than they had 
been in 1940. Apart from that, the new republic experienced limitations in its 
organizational capacities to improve rice cultivation. The first systematic attempt to 
increase rice production through improved extension services and use of fertilizer was the 
Kasimo Welfare Plan, introduced in 1952, which aimed to achieve self sufficiency by 
1956. **
**L.A. Means, 1961, op.cit., p.22; Details on rice policy during the colonial period can be found 
also in J H. Boeke, The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy, New York: Netherlands 
and Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946; and C. Peter Timmer, 1981, 
op.cit., p.34.
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Table 3-3: Average Annual Per Capita Available and Apparent 
Consumption of Milled Rice in Indonesia, 1954-1983 
(millions of m.t.)
Yeax Pro
duction
Imports Effect of 
Bulog’s 
Stock 
Changes*
Self
Sufficiency* 
Surplus[+] 
or Deficit[-]
Apparent 
Consumption 
Kg/per capita/ 
per year
1954 7.84 0.26 -0.09 -0.17 881955 7.51 0.13 +0.40 -0.53 871956 7.60 0.82 -0.06 -0.86 891957 7.63 0.55 +0.06 -0.61 851958 7.98 0.92 -0.06 -0.98 901959 8.29 0.89 +0.02 -0.91 911960 10.17 0.89 +0.08 -0.97 1091961 9.58 1.06 +0.03 -1.09 101
1962 10.28 1.02 +0.02 -1.04 106
1963 9.16 1.04 -0.12 -0.96 92
1964 9.61 1.01 0.00 -1.01 96
1965 10.25 0.20 +0.10 -0.30 92
1966 10.75 0.31 -0.10 -0.21 94
1967 10.40 0.35 +0.03 -0.38 91
1968 11.67 0.63 -0.35 -0.28 98
1969 12.25 0.60 +6.25 -0.83 104
1970 13.14 0.96 -0.27 -0.69 107
1971 13.72 0.50 0.00 -0.49 107
1972 13.18 0.75 +0.33 -1.08 106
1973 14.61 1.64 -0.41 -1.23 114
1974 15.28 1.06 -0.27 -0.79 113
1975 15.18 0.67 +0.22 -0.89 110
1976 15.84 1.29 +0.08 -1.37 116
1977 15.88 1.99 +0.03 -2.02 118
1978 17.52 1.83 -0.67 -1.16 120
1979 17.87 1.91 +0.29 -2.20 126
1980 20.16 2.00 -0.88 -1.12 130
1981 22.29 0.48 -0.55 +0.07 132
1982 23.19 0.30 +0.46 -0.76 140 **
1983 23.97 1.16 +0.49 -1.65 146 **
* Allows for changes in Bulog’s stock but not those in the private sector, as
country-wide or other surveys of private sector stocks have not been made. 
Also assumes 10% losses during harvesting and for seed plus 1% loss in 
marketing. This is an increase in losses from earlier calculations.
** preliminary
Sources: Production (converted from paddy at 68%) and population data from the
Biro Pusat Statistik; import and stock changes from Bulog. Quoted from 
Leon A. Mears, BIES 1984, op.cit, p. 126.
Between 1952 and 1956, production increased by 3.8 per cent annually, but this 
was mainly due to increases in the area harvested rather than higher yields.* By 1956,
Leon A. Mears, ”Rice and Food Self-Sufficiency in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, XX, No.2, August 1984, p.124.
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the level of production was again higher than that of 1940, but the population had 
meanwhile increased by around 20 per cent during that period, so imports of 800,000 
tons were necessary (see Table 3-3 on page 55). However, this Kasimo Plan was never 
adequately staffed or funded, and it never really got started.®
In the period 1956-1960, the first Five Year Development Program (Rentjana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahuri) gave priority to production increase by relying heavily on 
rehabilitation of irrigation facilities. It was planned to achieve a level of rice availability 
between 85 and 91.2 kg per capita by 1960.® Although this target was exceeded by 
1960, it was not achieved by domestic production so much as by rice imports (see Table 
3-3 on page 55).
A new program, based on Padi Centers, was introduced in 1959. This was later 
considered as the first program combining all the tasks of rice intensification, such as 
provision of education, information, fertilizers and pesticides. Lack of well-trained staff, 
the failure of the credit repayment system, and excessive centralization of the program, 
however, caused its termination in 1963, although the production of rice did increase 
during those years. But the program was considered a failure because of the necessity to 
increase rice imports by as much as 1.4 million tons in 1963 to meet the country’s basic 
needs (see Table 3-3 on page 55).
During the period 1960-1966, the government experienced constant budget deficits 
and inflation became much worse. The deterioration in agricultural infrastructure caused 
a decrease in area harvested in Java, where the area harvested in 1968 was actually 
lower than that of 1960. In addition, while rice consumption per capita declined by 
around 11 kg between 1960 and 1968, rice imports were fluctuating around a level close 
to one million tons (see Table 3-3 on page 55), at great expense to the country’s scarce 
foreign exchange reserves.
®For details, see L.A. Mears, 1981, op.cit; C. Peter Timmer, op.cit; L.A. Mears, 1961, op.cit; 
Anne Booth, "Irrigation in Indonesia, Part I,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, XIII, 
No.l, March 1977.
®L.A. Mears, 1984, op.cit., p.125.
7For details, see Tojib Hadiwidjaja, "New Trends in Agricultural Development Programs in 
Indonesia,” in Howard Beers, Indonesia: Resources and their Technological Development, 
Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1970; Alexis Reifel, "The Bimas Program 
for Self Sufficiency in Rice Production”, Indonesia, No. 8, October 1969; Ingrid Palmer, The New 
Rice in Indonesia, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD), 1976; Soedarnono Hadisapoetro, "Bimas Gotong Rojong and Agricultural 
Development,” Paper presented at Symposium on Problems of the Farmer and Bimas Gotong 
Rojong, No Year; Saleh Afiff and C. Peter Timmer, Rice Policy in Indonesia, Stanford, 
California: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1971; D. H. Penny, Masalah 
Pembangunan Pertanian di Indonesia, Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1978; and Gary E. Hansen, 1974, 
op.cit.
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The Suharto Period
Learning from its mistakes, the Sukarno government announced a new program in 
1964, known as BIMAS. The basic idea of this program was taken from the success of an 
intensification program carried out in 1963 by students of the Faculty of Agriculture, 
University of Indonesia (now IPB=/nstitut Pertanian Bogor, Bogor Institute of 
Agriculture) in three villages in West Java, involving 103 hectares of sawah. This 
project known as the Karawang Project, was an attempt to teach farmers the advanced 
technologies which came to be known as the Panca Usaha Tani (Five-fold way to better 
farming) which included: improved water control, use of selected seeds, use of fertilizers 
and pesticides, better cultivation methods, and stronger cooperatives.® In addition, 
facilities for credit, production inputs and marketing were to be provided through the 
establishment of cooperative organizations.
Emergence of the Bimas Program
The Karawang Project proved to be a success story and gave inspiration to the 
government to try to implement a new large scale program modelled on it. In the wet 
season of 1964/1965 the project area was expanded from the 103 hectares to 11,000 
hectares scattered throughout Java. The program was first called DEMAS 
(Demonstrasi Massal, Mass Demonstration), but after 1965 it became more generally 
known as BIMAS.
To improve the distribution of financial support for Bimas participants, the BRI 
(Bank Rakyat Indonesia) was given the task of distributing credit. Due to the rapid 
increase in demand for this credit, the KOLOGNAS (Komando Logistik Nasional, 
National Logistic Command), a forerunner of BULOG, was also given the task in 
mid-1966 of financing the participants, under the administration of the Governors and 
the Bupatis of the regions where the Bimas program was concentrated.
Under the Bimas program, the distribution of fertilizers, improved seeds and 
pesticides was made on a credit basis under which the farmers were to get all these 
prerequisites as a single package. This credit was later to be repaid out of their increased 
production. In addition, the introduction of new farming methods and intensive guidance 
to farmers was to be continued in a more effective way. In 1965/1966, 1,200 agricultural 
students were mobilized to carry out the program and in the following year, the 
extension services continued to expand. Rice production in 1966 showed an increase of 
12.8 per cent over the level achieved in 1963.
®Reifel, op.cit., p.13.
®E.A. Roekasah and D.H. Penny, "Bimas: A New Approach to Agricultural Extension in 
Indonesia” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No.7, June, 1967.
*®G. E. Hansen, 1973, op.cit., p.9.
^Mears and Moeljono, 1981, op.cit., p.29.
66
Table 3-4: Rice: Area Planted, Production and Yield for 
Java, Outer Islands and Indonesia, 1960-1983
Year Area Harvested 
(million ha)
Java Outer Indo-
Islands nesla
Production of 
milled rice 
(million m.t.) 
Java Outer Indo-
Islands nesia
Java
Yield 
(m.t./ha)
Outer Indo-
Islands nesia
1960 4.32 2.96 7.28 10.17 1.401961 3.99 2.87 6.86 9.58 1.40
1962 4.09 3.19 7.28 10.28 1.41
1963 3.65 3.08 6.73 9.16 1.36
1964 3.66 3.32 6.98 9.61 1.38
1965 4.01 3.32 7.33 10.24 1.40
1966 4.12 3.57 7.69 10.75 1.40
1967 4.02 3.49 7.51 10.40 1.38
1968 4.26 3.76 8.02 7.07 4.59 11.67 1.66 1.22 1.45
1969 4.29 3.72 8.01 7.50 4.75 12.25 1.75 1.28 1.53
1970 4.30 3.83 8.14 7.89 5.25 13.14 1.83 1.37 1.62
1971 4.41 3.80 8.32 8.44 5.24 13.72 1.91 1.38 1.65
1972 4.33 3.56 7.90 8.11 5.08 13.18 1.87 1.43 1.67
1973 4.57 3.84 8.40 8.86 5.74 14.61 1.94 1.49 1.74
1974 4.73 3.78 8.51 9.44 5.84 15.28 2.00 1.54 1.80
1975 4.65 3.84 8.49 9.33 5.85 15.18 2.01 1.52 1.79
1976 4.47 3.90 8.37 9.56 6.28 15.84 2.14 1.61 1.89
1977 4.38 3.98 8.36 9.33 6.54 15.88 2.13 1.64 1.90
1978 4.75 4.18 8.97 10.61 6.92 17.52 2.23 1.66 1.95
1979 4.63 4.18 8.80 10.68 7.19 17.87 2.31 1.72 2.03
1980 4.78 4.23 9.00 12.53 7.64 20.16 2.62 1.81 2.24
1981 5.05 4.34 9.38 13.96 8.33 22.29 2.76 1.92 2.38
1982 4.75 4.27 9.02 14.05 9.14 23.19 2.95 2.14 2.57
1983 4.59 4.37 8.96 14.40 9.57 23.97 3.14 2.19 2.67 *
* preliminary
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik- Quoted from Leon A. Mears, Bulletin of Indonesian
Economic Studies, 1984, op.cit., p.128.
The Inmas Program
In 1967, a severe drought damaged much of the rice growing area and reduced the 
level of production. In order to induce the farmers to increase their production, the 
government added the INMAS program (Intensifikasi Massal, Mass Intensification) in 
1967 alongside the BIMAS program, but without any provision for credit. The Inmas 
was aimed at farmers who ”were self-financing and voluntary participants,” and was ”an 
attempt to extend extension services and input supplies without placing a greater burden
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v 12on public credit resources.
The government was aware that production could not be increased merely by 
provision of credit and guidance for farmers. The incentive for farmers to plant padi also 
had to be strengthened and this could be done only if they received a suitable price for 
their product. Therefore, in 1968 the government introduced the Rumus Tani concept 
as an effort to provide a suitable rice price for farmers. This was carried out through a 
formula that the price of one kilogram rice should be equal to the price of one kilogram 
of fertilizer (urea) purchased by the farmers. This formula was the first deliberate 
attempt made by any Indonesian government to raise the price of rice as an incentive for 
farmers.
In the same year, 1968, a new program was added to the Bimas and Inmas 
programs. This involved the introduction of the new imported seeds being produced at 
the Los Banos International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, IR-5 and IR-8, 
which were called in Indonesia, PB-5 and PB-8 (PB= Peta Baru). Introduction of the 
seeds as part of the Bimas and Inmas programs gave rise to a new name, the Bimas 
Baru program, also the Inmas Baru: the old Bimas and Inmas were then called Bimas 
Biasa and the Inmas Biasa.
Until 1968, however, it was generally the case that farmers were reluctant to 
participate in Bimas. If they did participate in it they were pushed into it more by 
compulsion than by voluntary participation. The farmers’ reluctant to participate was 
caused by rigidities in the Bimas distribution system of production inputs for farmers. 
The amounts and combinations of the inputs were determined by the government, and 
this created frustration among the farmers because very often they did not correspond 
with their needs. As observed by Hansen:
The rigidities which came to encumber this program were preeminently 
embodied in the government’s approach toward the distribution of inputs to its 
peasant clientele. In this instance, there was a definite bias against deferring to 
the judgement of the peasant in the amount and kind of inputs necessary for 
satisfactory growth. Thus, the market mechanism which would permit the 
■ peasant to select his own combination of inputs, was eschewed in preference for 
the planning mechanism, which vested the power of choice in the hands of the 
bureaucracy. * *
^Ingrid Palmer, Indonesian Economy Since 1965, London: Frank Cass, 1978, p.82.
*3Mears and Moeljono, 1981, op.cit., p.31; C. Peter Timmer, 1981, op.cit., p.37.
l^Gary E. Hansen, "Indonesia’s Green Revolution: The Abandonment of a Non-Market 
Strategy Towards Change,” New York: SEADAG Papers, SEADAG., p.4.
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The Bimas Gotong Royong
Even in 1968, there were still difficulties in supplying credit, as well as obstacles in 
distribution of fertilizer to the farmers. The government then attempted to implement 
the ambitious BIMAS GOTONG ROYONG scheme (BGR). This was an attempt to 
create a large-scale extension program providing fertilizer and credit across entire areas, 
including the application of pesticides by crop-dusting aircraft, a procedure which gave 
rise to widespread criticism. Several foreign fertilizer and pesticide suppliers were 
contracted as suppliers in the program.
The function of these companies was to provide credit and distribute fertilizers and 
pesticides to the farmers at the farm gate through the village headmen. Apart from that, 
they also had the task of providing cash for allowances, seeds and advice to extension 
workers. In return for all this, they were to be paid by BULOG which, in turn, was to 
be recompensed in kind by the farmers in the form of one-sixth of the farmers’ total 
harvest. This repayment was to be carried out through the village headmen.
There were several reasons behind the introduction of the BGR. First, in order to 
avoid risks due to the inability of the government to fund a massive program by itself, 
foreign companies were to be involved heavily in the financing. Secondly, there was also 
an expectation that the foreign companies would assist in introducing and transfering 
the new technology of rice planting. Thirdly, it was hoped that participation of the 
foreign firms in the program would overcome the institutional and bureaucratic obstacles 
which had so far obstructed any real increases.* ®
In the planting season 1968/1969, the BGR program covered around one million 
farmers on 300,000 hectares in Java.*^ However, the scheme turned out to be seriously 
marred by technical difficulties and administrative disasters, which gave the entire 
program a bad name. To make matters worse, one European firm, COOPA, was also 
involved in a financial scandal connected with individuals very close to President 
Suharto himself. Administratively, the BGR was so large that no one institution could 
exercise effective control over its implementation, and this made effective coordination
*®Contracts were made with four West German companies: CIBA, COOPA, HOECHST, and 
AGRAR HYDRO TECHNIK, and with two Japanese firms: MITSUI and MITSUBISHI. See 
Mears and Moeljono, 1981, Ibid., p. 32; C. Peter Timmer, 1981, op.cit., p.39; G.E. Hansen, 1973, 
op.cit., pp.26-27.
* Mubyarto, Masalah Beras di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Ekonomi 
Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Gajah Mada, 1975, pp.70-71.
*^Mears and Moeljono, op.cit., p.32.
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difficult.*® In 1969, this program was terminated. Although the BGR scheme has since 
then had a bad name, it did in fact increase rice production by 4.2 per cent annually 
from 1968 to 1970 (see Table 3-4 on page 58).
The Improved Bimas
Although there had been an increase in rice production, imports were still high, 
reaching 960,000 tons in 1970. The government attempted to restructure the Bimas 
program so as to remedy the weaknesses which had been revealed by the failure of the 
BGR scheme. In 1971, it launched the Bimas Yang Disempurnakan (Improved Bimas) 
which was to be organized around a village unit [unit desa). One village unit or Wilud 
(Wilayah Unit Desa) was to cover an area of around 600-1000 hectares of sawah and 
each unit desa was provided with four types of infrastructure called Catur Sarana, 
needed to facilitate the provision of agricultural extension service and production inputs 
to the farmers.
The term infrastructure as used with regard to the Bimas program referred to the 
following: a) the extension service by the Agricultural Office, b) cheap credit from the 
bank (BRI), c) the distribution and sale of production inputs, i.e. fertilizer, pesticides 
etc., by village unit cooperatives, as well as by state and private companies, d) the 
marketing and processing of agricultural production which was also to be carried out by 
the cooperatives apart by state and private companies.*® To facilitate the 
implementation of extension service activities, farmers were divided into various farmers’ 
groups (Kelompok Tani). One such group was to be led by a model farmer known as 
Kontak Tani (Contact Farmer). He, in turn was to be the leader of about 15 to 20 
"progressive farmers” or Tani Maju who were each supposed to provide guidance to 15 
to 20 farmers who are members of a working group (Kelompok Kerja).
In theory, even the farmers’ wives were also to be given guidance on the new rice 
technology through the PKK [Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Association of
*®G.E. Hansen, 1973, op.cit., pp.32-33; Related to these organizational problems, there were, 
according to Mears and Moeljono, several other difficulties. First, the government had difficulty 
in paying the foreign contractors, and it was also hard to pay for rice imports, which remained 
high. These difficulties arose from the fact that the repayment of credit in the form of padi fell 
below expectations, as farmers found various ways to minimize their repayments. Secondly, it is 
quite understandable that the contractors tended to use their own insecticides, which proved to be 
not only not very effective but also harmful to fish in the ponds and rivers. Finally, farmers 
complained of "the centralized nature of the program and frequently resold the fertilizers that 
they had been given for ready cash rather than using it on their rice crops.” Mears and Moeljono, 
op.cit., p.32.
*®Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, "Badan Usaha Unit Desa, dan Masalah Pembinaannya.” Prisma, 
No.4, II, August 1973, p.35.
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Family Welfare),^ a section of the LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa). 
The children of the farmers, too, were to be grouped into Tani Taruna and Taruna 
Tani. In general, the government said it was "trying to bring the various elements of
the program closer to farmers and get away from the excessively rigid program which 
has been imposed on the farmers in the past”.
The new policy of the Improved Bimas was expected to have several advantages. 
As noted by Mears, one was to reduce the budget losses incurred through the BGR by 
better debt collection; another was to increase the concentration of the program in areas 
with the highest yield potentials; it should prove possible to reduce the amount of 
inducement now needed to compensate farmers for the risks anticipated, and similar 
benefits were expected to come from participation of private sector traders in input 
distribution and processing activities.
There were two aspects of the Improved Bimas scheme which were considered new. 
First, distribution of fertilizer, which was previously handled only by PN PERTANI, 
was now undertaken also by PT PUSRI and PERTAMINA as major distributors, while 
private traders were allowed to become involved in the distribution to farmers. This 
greatly increased the general availability of fertilizer for the farmers. Second, the floor 
price scheme was effectively implemented after 1970 (see Subsection on Price Policy 
below).
Between 1968-1974, production increased by 30 per cent, while yields were 
increased by 20 per cent. Also, rice consumption increased from 98 kg per capita in 1968, 
to 113 kg in 1974 (see Table 3-3 on page 55). However, from the Table it can be seen 
also that the production was still insufficient to meet the total demand for rice. There 
was still a high level of imports around 790,000 tons in 1974. This was caused by "the
^®PKK is a woman’s organization initiated by the Ministry of the Interior for women. Among 
its activities are evening classes in which the wives of the Camat or Village Headmen or woman 
teachers teach the women in their respective areas some civic education such as state ideology 
Pahcasila, or a course on how to make some kinds of cakes.
^The LKMD is a village level organization initiated by the government. It is conceived as a 
planning body at the village level (like the Bappeda at kabupaten or Bappenas at national level) 
with the function of taking initiatives and seeking the participation of villagers in assisting village 
government in planning and implementing village development programs. Its membership 
includes chairmen of various groups in the villages. Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Jawa 
Timur, "Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Operasional Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD) di 
Jawa Timur.” Unpublished, official document, Surabaya, March 28, 1981, p.9.
^Ace Partadiredja, ” Beberapa Masalah Dalam Produksi Makanan.” Prisma, Vol.IX, No.9, 
September 1980, pp.29-30.
^"Survey of Recent Developments”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, VI, 
November, 1970, p.8.
^Leon A. Mears, ”A New Approach to Rice Intensification”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, Vol.VI, No.2, July 1970, p.110.
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original shortfall, the higher total rice requirement from an increasing population, 
greater purchasing power due to rising incomes, and 25 per cent decline in the real rice 
price.” 2!*
During Repelita II (1974-1979), rice production increased by 3.0 per cent yearly. 
This was mainly due to a continuation of yield increases and no great price fluctuations. 
However, the production level was slightly lower than that of Repelita I because of 
attacks by the wereng pest in most saw ah areas throughout Indonesia in 1976 and 1977. 
Localised attacks by wereng were reported in 1974, but in 1976 the attacks were wide­
spread throughout all of Java for the first time. In that year wereng damaged around 
200,000 hectares or more of sawah.
The government’s efforts to reduce the damage through development of wereng 
resistant varieties such as PB-26, PB-28, and PB-30 were initially hampered by limited 
stocks of the varieties; therefore, farmers returned to the use of traditional varieties that 
were relatively resistant to the pest, even though their yields were not so high. The 
wereng attacks recurred again in 1979 and these again limited the increase of rice 
production in that year. Yet, the increase in rice production showed that the government 
had been successful in controlling the spread of the wereng pest and other diseases.
The increased yields for some parts of Java had resulted mainly from greater use of 
fertilizer. The consumption of Nitrogen fertilizer rose by an average rate of 20 per cent 
annually from 1969 to 1983. In the same period, the use of P205 was also increased at 
an average rate of 35 per cent annually (see Table 3-5 on page 64).
The increase in the use of fertilizers provides an indication of the change in the 
farmers’ attitudes toward the rice intensification program. By the mid-1970s, they were 
showing a more positive attitude than formerly toward the new agricultural 
technologies. As many reports have suggested, the farmers had to be compelled by 
government agencies during the Repelita I period, to plant the high yielding varieties 
and to adopt the better farming methods. This was known as a combination of stick and 
carrot (cheap credit and subsidized fertilizers and pesticides).25 6 However, with the 
increase in fertilizer consumption during the later years, it can be said that awareness 
among the farmers about the need for production inputs to increase their crops had 
become wide-spread.2
25L.A. Mears, 1984, op.cit., p.129.
26Howard Dick, "Survey of Recent Developments.”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol.XVIII, No.l, March 1982, p.28.
^Fertilizer was subsidized by the government to enable the farmers to buy at a low price. The 
amount of subsidy was more than Rp 1 trillion during the ten year period starting in 1971/1972, 
over 60 per cent of which was given to fertilizer produced in Indonesia. Details on Subsidy Policies 
can be found in L.A. Mears, 1981, op.cit., pp.422-426.
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Table 3-5: Fertilizer Consumption, 1969 - 1983 (000 tons)
Year N P205 K20
1969 155,2 36,2 1,0
1970 162,1 31,3 3,6
1971 219,2 24,2 1,0
1972 262,3 43,5 2,3
1973 312,0 65,3 1,9
1974 290,8 95,7 6,8
1975 311,3 110,2 1,0
1976 313,3 99,3 3,0
1977 442,4 104,7 9,7
1978 478,9 126,9 11,7
1979 550,9 129,9 17,8
1980 787,3 210,9 13,9
1981 946,0 299,2 14,9
* 1982 1,060,1 354,6 43,3
** 1983 973,4 317,3 54,3
* Figures corrected
** Preliminary Quoted
from Nota Keuangan, Ibid p.240.
In addition, improvements in the irrigation system have certainly also made a 
contribution towards the increase of rice production. Although it was said that 
approximately 85 per cent of the rice in Java was cultivated on wet lands (sawah), water 
shortages sometimes occurred even in the wet season. The government, therefore, gave 
special attention during the 1970s to the rehabilitation of irrigation and to the 
establishment of several new dams and many new irrigation channels.
The extent of rehabilitation of the irrigation system can be seen from the following 
figures. Under Repelita I, an additional 936,073 hectares were supplied with irrigation 
water. By the end of Repelita II, further rehabilitation schemes were extended to an 
area of 527,840 hectares, while new irrigation schemes were able to supply water to 
325,942 hectares. By the end of Repelita III, the government had been able to further 
rehabilitate 386,651 hectares of irrigated sawah and had established another 437,271 
hectares of new irrigation system. Thus, the total area of sawah rehabilitated by the 
government since Pelita I was 2.61 million hectares, or 29 per cent of the total area of 
padi in 1983 (8.96 million hectares in 1983, see Table 3-4 on page 58).
28Nota Keuangan 1985/1986, op.cit., p.346.
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The Insus Program
To further stimulate an increase of rice production the government introduced in 
1979 (the beginning of Repelita III) a new intensification program called INSUS 
(Intensifikast Khusus, Special Intensification). This program was also introduced as a 
part of the effort to prevent attacks of wereng. It was assumed that the tvereng pest 
could be reduced by planting padi at one time over a large area (tanam serentak), so 
that when the land was fallow in the next season, there would be no rice nearby to 
harbour the wereng and they would die out. The difference between Bimas or Inmas and 
the Insus is that while in the Bimas and Inmas Programs not all elements in the 
recommended package of inputs were fully used by farmers, in the Insus all of them had 
to be applied, i.e. high yielding variety seeds, irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides and 
improved cultural practices.
The Insus, like the Bimas program, operated only in irrigation areas. It began 
with 0.5 million hectares in 1979 and was to be progessively extended to cover all 
irrigation areas. For this purpose, the farmers’ groups in each village unit were to be 
utilized effectively in the program. Decisions on the time to plant, on seeds, amount of 
fertilizers, type of pesticides, and methods of farming and harvesting are left to the 
groups, but with the help of extension workers. This is to increase the farmers’ 
participation in the program. Stimulation was also given through Insus competitions 
among the farmers’ groups and through the provision of an Insus premium, which in 
1979 amounted to Rp 3 per kilogram for padi delivered to BUUD/KUD: since 1980 it 
has been continuously increased.
It was reported that the Insus program contributed to a considerable increase in 
rice production, with yields per hectare in 1981 of up to 10 tons under the program in 
some limited areas.^ Yields in excess of 6 tons per hectare are, however, extremely 
unusual with IR-36, except on small special plots. The sharp rise in the level of rice 
production in 1980 (by 17.3 per cent on Java and by 12.8 per cent throughout 
Indonesia), and also the steady increase in production from 1979 to 1983 by 7.0 per cent 
per annum on Java and by 6.8 per cent annually throughout Indonesia, were largely due 
to the Insus (see Table 3-4 on page 58).
^”Ruth Daroesman, "Survey of Recent Developments.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, Vol.XVII, No.2, July 1981, p.27.
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Price Policy
The New Order government realized in 1966 that new arrangements for the rice 
price should be made to ensure that it should be not too high for consumers, but at the 
same time not too low for producers. The technocrats responsible for economic policies 
were aware that during the Sukarno period the rice price had been kept low, well below 
the world price. Two factors had contributed to this: the low government purchase 
price for rice, and the large amount of rice imports. In 1967 the rice price rose suddenly 
by 300 per cent due to rice shortage. The shortage was aggravated by drought, a world­
wide shortage, insufficient government rice stock, and all these were then also 
complicated by panic and speculative buying of rice.3® This situation led to student 
demonstrations in that year demanding a lowering of the rice price.
The Rumus Tani of 1968 was, as mentioned above, the first attempt to ensure a 
more adequate price for producers, although in January 1968 the domestic rice price did 
in fact rise above the world parity level by 49 per cent: a very favourable situation for 
farmers. * In 1969, Mears and Afiff proposed a floor-and ceiling-price maintenance 
policy. It was designed to achieve four objectives.
1. Support for a floor price at a level high enough to stimulate production.
2. A ceiling price to assure a reasonable price for consumers (not too much 
above average purchasing power).
3. A sufficient range between these two prices to provide traders and 
millers a reasonable profit for the costs of holding rice between crop 
seasons.
4. Appropriate price relationships within Indonesia and internationally.
BULOG was given the task of operating this price policy from 1970 on. The 
introduction of this price policy, did not mean however that BULOG was charged to 
oppose market forces. BULOG’s actions in the market are intended primarily to reduce 
speculative fluctuations in the rice price, of a kind which were very marked before 1969, 
because traders were in a strong position to buy very cheaply at harvest time, then sell 
later in the year when prices became higher. They had an interest in creating low prices 
through collusion etc., and the farmers had no alternative, if they needed to sell padi, 
but to sell to them. The creation of a floor price at which BULOG comes into the 
market has changed that, at least in principle. It has not entirely eliminated 
fluctuations, but it has greatly reduced their range. * 32
3^*H.W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
No.10, June 1968, p.2.
Panglaykim, D.H. Penny, Dahlan Talib, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, No.9, February 1968, p.31.
32L.A. Mears, 1981, op.cit., p.391.
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During 1970-1971, BULOG was successful in implementing the new policy and the 
price of rice rose by 13.6 per cent of the level at 1969.**^ In 1972, however, production 
failed due to severe droughts throughout Southeast Asia, which caused a shortage of rice 
and sharp increases in its price. The increase in retail price revealed the incapacity of 
BULOG to purchase much padi and it was partly for this reason that in 1973, the village 
unit cooperatives (BUUD/KUD) were created, with the task of assisting BULOG in rice 
marketing and procurement activities.
The involvement of the BUUD/KUD in rice procurement was aimed, among other 
things, at competing with traders so that the possibilities for traders to get excess profits 
by lowering their prices below the floor price, would be reduced. BULOG itself has 
continuously been improved in its organization, management and the ability of its staff 
members to handle rice procurement activities, with the result that sharp fluctuations of 
rice prices were prevented (at least until the rice oversupply crisis of 1984-1985).
On the other hand, however, the KUDs have encountered many difficulties in 
management in competing with the private traders. In addition, before 1980, many 
BUUD/KUD were not provided with the drying floors needed to process padi, while wet- 
stalk padi was always priced below the floor price. Although in 1980 the government 
provided mechanical dryers for the cooperatives, the numbers were insufficient and not 
all KUDs received them. Hence, even prior to 1984, there were still many reports of 
farmers not receiving the floor price.
The Problem of Bimas Arrears
Behind the success in increasing rice production, however the Bimas program has 
had a continuous problem of reducing credit arrears that have accrued ever since 
Repelita I. The total amount of the arrears has steadily increased. Table 3-6 on page 68 
shows the distribution of Bimas credit for rice and arrears from 1971/1972 to 1982/1983.
One difficulty in analysing these figures is in comparing the total for each year. 
Every year, the figures have become larger because claims are still maintained. Yet, 
these figures also indicate, on the one hand, the difficulties facing by the government in 
claiming the credits from peasants in rural areas, and on the other hand, they show the 
lack of conviction among government officials in handling the claims, so that there is a 
suspicion that the arrears are not considered by the government as an important 
problem in rice policy implementation.
These arrears have occurred in part because of the system of Bimas credit
^Saleh Afiff and C. Peter Timmer, 1971, op.cit, pp.142-143; Mears and Moeljono, 1981, op.cit, 
p.47.
^Details on price policy can be found in L.A. Mears, 1981, op.cit., pp.396-417.
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Table 3-6: Distribution of Bimas Credit for Rice, 
1971/1972 - 1982/1983.
Yeax Distribution 
(billion Rp)
Repayment
(bill.Rp)
Arrears 
(b. Rp)
7. of
Arrears
Farmers
(000)
1971/72 9,8 9,5 0,3 3 1,538
1972/73 15,3 14,6 0,7 5 2,071
1973/74 36,5 33,6 2,9 8 3,107
1974/75 53,1 48,3 4,8 9 3,603
1975/76 72,3 64,6 7,7 11 3,582
1976/77 71,3 60,7 10,6 15 3,004
1977/78 62,5 51,2 11.3 18 2,471
1978/79 60,3 49,5 10,8 18 2,151
1979/80 49,5 41,8 7,7 16 1,607
1980/81 50,1 39,6 10,5 21 1,520
1982/83 59,4 29,4 30,0 51 1,372
1983/84 23,5 11,0 12,5 53 563
1984/85* 1,4 2 1,2 86 44
Credit of Inmas began since 1977/1978 
Situation on September 30, 1984. 
Source: Nota Keuangan R.I. 1985/1986, p.238.
distribution itself. Under that system, farmers who require credit have had to fill in a 
special form No.98-b personally or by collective registration through village officials. 
The form would then be sent directly by themselves to the village unit bank (BRI Unit 
Desa), after which they would receive the SPPB (Surat Perintah Pembayaran Bimas, 
Letter of Bimas Credit Disbursement).
This method was considered as one of the administrative weaknesses responsible 
for the credit arrears, since many cases of Bimas Fiktif arose, even as early as 1971. 
Because the total amount of arrears amounted by 1981 to billions of Rupiah, the 
government issued Presidential Instruction No.10/1981, on the basis of which a team 
known as TKPPKPM (Team Koordinasi Peningkatan Pengembaltan Kredit Program
**Jusuf Saefudin et.al., Aspek-Aspek Kelembagaan dalam Pembangunan Pertanian: Studi 
Kasus di DAS Cimanuk, Jawa Barat Penelitian Tahap III, Tahun 1977/78, Bogor: SDP-SAE, 
1978, pp.75-76.
®The term Bimas Fiktif applies to cases where a farmer (generally one of the more educated 
farmers) or local government officials registers several names of unidentified farmers, or registers 
several farmers without their agreement as Bimas participants, with the aim of collecting Bimas 
credit due to those farmers for their own personal purposes.
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Massal, Coordination Team for Increasing the Repayment of Mass Program Credit) was 
established at the provincial and kabupaten levels headed by the Regional Secretary 
(Sekwilda = Sekretaris Wilayah/Daerah).
Apart from that, the government tried in 1982 to change the method of credit 
distribution through the introduction of a new system, BIMAS POLA BARU, in several 
kabupatens in Java. Under the BPB scheme, credit was to be distributed through 
farmers’ groups themeselves. The form No.98-b now had to be signed by several officials, 
i.e. village head, extension worker, Chairman of the KUD, and the PPK (Pusat 
Pelayanan Koperasi).^
However, the lengthy procedure for obtaining the credit merely created delays in 
its distribution. Very often the credit was not received by farmers until late in the 
planting season. Moreover, the regulation requiring that credit be given only to KUDs 
which were able to repay a minimum 60 per cent of the previous credit advanced, also 
created problems when various farmers’ groups which had repaid their credits failed to 
receive further credit because other farmers’ groups remained in arrears.
The Decline in Bimas Participation
Another problem facing the Bimas program was the fact that in 1977 Bimas 
participation began to decline while the area planted under the Inmas scheme increased 
substantially. This trend has continued up to the present time. This can be seen in 
Table 3-7 on page 70 and also in Table 3-6 on page 68 which reveals a continuous decline 
in the number of farmers receiving the Bimas credit. The decline in Bimas participation 
was partly due to denial of credit by BRI to farmers who had defaulted on previous 
loans.
By this time, moreover, there was less need for provision of government-subsidized 
credit to encourage farmers to adopt the new rice technology and HYV seeds, for their 
profitability had become widely known. The original purpose of the Bimas scheme had, 
in effect, been achieved. Other factors behind the decline of Bimas participation, 
however, were delays in fertilizer distribution and the higher price of Bimas fertilizers 
over that of private traders. This will be further explained in the next chapter.
*^The bank was to distribute the credit to the KUD, which would further distribute it to the 
farmers’ groups. However, the bank would grant such credit only to KUDs which were able to pay 
at least 60 per cent of the previous credit distributed to the farmers’ groups. Thus, responsibility 
for the credit was now shifted directly into the hands of the farmers’ groups. It was hoped that the 
gemeinschaft character of the rural society would minimize the credit arrears, since farmers with 
debts would be shamed before the other farmers in their groups if they refused to make repayment 
of the credits. This hope has not entirely been fulfilled.
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Table 3-7: Bimas and Inmas of Padi: Area Harvested,
1969 - 1983 (000 Ha)
Year BIMAS INMAS Total
1969 1,309 821 2,130
1970 1,248 905 2,153
1971 1,396 1,392 2,788
1972 1,203 1,966 3,169
1973 1,832 2,156 3,988
1974 2,676 1,048 3,724
1975 2,683 954 3,637
1976 2,424 1,189 3,613
1977 2,069 2,181 4,250
1978 1,960 2,888 4,848
1979 1,571 3,452 5,023
1980 1,374 4,142 5,516
1981 a> 1,384 4,802 6,186
1982 a> 1,296 5,047 6,343
1983 b> 1,401 5,222 6,623
* INSUS is not included
a> figures are corrected
b> preliminary
Source: Nota Keuangan R.I. 1985/1986, p.235.
The Role of the KUD in Rice Policy Implementation
In 1973 the government adopted a new policy of utilising a rural cooperative 
organization, known initially as BUUD, later as KUD, as a key element in the system of 
rice instensification and procurement. Its decision to do so followed the rice crisis of 
1972, when it had been unable to purchase adequate stocks at a time of drought and 
severe shortages, not only in Indonesian but on the world market also. This policy was 
not entirely new, however. In 1969, the government had sponsored a pilot project for rice 
intensification in Yogyakarta. This project was an attempt to test the working of the 
four infrastructure schemes (Catur Sarana) needed by each such village unit. In order 
to provide the fourth of these, i.e. the distribution of production inputs and the 
processing and marketing of the products, a new cooperative organization was set up 
named BUUD.
The term ” cooperative” was not used in the new organization in order to avoid 
giving an adverse impression to farmers who had had bad experiences with the failure of
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former farmers’ cooperatives, KOPERTA, during the early Bimas program. The BUUD 
was itself a federation of various KOPERTA, and the initial idea behind its 
establishment was to try once again to include the cooperative in agricultural 
development activities.38 39It was expected that in the post-transitional period, the 
BUUD would be changed into a KUD. For the purpose of our discussion here, the term 
KUD will be used henceforth.
In 1973, the government made a decision to expand the number of KUD 
dramatically. This decision was motivated by three reasons: the success of the Yogya 
project, the rice crisis of 1972, and the government’s ideological commitment to a 
cooperative form of social organization. The Pilot project for rice intensification in 
Yogyakarta had proved successful in promoting the new type of cooperative among the 
farmers concerned, and its initiator, Prof. Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, was soon afterwards 
appointed Minister of Agriculture in 1972.
Moreover, because of the rice crisis in late 1972, in which BULOG failed to build 
up adequate stocks, the government decided to reform the system of rice marketing and 
procurement by involving the newly created KUDs in the system. In this new role, the 
KUD was given the task of purchasing wet padi or dry-stalk padi from the farmers at 
the local market price (in competition with private traders), processing it in the rice 
mills of the KUD and then selling the milled rice to BULOG.
The credit needed to purchase the padi was provided by the bank (BRI) which was 
also to supply the cooperatives with other credits to buy hullers and to provide the 
necessary training for its administrators.® President Suharto later explained in 1976 
that the involvement of the KUD in rice marketing and procurement activities was 
aimed at achieving two objectives: to enable the farmers to sell their padi at the floor 
price level, and to enable the cooperatives to develop the abilities needed for the 
marketing of the product.'*®
The support of the government for the KUD was also based upon the ideological 
commitment of the Republic as set out in the 1945 Constitution. Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution stated that the Indonesian economy is to be based upon the family spirit 
[jiwa kekeluargaan), and the Explanatory Memorandum states explicitly that the
38Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, 1973, op.cit., pp.31,37,38; and also Lampiran Pidato 
Pertanggungan Jawab Presiden/Mandataris Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia, 1973, p.108.
39
H.W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
IX, No.2, July 1973, p.6.
Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia di Depan Sidang Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, August 16, 1976, p.482.
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organization best fitted to implement that idea would be the cooperative. The primary 
objective of KUD is essentially similar to that of other cooperative organizations. 
According to the Cooperative Law No.12/1967, which was used as the basic law of the 
KUD, cooperatives are a means to increase the welfare of people and to strengthen their 
economic position.* 4^ A clearer staterpent on the objectives of the cooperatives is given in 
President Suharto’s August 17 speech in 1977.4^
The development objective is to increase the wealth equally. To achieve this 
objective, activities to increase production, equality in distribution of 
development results and activities in widening job opportunities, should be 
conducted simultaneously and in a balanced way. These activities can be 
carried out in a simultaneous and balanced way, if the economically weak 
group (golongan ekonomi lemah) is able to participate in development efforts. 
Thus, it is very important to create policies and actions to increase the ability 
of the group to participate in development programs. Cooperatives are a form 
of economic organization which have a social character. Thus, the cooperatives 
represent an organization which has great potential to increase the ability of 
the economically weak group in participating actively in development efforts 
and to facilitate all efforts to distribute the results of development equally.
The KUD is constituted, theoretically, as an organization for all rural people, so 
its objective is to increase their wealth. As a rural cooperative, the KUD was 
theoretically to be set up by the rural people themselves. In the first regulation on 
BUUD, Presidential Instruction No.4/1973, it was mentioned that BUUD was a 
transitional organization prior to the establishment of KUD, which was to be built up by 
and for the rural people. 4 On the basis of this regulation, therefore, the board of the 
KUD was to be selected and appointed by its members, and the board was to give 
progress reports to its members, all these being done at meetings of the members which 
were considered the highest authority of the organization.
The government’s efforts to motivate the development of KUD were carried out 
step by step. During Repelita /, efforts were made to restore the position of 
cooperatives as economic and social institutions of rural people, because under the Old 
Order government they had become merely a political tool of various political groups
4^The statement that cooperatives are considered to be economic organizations suitable for the 
Indonesian economy can be found in the Penjelasan Tentang Undang-Undang Dasar Negara 
Indonesia (Explanation on Constitution of the State of Indonesia) which contains an explanation 
of the meaning of each article in the 1945 Constitution.
4^Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia di Depan Sidang Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, August 15, 1974, p.609.
4^Lampiran Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia di Depan Sidang Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, August 16, 1977, p.X/3.
44Makali and Endang L.H., "Bentuk-Bentuk Kerjasama Ekonomi Skala Kecil dan 
Perkembangan BUUD-KUD di 6 Desa Sampel Dalam DAS Cimanuk,” Paper presented in 
Lokakarya Sejarah Sosial-Ekonomi Pedesaan, Cipayung, January 22-24, 1979, p.II-1;
Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, "Badan Usaha Unit Desa dan Masalah Pembinaannya,” op.cit., p.35.
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seeking political support. This effort was translated into one main program, an 
educational program on cooperatives. This was done through various courses on
cooperatives to cadres of cooperatives, teachers, cooperative extension workers, and
• 46courses in accountancy.
During Repelita //, a more deliberate effort was made than had previously been 
done to increase the role of the economically weak group in their business activities in 
order to increase their wealth. In this context, the government took three measures. 
First, it increased the education on cooperatives, especially on management. Second, it 
provided the necessary opportunities for cooperatives to carry out business activities; 
and, finally, it provided credit facilities. In this period, the government also provided the 
cooperatives with an increase in capital, guidance in business and organization, training 
and educational facilities, and the improvement of research on cooperatives.^
During Repelita II, the government formally changed the status of the BUUD 
under Presidential Instruction No.2/1978. The character and function of the KUD were 
very considerably changed in this regulation. In the new regulation, the BUUD has been 
determined as the advisory body to the KUD, but its previous roles as a cooperative 
organization were tranferred to the KUD. The differences between the original 
Presidential Instruction No.4/1973 and No.2/1978 on the position and role of BUUD 
and KUD can be summarized as follow:'*®
INPRES 4/1973 INPRES 2/1978
(BUUD/KUD) (BUUD/KUD)
Organization: a.BUUD was to be an
economic organization a.BUUD is a non-structural 
of farmers prior to organization beside KUD.
the establishment of 
KUD.
b.BUUD is carried on to b.BUUD to be the "pioneer, 
fuse primary guide, motivator and pro­
cooperatives into KUD. tector" of KUD.
c.BUUD carries out 
business activities.
c.BUUD prohibited from 
carrying out business 
activities.
d.BUUD board elected by 
members.
d.BUUD board to be appointed 
by executive body headed 
by the Camat.
Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia Soeharto di Depan Sidang Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, August 16, 1985, p.XI/4.
Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia Jenderal Soeharto di Depan Sidang 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, August 16, 1975, pp.489-495.
^"Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden, 1985, op.cit., p.XI/4.
Quoted and translated from Makali and Endang L.H., 1979, op.cit., pp.II-2, II-3.
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e.All farmers were to 
members.
Service: Bimas Farmers only.
Function: a.Provide guidance on
agriculture only.
b.Provide credit for 
Bimas farmers.
c. Supplier and distri- 
tor of production 
inputs.
d. Processing and 
marketing of Agri- 
products
e.......
Area: One village unit
(600 to 1,000 ha. sawa
In Repelita III, the government’s effort to develop the cooperatives was aimed at 
increasing the role and ability of the cooperatives, especially the KUD, in order that 
they would become the strongest economic force in the rural areas. Two programs were 
devised to implement the objective: a program for developing the organization of 
cooperatives, and a program for developing the business activities of cooperatives.*
Eleven years after its formation, it could be seen that the KUD had achieved some 
progress. The number of these cooperatives had increased from only 35, around 
Yogyakarta, in 1970 to 2,361 in 1973 and 6,579 in 1984 throughout all of Indonesia. The 
membership, according to official registrations, had also increased from 2.5 million in 
1973 to 12 million in 1984 (see Table 3-8 on page 75). A big jump occurred between 
1983 and 1984 when the membership increased by 26 per cent, and this was probably 
caused by the government’s determination to achieve a membership target of 12.5 
million members in 1984. This target led local governments to recruit new members of 
KUD by whatever means they could.
If the membership figures above are reliable, it means that each KUD has on the 
average 1,824 members. However, data on KUD’s membership presented by the Central
be e.Members are all persons
receiving the services of 
KUD.
All rural People to carry out
business activities.
a. Provide guidances on 
agriculture, cattle- 
breeding, fisheries, 
plantation and craft 
industries.
b. Provide credit for 
farmers, traders, breeders, 
crafstmen.
c. Supplier and distributor 
of production inputs and 
nine basic commodities.
d. Processing and Marketing
of agricultural, fisheries, 
plantations and crafts 
products.
e. Trade and tranportation.
One kecamatan
^ Ibid., pp.XI/4-5.
^Meth. Kusumahadi, ”Mari Kembali Ke UU No.12/67,” Kompas, July 12, 1985.
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Table 3-8: Development of KUD and Number of Members, 1973-1984
Yeax Number of KUD Number of Members 
(000)
1973 2,361 2,4591978 4,444 3,1161983 6,327 9,5391984 6,579 12,009
Source: Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden RI, 16 August 1985, pp.XI/ll k 14.
Bureau of Statistics indicated that in Java, where KUDs were concentrated, there were 
2,302 KUDs in 1983, and only 589 (25 per cent) of them have 1,000 members or more 
(see Table 3-9 on page 76). In other words, 75 per cent of KUDs in Java had less than 
1,000 members in 1983. Some KUDs even had only as many as 20 members.
Moreover, the total of 12 million members throughout Indonesia achieved in 1984 
was still a small proportion of the 124 millions of rural villagers (23 million households) 
in that year. Moreover, most of the members did not actively participate in the KUD, 
and often did not even know that they were enrolled as members of the cooperatives. 
The small number who were actively involved were the better-off farmers. The lack of 
participation can be seen, for example, from the fact that most of the KUD’s capital has 
come from government subsidies, not from membership fees.
The government’s effort to develop the business activities of KUD have also 
recorded some progress. At the end of Repelita I, there were 1,558 KUD involved 
actively in rice procurement activities and they were able to purchase 281.3 thousand 
tons of rice or its equivalent. During the Repelita II, the number of KUD involved in 
the activity increased to 2,125 with rice procurement amounting to 444.5 thousand tons 51 52 53 54
51
Biro Pusat Statistik, Daftar Nama dan Alamat Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) 1983, Jawa.
52
The Indonesian population was 147 million in 1980, and the number of households was 30 
million. The population in village areas was 114 million in that year, while the rate of population 
increase was 2.21 per cent annually. Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia, 1980-1981; and for 
details on this problem, see also Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, "Supaya Diperhatikan Aspek 
Pembangunan Kelembagaan KUD,” Kompas, August 6, 1984; and ”Prof. Soedarsono Tentang 
KUD,” Kompas Editorial, August 8, 1984.
53M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Neraca Perkembangan Koperasi 1985,” Kompas, July 11, 1985.
54Soedarsono Hadisapoetro, "Kepesatan Perkembangan Koperasi Tergantung dari 
Pemerintah,” Kompas, July 10, 1985.
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Table 3-9: KUD Membership in Java, 1983
Amount of Members Number of KUD
0-1,000 1,713
1,001-2,000 402
2,001-3,000 102
3,001-4,000 41
4,001-5,000 19
5,001-6,000 13
6,001-7,500 5
*7,501- 7
Total 2,303
3 KUDs had 11,000 members; one had 12,000; two KUDs had 18,521 and 
36,788 members respectively.
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Daftar Nama dan Alamat Koperasi Unit Desa
(KUD), 1983, Jawa.
of rice equivalent. At the end 1983, out of a total of 6,327 KUD, 2,246 were involved in 
procurement activity and they purchased 970.1 thousand tons, while at the end of 1984, 
2,291 KUD were involved in the activity with rice equivalent purchasing amounting to 
2,046.4 thousand tons. The number of KUD involved in the distribution of fertilizer 
and pesticides, and the amount of these two production inputs distributed also increased 
(see Table 3-10 on page 77).
Since 1981, in order to increase the role of KUDs as rural cooperatives handling 
the needs of rural people, the KUDs have also been given other tasks by the government. 
Beside their roles in distribution of production inputs and purchase of rice, they have 
also been instructed to maintain floor prices of maize, mungbeans, soybean, cloves, 
peanuts, broiler chicken, and eggs. In addition, they also manage the Candak Kulak 
credit system, i.e. small credit for petty traders, and deal with the new and very 
important sugar cane (TRI = Tebu Rakyat Intensifikasi) program.
However, alongside the successes noted above, there have also been various 
weaknesses in the KUD, some of which were first reported as occurring in 1973 and 
apparently they are still prevalent today. In the first procurement activities undertaken
Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia,” Ibid., p.XI/21.
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Table 3-10: Development of Stock and Distribution of Fertilizer 
and Pesticides by KUD, 1973/74-1984/85 (in 000 tons)
Season FERTILIZER PESTICIDESKUD Stock Distri­ KUD Stock Distri­
bution bution
1973/74 1,623 332 314 297 107 561978/79 2,825 385 300 2,190 2,465 1,8961983/84 3,647 697 458 2,645 5,827 3,7281984/85 3,555 253 143 2,365 2,482 532
Decline in amount of stock and distribution in 1984/85 due to data on the 
second crop season of that year not yet available.
Source: Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden RI, 16 August 1985, pp. XI/27 & 29.
in 1973, the KUD were ordered to buy dry stalk padi below the official floor price. 
Hence, many farmers refused to sell their padi to KUD, and local officials had to compel 
the farmers to sell to them in order to fulfil the rice procurement targets determined 
from Jakarta. In some areas it was even reported that soldiers were used in the efforts 
to force the peasants. In his analysis of the emergence of that situation, Arndt 
suggested.
...an understandable but unrealistic desire to protect the interests of urban 
consumers - and the government finances - by trying to bring the retail price of 
rice back to something like the mid-1972 level; coupled with the government’s 
continuing determination to give top priority in the rice program to the 
requirements of its own military and civilian employees; a misguided zeal in 
Jakarta to create effective cooperative overnight - partly perhaps in the age-old 
hope of reducing distribution margins by cutting out the private middleman - 
and in the provinces to demonstrate that the BUUD could deliver the rice; and 
behind all these, a belief that market forces could be overruled or controlled by 
sufficiently determined government action.
The attitude of local government officials as indicated above created an 
uncontrollable situation in many regions. Hence the government issued an instruction on 
July 3, 1973 abolishing the national rice procurement target and allowing the KUD to
For details on this affair, see H.W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, IX, No.2, July 1973, p.7; and Peter McCawley, "Survey of Recent 
Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, IX, No.3, November 1973, pp.2-5.
^H.W. Arndt, op.cit., p.8.
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buy and sell rice on the open market. The government announced that it would itself 
purchase rice for the national stockpile only in Java and South Sulawesi, and this was 
done only if the market price fell to the floor price.®® As a result, it was reported that 
development of KUD improved, i.e. in their abilities to compete with rice traders in 
buying padi from farmers at a small advantage. However, it seems that rice 
procurement targets remained and that compulsion to achieve the targets has 
subsequently been carried out, but in a more refined method.
On November 19, 1974, the government issued five basic policies on production 
and supply of food, including decisions to increase the fertilizer price and the price of rice 
as from February 1, 1975.. The government explained that decisions to increase prices of 
fertilizer and rice were taken in order to reduce the cost of the subsidies on both 
commodities. However, one objective of the policies was also to lessen the influence of 
private traders in the rural rice market and to strengthen the role of the KUD.* 59
These rice price and procurement policies did not yield satisfactory results, 
however. The KUDs still had difficulties in management as an intermediate between 
farmers and BULOG despite improvements in their organizations. Amongst complaints 
to the cooperatives were allegations that the rice price often fell below official floor price, 
and accusations that KUD boards were purchasing padi from farmers at low prices and 
then selling to BULOG at higher prices.®9 These problems also seem still prevalent and 
the government apparently has no measures in hand to remedy such malpractices.
The management of KUD itself was run not by the farmers but mostly by local 
government officials. This kind of situation has persisted ever since 1973, when the 
government decided to expand the number of KUD dramatically. At that time, Peter 
McCawley reported that "most of the BUUD were simply official organizations formed 
upon instructions from above and run by local government officials.”The same 
situation seems to continue up to the present.
In 1976, fertilizer consumption was reportedly decreasing and this was taken as an 
indication of the inability of KUDs to handle distribution of fertilizer, although it had 
been given a monopoly in distribution of the fertilizer. This was mainly caused by 
unqualified managers of most KUDs. Hence, in June 1977, the government reopened 
opportunities for private traders to become involved in distribution of fertilizer. 
Moreover, in August 1977, the government ordered the KUDs to sign contracts with the
5®P. McCawley, op.cit., p.6.
59Anne Booth and Bruce Glassburner, "Survey of Recent Development,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, XI, No.l, March 1975, p.23.
®9Indonesian Observer, April 16, 1975; Kompas, April 17, 1975.
Peter MCawley, "Survey of Recent Developments,” op.cit., p.3.
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distributors of fertilizer showing the price and tonnage of fertilizer received. This was 
done to protect the interests of both distributors and consumers.®2 The problem now is 
that there are still complaints about delays in fertilizer distribution, which means that 
KUDs still have difficulties in improving their distribution mechanism, and still face 
problems in increasing the capabilities of their managers.®*
During the period 1976-1977, wereng attacks resulted in a decline in rice 
production, which in turn resulted in a decrease in domestic procurement by KUD, so 
that BULOG had to increase the amount of rice imported. The decrease in domestic rice 
procurement in 1976-1977 continued into 1979, when a combination of wereng and rats 
attacked large areas of sawah in Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara Barat. However, these 
pests were not the only factor behind the decrease of procurement. It was also caused by 
an instruction by the Minister for Cooperatives that created confusion over the 
procurement price among the KUD. In this context Booth and Amina point out.
At the end of January, the Minister in charge of Cooperatives (who is also 
head of BULOG) issued a detailed directive which listed various quantitative 
and qualitative criteria to be used by KUD officials in determining procurement 
prices. To receive the full price of Rp 85 per kg, gabah had to have a maximum 
of 14 per cent moisture content, 3 per cent dirt content, 3 per cent red, yellow 
or broken content and 5 per cent green or mildew content. Gabah sold at the 
farmgate to traders or KUD agents would receive less than the official gabah 
procurement price of Rp 85, the difference being taken up by transport costs 
and trade margins....The procurement price per kg was to be quite 
substantially reduced if the gabah was wet, dirty or contained broken and 
empty grains....As the Director-General of Cooperatives acknowledged in mid- 
April, it was perhaps unfortunate that the KUD procurement price for good 
quality gabah had been given so much publicity, as farmers naturally felt 
cheated when they received less for their sales, either because of the poor 
quality of their crop or because of other reductions due to transport costs and 
marketing margins.
In October 1978 in an effort to "upgrade” the standards of the KUD, the 
government introduced a new concept of a "model KUD”. In this context, the 
government had previously selected 104 KUD (mostly situated in Java) out of 4,444 
KUD throughout Indonesia to serve as the Model KUD. At the end of Repelita III, 
when the number of the KUD had risen to 6,546 the government designated 3,701 KUDs 
as Model KUD.65 To be a Model KUD, a KUD has to fulfil the tiga sehat conditions of
®2H.W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
XIII, No.3, November 1977, p.22.
®5On the lack of capability of KUD managers, see "Laporan Sekitar KUD: Kualitas Manager 
Merupakan Faktor Renting,” Kompas, September 19, 1984.
®^Anne Booth and Amina Tyabji, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, XV, No.2, July 1979, p.26.
®5Nota Keuangan 1985/1986, op.cit., p.226.
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being sehat mental, sehat orgamsasi, and sehat usaha (three healthy conditions: 
mentally, organizationally, and in business activities). One of the criteria for evaluating 
its progress is through the ability of a KUD to recruit a minimum of 5,000 members. 
Again, with the fact that most of the KUDs have less than 1,000 members, this 
designation will create many unreal Model KUDs.
Furthermore, it was still reported that most farmers, especially the smaller ones, 
continued to prefer to sell their rice elsewhere rather than to the KUD.66 One reason for 
such action was that the farmers generally needed cash during the harvest time, while 
the KUD generally failed to make purchase at that moment because of delays in credit 
distribution from the bank. The farmers, therefore, had to sell their rice cheaply to 
private traders who were often the big farmers or even managers and staff of the KUD 
itself. Beside that, there was a problem of distance; in cases where farmers lived far away 
from the KUD office they refused to sell their rice to KUD because of the additional 
costs they had to pay for transportation.
In order to help the development of KUD, the government continuously provides 
financial assistance to the cooperatives through the development of various KUD 
facilities. In 1981, for example, the government provided funds to set up more than 1,000 
warehouses with a capacity of 135 ton each. It also established more than 5,000 storage 
blocks of 20 tons capacity for each, and 11,500 local retail kiosks. In addition, Rp 15 
billion was distributed in 1981 to the KUDs to build rice mills, mechanize dryers, drying 
floors, and fertilizer and pesticide warehouses.6' However, it is also reported that many 
of the retail kiosks were never used. A more detailed discussion of the actual working of 
particular KUDs in Malang residency will be given in Chapter Seven.
In summary, the colonial government began to get heavily involved in rice 
problems in 1933 through various efforts to increase production, the regulation of 
imports and exports of rice, and the maintenance of the rice price at a low level. These 
were just a clear indication of the growing importance of rice as the main agricultural 
commodity in Indonesia. Under Sukarno, various rice intensification programs were 
launched in order to increase production, but they failed to achieve their objectives 
because of weaknesses in administration of the program and lack of incentives to achieve 
the farmers’ enthusiastic participation in increasing production.
The Suharto government has made various improvements in the programs to 
increase rice production. Farmers’ demands for production inputs (fertilizers, seeds etc.)
6”Laporan Sekitar KUD: Swasta tetap Unggul dalam Pengadaan Pangan,” Kompas, 
September 18, 1984.
Ruth Daroesman, op.cit., p.25.
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and a cost of living component between harvests have been tackled through low interest 
credits. The enthusiasm of farmers to plant padi was raised and maintained through the 
introduction of the new price policy in 1968-1970. In addition, many irrigation channels 
were improved, while agricultural extension was strengthened. The farmers, as a result, 
have been assisted in obtaining production inputs which have become easier, and the 
new rice technology also became widely adopted. It was not surprising, therefore, that 
production of rice increased continuously throughout the years 1970-1985.
Behind that success, however, there remained the fact that the rice intensification 
programs all had various administrative weaknesses which created many problems, and 
there were even allegations that the programs had failed to increase the welfare of small 
farmers. Among the problems afflicting the programs were billions of rupiahs of credit 
arrears, and the decline in Bimas participation. Many farmers decided to leave the rigid 
Bimas scheme and moved to the more flexible Inmas and Insus programs.
Other weaknesses in the implementation of rice policies can be seen also in the 
implementation of the KUD program. The KUD had initially been set up to assist the 
government in distributing production inputs, particularly fertilizers, and to help the 
farmers in processing and marketing their products. However, the rice crisis of 1972 
made the cooperatives a rice procurement tool of the government, and this role has 
apparently become more prominent than the other roles. As a result, the KUD seems to 
be more a government agency than a farmers’ organization.
Apart from that, there are some other factors strengthening the above impression. 
First, many farmers have in fact no access to these cooperatives, and the cooperatives 
have failed to obtain support from them. Most of the farmers still prefer to sell their 
rice to private traders rather than to the KUD. Second, most of the KUD are dominated 
by elite members of the kecamatans, including local government officials, while the 
ordinary farmers generally have no role at all in the cooperatives. Unfortunately, the 
elite members dominating and running the management of the KUD are generally 
unqualified managers, so that there are many reports about weaknesses in their 
management.
Third, because most of the KUD’s capital and facilities come from the government 
and not from farmers themselves, most of the cooperatives’ activities are directed 
towards carrying out the government’s programs, such as maintaining the floor price of 
commodities other than rice (maize, soybean, cloves, peanuts), distributing credits for 
petty traders, and involvement in the sugar cane program. The government has, of 
course, claimed some progress achieved by the KUD: notably the increase in the 
numbers of KUD and their membership.
However, there is also a suspicion that the number stated is unreal. The target
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system applied by the government has created many KUDs which have no activities at 
all and are just called "Sign Board KUD” (KUD Papan Nama) and at the same time 
most of their members do not know about the cooperatives and are not aware that they 
are members of them. The problems faced during the implementation of Bimas and 
KUD programs are mostly administrative rather than economic in character. Hence, the 
organization of Bimas and the KUD will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Organization of Bimas and KUD Programs 
at National and Regional levels
Various government ministries institutions, and enterprises, both government and 
private, are involved in the Bimas and KUD programs. The leading roles in the 
programs, however, have been played by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Cooperatives. The Ministry of Agriculture has responsibility for implementation of the 
Bimas program and the Ministry of Cooperatives for the KUD program. It has been 
determined that the local government apparatus should take a role in the 
implementation of the programs in their regions. This chapter will describe the 
organizations responsible for implementation of the the Bimas and the KUD programs at 
both national and local levels. It will also describe the duties of the various 
organizations in planning, monitoring and evaluation of the programs.
It is worth noting at the outset, however, the share of the budget allocated to the 
financing of efforts to increase rice production by way of either the Bimas organization 
or agricultural extension (through BPLPP). From the budget, we can get an initial 
measure of how much importance is attributed to the programs for increasing food 
production, including rice, in comparison with other programs of the Agricultural 
Ministry. It can be seen from Table 4-1 on page 84 that the total budget of the 
Agricultural Ministry has increased by 38.8 per cent annually, and that the budget for 
programs to increase food production increased by 31.6 per cent annually during the 
period 1974-1983. The latter program is only one of several of the Ministry’s programs, 
which varied in number between 10 and 18 during that period; the budget for food 
production increase was, however, the biggest of these throughout that period. This 
shows the high priority given to the program.*
There are 13 bodies within the Ministry of Agriculture, including the BAKO 
BIMAS and BPLPP. Among these bodies, the Directorate General of Food Crops 
received the biggest budget throughout the period of 1974-1983, while the position of 
BAKO BIMAS varied between number two and four. Sometimes, as in 1974/1975, the
lRancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja (Pembangunan), Departemen Pertanian, 
from 1974 to 1982/1983.
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Table 4-1: Budget Planned for Food Programs, 1974-1983, (mill.Rp)
Year
(1)
Total Budget 
of Agri.Min.
(2)
Budget for 
Food Prod. 
Increase
7 of
No. 1
(3)
BAKO
BIMAS
7, of 
No. 1
(4)
BPLPP 7. of 
No. 1
1974/75 15,535 5,394 34.7 2,632 16.91975/76 28,787 7,420 25.8 3,500 12.2 3,922 13.61976/77 47,044 13,983 29.7 5,811 12.4 3,306 7.01977/78 54,676 17,260 31.6 7,210 13.2 4,963 9.01978/79 66,700 22,000 33.0 9,025 13.5 5,030 7.51979/80 85,918 23,000 26.8 9,640 11.2 5,560 6.51980/81 122,359 30,450 24.9 12,550 10.3 11,700 9.61981/82 155,185 36,000 23.2 13,367 8.6 17,550 11.31982/83 193,649 43,300 22.4 21,555 11.1 25,615 13.2
Notes: Agri.Min = Agricultural Ministry
BPLPP = Balai Pendidikan &. Latihan Penyuluhan Pertanian 
(Educational & Training Centre for Agricultural Extension)
Source: Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja (Pembangunan),
Departemen Pertanian, various issues.
budget for BAKO BIMAS was lower than that of the Directorate General of Forestry, 
but it was higher than the other bodies. Since 1976, however, the government has given 
more attention to the agricultural extension efforts, so that the budget for the 
agricultural extension body (BPLPP) was continuously higher than that for BAKO 
BIMAS (see Table 4-1 on page 84). Yet, that did not mean that the food production 
increase program has been given less priority, because that body has also served the 
needs of the program.
The BAKO BIMAS at the National Level
At the national level, the government, in order to handle the rice intensification 
programs, established in 1969 an organization called the BADAN KOORDINASI 
BIMAS (BAKO BIMAS, Coordinating Body of Bimas).* 3 Up to now, there have been
^ Ibid.
3This organization was established on the basis of Presidential Decision number 95/1969 under 
the name BADAN PENGENDALI BIMAS. On the basis of Presidential Decision No.6/1979, the 
name was changed to BADAN KOORDINASI BIMAS; and in 1983 (Presidential Decision 
No.62/1983) the name BADAN PENGENDALI BIMAS was restored.
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three presidential decisions issued to improve the organization.^ The discussion below 
will be based on the structure and role of BAKO BIMAS as based on Presidential 
Decision No.6/1979 because that was the one in force when my research was conducted, 
and also because the new presidential decisions did not make many changes to the 
structure and role of the body, particularly at the local level.
Structurally, the BAKO BIMAS is under the Ministry of Agriculture. It is headed 
by the Minister of Agriculture and has played a role in formulating policies and giving 
guidance for the implementation of the Bimas program. For example, the decision by 
the Agricultural Minister on Annual Planning of the Bimas program is made by this 
body. The name of coordinating body is used to show that there are various ministers 
involved in the body under the coordination of the Minister of Agriculture.®
The day-to-day operation of the BAKO is conducted by the SATUAN 
PENG ENDALI BIMAS (SP BIMAS, Controlling Body of Bimas) headed by the Vice 
Minister of Food Crop Production (Menteri Muda Urusan Produksi Pangan). Thus it is 
he who had the most direct responsibility for the day-to-day management of Bimas 
operations and the trouble-shooting role in dealing with local problems and breakdowns. 
Several Director Generals, Assistants and Chairmen of Bureaus of the various Ministries, 
and also the President Director and Director of the government banks were involved in 
the SP BIMAS.* 6
To assist the SP BIMAS in the daily operations of the program there is a 
secretariat headed by a secretary, the Director General of Food Crops who doubled also 
as the secretary of the BAKO BIMAS. The Secretariat included four bureaus: 
Administration, Planning and Programming, Supervision, and Credit and Production
^Presidential Decisions No. 95/1969, No.6/1979, and the latest, No. 62/1983, which is 
currently valid.
^Members of the BAKO BIMAS are the Ministers of Home Affairs, Public Works, Finance, 
Labour and Transmigration, Trade and Cooperatives (these two ministries: the Ministry of 
Labour and Transmigration and Ministry of Trade and Cooperative have since been divided into 
four ministries, i.e. Ministries of Labour, Transmigration, Trade, and Cooperatives.), Menteri 
Negara Penertiban Aparatur Negara/Deputy of BAPPENAS, Vice Ministers of Transmigration, 
Cooperative, and Food Crops, and Governor of the Central Bank (Bank Indonesia).
6They are: Director Generals of Irrigation (of the Ministry of Public Works), Domestic Trades 
(of the Ministry of Trade), Cooperative (of the Ministry of Cooperatives), Basic Chemical 
Industry (of the Ministry of Industry), Monetary (of the Finance Ministry), Pemerintahan Umum 
dan Otonomi Daerah (of the Ministry of Home Affairs), General Information (of the Ministry of 
Information), Radio & Television, Assistant to the Coordinating Minister of Economic, Finance 
and Industry/Deputy of the Economic Section of the BAPPENAS, Secretary of the 
SESDALOPBANG (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan, Secretary of 
Development Operation ), Deputy of BULOG, Chairman of the Bureau of Statistics, Chairman of 
the Institution of Education, Training and Extension of Agriculture, Director of Credit of the 
Central Bank, and President Director of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).
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Inputs.' In addition, there is a Technical Team that assisted the Secretary of the SP 
BIMAS in the daily operations of the secretariat. Members of the technical team are 
staff members of several ministries involved in the Bimas program.
One of the duties of BAKO BIMAS is, as mentioned above, to make an annual 
plan for the rice intensification program. Generally, the plan includes area targets of 
intensification to be achieved by provinces, estimates of the use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, amounts of agricultural credit to be distributed, and guidelines for 
implementation of the program by regions. Guidelines for the plan come from the book 
of REPELITA in which plans or targets for the areas, and levels for rice production to 
be achieved within the period of five years, are laid down.
These national targets are further specified as targets for the provinces; the 
specification is made in a technical meeting between the BAKO BIMAS and delegations 
of the Bimas organization at province level, SPBP (Satuan Pembina Bimas Propinsi, 
The Provincial Body of Bimas Managers), represented by the Head of Province Diperta 
(Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan, Food Crop Agricultural Office).® In the meeting, 
according to some staff members of the BAKO BIMAS, instructions are given by the 
BAKO BIMAS to the SPBP of the provinces about targets that must be achieved by the 
regions, rather than a discussion of the ability of the regions to achieve the targets 
taking place. Bargaining, of course, occurs in the meeting, about any targets which 
particular provinces feel are beyond their capacity. However, for each reduction in area 
proposed by the provinces, the government tries to ensure that there is a compensatory 
proposal by other provinces to increase their production targets.
Alternatively, a reduction in the area target of one province should be 
compensated for by an increase in the target area in another provinces. The reason for 
this, is the fact, that the crucial objective is not achievement of target area but the rice * &
^Presidential Decision No.62/1983 lays down that these bureaus have been expanded to eight: 
Administration (Tata Usaha), Planning (Perencanaan), Credit Distribution and Claim 
(Penyaluran dan Pengembalian Kredit), Supply & Distribution of Production Input (Pengadaan
& Penyaluran Sarana Produksi), Food Crop & Horticultural Productions Control (Pengendalian 
Produksi Tanaman Pangan <fc Hortikultura), Cattle Breeding & Fisheries Production Control 
(Pengendalian Produksi Peternakan <fe Perikanan), and Statistics, Reports, and Evaluation 
(Statistik, Laporan dan Evaluasi).
®The specification is carried out by the Planning Bureau of the BAKO BIMAS. The BAKO also 
distributes various forms to the SPBP seeking information about their proposals regarding their 
areas and production targets. After the specification of targets and the proposals of the provinces 
have been received, there is a technical meeting to discuss them. This meeting is headed by the 
secretary of the SP BIMAS and attended by all heads of bureaus and sections of the secretariat 
and by the technical team. Invitations to attend the meeting are distributed also to the SPBP, 
which are usually represented not by the Governors but by the Heads of Diperta of the provinces. 
Before 1983, the technical meetings were always carried out in Jakarta, but in 1983, they were 
carried out in Pandaan, East Java and in 1984 in Semarang.
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production target. This creates difficulties for the provinces, because it is difficult for 
them to agree about such compensation. However, there is a tendency among them 
simply to accept the stipulations of BAKO BIMAS (which is considered a representative 
of the central government) in order to maintain their reputation (nama baik) in the eyes 
of the central government. Whether or not they can, or will subsequently achieve the 
production target set for them, tends to be seen as a quite secondary issue. Any shortfall 
can be explained away later.
The results of the technical meeting continue to be discussed by the technical team 
of the BAKO BIMAS. The task of the technical team is, among other things, to 
systematize the proposals received during the meeting and to polish up a draft. The 
second draft from the technical team is then sent to a joint meeting (rapat gabungan) 
between the BAKO BIMAS and representatives of SPBP which is again represented by 
Heads of Provincial Diperta. The results of this meeting are again sent to the technical 
team for further polishing. The draft is then brought to the Minister of Agriculture, as 
chairman of the BAKO BIMAS, to be signed as a SK MENTERI PERT AN IAN 
(SK=5urot Keputusan, Decision of the Agricultural Minister) as the blue-print for 
implementation of rice intensification programs for the coming year. This decision is 
then sent to each SPBP of the provinces.
A monitoring system for program implementation has been developed in the 
BAKO BIMAS, although it seems that there is no serious evaluation on the results of 
the monitoring. There are various reports that must be sent - weekly, forthnightly, 
monthly, mid-yearly and yearly - by the SPBP to the BAKO BIMAS. These reports 
generally include data on the area planted and development of production, the situation 
and stock of production inputs, and reports on agricultural credit. For each province and 
kabupaten, the BAKO BIMAS sends various kinds of forms that are used for the reports. 
The forms are completed locally and returned to Jakarta.
Beside these regular reports, monitoring is also carried out through SSB (Single 
Side Band Radio) from the provinces. This is done every Monday and covers the 
condition and development of the area of intensification, production inputs and credit. 
The data received from the SSB are used in the Rapat EKUIN (Meeting of Economic, 
Finance, and Industrial Ministers with the President) which is held every Wednesday at 
BINA GRAHA, the presidential office. In addition, there is a weekly telegram sent 
directly by the SATPEL BIMAS KABUPATEN (SPBK = Satuan Pelaksana Bimas 
Kabupaten, The Kabupaten Body of Bimas Implemented) to the SESDALOPBANG 
office, also at BINA GRAHA. The telegram is constructed in a uniform style and sent 
by every kabupaten by Friday of each week.
®Interview, Ir. Dadi Mulyadi M.Sc., and Sumaryono S.H., staff members of BAKO BIMAS, 
September 27, 1984, and January 9, 1984.
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Reports from the SPBP of the provinces are received by the Bureau of Supervision 
of BAKO BIMAS.10 However, the main job of the bureau, according to staff there, is 
simply to compile the reports and then present the accumulated data to the Secretary of 
the BAKO BIMAS and the chairmen of the Ministry of Agriculture, as data for cabinet 
meetings. Therefore, the bureau has been called by its staff a mere Biro Tusuk Sate 
(bureau to stab meat as satay) to describe its duties as the simply compilation of various 
reports from below. 1
This te.sk of compiling all the reports from throughout Indonesia keeps the bureau 
quite busy. Therefore, one of the factors behind the lack of evaluation on program 
implementation is that there is no time actually to evaluate the provincial reports. The 
second factor perhaps is the lack of capability of staff members of the bureau to make 
such evaluation. Although some of them are university graduates at MA level, they 
have, mostly, no experience in local matters since they are recruited directly into the 
BAKO BIMAS office in Jakarta without prior appointment at local level.
The third reason is a tendency to avoid causing shock waves for the entire 
program by concealing the real situation. This causes a deterioration of the quality of 
the data put forward to the top level of administration because the staff often send up 
figures that they think their superiors want to believe have been reached. The staff 
members learn that they can get away with "padded” figures so long as they are not too 
outrageously wrong. The final reason for the lack of any real evaluation is the inability 
of BAKO BIMAS to coordinate the various ministries involved in the program. This is 
explained further in the following paragraph.
Actually, a monitoring system for program implementation has been developed by 
each office involved in the Bimas Program, covering not merely the Bimas program but 
also other programs in each office. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture has given 
the task to its subordinates at regional level of sending the weekly, fortnightly, and 
monthly reports on the execution of the various functions of the ministry. Similar tasks 
have also been given by other offices to their subordinates in the regions.
Stocks of fertilizer and their distribution, for example, must be reported by 
branches of PT PUSRI (Perseroan Terbatas Pupuk Sriwijaya) to their central office in 
Jakarta.12 Also, the stock and distribution of pesticides in regions must be regularly 
reported by branches of PN PERTANI (distributor of pesticides owned by the
10The Presidential Decision No.62/1983 has changed this bureau to the Bureau of Statistics, 
Report and Evaluation.
^Interview Ir. Yan Bastian, staff member of Bureau of Supervision of BAKO BIMAS, 
September 27, 1984.
12The name PUSRI refers to the factory and distributor of fertilizer. The majority capital is 
owned by the government. Its factory is located in Palembang, South Sumatra.
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government) to their central office in Jakarta.*^ Furthermore, reports on pest attacks 
have been sent to the Directorate General of Plant Protection of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
The BAKO BIMAS should, theoretically, receive all these reports from each office 
involved in the rice intensification program. However, as explained by the Deputy 
Secretary of BAKO BIMAS, many offices regularly fail to send the copies to BAKO 
BIMAS. According to him, this is a problem of coordination and in fact many of the 
offices do not want to obey the requirement to send copies of the reports to BAKO 
BIMAS. In his words, ”they are more worried about their direct superiors than about 
the BAKO BIMAS”.*^ Although the BAKO is a coordinating body, it seems, if this case 
is typical, that the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture is still unable to solve the 
coordination problems.
Therefore, program evaluations, as explained to me by one staff member from the 
BAKO BIMAS,are taken mostly from reports made by universities or other 
institutions which carry out research into program implementation, or through joint 
research between the BAKO BIMAS and the universities. In 1978, for example, joint 
research was undertaken with the Universitas Padjadjaran of Bandung producing one 
report titled "Survai Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Intensifikasi Padi dan Palawija Tahun 
1971-1978”.*® A perhaps more serious monitoring and evaluation exercise has been 
carried out by the Planning Bureau of the BAKO BIMAS. Because of its responsibility 
for planning, the Bureau makes its own evaluation on program implementation and its 
staff members have sometimes made visits to regions to seek more information.
The SATUAN PEMBINA BIMAS PROPINSI (SPBP) at the Province Level
At the provincial level, the SPBP is divided into two bodies: the MUSYAWARAH 
PEMBINA BIMAS PROPINSI (MPBP, Conference of Bimas Managers), and the 
PEMBINA HARIAN BIMAS PROPINSI (PHBP, Executive of Bimas Managers). The 
former is headed by the Governor and has responsibility for the whole outcome of Bimas 
implementation in his province; the latter runs the day-to-day operation of Bimas and is
^Besides these two bodies, there are several other enterprises that have licenses to import and 
distribute fertilizers and pesticides. They are PT. Panca Niaga, PT. Aneka Niaga, PT. Lamtoro 
Agung, CV. Jaya Niaga, PT. Cipta Niaga, and PT. Intrada.
^ Intermew, Ir. Amrin Kahar, Deputy Secretary of BP BIMAS, Jakarta, January 5, 1984.
*®Ir. Darmo Gandagunawan, staff member of the Bureau of Supervision of BAKO BIMAS, 
Interview, January 9, 1984.
*®The survey indicated, for example, the lack of numbers and the poor capacities of personnel, 
as well as lack of facilities, as factors responsible for the leveling off of Bimas participation since 
1976, along with the fact that only a small percentage of farmers actually know about KUD. 
Badan Pengendali Bimas & Universitas Padjadjaran, ” Survai Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Intensifikasi 
Padi dan Palawija, 1971-1978,” Unpublished Report Vol.I, 1978, p.65 & p.74.
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headed by the Head of Provincial Diperta. To assist the PHBP, a secretariat is set up, 
located at the office of provincial Diperta.* This PHBP is actually involved directly in 
handling implementation of Bimas, while the MPBP has tasks mainly concerning annual 
planning and is only involved in Bimas affairs if there are serious problems that are 
unable to be solved by the PHBP.
The SK MENTERI PERTANIAN, as mentioned above, establishes the guidelines 
for the Governors in planning the implementation of the Bimas program in their 
provinces. The target area for intensification determined for each province, as mentioned 
in the decision of the Agricultural Minister, is then further broken down into a set of 
targets for each kabupaten. This specification is the task of the MPBP. For this purpose, 
the Governor invites all the Bupatis and Chairmen of the PELAKSANA HARIAN 
BIMAS KABUPATEN (PHBK, the Kabupaten Daily Implementers of Bimas) to a 
meeting. Besides specifying the targets, the meeting is also required to prepare a draft 
for a SK GUBERNUR (Surat Keputusan Gubernur, Governor’s Decision) to set 
guidelines for the Bupatis. In the decision, target areas to be achieved by the 
kabupatens, are attached.*®
Targets for every kabupaten are determined on the basis of estimates of the 
abilities of each kabupaten, calculated for area and previous production of rice. Data 
used for the estimates come from reports sent by SPBK. In this case, the area and 
production targets are usually made the same as targets for the previous year. Therefore, 
a meeting on targets can be considered a routine meeting. Discussion occurs only if 
there are increases in the required targets of particular kabupaten which they feel are 
beyond their capacities.
As at the national level, however, the discussion does not provide an opportunity 
for rejecting the targets determined by the province. It is a forum for bargaining, 
although the usual result is that the targets are accepted by the kabupaten. As at the * 18
^Members of the MPBP are divided into two categories: the Anggota Tetap (Occasional 
Members) and the Anggota Tidak Tetap (Regular Members). Occasional members of the MPBP 
consist of all Heads of KANWILs of the government ministries involved in the Bimas program; 
members of the MUSPIDA I; the Branch Chairman of BRI and Chairman of DOLOG. The 
regular members of the MPBP are Regional Directors of PN PERTANI and PT PUSRI, and the 
Manager of PUSKUD. PN PERTANI is a government enterprise that has the responsibility, 
among other things, for distributing and supplying pesticides. PUSKUD or Pusat Koperasi Unit 
Desa, is a federation of KUDs which represents the interests of the KUDs at the provincial level. 
At the national level there is INKUD (Induk Koperasi Unit Desa, literally Mother of the 
KUD”) as representative of KUD at that level.
18At this meeting, and in other meetings of the MPBP, the Governor is usually represented by 
the Head of the Bureau of Production Development of First Level Region (Kepala Biro Bina 
Pengembangan Produksi Daerah Tingkat I). All members of the MPBP are involved in the 
arrangement of the SK GUBERNUR, but the targets for the kabupatens are specified and 
prepared technically by the Secretary of PHBP, who is assisted by all Chairmen of PHBK of 
kabupaten, i.e. Heads of Kabupaten Diperta.
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national level, there is a convention that failure to achieve a target in one kabupaten 
should be compensated for by the efforts of other kabupatens. However, the increase of 
targets is usually not far above the previous targets.
Monitoring and evaluation of the program are carried out by the secretariat of 
PHBP which receives various reports from the SPBK of Kabupatens. The weekly report 
from kabupatens is a report on the development and situation of the intensification 
areas. The report on the situation and stock of production inputs is made fortnightly. 
The monthly report comments upon area intensification development and distribution 
and payment of credit. In addition, there is also a weekly report received from the office 
of the Pembantu GubernurThis is a report on the intensification area, pesticides and 
fertilizers from all kabupatens in the area of the Pembantu Gubernur,20
All these reports will be compiled by the Secretariat and sent to Jakarta by telex 
every Monday as weekly reports from the province. The contents of the report include 
data on the planning and realization of Bimas and Inmas for Padi Sawah, Dry Field 
Padi (Gogo), Corn, Soybean, Peanut, Small Green Pea, Cassava, and Sweet Potato. For 
all these reports, the Secretariat of PHBP has prepared various forms, and thus the 
PHBK of Kabupatens just fill in the forms and sends them to Surabaya. The secretariat 
also has the task of evaluating program implementation. This is done every month by 
staff of the Evaluation Section in the office. These evaluations are based mostly on 
periodical reports from kabupatens. Sometimes, visits to the kabupatens are made by 
staff members of the Secretariat to check the implementation process.^*
The Secretariat, however, is not an institution that has the power to resolve 
problems uncovered during the implementation process. Each case is tackled by the 
office which has the task of handling it. For example, any lack of fertilizer found by 
staff members of the Secretariat during their visits to kabupatens, would be passed on to 
the Branch of PT PUSRI. Alternatively, problems in credit distribution would be 
reported to the BRI. This can be done by a telephone call or letter from the Chairman 
of the PHBP to the Branch Chairman of the factory and the BRI, but such reports 
should also be made known to the Governor. Thus, if the Chairman of the PHBP sends 
a letter of this kind to the PT PUSRI or to other institutions involved in the programs, 
he should send copies to the Governor.
*®The administrative area of the Pembantu Gubernur, includes four or five kabupatens.
^This report is sent through a special official who must come to the Secretariat of PHBP in 
Surabaya each Friday. The reports must not be sent by post because they must reach Surabaya 
on time and the SPBP allots travel expenses especially for this activity.
^Generally, two persons go on each occasion to the Secretariat of the PHBK of kabupaten to 
collect information on problems found in the implementation process and evaluate them in reports 
for Chairmen of the SPBP Interview, Ir. Taufiqurrachman, Staff member of the Secretariat of 
SPBP, Surabaya, February 20, 1984.
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If an unexpected problem is discovered by the SPBK, reports to the province 
would be made by the Bupati as well as the Head of Kabupaten Diperta to the Governor 
and the Head of Province Diperta. Reports on pest attacks or lack of production inputs 
in certain areas, for example, are received by the Governor from the Bupati and by the 
Head of the Provincial Diperta from the Head of Kabupaten Diperta. Thus, the Bupati 
would not directly report a problem to the Head of Provincial Diperta as Chairman of 
PHBP, because the latter is not the Bupati’s superior. Furthermore, decisions and 
methods for solving the problems could not be directly communicated by the Head of the 
Provincial Diperta to the Bupati. They have to be signed first by the Governor and sent 
by the governor’s office to the Bupati. The draft and content of the decision, of course, 
are in fact made by the Head of the Provincial Diperta who is assisted by the secretariat 
of the SPHBP; but the formal hierarchy has to be maintained.
The SATUAN PELAKSANA BIMAS KABUPATEN (SPBK) at the 
Kabupaten Level
It is important to clarify briefly at the outset, the structure of kabupaten 
administration. The Bupati, in administering the kabupaten, is assisted by a Regional 
Secretary (SEKWILDA) who leads and coordinates several sections in the kabupaten 
office. These are called Bagian and each of them is led by a Head of Section called 
Kepala Bagian. According to the Decision of the Home Affairs Minister No. 130/1978 
the number of sections is eight: Government Affairs; Law, Organization and
Management; Finance; Economics; Development; Social Welfare; General &: Public 
Relations and Protocol; and Personnel. In some kabupaten such as Malang, there are 
nine sections, because the Section of General & Public Relations and Protocol has been 
subdivided into the General and Protocol Section and the Public Relations Section.
Among these sections, the Economic Section is required, inter alia, to handle the 
implementation of the Bimas and the KUD programs. There are three subsections in the 
Economic Section: Pembinaan Perekonomian Rakyat (Development of the People’s 
Economy) handling the KUD’s affairs,Pembinaan Prasarana Perekonomian Rakyat 
(Development of Facilities for the People’s Economy) handling the Bimas Program and 
other agricultural development programs, and Perusahaan Daerah ii Perbankan 
Daerah (Regional Enterprise and Bank).
There are also several Kantors (offices) and Dinas Daerah (regional services) 
operating in a kabupaten. The Kantors are divided into two categories: the Kandep and 
the Kantor. The Kandep (abbreviation of Kantor Departemen) are branches of the
^This is based on Kabupaten Regulation (PERD\=Peraturan Daerah) No. 2/1983. 
^It also handles the Sugar Intensification Program (TRI).
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central government ministries at the kabupaten level. They are subordinate to the 
Kanwil (Kantor Wilayah, Area Office) at the provincial level. The Kantors are 
branches of some Directorate Generals in the Ministry of Interior at the kabupaten level. 
They are subordinate to the Directorates at the provincial level. In daily conversation, 
both the Kandep and the Kantor are called ”Kantor.
The regional services (Dtnas-Dinas Daerah) of the kabupaten, as mentioned, are 
the technical offices (aparat pelaksana) which implement kabupaten policies. They are 
organs of the kabupaten and subordinate to the Dinas Daerah Propinsi (Provincial 
Dinas) at the provincial level. In their daily activities, the dinas are responsible to the 
Bupati but technically they are also responsible to Dinas at the provincial level.^ 
Among the dinas daerah that are involved in the program implementations are the 
Diperta, Plantation, Animal Husbandry, and Public Works. There are no kantors of 
the Directorates General involved in implementation of the two programs.
In addition to these governmental bodies, there are various other government and 
semi-government institutions and enterprises that are involved in implementation of the 
Bimas and KUD programs at the level of the kabupaten. Such institutions, among other 
things, are Sub-Dolog, ® the branches of the BRI (BRI Cabang), and branch offices of 
the distributors of fertilizers and pesticides.
^Some Ministries of the central government which possess branches (Kandep) at the level of 
kabupaten are the Ministries of Education and Culture; Information; Transmigration; 
Cooperatives; Trade; Post and Telecomunications; and Agriculture. Each Kandep is led by a head 
of office called Kakandep (abbreviation of Kepala Kantor Departemen) who, technically and 
administratively, is responsible to Kakanwil (abbreviation of Kepala Kantor Wilayah or head of 
office) at the provincial level. In their daily activities, however, the Kakandeps are coordinated 
by and also responsible to the Bupati. Several Directorate Generals in the Ministry of Home 
Affairs that possess Kantors at the kabupaten level are Directorate Generals Agraria (Agrarian 
Affairs), Pembangunan Desa (Village Development), and Sosial Politik (Social and Political 
Affairs). Technically and administratively, these kantors are responsible to their Direktorat at 
the provincial level, while their daily activities are also coordinated by the Bupati. Employees of 
the Kandeps and Kantors are called pegawai pusat (central government employees). They are 
paid by the central government. Among the Kandeps that are involved in the Bimas and KUD 
programs are those of Information and Cooperatives.
^The structure of the dinas is regulated by a Decision of the Home Affairs Minister No. 
363/1977. The dinas are Dinas Pertanian Tanaman Pangan (Kabupaten Diperta, Food Crops), 
Perikanan (Fisheries), Peternakan (Animal Husbandry), Kehutanan (Forestry), Perkebunan 
(Plantation), Perindustrian (Industry), Kesehatan (Health), Pekerjaan Umum (Public Works), 
Tenaga Kerja (Labour), and the Dispenda (Dinas Pendapatan Daerah= Regional Tax Office). 
Thus, at the kabupaten level there are two offices of agricultural affairs: the Kandep of 
Agriculture as an institution of the central government, and the Kabupaten Diperta as a local 
government institution. Employees of the dinas daerah are divided into three categories: the 
Pegawai Pusat Diperbantukan (the central government employees seconded to the dinas 
daerah), the Pegawai Pusat Dipekerjakan (the central government employees employed in the 
dinas daerah), and the Pegawai Daerah Otonom (the local government employees). Both 
Pegawai Pusat Diperbantukan and Pegawai Pusat Dipekerjakan are paid by the central 
government, while the Pegawai Daerah Otonom are paid by the local government.
^®Sub-DoIog is a branch of DOLOG (Logistic Office) at kabupaten level.
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The SPBK includes the MUSYAWARAH PELAKSANA BIMAS KABUPATEN 
(MPBK, Conference of Kabupaten Bimas Implemented) headed by the Bupati and the 
PELAKSANA HARIAN BIMAS KABUPATEN (PHBK) which runs the day-to-day 
implementation of Bimas and is headed by the Head of Kabupaten Diperta.27 The 
Secretariat is headed by a secretary who is appointed from the staff of the Kabupaten 
Diperta. He is assisted by a Deputy Secretary who is appointed from staff of the 
Economic Section of the Kabupaten Office.
The membership of the PHBK in Malang is divided into four groups: 1. 
Kelompok Pembantu Pimpinan Pelaksana Harian ("Group of Assistants to the 
Chairman of Daily Implemented");28 2. Kelompok Ahli/Tehnik (Experts and 
Technical Group);29 303. Kelompok Penyuluhan/Penerangan Bimas (Bimas Extension 
and Information Service Group);**9 4. Kelompok Pengawas Bimas (Supervisory 
Group).
The tasks of SPBK are mostly administrative, although sometimes its intervention 
is needed to solve problems that cannot be handled by SATUAN PELAKSANA BIMAS 
of Kecamatan. Therefore, the groups above are actually not active, except the first 
group which is considered the real implementer of the Bimas program at kabupaten 
level. It is the group which has responsibility in monitoring and evaluating the program
27Among the members of the MPBK are members of MUSPIDA II. The chairman of PHBK 
has three deputies i.e. the Heads of the Plantation Office, the Animal Husbandry Office, and 
Fisheries Office.
281 hey include the Head of the Economic Section in the Kabupaten Office, the Chairman of 
the Kabupaten BRI, the Chairman of the Cooperative Office, the Chairman of Sub-Dolog, the 
two Chairmen of the Brantas River Irrigation Offices in Malang and Kepanjen Sections, the 
Chairman of PUSKUD Representatives, and the Inspector of Plantation Enterprise XXIII (PTP 
XXIII).
This group is headed by the Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture of Brawijaya University, a 
government university in Malang. His deputy is the Principal of the Agricultural High School at 
Malang (SPMA = Sekolah Pertanian Menengah Atas). The secretary of this group is the Head of 
the Economic Section in the Kabupaten Office, while his deputy is Head of the Agricultural 
Development Project in Ngantang (the name of one kecamatan in Malang). Members of this 
group are officials from the Branch of the Agricultural Research Centre, the Branch of the Pest 
Research Centre, Laboratory of Animal Diagnostics, and officials of the PERUM SANG HYANG 
SERI (seed enterprise). The function of this group is to provide technical suggestions, for example, 
in planting methods or in ways to counter pest attacks.
30 It is headed by the Head of the Information Office who is assisted by an official from the 
Kabupaten Diperta as a deputy. Members of this group consist of an official from Radio Republik 
Indonesia, the Head of Public Relations in the Kabupaten Office, an official of the Kabupaten 
Diperta, one of each from the Animal Husbandry, Plantation, and Fisheries Offices. This group 
has the task of providing information necessary for Bimas implementation.
I his group is headed by an official of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Its secretary is an 
official of the Economic Section in the Kabupaten Office. Members of the group are Military and 
Police Officers, officials of the Sub-Directorate of Politics and Social Affairs in the Kabupaten 
Office, of the BRI, the Cooperative Office, the Kabupaten Diperta, Plantations, Fisheries, and 
Animal Husbandry Offices.
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implementation, and in making the necessary decisions, in the name of the Bupati.
Thus, among the four groups, the first group is the most active group in the
implementation process of Bimas program.
Meetings of PHBK are always attended by members of the first group and the 
meetings take place in the office of one, and then another member of this group, in 
rotation. The Head of the Kabupaten Diperta, in the name of the Bupati, leads the 
meetings. The arrangements for the meeting are not the same for every kabupaten. In 
Malang, meetings are held monthly on the first Wednesday of the month. In Jember 
Kabupaten, the meeting is also held every month, but in Kediri it occurs twice a week. It 
very much depends upon how much attention is given by the Bupati to the Bimas
program. In Malang, the Bupati rarely attends the meetings, and during the survey, he
attended the meetings only twice (see Chapter Five).
The other groups involve themselves only if there are problems which cannot be 
handled by the first group, but such cases are rare. The expert team, for example, is 
rarely asked for its suggestions because technical problems can usually be handled by 
officials of the Kabupaten Agricultural Office (Diperta). Or, in the case of difficulties, 
the officials of Kabupaten Diperta prefer to seek suggestions from their superiors at 
province level. This is because members of the expert team are quite unknown by most 
staff members of the Kabupaten Diperta.
Members of the Information Group are in fact made up of people who have no 
background in agriculture. Thus, information for farmers is mostly provided by 
agricultural extension workers (PPL) at the level of kecamatan. The Supervisory Group 
also rarely takes actions against malpractices or scandals that occur during the 
implementation process. Many financial scandals in Bimas and KUD are not remedied, 
and during my research only ten village officials and ten staff members of BRI Unit 
Desa were sent before the courts (see Chapter Five).
On the basis of targets determined in the SK GUBERNUR, the MPBK will further 
determine targets for each kecamatan. In this context, the Bupati gives instructions to 
the Chairman of the PHBK, i.e. the Head of the Kabupaten Diperta, to work out the 
targets in detail. Technically, this task is carried out by the Secretary of the PHBK: in 
this he is usually assisted by the Sections of Statistics and Production in the Office of 
the Kabupaten Diperta. Part of the task is to estimate the need for seed. In addition, 
with the help of the Subsection of Pembinaan Prasarana Perekonomtan Rakyat of the 
Economic Section in the Kabupaten Office, the Secretary makes plans regarding the need 
for production inputs for the coming year. He also estimates the water supply required 
for irrigation with the help of the Water Irrigation Section in the Public Works Office, 
although these estimates are usually similar for each year.
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When such plans for the kecamatan targets have been prepared, a meeting of the 
MPBK is held to discuss the plans and to prepare a SK BUPATI (Bupati’s Decision) 
that will serve as a guideline for the implementation of the rice intensification program 
in the kabupaten. This is also a routine job for the organization, and targets for 
kecamatans are usually based on, and similar to previous targets. Around the time of 
implementation, the Bupati invites all camats and village headmen to hear explanations 
of the policy and ways of implementing it. There is no further determination of targets 
at the kecamatan level. The Satuan Pelaksana Bunas Kecamatan and Desa (village) 
are expected merely to execute the policy.
Implementation of the program is linked with the tasks of each office, but the 
leading role is in the hands of the Kabupaten Diperta. The Kabupaten Diperta, for 
example, has responsibility for the supervision of agricultural extension, the area of 
intensification and protection against pests; the BRI for the distribution of agricultural 
credit; the Cooperatives Office (Kantor Koperasi) for developing the KUD; the 
Irrigation Section of the Public Works Office for Water Irrigation Management; the 
Information Office for handling information services for the programs; and Sub-Dolog for 
rice stock activities and preventing sharp fluctuations in the rice price. Officials of each 
office, therefore, possess two kinds of responsibilities, on the one hand, to the Bupati 
both as a Chairman of the SPBK and as the sole administrator of the kabupaten, and on 
the other hand to their own superiors at the provincial office.
To manage the Bimas program and other tasks, the Kabupaten Diperta, for 
example, has four sections in its office, i.e. Statistics, Production, Plant Protection, and 
Agricultural Extension."a Each section receives regular reports from staff at the 
kecamatan level. Beside that, once a month the Head of this office conducts a meeting 
with all the staff of his office and at the kecamatan level. Further explanation of the 
monitoring system in the office will be presented in the section on SATLAK BIMAS 
KECAMATAN below.
The Kantor Koperasi (Cooperatives Office) as an agency of the Ministry of 
Cooperatives at the level of the kabupaten has the duty of supervising cooperative 
organizations, including the KUD. There are four sections in the office: the Binagram 
(Pembinaan Program or Programming Development Section) Binor (Pembinaan 
Organisasi, Organization Development Section), Binus (Pembinaan Usaha, Business
*^Data on agricultural development in the kabupaten, such as registrations of agricultural 
production per year and per kecamatan and other data can be obtained at the Statistical Section. 
The production Section has the responsibility for developing agricultural production and planning 
ways to maintain a certain level of production or increase it. If in one kecamatan there is a pest 
attack, this problem will be handled by the Section for Plant Protection. The Agricultural 
Extension Section, in addition, is a section which coordinates the work of extension workers at the 
kecamatan level.
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Development Section), and Penyuluhan Koperasi (Cooperative Extension Service 
Section). The office has its own monitoring system and some of its staff are placed in 
each KUD in order to help the KUD and also to run the monitoring system. This will 
further be clarified in the section on the KUD below.
The Kantor Penerangan (Information Office) at the kabupaten level, has the task 
of spreading information about the Bimas and KUD programs and the whole 
government development program. This office has subordinates at the kecamatan level, 
i.e. Kantor Penerangan Kecamatan, headed by Juru Penerangan (Jupen). Actually in 
each office at the kabupaten level there is a public relations section which is required to 
give information about programs handled by the office. To coordinate such information, 
the Information Office heads up a central body consisting of the public relations sections 
of each office. The body is named BAKO HUMAS (Badan Koordmasi Hubungan 
Masyarakat, ”Coordinating Body of Public Relations Office”). However, as mentioned 
above, most information on the Bimas program is given by agricultural extension 
workers living in the kecamatan.
The Sub-Dolog office, as mentioned, has responsibilities particularly to monitor 
and evaluate rice prices and rice stocks.**** The monitoring and evaluation are reported to 
DOLOG in Surabaya every ten days. Apart from that, this office also monitors the 
prices of soybean and corn. To assist the work of the Sub-Dolog in monitoring, a Price 
Monitoring Team (Team Monitoring Harga) of the SPBK also makes a check each day 
on the rice price. There is no branch of Sub-Dolog at the kecamatan level. Its food stock 
activities at the rural level, for example, are carried out through the KUD.
The Secretariat of SPBK has its own system of monitoring, but most of the data 
come from reports from each office involved in the Bimas. The major task of the 
Secretariat consists of the compilation of reports from various offices involved in the 
program, from the office of the Pembantu Bupati, and from the Camats for the needs 
of the Bupati or for regular reports to the SPBP. As at the national and the provincial 
levels, the offices have the job of sending copies of their reports to the SPBK. These are 
received by the Economic Section of the Kabupaten Office. However, as at national and 
provincial levels, it is also a fact that not all reports are actually sent to the Kabupaten 
office. Hence, more complete data may be found in the various offices involved in the 
programs because they have developed their own monitoring systems.
****The Sub-Dolog offices are of three types, A,B, or C, according to the workload of each office. 
The workload is based on the population numbers, area and agricultural potential of each 
kabupaten in which the office is situated. Sub-Dolog of Type A will operate in kabupaten with 
the highest workload, continuing through to Type C at the lowest. In Malang, the Sub-Dolog is of 
Type A as are those in 8 other kabupatens in East Java, i.e. Kediri, Jtmber, Probolinggo, 
Banyuwangi, Mojokerto, Madiun, Surabaya, and Tulungagung. Sub-Dolog of Type B in East 
Java are found in Bojonegoro, Bondowoso, and Madura.
* Administrative area of the Pembantu Bupati includes four or five kecamatans.
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The SATUAN PELAKSANA BIMAS KECAMATAN (SATLAK) at 
Kecamatan Level
The kecamatan is the level at which the real coordination of Bimas 
implementation takes place, although the most basic action occurs, of course, at the 
village level. The head of the kecamatan, the Camat, is the official to whom the Bupati 
assigns the responsibility for implementation of rice policy, not the village headman. The 
Bupati, in addition to receiving reports from the Head of the Economic Section and from 
the Pembantu Bupati, also monitors the implementation process by visiting kecamatan 
offices, or invites the Camat to meetings of regional heads (RAPIMWIL = Rapat 
Pimpinan Wilayah) and other official meetings. Other kabupaten officials simply come 
to the kecamatan for monitoring activities in connection with development programs.
The Camat is Chairman of the SATUAN PELAKSANA BIMAS KECAMATAN 
(SATLAK BIMAS KECAMATAN, The Kecamatan Body of Bimas Implementers). In 
this task he is assisted by Mantri Pertanian (Head of the Diperta office at kecamatan), 
who is appointed Manager (Ketua Harian) of the SATLAK. The Mantri Polisi (Deputy 
Camat) serves as Secretary of the organization. The implementation process is 
monitored by the Camat through meetings of SATLAK BIMAS or by visiting the 
villages.^®
Targets determined by the kabupaten for the kecamatan are discussed at the 
meetings and also various problems faced in the implementation of the program. For the 
monitoring of program implementation, the SATLAK BIMAS KECAMATAN is 
required to send regular reports to the SPBK. Copies of the reports are also sent to the 
Pembantu Bupati’s office. These are sent by the Camat, but the data for the monitoring 
are obtained from various institutions involved in the program at the kecamatan level. 
As at the kabupaten level, implementation of the program is part of the task of each 
office involved in the program at the kecamatan level. In some kecamatans, however, 
these meetings were not always attended by heads of offices, and this reflected the
^Members of the SATLAK include members of the MUSPIKA, Jv.ru Pengairan (Head of 
Public Works Office in the kecamatan), Juru Penerangan (Head of Information Office) PPL 
(Penyuluh Pertanian Lapangan, Agricultural Extension Worker), Head of BRI Unit Desa 
(branch of the BRI at the kecamatan level), PPL Disbun (Extension worker of Dinas 
Perkebunan, Plantation Office), and Chairman of KUD. Since the kecamatan is the lowest level 
in the hierarchy of national government, it has vertical offices of several central government 
ministries, although not all have branches at that level. Those which do include Education and 
Culture, Religion, Health, and Post and Telecomunications. The Ministry of Health is even 
represented at the village level; but the Post and Telecommunications Office is not found in all 
kecamatans.
^In some kecamatans in Malang, meetings of the SATLAK BIMAS KECAMATAN are held 
every week in the kecamatan office. The meetings are often headed by the Camats themselves, 
except when there are other activities demanding their attention (such as meetings with the 
Bupati), when they are represented by their deputies (Mantri Polisi).
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inability of the Camats to coordinate them in the task of program implementation 
(problems of coordination will be discussed on Chapter Five).
The day-to-day operation of the Bimas program is handled by the Mantri 
Pertanian as Manager of SATLAK BIMAS KECAMATAN. Yet, in fact, the most active 
people in the body are the extension workers (PPL), whose role involves not only 
spreading information on new technologies, but also handling matters of credit and 
KUD. It is the PPL who is, in fact, most often questioned by the Camat about any 
problems faced in the implementation of the Bimas program, not the Mantri Pertanian 
who actually has a lower educational level than the PPL and is himself mostly involved 
in the administrative tasks of his office.3^
The PPL who has responsibility for agricultural extension, including the 
development of the Farmers’ Group, works in an area called WKPP (Wilayah Kerja 
Penyuluhan Pertanian, or "Work Area for Agricultural Extension Service”). One PPL is 
responsible for one WKPP in an area in which there are 16 Farmers’ Groups. This 
means that one PPL has responsibility, in theory, for the extension of information about 
new varieties and better farming methods to between 3,600 to 6,400 farmers in his 
WKPP.* 38
Reports on the implementation of the Bimas program are made according to set 
procedures in which all offices involved in the program send their reports to their
3^The job of the Diperta at the kecamatan level is coordinated by one Mantri Pertanian, 
called Mantan, who is responsible mainly for the administration of the office at that level. There 
are two other agents of the Diperta in the kecamatan: the PPL and the PPH (Petugas Pengamat 
Hama, Pest Inspector). However, structurally they are not subordinate to the Mantan. They are 
coordinated by the Kabupaten Diperta but not employees of the office. They are appointed by 
two different projects in the Ministry of Agriculture. The PPL is appointed as an employee of the 
NAEP (National Agricultural Extension Project) which is established by the BPLPP. This is a 
project of the Directorate General of Food Crops sponsored by the World Bank. The PPH is an 
employee of the BPTP (BALAI PROTEKSI TAN AM AN P ANG AN, "Plant Protection Office”). 
Thus, these two staff are employees of the central government and they are categorized as 
Pegawai Pusat Dipekerjakan (seconded) to the Kabupaten Diperta.
38Several WKPPs (generally three or four cover the area of one kecamatan) are subordinate to 
one WKBPP (Wilayah Kerja Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian, "Work Area of the Office of 
Agricultural Extension Service”) which covers the area of the Pembantu Bupati. This generally 
includes four to five kecamatans. Each WKBPP is led by two PPMs (Penyuluh Pertanian 
Madya, "Senior Agricultural Extensionist”): a PPM Programmer who has responsibility for 
making programs for the PPLs, and a PPM Supervisor who supervises the work of the PPLs in 
their WKBPP. The PPM is, in turn, coordinated by PPS (Penyuluh Pertanian Spesialis, 
"Agricultural Extension Specialist”) who has an office in the Kabupaten Diperta. Furthermore, 
the PPS works under the coordination of the Head of the Agricultural Extension Section in the 
office of Kabupaten Diperta, although structurally he is subordinate to the Balai Informasi 
Pertanian (Agrigultural Information Office) at the provincial level which, in turn, is subordinate 
to the BPLPP. The PPH, on the other hand, is coordinated by SOP (Stasiun Operasi 
Pengamatan, "Observation Station”). In Malang, the station is generally in the same office as 
the WKBPP. At the kabupaten level, these offices are coordinated and headed by the Head of the 
Plant Protection Section in the Kabupaten Diperta Office.
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superior at kabupaten level as well as to the Camat. The Mantri Pertanian, for 
example, makes a weekly report to the Head of the Kabupaten Diperta. The PPL also 
make a weekly report to the Senior Agricultural Extensionist (PPM) who, in turn, 
reports to Agricultural Extension Specialist (PPS). The Pest Inspector (PPH) reports 
on problems of pests to the observation station (SOP).
If there is a serious problem, a report can be made regardless of the regular 
procedures. The Mantri Pertanian and the PPL, for example, can send a report directly 
to the Section of Plant Protection in the Kabupaten Diperta Office if they find pests 
attacking in one area and such attacks are unknown as yet to the PPH. The Head of the 
Kabupaten Diperta also invites his staff, including the Mantri Pertanian, the PPL and 
the PPH to a monthly meeting. The data from the monthly report are used by the Head 
of the Kabupaten Diperta mainly for meetings of the SPBK. Data concerning credit 
distribution and payment are reported by the Head of BRI Unit Desa at kecamatans. 
Furthermore, data on irrigation will be provided by the Mantri Pengairan (an irrigation 
official at kecamatan level) who gets the data from the Kuwoxvo (Head of Irrigation 
Section at Village Headman’s office).
The SATLAK BIMAS DESA at Village Level
The village headman (Lurah or Kepala Desa) is Chairman of the SATUAN 
PELAKSANA BIMAS DESA (The Village Body of Bimas Implementers), and is 
supposed to be responsible for the implementation process to the Camat. To perform his 
task, the Lurah is assisted by the Pamong Tani Desa (Head of Agricultural Section at 
Village Headman’s Office). However, in actuality, all members of the village 
administration (Pamong Desa) are involved in the Bimas implementation process.
The position of the Lurah and other members of the village administration, is 
crucial for the Bimas program. While the Camat is the ultimate coordinator, the Lurah 
is the real implementer of the Bimas program. It is the Lurah who is involved actively 
in Bimas implementation, and faces the day-to-day problems of the implementation 
process, and who tries to find solutions to these problems. From the Lurah, the Camat 
obtains the Bimas data for his reports to the Bupati. It is also to the Lurah and PPL, 
that farmers come seeking solutions to their agricultural problems, such as the need for 
agricultural credits, production inputs and irrigation problems. The Lurah has the 
authority to sign letters of recommendation for agricultural credits.
In addition, the position of the Lurah and other village administrators, is also 
important in developing farmers’ groups and mobilizing farmers participation in 
agricultural development programs. There are many cases in which farmers groups are 
not well developed due to the reluctant of the village administrators to support the 
groups. Distribution of irrigation water to farmers is also in the hands of the village 
administrators. Any failure or obstacles to its distribution will affect production levels.
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Organizations for the Implementation of KUD
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the KUD is one of four infrastructures needed for 
the village unit in agricultural development activities. At the local level, therefore, 
development of the cooperatives, as a part of the Bimas program, is placed under the 
responsibility of the regional heads of each level: from the Governors down to the 
Camat. Technically, it is under the supervision of the vertical office of the Ministry of 
Cooperatives: the Kanwil Koperasi at provincial level, and the Kantor Koperasi at 
kabupaten level.39
The Kantor Koperasi at kabupaten level, as mentioned, has four sections: 
Binagram (Bina Program, Program Development Section), Binor (Bina Organisasi, 
Organisation Development Section), Binus (Bina Usaha, Business Development 
Section) and Penyuluhan Koperasi (Cooperative Extension Service Section). The 
Section Binagram is required to make plans on development of KUDs, e.g. to specify 
targets for membership that should be achieved by KUDs each year.
The target is determined by the KANWIL KOPERASI of the provincial level, 
based on the national target set by the Ministry of Cooperatives. According to the Head 
of the Cooperatives Office in Malang, the membership target of KUD for Malang 
Kabupaten for 1982 was 83,000 and for 1983 was 140,000. This increase was due to 
shifting the target numbers from other kabupatens which did not have the capacity to 
achieve targets determined for them by the province. Up to June 1983, KUD 
membership amounted in total to 94,000, and one of the causes of the failure to achieve 
the target was the weaknesses of the extension service.^9 Detail on problems of KUD 
membership can be found in Chapter Seven.
To provide extension services, the Cooperatives Office in Malang has appointed 
ten PKLs (Penyuluh Koperasi Lapangan, Cooperative Extension Workers), working 
under the coordination of the Penyuluhan Koperasi Section. The PKL is a replica of 
PPL from the Agricultural Office, but differs from the PPL, appointed at kecamatan 
level in that the PKLs are placed within the Cooperatives Office in Malang. The small 
number of PKLs and their location have resulted in poor capacity to provide the 
extension services needed by 31 KUDs throughout Malang Kabupaten.
Moreover, the quality and capacity of the PKLs to perform their tasks effectively 
has to be doubted. All of them are young people, just graduated from Senior High 
School, with three months training on cooperatives. They still need time to increase 
their experience in order to provide the necessary extension services for most members of
39There is no vertical office of this ministry at Kecamatan level. 
^Interview, August 8, 1983.
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KUDs at village level. Compared to their counterparts, the PPLs, they are most inferior 
in terms of effectiveness.
The Binor Section has the job of assisting the KUDs in developing their 
organization and supervising the organizational development of the cooperative, while 
the task of the Binus Section is to develop and supervise the activities of KUD 
organizations. The staff members of these two sections are actually insufficient to do 
their jobs effectively; most of them are involved in administrative tasks within their 
offices, and it is only heads of these sections who actually make visits to KUDs.
Monitoring of the development of KUDs and of the problems faced by them is 
carried out in various ways in each kabupaten. In Malang, the Cooperative Office invites 
managers of all KUDs, the PKLs, Chairmen of the PPK, PAU, and BKO to a weekly 
meeting every Monday. Because there is no subordinate of the Cooperative Office at 
the kecamatan level, there are on the spot checks made by staff members of the 
cooperatives office who visit each KUD, especially around the end of the fiscal year 
(February till March). In Kediri, in addition to weekly reports from the KUDs, 
monitoring is done through the SSB (Single Side Band Radio). All KUDs in Kediri have 
had radios distributed. In Jember, the monitoring is carried out merely through weekly 
reports and on-the-spot checks.
At this weekly meeting, reports on development and problems faced by each KUD 
and PPK, BKO and PAU are proposed. The reports seem, however, to be considered 
more as data for the Head of the Cooperatives Office for his report to the province, than 
as problems that should be evaluated and solved there and then. The actual 
implementation of KUDs shows much evidence of managerial weaknesses, financial 
corruption, and other malfunctioning, all of which restrains the farmers from 
participating in the KUD; but no actions are taken to remedy these weaknesses. 
Apparently, the attention given by the Head of the Cooperatives Office and his staff 
members is aimed more towards the problem of how to achieve targets set by the 
province and to develop KUDs as rice procurement agencies, than to ensuring that the 
KUDs provide benefits to farmers.
Presidential Instruction No.2/1978 lays down that the kecamatan has been the 
centre for development of KUD, and thus it is at the kecamatan level that the real * *
^PPK = Pusat Pelayanan Koperasi (Centre for Cooperative Service) is an organization which
has the task of assisting KUDs in their business activities, e.g. in distributing fertilizer from 
PUSKUD to KUD, or providing guidance to KUDs in using their credits. PAU = Pusat 
Administrasi Usaha (Centre for Administration) has the task of assisting KUDs in carrying out 
their administration. BKO = Badan Kontak Organisasi (Body of Contact Organization) is 
established to help the KUDs in developing their organization and management. These three 
institutions are set up as projects of the Kanwil of Cooperatives.
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action regarding KUDs takes place. Unfortunately, as mentioned, the Cooperatives 
Office has no branch at kecamatan level, so supervision of KUD is given mostly to the 
Camat and various other groups interested in the KUD.42 The power of the Camat over 
KUD matters can be seen in his right to intervene in selection of the Chairman of the 
KUD or to take any other actions necessary to help the development of the cooperatives.
The power of the Camat and other members of MUSPIKA over the KUD, is often 
used by them to intervene in the management of the KUD; this gives them a chance to 
use the Finances of the cooperatives for their own purposes, through cooperation with the 
board of the KUD. Thus, in actuality, the groups most advantaged in making use of the 
KUD are simply the Camat, members of MUSPIKA, and board members of the KUD. 
Many cases of involvement in financial scandals of the KUD by these three groups have 
been reported.
This has occurred because of two main factors. First, there is a lack of supervision 
by the Bupati, as well as by the staff members of the Cooperatives Office. The Bupati, 
although he has responsibility for developing the KUDs, seems to give little or no 
attention to cooperative affairs and seems to accept simply at face value the reports 
from the Camats. The Head of the Cooperatives Office very rarely or never makes visits 
to the KUD, while his office lacks the personnel to perform the tasks of supervision 
adequately. Weekly meetings conducted by the Cooperatives Office, as mentioned 
above, constitute a forum where development and problems of the KUDs can be 
reported, but without any requirement to make any further checks on the reliability of 
the reports.
Secondly, there is a lack of farmers’ participation in the KUD, mainly due to the 
fact that KUD is actually a top-down project and not a real farmers’ organization 
managed by the farmers. Hence, there is no real public supervision over the 
management of KUD. As mentioned in Chapter Three, most farmers do not know the 
benefits of the KUD, and even do not know who are members of KUD’s board or what 
are the activities of the cooperatives. Some of them who are registered as members of 
KUD are not really aware of their membership because they are automatically registered 
as members when they take out their Bimas credits. More important than that is the 
fact that after their registration they still do not know anything about the management 
and development of the KUD of which they have become members. The KUDs have 
been dominated solely by elite members of the kecamatan, but most farmers have no 
access to it. Further details on this matter can be seen in Chapter Seven.
42The Camat has been instructed to develop the KUD under a joint decision of the Minister of 
Interior and Minister of Trade, No. 192 Tahun 1979 and No. 593/Kpb/X/79.
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In summary, as two important national programs, Bimas and KUD have involved 
many government and non-government bodies. At the national level, the BAKO BIMAS, 
a special organization set up to implement the Bimas program, has involved at least 
seven ministries under the coordination of the Agricultural Minister. In addition, eight 
government and private companies have also been involved in the program with the task 
of supplying production inputs.
At the local level, the BAKO BIMAS has its agencies from provincial down to 
village level. At each level, the regional head is appointed as Chairman of the agency. 
Also, in the implementation of KUD, the regional heads at all levels are designated as 
supervisors. This appointment indicates the importance of these programs, and also 
shows a strong wish that through the direct involvement of these regional heads in the 
programs, the central government’s most powerful machinery of control will be involved 
in the rice program, so that its objectives will be achieved and any obstacles minimized.
The facts reveal that Bimas has been successful in increasing rice production, 
although the KUD has only made slight contributions to rice procurement activities. 
However, these facts also reveal the dominant position of the central over the regional 
authorities. Production and area targets of Bimas, and membership targets for KUDs 
are determined by the centre, and there is no choice for the regional authorities but to 
accept those decisions. This target approach affects the attitude of lower officials, who 
then adopt all the methods necessary to achieve the targets determined by the centre, 
even though they run into resistance from the farmer in the process. The facts also show 
that coordination among those involved in the program is still very difficult to achieve, 
and that some heads of offices are reluctant to accept the leadership of regional heads as 
program coordinators at the local level. Even at the national level, this lack of 
coordination is also found. This affects the reliability and availability of data in the 
BAKO BIMAS office and its agencies at local levels.
From the working of the BAKO BIMAS and its agencies at the local level, and 
from that of offices handling the KUD implementation, it seems that monitoring and 
evaluation have not been given serious attention. Therefore, many weaknesses in the 
implementation of these programs have never been remedied. Although there are regular 
reports from below, it is doubtful that these reports are given serious attention. This 
occurs because the numbers of personnel in the monitoring and evaluation sections at all 
levels are not sufficient, and they also lack adequate experience and technical know-how 
to do their jobs. Apart from that, there is often a tendency to conceal the real facts 
discovered by an evaluation, so long as the situation is not too serious, in order to avoid 
causing disruption within the program. However, the most important factor behind the 
lack of serious monitoring and evaluation is, perhaps, the opinion of the officials that as 
long as the main objectives of the programs can be achieved, i.e. the required rice
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production increase and procurement targets reached, the other objectives can be 
ignored.
Thus, reports on delays in fertilizer distribution or, for example, on the inability of 
agricultural extension workers to provide service for all or most of the farmers, or on 
financial corruption in KUDs and other weaknesses in the implementation of the two 
programs, tend to be given little or no attention. From the perspective of the farmers, it 
seems that the large sums of money allocated in the budget plans have been disbursed 
mostly for financing the officials and administrators of the programs rather than to serve 
the interests of the farmers. Details on the kinds of problems observable in the 
implementation of these two programs can be found in Chapters Six and Seven.
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CHAPTER 5
Problems of Implementation and the Role of Kabupaten
Instansis
The last fourteen-year period of rice policy implementation in Indonesia, between 
1970-1984, reveals some interesting features. As mentioned in Chapter Three, although 
rice production increased steadily every year, participation of farmers in Bimas has 
shown a declining trend, while on the other hand, participation in Inmas and Insus has 
increased. Also, while new technologies in agriculture have spread widely among farmers, 
there has been an unequal income distribution among the rich and the poor farmers.
Development of the KUD itself also indicates some deviations from the original 
stated objectives, when the cooperative was started by the government in 1973, which 
were to help farmers in obtaining production inputs, especially fertilizers, and also 
agricultural credits. While the KUD are not yet able to serve farmers’ interests as 
originally intended, they have become the locus of elite group competition for access to 
resources serving their own interests, in a way which has made them important local 
institutions in the working of national rice policies.
The trends discernible, and results of the rice intensification and KUD programs 
have, to some degree, been brought about by the actions of those responsible for their 
implementation in the regions, that is, local government officials and central government 
offices at regional level. This chapter will give a general description of the problems 
found in implementation of Bimas and KUD in Malang Kabupaten. It will also analyse 
the work of various government offices (instansis) in the kabupaten in implementing the 
two programs.1
Rice Production in Malang
One of the big achievements of the Bimas program has been increased rice 
production. During Repelita I (1969-1974), rice production at the national level 
increased by 4.5 per cent p.a. (as mentioned in Table 3-4 on page 58 in Chapter Three). 
In Repelita II (1974-1979), however, the rate of increase slowed to 3.6 per cent p.a.
1 In order to protect informants, the names have been given fictional names.
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largely because of extensive wereng infestations in 1976-1977. During the Repelita II, 
there was a decrease in area harvested from 8.51 million hectares in 1974 to 8.36 million 
hectares in 1977, because of these attacks. Rice production continued to increase, 
however, although slowly between 1974-1977. In the following years, from 1979 to 1983 
it increased very rapidly, by on average, 7.7 per cent p.a.
In East Java, there were some unusual features in the overall picture of rice 
production. From 1970 to 1974, rice production increased faster than the national 
average at 5.1 per cent p.a. (see Table 5-1 on page 107). In 1975, production decreased 
partly because of wereng and drought; then again a sharp decrease of production 
occurred in 1977 and 1978 when the wereng attacked many padi areas. From 1979 to 
1981, extremely good weather and better application of farming methods raised the 
production at the remarkable rate of 10.5 per cent p.a. The overall rate of increase of 
production from 1970 to 1981, was on average, 4.5 per cent p.a.
Table 5-1: East Java: Area Harvested, Production, and
Yield of Rice, 1970 - 1981.
Year Area Harvested 
(million Ha)
Production 
(mil.ton)
Yield (qu/ha) 
(dry stalk padi)
1970 1.20 4.51 37.56
1971 1.22 4.66 38.13
1972 1.21 4.69 38.70
1973 1.32 4.92 39.18
1974 1.32 5.50 41.64
1975 1.33 5.38 40.49
1976 1.34 5.81 43.41
1977 1.31 4.47 34.06
1978 1.37 4.87 35.55
1979 1.40 5.25 37.56
1980 1.43 6.11 42.78
1981 1.52 6.93 45.63
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia, Various Issues.
Rice production in Malang Kabupaten also increased steadily, and what is 
interesting here is the fact that the rate of the increase is even much higher than the 
level of increase achieved by East Java overall, i.e. 8.0 per cent p.a. between 1970-1983 
(see Table 5-2 on page 108). In 1974, there was a slight decrease of production due 
partly to rat attacks, but it rose again in 1975. As in many other parts of Indonesia,
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wereng attacks in most sawah areas in Malang in the period 1976-1977 resulted in a 
decrease of production in those years. After 1978, however, production increased 
steadily, reaching a peak of 414,939 tons in 1981. A combination of rats and various 
other pests again reduced the production in 1982 and 1983.2
Table 5-2: Malang: Area Harvested, Production, Production Average
1970 - 1983.
Year Area Harvested 
(Ha)
Production
(ton)
Production Average 
(qu/ha)
1970 69,117 183,367 26.531971 64,924 228,532 35.20
1972 67,837 268,838 39.63
1973 71,550 296,228 41.41
1974 74,423 271,674 36.02
1975 79,244 329,100 41.53
1976 77,058 328,498 42.63
1977 71.460 313,566 43.88
1978 72,435 345,723 47.73
1979 71,726 372,690 51.96
1980 73,313 376,632 51.37
1981 78,273 414,939 53.01
1982 72,166 384,058 53.22
1983 70,884 389,924 55.01
Source: Diperta of Malang Kabupaten
The Impact of the Rice Intensification Program
The increased rice production in Malang, on the one hand, was a result of the 
government rice policies in introducing the use of new technologies in padi planting and 
the better farming methods through the Panca Usaha Tani, as well as the application of 
the hew price policy for rice since 1970. On the other hand, the increase of production 
has been stimulated by the awareness of farmers themselves of the advantages of 
planting the high yielding varieties, and the application of the Panca Usaha Tani 
methods, as demonstrated by extension workers. This happened particularly after 1974, 
when the farmers began to be more aware of the benefits of the new technologies and the 
new methods.
However, as also occurred at the national level, the rice intensification program in
2 Interxriew, the Head of Malang Diperta, January, 19, 1984.
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Malang did not only provide good results; some negative impacts and problems have also 
been noticed. In this section, five problems were observed during implementation of rice 
policies in Malang; problems regarding acceptance of the high yielding varieties, 
problems in the adoption of new technology of rice planting, the decline in Bimas 
participation, problems of credit arrears, and effects on the income of farmers will be 
discussed.
Problems in Adoption of the High Yielding Varieties
The spread of the use of HYVs among farmers in Malang has been impressive and 
the seeds are planted not merely by those who joined the Bimas schemes, but also by 
many of those who did not. In 1980, the Bupati of Malang reported that in the dry 
season of 1979 and the rainy season of 1979/1980, ninety five per cent of farmers were 
using the HYVs, such as IR-34, IR-36, and IR-38. Another five per cent, according to the 
Bupati, were not required to plant the HYVs because their sawahs lie in upland areas 
above five hundred meters.
The percentage proposed by the Bupati may be too high, but during my 
investigation I saw that most of the farmers, including those who did not join the Bimas 
schemes (i.e. small farmers who own 0.2 ha sawah or less), have planted the HYVs as 
suggested by extension workers. These small farmers generally are not contacted by the 
extension workers, but they hear about the HYVs from their neighbours. Edmundson’s 
study in Desa Glanggang, Malang, also found that in 1971 only fifty per cent of farmers 
in the village were planting the HYVs, but by 1976 the number had increased to ninety 
per cent.
An attractive rice price, resulting from the government’s rice price stabilization, is 
one of the factors behind the increased motivation of farmers to plant the HYVs. 
Although many farmers, especially those who live far from the capital of kecamatans and 
KUD offices, do not know about the floor price and often sell their rice to rice traders 
below the floor price. They feel that the price level is still quite adequate and does not 
inflict a loss upon them. Many farmers who plant multiple crops (tumpang sari) now 
preffir to plant padi rather than palawija, because padi always yields a benefit and 
entails fewer risks in terms of price fluctuations, than palawija.
Apart from that, farmers in rice-producing areas have no other choice but to plant 
padi because the condition of their sawahs is suitable only for padi. Certainly there are 
some farmers who still maintain local varieties and refuse to plant the HYVs, but their
^Bupati Kepala Daerah Tingkat II Malang, "Keterangan Pertanggung Jawaban Bupati Kepala 
Daerah Tingkat II Malang, Tahun Anggaran 1979/1980,” Unpublished Report, p.16.
4W.C. Edmundson, "Two Villages in Contrast: 1971 - 1976”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, XIII, No.l, March 1977, p.98.
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numbers are small. They are generally from the older generation who want to preserve 
the local varieties from annihilation because of a nostalgia for the times when they were 
young, a time when they and their parents ate the tasty and famous local varieties of 
rice.
Problems in Adoption of New Technology in Rice Planting
Adoption of the new technologies can be seen, among other things, in the increase 
in the amount of fertilizers used. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the use of Nitrogen 
fertilizer at the national level increased by an average rate of 20 per cent annually from 
1969 to 1983; and consumption of P205 increased at an average rate of 35 per cent 
annually. In Malang too, the use of fertilizer also increased, although it remained below 
the 300 kilogram per hectare level recommended as a minimum standard. The increase 
was about 27 per cent over three years from 1975/1976 to 1979/1980, or about 9 per 
cent yearly (see Table 5-3 on page 110). If farmers cannot obtain the fertilizer in their 
villages, they will look for it in the kecamatan capitals or in the town of Malang. 
Certainly, there were still some farmers who refused to use fertilizer. The main reason 
for their refusal was their inability to buy the fertilizer. Their numbers, however, were 
very limited and most of them were small farmers.
Table 5-3: Malang: Use of Fertilizers in qu/ha under 
Bimas and Inmas schemes, 1975-1979/1980
Planting Season Urea
Bimas Inmas
TSP
Bimas Inmas
Dry 1975 242 144 11 3
Rainy 1975/1976 256 200 50 48
Dry 1976 244 250 12 4
Rainy 1976/1977 100 159 8 “
Dry 1977 259 217 26 12
Rainy 1977/1978 287 231 73 -
Dry 1978 297 170 75 50
Rainy 1978/1979 276 226 75 45
Dry 1979 189 45
Rainy 1979/1980 235 39
Quoted from Achmad Suryana et.al., Keragaan Intensifikasi Khusus (INSUS) Padi:
Suatu Telaahan Pada Dua Kelompok Tam dt Kabupaten Malang dan 
Banyuwangi Jawa Timur, (Departemen Pertanian: Pusat Penelitian Agro 
Ekonomi, Badan Litbang Pertanian, 1981, p.IV-16.
The use of pesticides also has become widespread among farmers in Malang. They
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generally follow the suggestions of extension workers about doses and methods to 
counter pests and rats. Some farmers still refuse to use the pesticide, preferring to use 
magic by inviting in the dukuns (sorcerers) to counter the rats and pests.5 * * * 9However, 
their numbers are small and farmers who have already realized the benefits of the 
pesticides generally ridicule this attitude.
Much of the sawah in Malang has been irrigated by the government irrigation 
system. In 1981, out of a total of 57,167 hectares of sawah, 29,816 hectares were 
irrigated by the technical irrigation system (Pengairan Tehnis), 11,125 ha were under 
semi-technical irrigation (Pengairan Setengah Tehnis), and the area under simple 
irrigation systems (Pengairan Sederhana) was 12,125 ha.5 The remainder, a total of 
1,913 hectares was irrigated by non-PU irrigation,^ and 2,021 hectares were rain-fed 
sawah (sawah tadah hujan).
The kabupaten government has allocated considerable funds for improvement and 
rehabilitation of irrigation channels. The percentage of expenditure on irrigation 
improvements varied from 11.7 per cent to 31.3 per cent of the total Ipeda expenditure 
during the period 1969 to 1980. The contribution of the irrigation improvements to the 
increase of rice production in Malang cannot be known exactly since there have been no 
studies on that topic. However, the results of a study on irrigation projects in 
Bondowoso and Jember, East Java, can be used as a basis for comparison with the case 
of Malang.
The study, which was made on the basis of 19.74 data, concluded that "the net 
return to wet season paddy production under irrigation is 3.58 times the return of
5The dukuns gave them certain articles such as stones wrapped with white cloth to be planted 
in the four corners of their sawah, or dried coconut leaves that should be hung in the middle of the 
sawah.
"The term technical irrigation system refers to "irrigation where all structures are permanent 
and measuring devices are supplied at each of the turnouts to monitor the flow of water into the 
canals.” The semi-technical irrigation systems "provide permanent structures and gates at the 
turnouts to control flow of water but no measuring devices.” The structures of the simple 
irrigation system "include a simple diversion weir with a control headgate, unlined main canal, a 
few secondary and tertiary unlined conveyance ditches, small diversion and turnout structures and 
a simple means of waste or drainage structures...Such structures are characterised by low initial 
cost but with relatively short useful life (5-10 years).” Anne Booth, "Irrigation in Indonesia Part 
I,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.XIII, No.3, March 1977, p.59 and p.64.
^Non-PU (PU=Pekerjaap, Umum or Public Works) irrigation refers; to irrigation channels 
made by farmers and not by the government.
®Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Malang, Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka, 1981, pp.95-97. 
Irrigation for most sawahs in Malang comes from three main rivers: Kali Konto, Kali Brantas, 
and Kali Lesti. Kali Brantas which is met by Kali Lesti at the intersection of Kecamatan 
Kepanjen, Gondanglegi, and Pagak, has been a water source for Karangkates Dam, the biggest 
dam in East Java.
9IPEDA, Iuran Pembangunan Daerah, Contribution for the Regional Development.
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Rp.10,397- without irrigation.” The contribution of the improvement of irrigation 
channels to the increase of rice production, according to Booth, comes about in two 
ways.
First, they allow more intensive or multiple cropping because cultivators are 
able to plant two or three crops requiring water per year whereas without 
guaranteed water supplies they could plant only during the rainy season. 
Secondly, guaranteed and controlled water supplies usually lead to higher yields 
per planting because the risk of crop failure due to inadequate rains is lessened.
In Malang, irrigation rehabilitation has enabled 23,396 hectares of sawahs out of 
the total 57,167 hectares in the kabupaten to be planted three times a year.*^ It is this 
kind of increase in cropping intensity since 1970, the ability to obtain two or three crops 
of rice per year (in a few cases even more), that has made a very big contribution to the 
increase in output.
The Decline in Bimas Participation
The decline of Bimas participation in Malang, as in other parts of Indonesia began 
about 1976, about the same time as participation in Inmas and Insus programs increased 
significantly (see Table 5-4 on page 113). The production figures in Table 5-5 on page 
114 indicate that most of the rice production increase in Malang came from Inmas and 
Insus. Government officials at both national and local level have generally stated that 
the main reason behind the decrease in Bimas participation and the shift of some 
farmers to Inmas and Insus programs is due to an increase in farmers’ ability to finance 
the working of their sawah by themselves; they no longer need credit from the 
government. This statement is correct as long as it is related to the larger farmers, who 
generally have no difficulties in financing the working of their sawah, but it is more 
questionable about the small farmers.
However, the farmers who had previously joined the Bimas but later quit the 
program gave at least five reasons for refusing to continue their participation in the 
program. First, many of them have had terrible experiences because the local 
authorities have compelled them to repay the credits advanced to them, even though 
they should have been freed from that obligation because of losses when their sawah 
were attacked by wereng (dipusokan). This coercive action resulted from weaknesses in 
the administration of the credit.
^Donald C.Taylor, Wiryadi Prawirodihardjo, and Effendi Pasandaran., An Economic 
Analysis of Irrigation Water Resources in East Java, RDS, SAE, Bogor, No.l, no year, p.12.
**Anne Booth, "Irrigation in Indonesia, Part II,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
XIII, No.2, July 1977, p.62.
^"Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1981, op.cit., p.93.
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Table 5-4: Malang: Planned & Actual Areas of Bimas, Inmas, Insus,
1970-1983 (Thousand Ha)
Season BIMAS
Planned Actual
INMAS
Planned Actual
INSUS
D. 1970 5.00 3.43 3.77 3.24R. 1970/1971 18.00 18.47 5.76 5.48D. 1971 6.25 3.93 4.33 4.33*R. 1971/1972 18.61 19.73 5.77 5.77*D. 1972 6.20 5.95 7.37 7.37*R. 1972/1973 25.14 26.40 11.39 11.39*D. 1973 6.65 7.13 13.30 13.30*
R. 1973/1974 35.35 35.35 2.50 2.50*
D. 1974 ..Not Available. . . .
R. 1974/1975 ..Not Available.. . .
D. 1975 ..Not Available. . . .
R. 1975/1976 ..Not Available....
D. 1976 7.00 9.64 10.00 16.93
R. 1976/1977 25.00 22.98 22.50 22.87
D. 1977 7.00 8.59 10.00 12.69
R. 1977/1978 25.00 0.83 22.50 21.99
D. 1978 7.00 5.44 10.00 19.98
R. 1978/1979 25.00 20.66 22.50 8.59
D. 1979 7.00 0.26 10.00 21.63 0.38
R. 1979/1980 27.90 3.42 23.10 21.13 2.30
D. 1980 5.00 4.60 17.00 21.39 0.92
R. 1980/1981 22.00 8.82 26.50 39.21 4.80
D. . 1981 5.00 3.18 19.00 25.35 19 .-68
R. 1981/1982 21.50 8.56 27.56 37.26 37.08
D. 1982 4.00 1.49 20.00 22.36
R. 1982/1983 21.50 5.20 25.50 37.59
D. 1983 3.00 0.15 20.30 24.63
Source: Diperta of Malang Kabupaten & Keterangan Pertanggung Jawaban Bupati
Malang, August 24, 1982.
Second, because of various other administrative obstacles, delays in distribution of 
fertilizers have frequently occurred, the fertilizer often coming only after the planting 
season. As mentioned in Chapter Three, a new credit system (BPB) was introduced in 
1982 to reduce arrears, as well as to satisfy the farmers. The new system, which laid 
down that credit was to be distributed through KUD, has in fact been another factor 
behind the delays in fertilizer distribution. This has further disappointed the farmers. A 
description of the causes of such delays, as seen from the KUD’s perspective, can be 
found of the section on Tumpang and Pakisaji KUDs in Chapter Seven.
To overcome this obstacle, the government has issued a policy instruction that all
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Table 5-5: Malang: Rice Production through Bimas, Inmas, 
and Insus, 1980/1981 - 1982 (ton)
Year Bimas Inmas Insus
1980/1981 51,814 189,057 103,1011981 20,350 134,958 63,9731981/1982 41,521 184,026 63,3041982 12,030 118,583 59,210
Source: Kan tor Statistik Malang, Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka, 1981, and
1982.
farmers who have no arrears can be involved in Bimas scheme, and that fertilizer 
distribution must fulfil five conditions (Lima Tepat) as follows Tepat Jenis, Tepat 
Waktu, Tepat Tempat, Tepat Harga, and Tepat Jumlah (the proper kind of fertilizer, 
proper time of distribution, proper place of distribution, proper price and proper 
amount). But the instruction seems to have had little effect. The bank (BRI) has still 
maintained its policy that only KUDs which had repaid 60 per cent of the credit 
advanced to them were eligible for new credits. In other words, the policy of the 
government has not been carried out by the bank.
Moreover, the five conditions sometimes cannot be met by the staff of PPK or the 
KUD. It is all very well for the government to issue general policy instructions that 
fertilizer should be distributed at the right time and place and price and quantity, but 
the problems of implementing such instructions at the village level are quite another 
matter; and there appears to be very little effective follow-up to ensure that the policy is 
implemented.
The Bupati of Malang was aware of the obstacles to implementation of the 
instruction because of weaknesses in program coordination. In order to resolve the 
problem, as well as other problems of coordination, the Bupati has made various efforts 
either through formal or personal approaches to the heads of offices involved in Bimas 
and the KUD programs, but the problems remain. The personal approach has been made 
through individual discussions with officials, while the formal one was conducted during 
the formal meeting of the Sat pel Bimas Kabupaten.
In these meetings the Bupati sometimes gave reminders to the heads of offices 
about the Bupati’s authority as the person responsible for the success of the program
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implementation. But, as he himself recognized, coordination is still difficult to achieve, 
especially where it involves offices of the central government ministries in the region. 
However, it tends to be better now than in the period before the regional head was 
designated as the sole administrator in 1974.13 The fact that there were delays in 
fertilizer distribution throughout the time I was conducting my field work shows that 
the Bupati’s actions had not been sufficient to overcome the problem. Furthermore, 
according to the Head of Kabupaten Diperta, although the Bupati knew about the above 
obstacles, he made no report about them to the Governor, because such a report would 
have damaged his reputation and would have been regarded as evidence of his inability 
to manage the kabupaten’s affairs adequately.14
Third, many farmers are not happy with the fertilizer distribution system. Before 
KUD was designated as distributor of Bimas credit, the fertilizers were distributed in the 
offices of the village unit bank, or in Balai Desa (village government’s office). When 
such fertilizers came to be distributed through the KUD, farmers had to obtain them 
from KUD kiosks which were not always close to their houses or farms. In both cases 
they had to bear the additional costs of transporting them so that many of them were 
reluctant to collect the fertilizer. The government has given credit to the KUDs to build 
shops in some villages in order to make them closer to the farmers, but in nearly all 
cases, these shops are still not opened.
Fourth, there were some cases where farmers refused to fill in form No.98-b (the 
registration form for Bimas participation) simply because they did not want to have to 
contact the village headmen (Lurah) and the bank. Some farmers have had the 
experience that the Lurah would always cut off some part of the credit before it was 
distributed to farmers. But when time came to repay, the farmers had to pay the full 
amount of the credit. There were also some cases of Bimas Fiktif, especially in the early 
stage of the program, where village officials made use of the names of farmers or landless 
farmers in their villages who were then registered as Bimas participants without their 
knowledge. The village officials then took the money from the credit for themselves. 
Furthermore, some staff members of the village unit bank deceived the participants of 
Bimas by not giving any receipts to farmers paying the credits, and collected the money 
for their own use.
Fifth, the production inputs, especially fertilizer, are now becoming easier and 
cheaper to buy from private traders than from the KUDs. In February 1984, the price of 
Bimas fertilizers was Rp.90- per kilogram, while in private shops it was only Rp 83. The
^Interviews, the Bupati of Malang, August 3, 1983; and the Head of Malang Diperta, June 13, 
1983.
14Interwiew, the Head of Malang Diperta, June 13, 1984.
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lower price of fertilizer in private shops was caused, among other things, by the ability of 
traders to buy the fertilizer from its main distributors (PN. PERTANI, PUSKUD, PPK, 
or KUD) below the government price. This was made possible through personal contacts 
between staff members of these offices and the traders, resulting in deals benefiting the 
personal interests of both parties. Even the delays in fertilizer distribution that farmers 
often complained of, were partly due to this kind of manipulation, since it compelled the 
farmers to buy from the private traders.*** Finally, some small farmers who owned only 
0.2 ha or less simply did not have the ability to repay their Bimas credits. Although the 
program had increased their income, it was still insufficient to repay their credit. Cases 
illustrating this problem can be found in chapter six.
The Problem of Credit Arrears
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Bimas program ran into a serious problem of 
credit arrears. Ironically, but very significantly, it was a fact that although in individual 
terms, the majority of delinquents were farmers, in terms of the amount of money 
borrowed, it was civil servants, the military, teachers and village officials who had the 
highest percentage of arrears. Nationally, these groups had a total Rp 15 billion of 
arrears, involving 141,623 individuals in June 1983; while the farmers who had become 
delinquents numbered 2,328,671 with Rp 10 billion of arrears.* ® This means that each 
delinquent farmer had arrears of only around Rp 43 thousand, while delinquents from 
the other groups had around Rp 106 thousand per individual. Among the farmers 
themselves, it was generally the rich farmers who were most numerous among the 
delinquents.*'
In Malang, data from the Kabupaten Office showed that there remained 
Rp. 1,024,501,680.- of credit arrears in June 1983, involving 33,112 delinquents. The 
largest number of the delinquents was farmers, who included 32,805 or 93.6 per cent of 
the total delinquents. From the amount of money borrowed, however, it was village 
officials who accounted for the largest amount of arrears (see Table 5-6 on page 117). It 
is known from the Table that the total amount of credit defaults by the ” non-farmers” 
amounted to Rp. 153,001,680., involving 307 people.
A team TKPPKPM was set up in Malang, headed by the Sekwilda, but it was not 
very active in conducting its tasks. In its daily activities, most of the work of the team 
was carried out by the Camats and the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan, and by the staff of
***Interviews with some staff members of PPK, KUD and extension workers (PPL).
*6”Sampai Juni 1983, 88,000 Pamong Desa Selewengkan Kredit Massal,” Kompas, September 
1, 1983.
* Kompas, September 19,1983.
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Table 5-6: Malang: Arrears of Bimas & In mas Credits, 1983
No.of people Amount of 
money(Rp)
Average
(Rp)
Farmers
Government Civil Servants:
32,805 871,500,000. 26,566.
Teacher 13 641,000.
90,097.56Others 28 3,053,000.Military members 20 990,680. 49,534Village officials 197 129,129,000. 655,477.15Other groups(important 
figures in villages)
49 19,188,000. 391,591.83
Source: The Economic Section of Malang Kabupaten.
the Economic Section at the Kabupaten Office.*® There were two staff members in the 
economic section handling the problem of credit repayments, but they were frequently 
not present in their offices because of the many other tasks they had to do at the same 
time. Hence, it is not hardly surprising that during my stay in Malang, only ten village 
officials were actually brought to court.
Two points about the problem of credit arrears need to be stressed here for their 
relevance to policy implementation at the local level. First, it is a problem which has 
had only indirect implications for the primary objective of the Bimas program, i.e. 
increasing rice production. The reasons for seeking to collect the credit still owing to the 
government are related primarily to considerations of sound public finance and banking 
practice and social equity. The goal of increasing rice production is not significantly 
endangered by the problem of arrears, which in fact amount to a very small part of the 
total credit extended in Malang Kabupaten (Rp 1,024,501,680 in June 1983); moreover, 
arrears are a far lower percentage of the total credit extended in East Java than in West 
Java, where failure to repay credit is more widespread.
Second, it is the socio-political implications of the practice that are most 
significant: the fact that it is one of the most blatant abuses of the Bimas system and
®The Sekwilda actually has little role in the implementation of rice intensification and KUD 
programs. He has no position in Satpel Bimas Kabupaten. In an interview with the Sekwilda of 
Malang, he explained that most of his duties are to manage the kabupaten administration, but 
not to get involved in program implementations.
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one of the main reasons why it has achieved a bad reputation for corruption and waste. 
The fact that so many village officials and the richer farmers who have connections with 
them, have been the main beneficiaries of this form of abuse, underlines the accusation 
that Bimas has in practice had the effect - even though it was not the intended purpose - 
of tranferring government funds primarily into the hands of the village elite, not to the 
peasants as a whole. The arrears problem is a symptom and symbol of the most 
undesirable feature of the Bimas system.
The Effects on per capita Income in Malang
According to the Kabupaten office, average per capita incomes in Malang 
increased between 1976 and 1982 by 19.4 per cent per year on a current price basis, and 
by 6.03 per cent per year based on constant prices (see Table 5-7 on page 118).*® How 
much of the benefit of this increase actually accrued to farmers? There are no studies 
specifically describing the income trends of farmers in Malang, but a study conducted in 
1984 in some villages in East and West Java described the average rate of increase of 
farmers’ incomes during the period 1976 and 1983 and can be used as a rough basis for 
comparison with the incomes of farmers in Malang.
Table 5-7: Malang: Per Capita Income 1976-1981, 
Based on Constant Price
Year Population Per Capita 
Income (Rp)
7, of Increase
1976 1,871,993 67,752.34
1977 1,888,327 70,517.88 4.1
1978 1,899,395 74,540.82 5.7
1979 1,916,357 77,863.52 4.5
1980 1,938,245 82,166.18 5.5
1981 2,048,029 90,705.57 10.4
Source: Statistic Office of Malang Kabupaten.
The study found that the increase of farmers’ incomes on a constant price basis 
was between 41 to 78 per cent in upland areas, and between 13 to 73 per cent in lowland
^Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Malang, "Evaluasi Berbagai Data Hasil Survey Pendapatan 
Regional dan Sosial Ekonomi di Kabupaten Dati II Malang, Tahun Anggaran 1982/1983.” 
Unpublished Report, pp.2-3.
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areas during that period.20 The improvement in the farmers’ standard of living can be 
seen in a study made by Edmundson in Desa Glanggang, Malang. In 1976, according to 
Edmundson, most of the population in this rice-producing village seemed to have become 
more prosperous than they were in 1971. Furthermore, Edmundson pointed out:21
Perhaps the most pleasing change seen in Glanggang between 1971 and 1976 
was the fact that so many of the poorer class split bamboo homes had been 
replaced by cooler and more permanent brick structures. All the new homes 
being built were gedung construction and many of the old bamboo gedek 
structure had been converted to brick...Housing is one of the clearest indicators 
of economic wealth and by 1976 about 80 per cent of the villages were housed 
in brick homes.
Certainly, not all of that prosperity came just from agriculture, although most of 
the people in the village were farmers. The proximity of the village22 23to Malang town 
enabled the villagers to obtain alternative jobs outside agriculture, which made a 
significant contribution to their wealth. The picture of Desa Glanggang can be accepted 
as fairly typical of the many rice-producing villages in Malang which have benefited from 
the increase in rice production, but it certainly cannot be considered as a general 
depiction of the economic life of all farmers in the kabupaten. However, it is also a fact 
that the general increase in incomes has widened the gap between the rich and the poor 
in the village areas. Edmundson writes in the same article that there was a degree of 
concentration of wealth in the hands of big farmers in Desa Glanggang.2^
During my visits to various villages, I got different answers from farmers when I 
asked them, ”Has your life become better since the introduction of Simas?” For most big 
farmers, life is certainly better now than before the Simas. However, the answer from 
small farmers varied from those who said that their conditions of life are better now to 
those who felt that their living conditions were stagnant, neither worse nor better. 
Simas has enabled the big farmers to restore houses, buy radios and television sets, buy 
more land, or even build rice mill units. The small farmers who felt that their life is 
better usually gave the answer that although the Simas program had increased the 
production of their sawah, most of their income actually came from other activities, or 
from their children who were now able to provide a financial contribution to their 
parents. Details of such stories can be found in Chapter Six.
20This study classified the farmers into four categories: the landless labourers; those who own 
0.25 ha land; who own 0.25-0.49 ha; and who own 0.50 ha. Yusuf Saefudin and Yuni Marisa, 
Perubahan Pendapatan dan Kesempatan Kerja, Bogor: Studi Dinamika Pedesaan, Yayasan 
Penelitian Survey Agro Ekonomi, September 1984, p.12.
21W.C. Edmundson, op.cit., pp.100-101.
22Some 14 Km from Malang town and included in the area of Kecamatan Pakisaji.
23Edmundson, op.cit., p.99.
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The Development of the KUD in Malang
Eleven years after their establishment in 1973, the KUDs in Malang still faced 
difficulties in developing their organization, and most of them still could not be 
considered as organizations serving the interests of farmers. Certainly, there were some 
exceptions, but their numbers were still small. All 33 KUDs in Malang Kabupaten (not 
including those in Kotamadya of Malang) have been recognized by the government as 
Model KUD. As mentioned in Chapter Three, one of the criteria to become a model 
KUD is the ability of the KUD to recruit a minimum 5000 members.
In Malang, there were in fact only four KUDs with more than 5000 members in 
1983: KUD Ampelgading of Kecamatan Ampelgading (6023), KUD Raga Separih of 
Kecamatan Gondanglegi (5014), KUD Pakis of Kecamatan Pakis (5110), and KUD Batu 
of Kecamatan Batu (5910). Most KUDs had only around 2000 members, and one KUD 
had only 230 members in 1983, i.e. KUD Minajaya of Kecamatan Sumbermanjing.24 25 26 
Even with 2000 people as members, only a small proportion of the kecamatan population 
would have been recruited as members of the cooperative, i.e. around 400 households 
per kecamatan, or less than three per cent of the total on average. ®
The designation of the 29 KUDs as Model KUD was done simply by the Bupati 
giving instructions to the Head of the Cooperative Office in Malang Kabupaten to issue 
such a designation in order to show the provincial government that the local government 
in Malang Kabupaten had been able to develop nearly all KUDs in its area as Model 
KUD.It was little more than a formal gesture.
Although some KUDs have demontrated their ability to recruit many members, 
we should be cautious about accepting the accuracy of the numbers of members, as 
mentioned in Chapter Three. Many of the "members” are registered in name only on the 
membership list without actually knowing their rights or obligations as members. The 
KUDs in Malang have usually taken Rp 1000 from each farmer accepting Bimas credit, 
and they consider this money as a saving (simpanan pokok), i.e. the kind of money that 
should be paid to KUD if someone becomes a member.
• This is the simplest way to recruit ” members” without any need to know the 
farmers’ opinion on whether or not they want to be members of the cooperative. While 
the farmers know that the KUD has taken their money, many of them are not aware 
that they thereby become members of KUDs. Many of them have never made contact
24Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Pertanian 1983, pp.84-86.
25There were 441,841 households in Malang in 1982, which means that 31 kecamatans averaged 
14,253 households at that time. One household had five members on the average. "Kabupaten 
Malang Dalam Angka,” 1982, op.cit., p.22.
26Interview, the Head of Sinus Section at Cooperative Office in Malang, August 5, 1983.
129
with the KUDs either to buy fertilizer or sell their rice, and they never knew what was 
done with their savings because the KUDs never gave them information on that; nor 
were they invited to the annual meetings which, in fact, were also very rarely held.
The KUDs in Malang have simply become institutions through which the 
kecamatan elites control the working of the government-ordained cooperative for their 
own financial benefit. This development is similar to that observed by Timothy 
Mahoney in Central Java.^ Such elites built a kind of oligarchy in the cooperative in 
which nearly all channels for farmers’ participation were closed. The details of 
management of the cooperatives were known only to their staff members and there was 
little possibility for farmers to learn anything about the management. The annual 
meeting (RAT) which, according to regulations, is to be a place for the KUD board to 
give reports on all their activities over a one-year period to all KUD members, as 
mentioned, was rarely carried out. Or, if it is, the farmers invited to the meeting are 
selected and limited only to those who have good relationships with the members of the 
board. Thus, opposition to the board is minimized.
In addition, the KUD boards sometimes occupy their positions for a long period. 
If there is any change in the management, it usually occurs through a system of rotation. 
Members of the board remain but their positions on it are changed. In this respect, good 
relations between the board and the local government officials, who have the power to 
determine the board membership, are most important. Therefore, the support of the 
local government officials is critical for groups using KUDs as their arenas for 
competition.
Groups involved in this competition are usually associated with the three political 
parties: the PPP, the PDI, and Golkar. Apart from the three political parties, there are 
two other government sponsored groups that are usually involved in the competition for 
influence on the KUD boards, i.e. the PEPABRI (Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI, 
Association of the Retired Army Members), and the KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda 
Indonesia, National Committee of Indonesian Youth).
All the above points lead to the conclusion that the ordinary members are not 
important to the board of the KUDs; in fact the latter may even be reluctant to ask 
farmers to become involved in the cooperatives. The fact that farmers are not needed by 
KUDs can be seen from the way the KUDs go about purchasing rice for the food 
stockpile. The KUDs generally buy most of their rice from rice traders, obtaining only a 
small part of it from farmers directly. As a result, the farmers still prefer to sell nee to 
traders. Their reasons are mainly economic: if they sell rice to KUD, they have to pay
27rpjmot^y Mahoney.,”Local Political and Economic Structures” in Gary E. Hansen (ed) 
Agricultural and Rural Development in Indonesia, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.
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for its transportation from their sawahs to the KUD warehouses, while traders usually 
come to sawah areas to buy the padi.
The KUDs generally explain this state of affairs by saying that they lack personnel 
to buy rice directly from sawah. However, while this may be true, there is also a profit 
motive behind this action. By buying rice from traders, the KUDs are able to benefit 
from the transportation fee paid by the Sub-Dolog, without having to go to the trouble 
of seeking out the rice themselves, and this method enables them to avoid the red tape 
generally involved in rice purchasing activities (for detail on this, see Chapter Seven).
The domination by elite groups in KUDs, the lack of mass control, and perhaps 
the lack of government control over the management of the cooperative, has given rise to 
many cases of financial corruption carried out by staff members of the KUDs. Various 
techniques are used for this manipulation and unfortunately, some local government 
officials and officials of the Cooperative Office have also been involved in this kind of 
mismanagement. Examples of this will be given in Chapter Seven.
The Working of Kabupaten Instansis: A Description and Analysis
The Political system and Program Implementation
The superior power of the centre over the regions, which was discussed in Chapter 
Two, influences the implementation of the rice intensification and KUD programs in 
various ways, and creates all sorts of problems, as discussed above. One of the 
consequences of this power is that there is a tendency for local officials to give higher 
priority to the interests of the central government rather than to those of the regions 
themselves, or even of the groups which are the targets of the government’s program. In 
the case of rice policy, the power of the centre is most clearly manifest in the way local 
officials react to the central government’s instructions to the regions to achieve national 
and regional rice stock targets. This is one of the reasons of the government’s success in 
increasing rice production.
The national targets for rice production, areas and stock of rice, have to be 
achieved by regions as mentioned in Chapter Four, and they are rarely able to express 
serious objections to determinations made by the centre. This situation emerges 
because the environment within which the Indonesian bureaucracy operates often 
compels the local government officials simply to accept the orders given to them rather 27
^Interviews: the Head of Malang Diperta, June 23, 1983} the Head of Kediri Diperta, 
February 5, 1984; Ir.Taufiqurrachman, staff member of Bimas Section in East Java Province 
Diperta, November 15, 1983; Ir. Amrin Kahar, Deputy Secretary of BAKO Bimas, January 1, 
1984; and Ir. Dadi Mulyadi M.Sc., staff member of Planning Bureau of BAKO Bimas, September
27, 1984.
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than to express their inability to carry out such orders. So they appear to accept all 
instructions from above although this may in fact be a very different matter from 
ensuring that the orders are actually implemented. The important thing for them is to 
pass on the relevant instructions or targets to their subordinates and to be able to report 
later that their implementation has been achieved successfully. It seems that there is fear 
among the regional officials that any questioning of the targets and instructions from 
above will hamper their careers, which are highly dependent on the approval of their 
superiors.
Achievement of the targets of Bimas and the KUD, and also other development 
targets, are among the main yardsticks applied by superiors in evaluating the success of 
local government officials in administering their regions and in implementing the 
programs. Therefore, in Indonesia, the term of ”to achieve the target” (mencapai 
target), by which is meant that a certain region has achieved development targets 
determined by the central government, is one that gives rise to pride for most local 
government officials. Their careers, for the most part, depend upon the achievement of 
their targets, since pembangunan (development) has been made a primary political 
slogan of New Order Indonesia.™ Hence, every effort will be made to show that targets 
have been achieved without any need to give much attention to how the programs are 
actually implemented.
What are the priorities in the targets of rice policy and the KUD ? It seems from 
the various cases arising in the course of implementation of Bimas and KUD programs, 
that the priorities are not so much to improve the conditions of small farmers or other 
rural villagers, but simply to increase overall rice production, and to help the 
government in collecting the rice needed for the national stock. As can be seen in the 
case of KUD, for example, the authorities seem to ignore the questions of where the 
KUDs buy their rice from, and ignore also the problem of whether the cooperatives are 
really giving any benefit to the farmers or not. An adequate stock of rice is important 
for maintaining political and economic stability. Thus the achievement of the target is 
considered the most important thing affecting the whole process of program 
implementation and the attitudes of the local government officials towards the rice 
program.
The lack of concern on the government’s part for the farmers’ interests is made 
possible by the pattern of power relationships between the centre and the regions, and 
between the superior and the subordinate officials. The system of official appointment * *
js very dangerous for someone to be accused as an obstacle to development or penghambat 
pembangunan. He can be categorized as a subversive element or member of the PKI, the former 
Indonesian Communist Party. This accusation is very similar to the charge of being Kontra
Revolusi or Anti-NASAKOM during the Sukarno period.
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in Indonesia’s New Order, has created a higher degree of subservience of subordinates to 
their superiors. The appointment of the Governor and the Bupati are, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two, carried out by the central government.30 *
The power of the superior authorities which is built into the system, is not limited 
to the right to select and appoint their subordinates, but also to replace them with other 
persons, if necessary. This is strengthened by regulations and laws concerning the 
government civil service which mention the need for all government civil servants to give 
their loyalties to the government, which is then translated as loyalty to their 
superiors. Furthermore, the powers of the Governors and the Bupatis, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two, are not merely limited to their immediate subordinates, but also extend 
over many other posts such as the appointment and replacement of members of the 
DPRD from Golkar faction, and the determination of the leadership of various 
government-sponsored organizations such as KNPI and even the KUD boards.
The above mentioned system may on the one hand be effective in creating and 
maintaining stability in rural areas by reducing the possibility of opposition from local 
officials. For instance, the success of the government’s rice policy probably resulted in 
some degree from the fact that the production targets set by the national government 
were accepted without question by the lower-level officials. This achievement was made 
possible by the availability of an obedient bureaucracy at the regional level.
On the other hand, this high degree of subservience of local officials does not mean 
that they lacked power to implement the programs. In fact they have a great deal of 
freedom to choose various ways to achieve successful implementation of the programs, so 
long as they do not disturb the achievement of priority targets proposed by the centre. 
The local officials have, in fact, considerable freedom to use any methods they wish, 
including threats, force and compulsion, to achieve the targets set. The Bupatis 
frequently threaten the Camats that if a program is not executed successfully in the 
kecamatan, this will affect their careers; or the Head of Kabupaten Diperta gives a 
similar reminder to the Mantri Pertanian and to PPL. Such cases are found not only in
30Appointments of Camats are made by the Bupati himself from among kabupaten staff 
members, without any need for agreement from the DPRD II. The Village Headmen, although 
they are elected directly by rural people in an election, are selected from a list of candidates which 
must be approved by the Bupati, and their appointments are validated by him. Even today, there 
is a continuing effort to reduce the autonomy of the village authorities. Whereas the village 
headmen were previously paid by the village community through provision of tanah bengkok 
(appanage land) and were thus not categorized as government servants, some village headmen 
today are appointed as government employees and receive salaries from the government. In 
Malang, sixteen village headmen were appointed as government civil servants in 1982.
3*Law No.8/1974 on Pokok-Pokok Kepegatvaiarr, Government Regulation No.30/1980 on 
Peraturan Disiplin Pegawai Negeri Sipii, and Presidential Decision (Keppres) No. 82/1971 on 
KORPRI.
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Malang but also in other kabupatens. In Kediri, for example, the Bupati sent an official 
letter to all Camats requiring that the KUD must be developed successfully, saying also 
that any failure to do so would affect the careers of the Camats.32
The attitude of the Bupatis toward the Camats is automatically imitated by the 
latter or by the Mantri Polisi (Deputy of Camat) in respect of their subordinates and of 
the farmers also. Sometimes, I saw Camats or Mantri Polisi threaten the village 
headmen or other staff members of village government. In one kecamatan, the Mantri 
Polisi said angrily to an old Kuwowo, who came too late to a meeting in the kecamatan 
office:33
Why are you late in attending this meeting? I sent you an invitation two 
days ago, did you receive it? Do you know that your action can be considered 
as an obstacle to development, and do you know what is the sanction for that?
Do you know that on the basis of regional law (Peraturan Daerah) No.15/1981 
the Camat can discharge you as an official of the village government ?
It seems, however, that most government officials need to use compulsion or 
threats in order to overcome obstacles to the implementation of programs or the 
achievement of targets determined by the centre as promptly as possible. There are 
many possible obstacles to the Bimas program, ranging from refusal to plant the HYVs 
(particularly in the early years of the program) to refusal to plant a particular kind of 
variety on a block basis (tanam serentak). Officials say that these obstacles arise 
because most farmers are uneducated and thus do not understand the objectives of 
development programs introduced for the benefit of all Indonesians by the government. 
Sometimes, according to officials, the farmers are induced by particular interest groups 
to hamper implementation of the programs. As one Mantri Polisi points out:
Compulsion and threats are used in accordance with the social situation and 
the condition of each area...but for my kecamatan, in ninety per cent of cases 
these methods must be applied because the people here have little awareness of 
the objectives of development and it is difficult to get them to participate in 
development programs.
Threats and coercion rather than bargaining and persuasion, will be carried out 
most effectively in a society in which opposition or criticism are considered taboo. The 
DPRD is, in theory, a channel for the people’s aspirations, but since this body is not 
designated as a place for criticism of, and opposition to the government, but as a partner
32Decision of the Bupati of Kediri No.518/2018/443.14/1983 dated October 24,1983.
33Kuwowo is a staff member of the village headman, who has responsibility over irrigation 
water. In other parts of Java, he is also named Jogotirto or Ulu-Ulu.
*^The interest groups here refer to two political parties (PPP and PDI) or to ex-members of 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party).
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to the executive, it has lost its supervisory role over the executive.**® In addition, the 
proportional representation system, combined with the list system applied in the election 
system in Indonesia, prevents people from choosing representatives known personally to 
them.®® This is because it is not they who select the candidates, but the parties. 
Furthermore, one-third of the DPRD members are appointed by the government in 
order to safeguard the position of the government party, Golkar, in those assemblies.
The DPRD itself has various internal weaknesses, particularly the DPRD II in 
Malang. First, most members of the DPRD II live in the town of Malang or in 
kecamatan capitals, and thus rarely make contact with rural people. Because of this and 
also because they are not known by the masses, most of the people’s aspirations have 
been channeled, instead, through the local government apparatus (especially through the 
extension workers, in the case of farmers). Secondly, the level of education of DPRD 
members is generally lower than that of the executive staff and this affects their 
performance and ability to exercise any authority over the executive. This also results in 
a lack of ability among most of the DPRD’s members to understand the people’s 
aspirations and this gives rise to an impression among the people that the main 
motivation to become a member of the assembly is just to get the salary it yields.®"
The only relatively effective tool as a channel for public aspirations is the press. In 
Malang, the Bupati and his staff pay serious attention to news reports in the press, such 
as Kompas and a local newspaper, Suara Indonesia. Negative reports on Malang in the 
newspapers will cause embarrassment to the Bupati not only in the eyes of the provincial 
authorities but also in the eyes of the public in Malang. The staff of the Bupati, as also 
of the Camats, are particularly worried if there is bad news about the outcome of their 
activities, because the Bupati will admonish them on such matters.
However, this does not mean that newspapers have no limitations in their ability 
to channel public aspirations to the authorities. Quite the contrary: the government has 
power to censor any news classified as ” dangerous” to national stability or the authority 
(kewibawaan) of the government. These stipulations have forced the newspapers to be
®®Chapter Two of Law No.5/1974 on Local Government states that local governments of the 
Province and Kabupaten include the Governor and the Bupati, together with the DPRD I and 
DPRD II. This means that the DPRDs are not merely legislative bodies, as their name implies, 
but are also associated the executive branch of local government. See Chapter IV, Article 13, 
Point 1; and also "Hasil Penelitian Kedudukan dan Kewenangan Lembaga Eksekutif dan 
Legislatif Daerah, Suatu Studi Tentang Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Penampilan Politik 
DPRD.” op.cit.
®®For discussion on the use of these systems in Indonesia, see M. Budiardjo, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu 
Politik, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1977, p.206.
®^Among people in Malang there is a joke that members of the DPRD generally apply the 
"Five D”, i.e. Datang, Daftar, Duduk, Dengar, and Duit (Come to sessions then register their 
names, take a seat, listen, and collect sessional allowances).
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very careful in selecting news items, so as to avoid any ban by the government. Apart 
from that, there is no established habit of using newspapers and other mass media as 
channels of protest or aspirations among the public, particularly the rural people.
The weakness of the DPRD and the semi-impotency of the press have created a 
situation in which implementation of development programs has resulted in a serious 
lack of popular participation and control, and these have caused the bureaucracy to be 
nearly uncontrollable, except from within its own internal circles. An uncontrolled 
bureaucracy thus tends to work arbitrarily. Yet the emergence of various ” deviations” in 
the implementation of rice intensification programs and the KUD reveals that the 
bureaucracy cannot be adequately supervised just from within the bureaucracy itself. 
Such supervision needs to be carried out also by the people, or the target groups at 
whom the programs are aimed, through their participation in program implementation. 
However, popular participation, although it is an important element in any program’s 
success, may not be regarded as very important in a program in which the objective is 
not the interests of the people but the interests of the government itself.
Problems of Responsiveness and Accountability
Another result of such subservience is that officials at both the national and local 
levels tend to ignore the opinions of their subordinates or target groups when they make 
decisions. When the BAKO Bimas was preparing a draft for a new structure of the 
Satpel Bimas Propinsi and Kabupaten, one staff member of the BAKO Bimas who had 
the job of preparing the draft, explained to me that the; idea for the new structure came 
from his superior. In order to make the draft, he simply relied on his memories of his 
discussions of Bimas problems with officials at the local level, on the basis of which he 
made a random choice of two kabupatens in Central Java to obtain any further 
information necessary.
According this official, the information he got from those two kabupatens was 
sufficient to represent the opinion of other kabupatens. He said that he deliberately did 
not visit any other regions because it would have raised difficulties for him in finishing 
the draft as fast as possible. In his view, if he went to many other kabupatens he would 
have received too much information or too many proposals from them and that would 
have delayed the finishing of the draft.
I found a similar attitude also at the kecamatan level. At a meeting of Satpel 
Bimas Kecamatan in one kecamatan, there was a discussion on a problem about whether 
the Camat should attend the RAPIMWIL in the kabupaten office before or after the
^®The draft was approved as a new structure for Satpel Bimas Propinsi and Kabupaten and has 
been in force since April 1984, although until September 1984 it did not apply yet in those 
regions.
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sarasehan (discussion meeting) with Kontak Tanis. All staff members of the kecamatan 
proposed that the Camat should attend the RAPIMWIL before the Sarasehan on the 
grounds that farmers always have many proposals and these would only create 
difficulties for the Camat in the RAPIMWIL. Therefore, according to them, it was 
better for the Camat to simply give the instructions he received from the Bupati, to the 
farmers in the sarasehan.
This sort of subservience has also created a situation in which the subordinates 
always try to make their superiors happy. This attitude has an impact on the quality of 
reports made by the subordinates. Many reports merely describe situations that are 
satisfactory, but they tend to conceal any bad things occurring in the course of 
implementation of a program, insofar as the problems are not too serious and will be 
able to be resolved later. This is done just to avoid causing any dissatisfaction among 
their superiors which may hamper the promotion of the subordinates. In Indonesia, these 
kinds of reports are called ” Asal Bapak Senang” (ABS) reports.
Programs Assigned Priority; the Seriousness and Continuity of Supervision
This uncontrolled bureaucracy, as I have mentioned, tends to work arbitrarily, 
because there is no public control over its operations. One of the consequences of this 
situation has been a lack of serious supervision over the implementation of rice policy 
and the KUD, even though supervision over the course of the implementation process is 
a crucial precondition for any program’s success. The problem of supervision is 
connected with the amount of attention given to the programs by officials. Here the role 
of the Bupati is crucial for the program’s success, because as the head of the kabupaten, 
his attention and activity with regard to program implementation will affect the 
performance of his subordinates. A Bupati who gives much attention to a program 
usually succeeds in accelerating the implementation of the program because he becomes 
actively involved in the process; hence his staff will also give more attention to its 
effective implementation.
However, the attention of the Bupati is also affected by his degree of interest in a 
particular program; and in Malang, this interest is influenced by the priority given by 
the centre toward such a program and by the length of the program. A program given 
priority by the centre will also get much attention from the Bupati because it will 
usually attract more funds and facilities than other non-priority programs. On the other 
hand, a program which has been conducted for several years will be given less attention 
than a new program.
The attention given by the Bupati to a program can be seen inter alia in the ways 
he conducts checks on its implementation. The Bupati of Malang (at the time of this 
research) rarely made any direct personal checks on the implementation of Bimas and
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KUD, and rarely attended the monthly meetings of the Satpel Bimas Kabupaten. In 
this, he differed from his predecessor who, according to kabupaten officials, gave 
instructions that the meetings be held every week, and always attended them.39
During the 64 weeks of my research, the Bupati attended meetings of the Satpel 
Bimas Kabupaten only twice, in order to deal with particular problems that needed his 
intervention. The Bupati said he rarely attended the meetings because continuous or 
daily supervion on Bimas and KUD programs was no longer needed, since the programs 
had been carried out for some years by them and all members of the Satpel Bimas 
Kabupaten and Kecamatans knew their tasks properly. Continuous supervision, 
according to him, would only suggest a lack of confidence in the capabilities of his 
subordinates.
Some Camats explained that the Bupati usually made indirect checks on the 
implementation of rice policy and the KUD, or in their terms, the Bupati used a ” 
si stem komunikasi berjembatan", that is, he checked on problems of program 
implementation only with his staff or with the Camats, but rarely checked rice policy 
implementation or the KUD program directly himself. This does not mean that the 
Bupati never visited the villages, however. In fact, he quite often made such visits, but 
generally to check implementation of other development programs, particularly the 
INPRES Programs.42
The attitude of the Bupati toward Bimas and the KUD programs affected the 
attitude of most of his staff in the Satpel Bimas Kabupaten. The Head of Malang 
Diperta and Head of the Economic Section in the Kabupaten Office, the two most 
important officials in the implementation of the programs, very rarely made visits to * 49
39Interview, the Head of Plant Protection Section in Malang Diperta office, who was also the 
former Secretary of Satpel Bimas Kabupaten Malang, February 2, 1984.
49At his first meeting, he solved a problem of coordination between the Diperta and Plantation 
office (Dinas Perkebunan). This involved a problem in which the area of the sugar intensification 
program (TRI), which comes under managament of the Plantation office, had been extended 
bey.ond the area of rice. The Bupati gave instructions to Head of Plantation office to recheck the 
areas of TRI, and asked him to reduce the areas. At the second, the Bupati asked the Head of 
District Court about the possibility of bringing to the court various local government 
functionaries involved in credit manipulations. This problem needed cooperation between police, 
public prosecutor, the court and kabupaten office, which could not be handled merely by the 
Satpel Bimas Kabupaten.
^Interview, August 3, 1983.
I often followed the Bupati’s visits to kecamatans and villages, and I found that most of the 
visits were carried out to attend opening ceremonies, or official ceremonies associated with the 
INPRES Projects. From the schedule of the Bupati’s daily activities in Public Relations Section in 
the kabupaten, it could be seen that most of his activities were involved with the INPRES 
Projects. Some kabupaten officials explained that the Bupati gave much more attention to the 
INPRES projects than to Bimas and KUD. According to them, the Bupati was known as one who 
always carried tools such as crowbars in his car to check the quality of roads or buildings 
implemented through the INPRES program.
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kecamatans or villages to check the implementation of Bimas and the KUD, at least 
during my period in Malang; and this situation was confirmed by the Camats. 
According to the Camats, the two officials seemed to accept the reports given by their 
subordinates, and if there were any obstacles to the programs, they simply asked staff 
members of their offices to check it. This attitude arose not because they are too low in 
rank to have much authority in the villages compared with the Bupati but mainly just 
because of a reluctance to carry out the direct personal supervision over the 
implementation of the program. Factors behind this reluctance will be clarified in 
another section.
The Cooperative Office seems also to have lacked any serious commitment to 
supervising the development of the KUD. Meetings were held by the Head of the office 
with the CPNS every Monday morning,^ and occasional visits to the KUDs were 
carried out by staff members of the office, especially at the end of the fiscal year 
(February, March, and April), to check the management of the cooperatives. However, 
the adequacy of these checks must be doubted because the visits lasted only one or two 
hours for each KUD. This lack of seriousness in carrying out supervision has given rise 
to various types of deviations and financial corruption in the KUDs.
I often followed the visits of the staff members of the office to the KUDs. On these 
occasions, there were checks on the KUD bookkeeping, or questions about the KUD 
situations, or suggestions about how to solve problems. In one KUD, I heard the Head of 
one section in the Cooperative Office ask the chairman of the KUD about where he kept 
some Rp.400,000 (the balance of transactions made by the KUD and registered in its 
bookkeeping) because the official did not see the money in the safe deposit box. The 
chairman of the KUD answered calmly that the money was not in the box, but in the 
house of the KUD treasurer. The official explained that such an action was wrong and 
the money should be returned to the box. The chairman of the KUD and the treasurer 
nodded and the inspection was concluded with laughter and lunch. Other examples of 
KUD problems will be related in Chapter Seven.
. There is a tendency among the officials of the kabupaten down to the village level 
to conceal problems and avoid their duties insofar as they are not known by the 
superiors. Some extension workers (PPL), for example, complained that their reports on 
lack of fertilizers or seeds often got no response from those responsible for distribution of 
these production inputs. The Camats and other officials, according to them, would 
always say, ” Yes, the reports will be sent to the kabupaten office,” or officials at 
kabupaten level would say, ”The reports will be sent on to the province.” But often
^CPNS = Calon Pegawai Negeri Sipil, Candidate of Civil Servant; i.e. an employee of the 
Cooperative Office seconded to each KUD.
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there were no further actions. The situation would be different if officials from Jakarta 
or the Governor of the province suddenly discovered some problem during their on-the- 
spot checks, or if there was a serious and widespread problems such as the attacks of 
toereng reported by the press.
In such a situation, the kabupaten officials would take actions to remedy the 
problems very speedily. In this situation, coercion and threats are sometimes used 
against subordinates. Nearly all problems in the program implementation are handled 
with this kind of "shock therapy” method, which can itself be regarded as evidence of a 
serious lack of checking. Moreover, the discovery of billions of rupiah of credit arrears 
and similar discrepancies found in the planned and actual figures for Inmas in Malang 
from 1971 to 1974 (see asterisked figures in Table 5-4 on page 113) are other indications 
of the lack of seriousness in checking.
The reluctance of many officials to conduct direct checks and to give serious 
supervision to program implementation are caused by several factors. For the 
government officials at the regional levels, both Bimas and the KUD programs are 
merely two out of many development programs that have to be conducted 
simultaneously. Therefore, many of them complain about the heavy burden of their jobs. 
The Bupati, the Camats and several Office Heads, all say that they have too many 
duties to be handled at the same time. As a result, according to them, they are unable 
to concentrate on a particular program because so many different development programs 
need their attention.
Both Bimas and the KUD programs have been implemented for many years now, 
and have given rise to weariness among the implementers, because much of the work 
related to the programs has become routine. As explained by the Head of Dipertas of 
Malang and Kediri Kabupatens:
Many tasks of implementating Bimas have become routine. Reports from 
below, especially figures on area, are made by repeating the old figures, and the 
reports are just made by filling the columns in various forms prepared.
The enthusiasm found at the beginning of the programs’ implementation has 
decreased, according to the officials, because the challenges faced in the early stages have 
also decreased, and this also contributes to the emergence of this weariness.
^One of the challenges arising early in the Bimas program was, for instance, the refusal of 
farmers to plant the new high yielding varieties in preference to the traditional types.
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Lack of Facilities, Personnel, and Resources
Most of the offices implementing the Bimas and KUD programs lack adequate 
facilities and personnel, and most office heads complain about these problems. Official 
cars were sold to them in 1982, thereby becoming private cars, but without any subsidy 
for petrol and maintenance. Thus it can be understood that with their low salaries, they 
rarely make visits to kecamatans or villages. If they should go to the villages, there is a 
habit among them of asking the village headmen for some thousands of rupiah for petrol 
(in Indonesian terms: y’Uang Bensiri") even though the latter also generally lack official 
funds for this contribution.
The local government officials involved in the Bimas program have previously 
received, as an incentive, an allowance in addition to their salaries, ranging from Rp 15 
thousands to Rp 30 thousands a month for each. However, this allowance was abolished 
in 1980; according to officials of Kabupaten Diperta, although this money was small in 
amount it was in fact important in maintaining the enthusiasm of the staff for the 
implementation of the program.On the other hand, the INPRES projects offer new 
chances for financial benefits for the kabupaten officials through tenders on new projects 
and gifts from contractors to them if the contractors hope to win the tenders. Although 
it is difficult to prove, rumours among officials and contractors mention that some 
money (uang pehcin) must be given to the officials to win the tenders.
Although many tasks of implementing the program have become routine, there are 
others which still need to be carried out with serious commitment and unfortunately, in 
these matters, the program often suffers from a shortage of personnel. At the kabupaten 
level, for example, there was only one staff member for plant protection at the Diperta 
office in 1984, who had to go to each kecamatan, and only two personnel at the 
kabupaten office, as mentioned above, for handling the credit arrears. To coordinate 
and supervise the works of the PPLs, as mentioned in Chapter Four, there are only two 
PPMs in each WKBPP: the PPM Programmer and PPM Supervisor. In fact, many of 
these PPM Supervisors rarely visit the WKPPs to check the work of the PPLs, although 
they are given motorcycles. Most of their time is spent in carrying out administrative 
jobs, such as making the weekly reports to the Kabupaten Diperta, or arranging training 
for the PPLs.
^Interviews, the Head of Malang Diperta, June 13, 1983; and Secretary of Satpel Bimas 
Kabupaten Malang, May 30, 1983.
“Two staff members of BAPPEDA (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah, Regional 
Planning Office) in Malang and one in Kediri explained that in most kabupatens there are groups 
of contractors which have close relationships with the Bupati and kabupaten officials. Tenders 
will always be won by members of these groups in rotation. The rotation is maintained just to 
camouflage the "relationship” between the kabupaten officials and the contractors. Certainly, 
these involve some money for gifts to the officials.
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Apart from that, the PPM are also very busy compiling weekly reports from the 
PPLs, so that apparently they do not give much attention to the reports. At the 
Kabupaten Diperta level there is a Head of the Extension Section as superior of the 
PPMs and PPLs. He is assisted by four staff members who are also engaged m compiling 
weekly reports from the PPMs for the Head of the Diperta. Hence, there is little 
possibility for them to give serious attention to such reports and this also is a factor 
contributing to the unreliability of the reports.
The unreliability of reports is also aggravated by lack of facilities. In each 
kecamatan, there is one Mantri Pertanian and one Mantri Statistik, who generally 
make their weekly reports on the rice intensification areas on the basis of reports from 
the Carik Desa (secretary of village) and the Kuwowo. Very often their reports differ 
from those of the PPLs. Such differences occur because there is no common yardstick to 
measure the development of the areas, and it is done only on the basis of observations 
(pengamatan), while there is inadequate checking, or even none at all, into the reports 
from the Carik Desa and the Kuwowos.^
One Mantri Pertanian and one Mantri Statistik, most of them equipped only 
with bicycles, are insufficient for checking the intensification areas throughout the 
kecamatan every week. Thus, as was pointed out to me by one Mantri Statistik, ”1 
just accept the reports of the Carik Desa.” The PPL themselves also make their reports 
on the basis of their observations during their visits to villages. The existence of two 
different reports in one office, therefore, is often confusing, but the Diperta officials 
usually use the reports from the Mantri Pertanian as its basic report to the province.
The number of extension workers is also insufficient. Although the number of 
extension workers (PPL) who are responsible for providing guidance and information in 
agricultural techniques, increased from 49 in 1976 to 93 in 1983, they are still insufficient 
to provide the necessary service for all farmers’ groups in their respective areas. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, one PPL is resposible to give guidance for farmers’ groups 
in one WKPP (i.e. 16 Farmer’s Groups, involving 3,600 to 6,400 farmers). In fact, one 
PPL.is only able to give guidance to 5 or 6 farmers’ groups, totalling 2,000 to 3,000 
farmers effectively. Therefore, many farmers have no contact at all with the extension 
workers, and where they do apply the new agricultural techniques, this is because they 
learned about them from other farmers.
The above situation arises because most of the PPLs are not provided with 
transportation and housing. Therefore, the farmers’ groups which have generally been 
adequately developed are merely those located in the villages close to the kecamatan
47Interviews, some Mantri Polisi and Mantri Statistik.
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capitals where most of the PPLs live. Among the 93 PPLs in Malang Kabupaten, only 
30 have been given motor cycles and receive subsidies for petrol and parts from their 
offices. The others have had to buy motorcycles for themselves, and ironically they were 
not even given any contribution toward petrol and parts. Due to the inability of the 
government to provide housing for the PPL, most of them then prefer to stay in the 
kecamatan capitals, or live in Malang town with their parents or parents in-law, hence 
quite far away from their job areas (YVKPP).'*®
This lack of mobility has resulted in lack of effectiveness of their work and in 
difficulty in meeting anyone except their chairmen (the Kontak Tanis) of the farmers’ 
groups. 1 he lack of mobility is further aggravated by the attitude of the Camats, who 
often give the PPLs jobs beyond their main tasks of agricultural extension. They are 
often asked by the Camats to help the kecamatan in, for example, preparation of village 
competitions (Lomba Desa) and other such occasions, or in preparation of the 
celebration of Indonesian independence day every 17th August and other administrative 
tasks.
The Head of the Diperta of Malang Kabupaten urged the Camats at several 
meetings to free the PPLs from such other tasks and to give the administrative duties to 
the Mantri Pertanian as the official who was specially appointed to carry out the 
administrative duties of the agricultural office. But it is a fact that the Camats generally 
prefer to contact the PPLs rather than the Mantri Pertanian, because the Mantri 
generally have lower educational level than the PPLs. Other examples of this sort of 
situation will be given in Chapter Six.
The lack of personnel and facilities is also found in other offices. To give guidance 
to KUDs, the Cooperative Office recruited high school graduates as PKL, but their 
number is even smaller than the PPL. In Malang, there were only ten PKLs in 1984, and 
this number was certainly insufficient to provide guidance to 33 KUDs. The number 
of Jupen of the Kantor Penerangan (Information Office) was also insufficient and they 
were burdened by various duties. In each kecamatan there were two Jupens only in 
1984, who had the task of spreading information to rural people on various development 
programs, including Bimas and the KUD. Their various jobs included, for example, * 27
In August 1984, several PPLs were moved to other kecamatans as part of the tour of duty 
carried out for the first time in Malang for the PPLs. They generally felt frustrated with this tour 
of duty because they must themselves pay for transportation and new housing in the new 
kecamatan. Hence, most of them decided to remain in their old kecamatans and go every day to 
their new WKPPs by motorcycle. This reinforced their immobility, but they had no alternative.
The lack of PKL was also found in Kediri and Jember. In Kediri, there were also ten PKL for
27 KUDs, and in Jember there was not one PKL for 76 KUDs in 1984. To do the jobs of the PKL, 
the Head of the Cooperative Office of Jember had appointed 8 staff and placed them in various 
kecamatans with the task of giving guidances to the KUDs. Interview, the Head of Cooperative 
Office of Jember Kabupaten, February 16,1984.
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organizing the Kejar (Kelompok Belajar, Learning Groups), a program of the Ministry 
of Education; organize the PKK and LKMD of the Ministry of Home Affairs; and 
organize groups of Sipedes (Siaran Pedesaan) of Radio and Television.®®
Problems of Coordination
Weaknesses in monitoring and obstacles to the implementation of Bimas and the 
KUD are caused also by weakness in coordination among the various offices involved in 
the programs. These weaknesses still existed, despite an attempt to reduce them through 
the Law No.5/1974. The Bupati, according to the Law, as mentioned in Chapter Two, is 
the sole administrator of the kabupatcn. This means that all offices in the kabupaten 
must be under his coordination. In fact, some vertical offices®^ are relatively difficult for 
him to coordinate. Of course, the offices do not refuse the instructions of the Bupati 
openly, but they are sometimes reluctant to give regular reports to the kabupaten office 
and pay more attention to their departmental superiors, who will have greater influence 
over their career prospects.
In the case of Bimas and KUD, for example, the Economic Section of Kabupaten 
Office which has the task of compiling regular reports from the offices involved in the 
programs, finds it difficult, in fact, to get the reports, and not all data on the programs 
can be found in the section. Thus people who need to know this data must go to the 
offices involved in the programs. It seems that there is still a feeling among the heads of 
the offices that the Bupati is not their direct superior. Therefore, 1 sometimes saw the 
Head of the Economic Section confused, having to call angrily to the staff members of 
one of the offices to ask for data needed by the Bupati. The officials in Malang said that 
this weakness is caused by the ”egocentrism" of the vertical offices.
The Camats, as mentioned in Chapter Four, also have difficulties in coordinating 
several offices, especially the vertical offices in kecamatans, due to such egocentrism. 
This is also aggravated by difference in ranking between the Camats and some heads of 
the vertical offices in the kecamatans. Some of them, in fact, have higher ranks than the 
Camats who, according to Law No.5/1974, are the sole administrators of the kecamatan. 
This difference gives rise to a reluctance by the heads of offices to recognize the 
superiority of the Camats. Hence, it is sometimes found that meetings on development 
programs carried out by the Camats were not attended by the heads of those offices, 
who were merely represented by subordinate staff.
Apart from that, difficulties in coordination are created by the Camats themselves. 
An example of this can be found in the kecamatan’s efforts to reclaim the Bimas credit.
50,Interview, the Head of Propaganda and Agitation Section of Information Office of Malang 
Kabupaten, February 13, 1984.
®^Offices of the Central Government Ministries at regional level.
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Sometimes these efforts were inadequately conducted, because at the time the claims 
were to be made, the head of the village unit bank (BRI) refused to come forward to lead 
the process, although the Camat and other members of the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan 
attended. The bank officials explained that their reluctance to attend on these occasions 
was because the Camats and members of MUSPIKA usually asked for payments for such 
activities. The bank, in fact, was given no authority by its superior, the BRI Cabang of 
Malang, to make such payments.
On the other hand, the Camats and the members of MUSPIKA have their own 
reasons for making these demands. They assert that credit distribution and collection 
are the duty of the BRI and not their job. The BRI, according to them, gave no reports 
on distribution of the credits to Satlak Bimas Kecamatan and thus the Camats and the 
MUSPIKA did not know about the amount of credit or to whom it had been distributed. 
Only when the problem of arrears was raised, would the bank then ask for their help. 
Hence, it was fair, they argued, for them to ask for payments.
Rewards and Sanctions
The declining enthusiasm of most local officials in implementing rice policy is not 
only because of the abolition of incentives, but also because promotions for them are 
difficult. This is especially experienced by those who are categorized as local government 
employees (pegawai daerah). For example, the Secretary of Satpel Bimas of Malang 
Kabupaten (MA in Agriculture), was still classified as a provisional civil servant (co/on 
pegawai negeri) in the Kabupaten Diperta office 10 years after his appointment. In his 
position, he only receives 80 per cent of the standard civil service salary per month, and 
has no chance of promotion.
Therefore, he seems reluctant to carry out his tasks, and in one meeting with the 
Bupati, he was thrown out of the meeting because the Bupati was disappointed with his 
laziness as he was unable to finish many of his tasks. Also, when he attended a training 
course conducted by BAKO BIMAS in Jakarta, he spent most of his time there not 
attending classes, but looking for another job. However, he was not successful.®^ When I 
left Malang in September 1984, he was still frustrated and still wanted to leave the 
Diperta office. This situation emerges because the regional government (the province) 
has limited capacity to appoint more employees while the need for more staff has 
increased. Apart from this, promotion for higher ranks is often hampered by red tape.
Furthermore, the emergence of deviations and obstacles in implementation of 
Bimas and the KUD is also caused by the lack of strict penalties for those guilty of rule
"This story was told to me by the Secretary of Satpel Bimas of Kediri Kabupaten who also 
attended the training course.
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infractions in the implementation process; in fact, it can be said that there are simply no 
sanctions at all. In the case of Dimas Fiktif, as I have mentioned, no government 
employees involved in these cases have ever been sent to the courts, while in the case of 
credit arrears, there were only ten village officials sent to court from among 307 
government employees who were in debt, although there was a special team 
(TKPPKPM) with power to handle the credit problems. Also, there has been no effort 
to investigate and to punish staff members of the SubDolog who manipulated the quality 
of rice (rendemen) for their own personal benefit, although that scandal was publicly 
known (See Chapter Seven for details of this affair).
In addition, in the cases of corruption in the KUDs, no action was taken to remedy 
the scandals. In the case mentioned where Rp 400,000 of the KUD’s money was kept in 
the house of the KUD Treasurer, there was no action from the Cooperative Office to 
prosecute or to charge the KUD board although this action was the kind of 
mismanagement leading towards financial corruption. Furthermore, there was no 
further action from the Cooperative Office staff to check whether the money was ever 
returned to the safe deposit box or not. In another case of financial scandal perpetrated 
by one CPNS, the Cooperative Office also took no action either to send the CPNS to 
court or to discharge him as a staff member of the office. The local cooperative office 
merely returned him to the Kabupaten Cooperative Office in Malang and replaced him 
with another CPNS. Similar cases of financial scandals in the KUDs can be found in 
Chapter Seven.
This lax attitude is made possible by the fact that there is no clear definition 
about what actions can be categorized as rule infractions in terms of the program 
implementation directives and what kind of charges can be made. For example, there is 
still confusion whether the delinquents who have not repaid Bimas credits will be 
considered as criminals or not (see also Chapter Six on Credit Arrear problems). 
Furthermore, although there are regulations providing for punishment, they are often 
difficult to apply because the pattern of relationships between superiors and 
subordinates is informal and personal. The above mentioned case of checking on the 
KUD, in which the check then terminated with laughter and lunch without any effort to 
return the money, is one example of the informal relationship between the superior and 
the subordinate.
The government has made various efforts to improve the quality of supervision 
over the work of the government bureaucracy, among other things, by establishment of 
the Inspectorate General from national down to kabupaten level. At the level of the 
province, there is the ITWILPROP (Inspektorat Wilayah Propinsi) to supervise the use 
of the provincial budget and budgets of development projects. At kabupaten level, there
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is the ITWILKAB (Inspektorat Wilayah Kabupaten) with a similar task.**** It is widely 
known, however, that supervision made by the inspektorat is not very effective. There 
is no case in East Java in which the Bupatis or other heads of offices at the provincial 
and kabupaten level have been discharged by the Governor on the basis of reports from 
the ITWIPROP.
At Kabupaten level, some village headmen have been discharged because of 
financial scandals reported by the ITWILKAB to the Bupati. However, it is also widely 
known that a few thousand rupiahs given by the Camat or village officials to staff 
members of the ITWILKAB will save them from the charges.Apart from that, the 
weakness of the ITWILKAB also lies, according to one staff member of this body, in the 
low level of sensitivity, by most of the Itwilkab’s staff members, towards cases arising, 
and the lack of mobility of the body due to lack of personnel.'’*’ However, the main 
weakness of the body, as mentioned above, may lie in the relationships among the local 
officials. The Camats, for example, are of a similar level to those in the ITWILKAB and 
often they are close friends. There is a possibility that one day a Camat will be returned 
to the kabupaten office and appointed a staff member of the ITWILKAB. On the other 
hand, there is also a possibility that the staff of that body will later be appointed a 
Camat.
In conclusion, many of the difficulties and weaknesses in implementation of Bimas 
and the KUD programs can actually be referred to the overcentralized system of 
administration. The overcentralization of administration gives rise to a situation in 
which the interests of the centre rather than regions have to be given priority. This 
overcentralization is made possible by the 1974 Law on Regional Government which 
provides that the head of local government is the organ of the centre, and that the local 
representative body is merely the partner, not the supervisor of the executive.
In addition, other government regulations then determine that the appointment 
and career of the local officials is very much dependent on the centre. As a result, the 
main objective of the local officials in implementing the development programs is to 
achieve the priority targets determined by the centre, because that affects their careers 
and their future. In other words, the system has created a high degree of subservience to 
the centre in the regions, and of the subordinates to their superiors.
^Instruction of East Java’s Governor No.ID x.713/101/1983 on "Pelaksanaan Keputusan 
Menteri Dalam Negeri No.220 tahun 1979 tentang Organisasi dan Tatakerja Inspektorat Wilayah 
Kabupaten/Kotamadya.” Unpublished Document.
Interview, Head of Government Section of Malang Kabupaten, July 16,1983.
™ Interview, Head of Administration Subsection of ITWILKAB of Malang Kabupaten, 
February 13,1984.
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This subservience has created a situation in which local officials tend to ignore the 
opinions of subordinates and the interests the rural people. Hence, threats and coercion 
have became a part of their activities to achieve targets. These two methods can be 
applied effectively because opposition is prohibited and channels for the expression of the 
people’s aspirations are limited. As a result, the bureaucracy has been uncontrolled 
because there is a lack of popular participation in the program implementation.
The overcentralization of the administration gives rise also to a common attitude 
among the government officials of ignoring the problems of how the programs are 
implemented, as well as a wish to remedy the weaknesses found in the implementation of 
the programs. Thus, although the Bimas and the KUD programs have wrestled with lack 
of supervision, facilities, personnel, resources, and coordination which have at times 
hampered the implementation process, no effective action has been taken to remedy 
these weaknesses, even though they have already been well known to the officials. Action 
to remedy those weaknesses is not considered a high priority task, so long as the primary 
targets of increasing rice production and ensuring adequate rice stocks are achieved.
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CHAPTER 6
Rice Intensification Programs in Five Kecamatans
As I travelled to Tumpang, there were around sixteen passengers in the 
Daihatsu minibus I was riding, while the capacity of the small car was only 
eight passengers. In Pakis, the car stopped to take on a new passenger in front 
of a policeman who was riding his scooter. He looked at the car and acted 
unconcerned at the rule infraction, started his scooter and continued his 
journey. Perhaps many local officials have acted like the policeman when they 
have been making checks on Bimas and KUD implementation.
This chapter will describe and analyse the implementation of rice intensification 
programs in five kecamatans in Malang. Two kecamatans in the north (Tumpang and 
Jabung) and three in the south (Kepanjen, Sumberpucung and Pakisaji) of Malang 
Kabupaten have been chosen as objects of this study. The objective of this chapter is to 
provide some examples of how policy is implemented at kecamatan level, the third level 
of local government in Indonesia. After describing some general features of the 
kecamatans, an analysis of the results of the rice intensification program will be 
provided.
General Description of the Five Kecamatans
Kecamatan Tumpang lies around 20 kilometers to the east of Malang town. The 
road connecting Malang town to the capital of this kecamatan is relatively good and 
there is frequent public transport with Colts or Daihatsu minibuses. In 1982, 
Kecamatan Tumpang had 14 villages and 14,000 households. It is not an especially 
fertile kecamatan although it is one of the major rice production areas in the northern 
part of Malang; the area of dry land {legal) is greater than the sawah area. The sugar 
and coffee are two major plantation commodities planted in Tumpang. The sugar area 
covered 707 hectares (the second highest after Pakisaji) and produced 40 tons in 1982; 
while the coffee area covered 102 hectares and produced 60 tons in 1982 (see Table 6-1 
on page 141).
The total area is 64.80 sq.km., of which 3,579 ha are dry land, 1,688 ha are sawah,
1Kantor Statistik Malang Kabupaten, "Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka," 1982, op.cit., p.22.
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Table 6-1: Plantations & Production in Five Kecamatans, 1982
Sugar Coffee Clove Coconut Kapok
ha. ton ha. ton ha. ton ha. ton ha. ton
Tumpang 707 40 102
Jabung 446 20 365
Kepanjen 340 15 8
Sumberpucung 484 21 156
Pakisaj1 750 33 8
60 14 2 40 24 6 7201 7 2 52 34 - -
4 4 1 94 99 51 51132 6 2 159 158 15 104 1 0.3 126 . 126 19 33
Source: Malang Kabupaten Dalam Angka, 1982, pp.117-121.
766 ha are village areas, 26 ha free plantation, while the rest is forest.^ Yet rice 
production in Tumpang (17,885 tons in 1983) was higher than that of its neighbour, 
Kecamatan Jabung (13,776 tons in 1983), although it is lower than three other 
kecamatans (See Table 6-3 on page 143).
Tumpang is, also, a rather well-developed region with relatively good educational 
facilities compared to those of its neighbour, Kecamatan Jabung (see Table 6-4 on page 
144), and there is even one private institute at tertiary level, the Institute of Teaching 
and Educational Science (IKIP = Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan) established 
by PGRI. The population is relatively dense, i.e. 914 per sq.km, in 1982, with a 
moderately high rate of growth of around 1.6 per cent annually between 1970 - 1980 (see 
Table 6-2 on page 142).
Kecamatan Jabung is a much poorer region, located approximately 20 Km from 
Malang town to the northeast . The area of the kecamatan is 126.80 sq.km, most of it 
consisting of dry land, i.e. 3,521 ha compared to 1,171 ha of saw ah; 688 hectares are 
used for village areas; 393 hectares for plantation and 6,907 hectares were classified as 
forest in 1981 In this kecamatan there were 15 villages and 11,905 households in
^Ibid., pp.4-5.
3Persatuan Guru Republtk Indonesia or Indonesian Teachers Association.
^"Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1981 & 1982., op.cit., pp.3-4 & pp.4-5. Data of 
Kecamatan Office of Jabung shows some different figures on the use of land in the kecamatan. In 
1981, area of the kecamatan, according to the office was 13,549 hectares. The area has been 
divided into 793.5 hectares for village areas, 1,170 hectares for sawah, 3,633 hectares for tegal, 9.0 
hectares for plantation, and 7,929 hectares of forest. Kecamatan Jabung., "Laporan Data-Data 
Kecamatan”., Unpublished Report to Bappeda of Malang Kabupaten, 1981.
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Table 6-2: Area, Population and Sawah Area
of the Five Kecamatans, 1982
Kecamatans Area
(sq.km)
Popu­
lation
Geogl.Density 
of Population 
(sq.km)
Rate of Popl. 
Increase 1970- 
1980 (% / Yr)
Sawah
Area
(ha)
Tumpang 64.80 59,198 914 1.6 1,688Jabung 126.80 51,051 403 1.5 1,171Kepanjen 56.60 76,296 1,348 1.6 3,055S umbe rpucung 85.90 85,192 992 0.3 4,808Pakisaji 44.65 53,949 1,208 0.6 2,295
Source: Statistics Office of Malang Kabupaten, and Kabupaten Malang Dalam
Angka, 1982.
1982. The poor condition of the soil has the affect of making the level of rice production 
in this kecamatan the lowest of the five kecamatans (see Table 6-3 on page 143). Coffee 
and sugar, in this kecamatan, are also two main plantation crops. The area under sugar 
covered 446 hectares and produced 20 tons in 1982, while the area of coffee was 363 
hectares and produced 201 tons in the same year (see Table 6-1 on page 141).
The capital of this kecamatan is not a centre of business activities and 
transportation to it is relatively difficult, although the main road is quite good.® 
However, the roads to many villages are in very bad condition. Most of them are 
without asphalt, and many bridges are made from bamboo. The situation and condition 
of the kecamatan capital gives the impression that Jabung is one of the less developed 
and more isolated kecamatans in kabupaten Malang, especially in comparison with its 
more prosperous neighbours, Pakis and Tumpang. There were only 66 small shops in 
the kecamatan capital in 1980, and there was no cinema as in Tumpang.
The population density of this kecamatan is the lowest among the five 
kecamatans, i.e. 403 per sq.km., in 1982, but its rate of growth is relatively high, 1.5 per 
cent per annum between 1970-1980 (see Table 6-2 on page 142). Educational facilities
Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1982, op.cit., p.22.
®There is very little public transport that directly connects Malang town with the capital of 
this kecamatan, only some ojeks (motorcycles which are used to carry passengers) or dokar (two­
wheeled, horse-drawn carriages) that can be hired from a market at Kecamatan Pakis. Sometimes 
there are Colt or Daihatsu minibuses from the market but they are very rare.
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Table 6-3: Production of Rice in the Five Kecamatans,
1970-1983 (tons)
Year Tumpang Jabung Kepanjen Sumberpucung Pakisaji
1970 7,258 5,670 19,919 20,704 9,6041971 7,954 6,120 22,544 20,444 11,1561972 9,144 5,548 23,806 21,648 9,8451973 9,531 9,945 26,095 23,633 12,0871974 9,699 11,019 29,113 25,026 13,6881975 10,969 8,418 30,962 27,539 12,9681976 14,219 8,656 29,440 27,765 12,0961977 13,350 10,032 32,691 30,587 13,0181978 14,520 13,197 34,807 29,567 13,821
1979 16,320 8,046 36,770 34,059 11,538
1980 17,217 11,194 36,120 32,253 20,340
1981 17,958 11,157 36,450 38,629 21,839
1982 18,900 13,049 40,704 31,279 18,474
1983 17,885 13,776 39,743 34,146 19,418
Sources: Kan tor Kecamatan Pakisaji and WKBPP of Kepanjen and Tumpang.
are also worse than those in the other kecamatans, especially at the high school level (see 
Table 6-4 on page 144). Therefore, those who want to continue their studies at the high 
school need to go to Tumpang or Pakis.
The other three kecamatans (Kepanjen, Sumberpucung and Pakisaji) are situated 
south of Malang town, Kecamatan Kepanjen being 18 Km away from Malang town. The 
town which is the capital of this kecamatan lies on the main road connecting Malang, 
Pakisaji, Kepanjen, Sumberpucung and Kabupaten Blitar. This is a prosperous region, 
with a fast developing town as its commercial centre.^ The town is also a stopping place 
for buses and minibuses connecting Malang and Blitar via Pakisaji and Kepanjen, or 
Blitar and Lumajang and vice versa.
Kepanjen is a densely populated rice-producing region with an extensive sawah 
area. It had the highest rice production of the five kecamatans under study (see Table
There is a plan by the government of Malang Kabupaten to move the capital city of the 
kabupaten from Malang town to the capital of kecamatan Kepanjen. Hence, some offices at the 
level of the kabupaten have been located in the capital of the kecamatan, such as the Family 
Planning Office (BKKBN= Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, National 
Coordinating Body of Family Planning) and the RKPD (Radio Khusus Pemerintah Daerah, 
Radio of Malang Kabupaten).
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Table 6-4; Number of Schools at the Five Kecamatan in 1982
Kecamatan Kinder- Elementary Junior Senior
garten
Gov. Private Gov. Private Gov. Private
Tumpang 13 36 3 1 4 1 2Jabung 6 39 - 1 1Kepanjen 16 42 9 2 10 1 7Sumberpucung 17 66 4 1 11 4Pakisaji 12 32 5 - 2 - 2
Source: ”Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1982, Ibid., pp.49-55.
Note: One government junior high school was newly opened in 1983 in Jabung.
6-3 on page 143). Plantation crops do not cover an extensive area. Sugar, for example, 
was cultivated on just around 340 hectares and the production was only 15 tons in 1982, 
the smallest area and production in the five kecamatans under study (see Table 6-1 on 
page 141), presumably because rice cultivation is much more profitable to the farmers 
than sugar.
The area of the kecamatan is 56.60 sq.km., of which 1,104 hectares are village 
areas, 3,055 hectares are sawah, 632 hectares are dry land, and 869 hectares are forest.® 
There are 18 villages and 15,791 households in the kecamatan in 1982. The density of 
its population is the highest among the five kecamatans, i.e. 1,348 per sq.km., in 1982, 
while the rate of population growth is also relatively high, i.e. 1.6 per cent per annum 
between 1970-1980 (see Table 6-2 on page 142).
This kecamatan also has the most advanced educational facilities of all five in the 
present study. All levels of education are found there, from the kindergraten to senior 
high school (see table 6-4 on page 144), and even an IKIP owned by Muhammadyah, a 
modernist Muslim Association.®, Many students come to schools at Kepanjen from the 
nearby kecamatans such as Sumberpucung, Pakisaji and Gondanglegi.
Kecamatan Sumberpucung lies to the west of Kecamatan Kepanjen, 29 Km from 
Malang town. The capital of the kecamatan is located on the main road connecting 8 * *
8"Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka, 1982, op.cit., pp.4-5.
®Kantor Kecamatan Kepanjen, "Banyaknya Sarana Pendidikan Dalam Wilayah Kecamatan 
Kepanjen”, Unpublished Report, 1984.
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Malang, Pakisaji, Kepanjen, Sumberpucung, and Blitar. It is a small town with some 
small shops along the main road, but it is also a rice-producing area, most of it being 
sawah. Rice production of this kecamatan was the second highest among the five 
kecamatans under study (see Table 6-3 on page 143). The area under plantation crops 
(particularly sugar, coconut and coffee), is relatively extensive in this kecamatan. The 
area under sugar was 484 hectares and produced 21 tons in 1982; coconut area covered 
159 hectares with production of 158 tons of copra, while the area under coffee covered 
156 hectares and produced 132 tons in 1982 (see Table 6-1 on page 141).
The total area of the kecamatan is 85.90 sq.km, of which 1,382 ha are village 
areas, 4,808 ha are sawah, 2,037 ha are dry land, 352 ha are forest and 15 ha are swamp 
areas. In the kecamatan, there are 12 villages. The density of population in this 
kecamatan is 992 per sq.km., (1982) and its rate of growth is the lowest among the five 
kecamatans, i.e. 0.3 per cent annually (see Table 6-2 on page 142), presumably because 
of substantial outmigration. The education is less developed in this kecamatan than in 
Kepanjen; there was no senior high school or tertiary institution (see Table 6-4 on page 
144).
The town of Pakisaji which is the capital of the Kecamatan Pakisaji is situated 
only 11 kilometres to the south of Malang town and can be considered virtually a 
dormitory suburb. Its capital lies on the road connecting Malang town to Kecamatan 
Kepanjen and Blitar. Transportation facilities are, of course, very good. The condition 
of the main road connecting Malang town and the capital of the kecamatan is excellent 
and, as in Kepanjen and Sumberpucung, buses from Malang town to Blitar run from 
5.00 a.m. till 11.00 p.m. every day. Besides buses, people of Pakisaji can also use bemos 
(motorized pedicabs) to or from Malang town, or they can take Daihatsu or Colt 
minibuses which connect Malang town and the capital of Kecamatan Kepanjen. Some 
people who have jobs in Malang town, such as kabupaten staff and teachers, live in this 
kecamatan.
There were twelve villages in this kecamatan, and 11,611 households in 1982. 
Pakisaji is a rather small kecamatan of around 44.65 square kilometres, of which 943 
hectares of land were used for village areas, 2,295 hectares for sawah, and 1,139 hectares 
for dry land. Rice production in this kecamatan was lower than in Kepanjen and 
Sumberpucung, not because the fertility of its land is lower than the two other. 
kecamatans (yields per hectare were almost the same), but because the total area of 
sawah in Pakisaji is much smaller than those of Kepanjen and Sumberpucung (see Table * 12
Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1982, op.cit., pp.4-5. 
^"Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” Ibid., 1981 & 1982, p.19 & p.22.
12Ibid., 1982, p.4.
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6-3 on page 143, and Table 6-6 on page 149). Coconut and sugar are the main plantation 
commodities in this kecamatan: coconut was planted on 126 hectares and produced 19 
tons in 1982, while sugar was planted on 750 hectares (the widest area in the five 
kecamatan studied) with production of 33 tons in 1982 (see Table 6-1 on page 141).
The density of population in this kecamatan is high, 1,208 per sq.km, in 1982 but 
its rate of growth is relatively slow, i.e. 0.6 per cent yearly (see Table 6-2 on page 142). 
The development of schools has been slower in this kecamatan than in Kepanjen, 
presumably because of the region’s proximity to Malang town. There was no government 
school at junior and senior high school levels and only two secondary private schools at 
those levels (see Table 6-4 on page 144). Therefore high school students go to either 
Malang town or Kepanjen for their studies.
Rice Production in the Five Kecamatans
In this section, the trends in rice production in the five kecamatans and several 
factors behind these trends will be examined. Generally, rice production in the 
kecamatans has increased continuously since 1970. The differences among the 
kecamatans lie only in the extent and the causes of the increase.
Kecamatan Tumpang
In Tumpang, although the area of sawah is smaller than that of dry land, rice is 
nevertheless the primary commodity. Even before introduction of the high yielding 
varieties, Tumpang had a famous local rice variety called Beras Tumpang. Today, 
nearly all the sawah in this kecamatan is planted with the HYV. Up to 1979, rice 
production in Tumpang was increasing at an average rate of 12 per cent annually, with 
sharp increases in production in 1972, 1975 and 1976 (see Table 6-3 on page 143).
One of the main factors behind the increase in rice production in 1972 was the 
rehabilitation of three irrigation channels in 1971. In 1975 and 1976, the level of 
production increased sharply, partly due to good weather, an increase in the area 
harvested, and better application of the Panca Usaha Tani. However, as in many other 
kecamatan, wereng attacks resulted in a fall in production in the years 1977 and 1978. 
By 1979, the wereng attacks had ceased and production increased in that year, due also 
in part to rehabilitation of three other irrigation channels, and relatively good 
weather.13 From 1979 to 1982 production increased by 5 per cent annually. The decline 
in production in 1983 was in part due to attacks of tungro, butir hijau, and gondrong
13There are ten dams in Tumpang with 15 irrigation channels. They are able to supply water 
for 1,514 hectares sawahs in 1983. Cabang Seksi Pengairan Brantas, Tumpang., "Daftar: 
Inventarisasi Saluran Dalam Wilayah Kecamatan Tumpang”, Unpublished Report to 
Kecamatan, 1984.
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diseases.
Most of the increase in rice production since 1976 apparently resulted from the 
Inmas program. However, no details about the extent of Bimas, Inmas, and Insus 
production can be found in either Kecamatan office or in the WKBPP, while in the 
Kabupaten Diperta there was no compilation of production data on an annual basis.* ** 
The kecamatan office was only able to present the planned and actual extent of Bimas 
and Inmas in hectares (see Table 6-5 on page 148), but those figures are adequate to 
show that the area under the Inmas scheme grew to be substantially larger than that 
under the Bimas program in the later years. In that Table it can be seen that the actual 
Bimas area decreased by an average of 13.5 per cent yearly from 1976 to 1982, while the 
actual area planted under Inmas increased by 30 per cent annually during the same 
period.
Apart from rice, two palawija crops (corn and cassava) also provide important 
commodities in Tumpang, although their areas and production are less than the areas 
and production of rice. Data from the WKBPP and Kecamatan office indicate that 
production of corn increased by 8.7 per cent annually from 1970 to 1983 (from 2,913 
tons in 1970 to 6,455 tons in 1983) while production of cassava increased by 5.6 per cent 
yearly during the same period (from 1,819 tons to 3,250 tons). This fact gives an 
indication that many farmers in the kecamatan are dependent upon selling these crops as 
well as rice in the markets.
Kecamatan Jabung
Kecamatan Jabung as mentioned above, is a relatively unfertile kecamatan. Some 
of its area is hilly, and most of the sawah in the kecamatan is rain fed (sawah tadah 
hujan). There are only three villages in the kecamatan which are irrigated by technical 
irrigation channels: Sukopuro, Pandansari, and Sidomulyo, and they are the rice- 
producing areas in the kecamatan. Other villages are unfertile and without irrigation 
channels for their sawah. The rice area of the kecamatan is less than the area of 
palawija, especially corn. However, the rice intensification programs have been able to 
increase rice production to nearly twice the production levels of corn. Thus, while the
^Interview, PPM Programmer of Tumpang WKBPP, August 5, 1984.
***The staff in Diperta presented monthly reports from the WKBPPs in many books, which 
makes the compilation difficult and time consuming. When I asked one PPL of Tumpang, he 
showed me drafts of reports on Bimas and Inmas production from 1970 to 1983 that were written 
by him to be sent to Kabupaten Diperta. The drafts were made because the Diperta suddenly 
asked for the data from WKBPPs to be presented in an agricultural exhibition in Surabaya. 
Because the PPL had difficulty in finding the data in his WKBPP (in Tumpang) he decided to 
construct the data based on his estimation of the last yield average per hectare. This illustrates 
how difficult it is to get even the most basic information relevant to the success of the government 
rice policy at the kecamatan level. Data of this sort are not regarded as particularly important.
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Table 6-5: Kecamatan Tumpang: Planned k Actual Areas 
of Bimas k Inmas, 1976-1981/1982
Season Bimas
Planned
(ha)
Actual
Inmas
Planned
(ha)
Actual
D. 1976 800 630 400 570R. 1976/1977 1,280 935 150 465D. 1977 625 411 600 815R. 1977/1978 1,250 1,007 150 393D. 1978 410 323 800 877R. 1978/1979 1,250 690 150 710D. 1979 400 187 600 825
R. 1979/1980 800 370 600 1,035D. 1980 250 90 700 860
R. 1980/1981 650 192 750 1,208D. 1981 250 58 700 892
R. 1981/1982 680 178 800 1,302
R = Rainy Season 
D = Dry Season
Source: Kantor Kecamatan Tumpang
area of corn was 4,036 ha in 1983 and the area of rice was only 1,968 ha (see Table 6-6 
on page 149), the production of corn was only 8,274 tons in 1983 compared to 13,776 
tons of rice produced in 1983 (see Table 6-3 on page 143). Yet corn and cassava are two 
important palawija crops in Jabung. Their production had increased by 2.7 per cent 
and 0.9 per cent per year respectively from 1970 to 1983.
Production of rice in this kecamatan has increased from 1970 to 1976 by 7.5 per 
cent annually. According to an agricultural official (Mantri Pertanian) of Kecamatan 
Jabung, sharp increases in production in 1973 and 1974 were due to an increase in the 
area harvested (see Table 6-6 on page 149). The increase in the area of padi occurred 
when many farmers decided to plant padi after a fall in the price of palawija in 1972. 
The increase was also the result of the use of HYV and good weather at the time. In the 
period 1975-1976, wereng infestation reduced the level of production. A combination of 
wereng and tungro and drought again destroyed much sawah in 1979. Better farming 
methods following the Panca Usaha Tani guidelines contributed to increased production 
in 1977, 1978, and from 1980 to 1983.
16Data from WKBPP of Tumpang.
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Table 6-6: Area Harvested and Yield in the Five Kecamatans,
1970 - 1980 (hectare and ton/ha)
Year Pakisaj1 
Area Yield
Kepanjen 
Area Yield
Sb.Pucung 
Area Yield
Tumpang 
Area Yield
Jabung
Area Yield
1970 1679 6.0 4826 4.5 5210 4.2 1910 3.8 1620 3.51971 1968 6.2 4997 4.9 5154 4.3 1940 4.1 1700 3.61972 1674 6.2 5134 5.0 5130 4.5 1905 4.8 1387 4.01973 2075 6.4 5149 5.4 5075 4.9 1945 4.9 2210 4.51974 2236 6.5 5292 5.8 5165 5.0 1830 5.3 2119 5.21975 2022 6.6 5279 6.2 5371 5.5 1910 5.6 1718 4.91976 2024 6.2 4720 6.6 5080 5.8 2410 5.9 1603 5.41977 2194 6.8 5069 7.3 5236 6.3 2225 6.0 1672 6.01978 2355 6.7 5079 7.5 4764 6.8 2200 6.6 2062 6.41979 1605 7.2 5205 7.7 5199 7.2 2400 6.8 1642 4.91980 2761 7.4 5177 7.6 5059 7.1 2425 7.1 1696 6.61981 2928 7.6 4897 7.5 5981 7.0 2460 7.3 1617 6.9
1982 2331 7.8 4666 7.8 4753 2662 7.1 1905 6.9
1983 2420 8.0 3816 7.7 5358 • • . 2555 7.0 1968 7.0
Figures for Yield per hectare are based on Bimas figures.
Sources: Kan tor Kecamatan Pakisaji and WKBPP of Kepanjen and Tumpang.
Kecamatan Kepanjen
South of Malang, Kecamatan Kepanjen is a rice-producing kecamatan, with most 
of its area under sawah. Most of the saw ah is technically irrigated (1,910 ha); semi- 
technically irrigated sawah amounts to 126 ha; the non-PU irrigated sawah 5 ha; and 14 
ha were rain fed in 1981. A new dam still under construction, the Sengguruh Dam, is 
located in Desa Sengguruh.
Rice production in this kecamatan is the highest of the five kecamatans under 
consideration here (See Table 6-3 on page 143). From 1970 to 1979, the rate of increase 
in rice production was 8.5 per cent annually and from 1979 to 1983 was 1.6 per cent. 
However, by 1979 the level of production reached more than 36 thousand tons and even 
40 thousand tons in 1982. The increase in production in 1971 was partly due to an 
increase in the area of Bimas, as much as 43.5 per cent. The production increases in 
1973 and 1974 were also partly due to increases in Bimas area of 63 per cent and 45 per 
cent respectively. Average yield per hectare also increased from 5.0 in 1972 to 5.4 and
17 Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1981, op.cit., pp.93-97.
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5.8 tons in 1973 and 1974. A rise in productivity in 1975 led to a further increase in 
production, yielding 6.2 tons per hectare in that year.
In 1976 wereng attacked Kepanjen and caused a fall in production of 5 per cent. 
But from 1977 on, production increased continuously. This was partly due to an increase 
in the Inmas area and in its productivity per hectare. Although the area of Bimas 
decreased continuously after 1976, the productivity per hectare increased, reaching an 
even higher level than Inmas (see table 6-7 in page 150). Also, one of the important 
factors behind the increase of production was the ability of many farmers here to harvest 
three times a year. In addition, since 1980 there has been a further contribution by Insus 
to the total production of rice in the kecamatan.
Table 6-7: Kepanjen: Area harvested, yield, and production of 
Bimas, Inmas and Insus, 1970 - 1983
Year B I M 
Area Yield
A S
Production
I N M
Area Yield
A S
Production
INS
Area Yield
U S
Production
1970 1,232 4.5 5,543 3,594 4.0 14,376
1971 1,769 4.9 8,666 3,228 4.3 13,878
1972 1,405 5.0 7,025 3,729 4.5 16,781
1973 2,300 5.4 12,420 2,849 4.8 13,675
1974 3,316 5.8 19,231 1,976 5.0 9,882
1975 3,315 6.2 20,553 1,964 5.3 10,409
1976 3,008 6.6 19,852 1,712 5.6 9,587
1977 1,989 7.3 14,520 3,080 5.9 18,172
1978 2,029 7.5 15,690 2,987 6.4 19,117
1979 1,450 7.7 10,860 3,755 6.9 25,910
1980 1,082 7.6 8,221 4,095 6.7 27,437 55 8.4 462
1981 812 7.5 6,088 4,086 6.9 28,194 252 8.6 2,167
1982 932 7.8 7,266 3,734 7.5 28,001 625 8.7 5,438
1983 471 7.7 3,623 3,345 7.2 24,080 1,400 8.6 12,040
Source: WKBPP Kepanjen.
Kecamatan Sumberpucung
Kecamatan Sumberpucung is also a major rice-producing kecamatan to the south 
of Malang. More than half of the area of the kecamatan is sawah, nearly all of it 
supplied with irrigation water, mostly by the technical irrigation system.Rice
^®There were 2,684 hectares of sawah supplied by the technical irrigation system, 1,253 
hectares of semi-technical irrigation system, and 867 hectares under simple irrigation system 
(pengairan sederhana). There is non-PU sawah and rain-fed sawah in the kecamatan. PU is 
Pekerjaan Umum or Public Works Office. The Non-PU sawah means that the sawah do not have 
irrigation channels made by the office. ”Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1981, Ibid., pp.93-97.
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production, as in other kecamatan, also shows a continuous increase since 1971 (see 
Table 6-3 on page 143). From the Table it can be seen that rice production increased by 
6.4 per cent annually from 1971 to 1976. The production increase in 1973 was partly 
due to an increase in Bimas area of 21 per cent and an increase in the productivity per 
hectare under this scheme from 4.5 tons to 4.9 tons/ha (see Table 6-8 on page 151). 
Apart from that, although the area of Inmas decreased in that year by 26 per cent, the 
productivity per hectare increased from 3.9 tons to 4.2 tons/ha.
Table 6-8: Kecamatan Sumberpucung: Area Harvested, Productivity 
and Production of Bimas, Inmas, Insus, 1970-1983
Year
Area
(ha)
B I M 
Yield 
(ton)
A S
Production
(ton)
Area
(ha)
I N M 
Yield 
(ton)
A S
Production
(ton)
Area
(ha)
INS
Yield
(ton)
U S
Productii
(ton)
1970 3527 4.2 14,814 1683 3.5 5,889
1971 1718 4.3 7,386 3436 3.8 13,058
1972 2735 4.5 12,307 2395 3.9 9,341
1973 3312 4.9 16,229 1763 4.2 7,405
1974 4049 5.0 20,451 1116 4.1 4,575
1975 3551 5.5 19,532 1820 4.4 8,007
1976 2248 5.8 13,039 2832 5.2 14,726
1977 2236 6.3 14,089 3000 5.5 16,498
1978 1622 6.8 11,028 3142 5.9 18,539
1979 982 7.2 7,068 4217 6.4 26,991
1980 586 7.1 4,158 4248 6.2 26,340 225 7.8 1,775
1981 402 7.0 2,815 5323 6.2 33,001 256 7.9 2,812
1982 .... 4527 6.5 29,426 226 8.2 1,853
1983 5128 6.3 32,306 230 8.0 1.840
Source: WKBPP Kepanjen.
From 1976 to 1979, production increased by 10.2 per cent annually, but there was 
a decrease of 3.3 per cent in 1978 due to attacks by rats. From 1979 to 1981, production 
increased by 13.4 per cent and this was mainly due to the contribution of the Insus 
program. The total production for 1982 and 1983 cannot be calculated because data on 
Bimas production is not available for those years.
Kecamatan Pakisaji
The last kecamatan under consideration here is Kecamatan Pakisaji, a rice-surplus 
kecamatan which draws most of its rice from three villages: Glanggang, Per man u and 
Kebon Agung. Although rice production in this kecamatan is lower than that of 
Kepanjen and Sumberpucung, this is due to the fact, as mentioned, that the area under
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cultivation in the kecamatan is smaller than in the two other southern kecamatans (see 
Table 6-3 on page 143), although the level of soil fertility of the three kecamatans is 
quite similar (see Table 6-6 on page 149 on yield per hectare.)
Further, compared to other food crops (palawtja) produced by the kecamatan, rice 
still occupies an important position, in terms of calorie intake, for the population of 
Pakisaji. Other food crops include corn, peanut, soybean, cassava and sweet potato. 
The MRE of these crops was only 15 per cent of that of rice.20
From Table 6-3 on page 143, it can be seen that the rate of increase of rice 
production in Pakisaji between 1970 and 1978 was around 7.4 per cent yearly. A sharp 
increase in 1971 was due to a combination of reconstruction of some irrigation channels 
in the kecamatan and good weather. The decrease of production in 1972, by as much as 
12 per cent, was caused partly by an attack of walangsangit (noxious bug for rice 
plants) and rats, while the decrease and stagnation in 1975 and 1976 were the results of 
wereng. In 1979, pests again attacked Pakisaji, resulting in a decrease of production of 
16.5 per cent.
The increase in Inmas participation in 1973 that contributed to increase in 
production (see Table 6-9 on page 153) might also have been accelerated by an increase 
in the activity of the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan in recovering Bimas credit repayments 
from farmers during 1972. The shift occurred because the delinquents want to avoid the 
repayment, and also because of the fact that up to 1975 many farmers were actually still 
dependent on the Bimas, especially during a crisis. This can be seen in the increase of 
Bimas participation in 1975 and 1976 when wereng pest attacked most padi areas in the 
kecamatan (see Table 6-9 on page 153).
An almost incredible increase of 77 per cent in rice production was reported in 
1980 when, for the first time, the total output rose above 20 thousand tons. This was 
partly due to a combination of good weather and sharp increases in Inmas and Insus 
production. Although the rate of production increase between 1980 and 1983 was only 
around 6 per cent yearly, production was maintained at a higher level than in the 
pre-1979 period. A decrease in production in 1982, according to local PPL, was due to an 
attack of walangsangit and rats and difficulty in obtaining seed.
Most of the increase in rice production since 1980 has been the result of the Inmas 
and Insus programs which show an increasing trend toward greater participation by
^"Kabupaten Malang Dalam Angka,” 1982, Ibid., p.121.
^Production of these palawijas in 1983 were as follow: Corn was 317 tons; Peanut 31 tons; 
Soybean 23 tons; Cassava 4,350 tons; and Sweet Potato 108 tons. Production of Corn 
continuously declined by 3.4 yearly from 1970 to 1983, but production of Cassava increased 
constantly by 19.6 per cent yearly during the same period. Data from Kecamatan Office of 
Pakisaji.
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Table 6-9: Pakisaji: Area of Bimas and Inmas,
1970 - 1983
Year Bimas (ha) Inmas (ha) Insus (ha)
1970 514 1,165
1971 658 1,310
1972 787 887
1973 92 1,983
1974 1,021 1,215
1975 1,550 472
1976 1,226 758
1977 735 1,459
1978 720 1,635
1979 201 1,284 120
1980 424 2,012 325
1981 205 2,303 420
1982 58 1,733 540
1983 150 1,950 320
Source: Kantor Kecamatan Pakisaji.
farmers. Although figures presented in Table 6-9 on page 153 must be regarded as 
suspect, they detract from the fact that both Inmas and Insus have given much 
contribution to the production increase in this kecamatan. Inmas had succesfully 
increased production by 57 per cent in 1980 and after that by an average 17.5 per cent 
yearly. In 1982, the Inmas production fell by 22 per cent due to pest attacks (see Table 
6-10 on page 154).
The Insus program, on the other hand, achieved its production peak in 1980 when 
it produced a 183 per cent production increase on Insus land only (from 1,104 tons in 
1979 to 3,120 tons-see Table 6-10 on page 154). Furthermore, between 1981 and 1982 
the rate of increase was around 27 per cent. However, in 1983, Insus production fell by 
40 per cent due to the failure after 1981, of the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan to pay the 
Insus premiums which made some farmers reluctant to join the program. 21
21 Interview, Village Headman of Perm an u and Glanggang, June 27 and 28, 1983.
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Table 6-10: Pakisaji: Bimas, Inmas, Insus Production
and Yield, 1970 - 1983.
Year B I M A S I N M A S I N S U SProduction Yield Production Yield Production Yield(ton) (ton/ha) (ton) (ton/ha) (ton) (ton/ha)
1970 3,081 6.0 6,523 5.61971 4,080 6.2 7,076 5.41972 4,880 6.2 4,965 5.61973 586 6.4 11,501 5.81974 6,639 6.5 7,049 5.81975 10,231 6.6 2,737 5.8
1976 7,852 6.2 4,244 5.6
1977 4,995 6.8 8,023 5.5
1978 4,827 6.7 8,994 5.5
1979 1,446 7.2 8,988 7.0 1,104 9.2
1980 3,134 7.4 14,086 7.0 3,120 9.6
1981 1,558 7.6 16,585 7.2 3,696 8.8
1982 452 7.8 13,000 7.5 5,022 9.3
1983 1,201 8.0 15,209 7.8 3,008 9.4
Source: Kantor Kecamatan Pakisaji
The Impact of the Bimas Program in the Five Kecamatans
This section will examine six issues involved in the rice intensification programs 
carried out in the five kecamatans. These include the responses of farmers toward the 
program and to better farming methods; the continuous decline of Bimas participation; 
the problem of credit arrears; farmers’ access to agricultural extension; and the impact of 
the program on farmers’ income.
Responses of Farmers toward Bimas Program and to Better Farming 
Methods
In terms of extending the use of high yielding varieties (HYV) among farmers, the 
government’s Bimas program has been a success in all the five kecamatans. According to 
the Camats in the five kecamatans and extension workers (PPL) and from the 
impressions formed through personal interviews with farmers in the five kecamatans, it 
seems certain that most of the farmers have shifted from local varieties to the HYV. 
Also, the government has succeeded in ensuring the availability of production inputs 
such as fertilizers and pesticides. Most farmers now feel that it is easy to buy fertilizers 
and pesticides in private shops.
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In the last month of my stay in these kecamatans (September 1984), for example, 
farmers were planting one kind of HYV called ”Sadang”. Farmers involved in rice 
intensification programs planted the sadang variety as proposed by the PPLs. However, 
nearly all other farmers, and particularly the small farmers, also began to plant this kind 
of HYV after they heard and saw that the new seed had good productivity and price. 
Thus, the market now seems favourable for most of the farmers, so most of them 
continue to plant padi. Those who had previously decided to plant sugar have decided to 
return to padi. Many sugar planters in rice producing villages have now returned to padi 
because sugar intensification (TRI) has raised many problems and often inflicted losses 
upon the farmers.^
The increase in productivity per hectare (see Table 6-6 on page 149) shows also 
that farmers have generally accepted the (Panca Usaha Tam) method. Thus, as 
explained by PPLs and Camats, the farmers even come to ask the PPL if there are any 
problems about planting or they ask about seeds most suitable for the next planting 
season. Of course, there are sometimes farmers who still make mistakes when they apply 
the Panca Usaha Tani, as in the use of the right doses of fertilizers and in efforts to 
eradicate pests. In addition, in the use of seed, farmers have generally bought the second 
or the third generation of HYV seeds, not the certificated seed of PT SANG HYANG 
SERI (the government enterprise producing seeds) due to the high price of the 
certificated seeds. ** In the farmers’ calculations, the high price of that seed will not 
produce a profit when the rice is sold.
The only obstacle in introducing the Panca Usaha Tani is found in the refusal of 
some farmers (only a few in number but especially the big farmers with more than 2.0 
ha), to plant the types of seeds proposed by the extension workers. They choose by 
themselves the kind of seeds to be planted. Sometimes, although the farmers’ groups of 
which they become members, decided to plant padi in a certain planting season, they 
choose to plant palavuija and thus refuse to follow the decision made by their own 
groups.
. The extension workers usually have no power to compel them to obey the group’s 
decision, hence sometimes they ask for the help of village authorities on those matters,
^Interviews with several sugar planters from villages of Glanggang, Permanu and Kebon 
Agung in Kecamatan Pakisaji; Jatiguwi and Senggreng in Kecamatan Sumberpucung; Kemiri and 
Panggungrejo in Kecamatan Kepanjen; Kemantren and Jabung in Kecamatan Jabung; and 
Pulungdowo, Kambingan and Pandanajeng, October - December 1983.
^Price of the certificated seed in 1984 was Rp 325 per kilogram, and the non-certificated seed 
was Rp 300 per kilogram. Seed of the second and the third generation (that has been planted) was 
Rp 200 per kilogram.
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since the decision is an autonomous one for the farmers’ groups.24 * 26But the effectiveness 
of this action is dependent on the relationship between the PPL and the pamong desa 
(village government officials). In villages where the relationship is not good, the pamong 
desa sometimes ignore the request of the PPL.2®
Refusal of the farmers to plant the proposed seed has affected the effort of the 
tanam serentak system, i.e. simultaneous planting of padi on a block basis. The basic 
reason for such a refusal is actually economic. The farmers generally have their own 
calculations about the kinds of seeds to be planted or whether they will plant padi or 
palawija crops. The sanction, therefore, sometimes cannot be effectively applied if they 
can propose this economic reason as a basis for their refusal to comply with the group’s 
decision. Yet, since the number of those who refuse to participate in the tanam serentak 
is small, their actions do not have serious implications for the program implementations 
overall.
Farmers’ Access to Agricultural Extension
Progress in spreading the HYV and in teaching better farming methods does not 
necessarily mean that all farmers have access to the extension service. As mentioned in 
Chapter Five, the number of PPL is insufficient to provide service for all farmers’ 
groups, while there is also a lack of transportation and housing facilities.2® The LAKU 
program, during which the saung meeting is usually conducted, for example, is only 
carried out effectively for five or six farmers’ groups in three or four villages within each 
WKPP.27 As for other farmers’ groups, especially those who live far from the houses of 
the PPLs, the PPLs often come to meet only the Kontak Tanis in their houses to 
provide new information and guidance, but more especially just to get the signatures of 
the Kontak Tanis needed for their book reports. This practice is carried out on average
^4In Desa Kemiri, for example, those who do not obey decisions of the farmers group would 
not be given supply of water to their sawahs.
2®Intermew, PPL of Kepanjen III, August 14, 1984.
26In August 1984, several PPLs had been moved to other kecamatans as a tour of duty carried 
out for the first time in Malang. They generally felt frustrated with this because they must 
themselves pay for transportation and new housing in the new kecamatan. Hence most of them 
decided to remain in their old kecamatans and go every day to their new WKPPs with their 
motorcycles. This reinforces their immobility but they have no alternatives.
27I often followed some PPLs when they visited villages to carry out the LAKU (Latihan dan 
Kunjungan, Training and Visit for and to Farmers’ Groups as one of the tasks of the extension 
workers). Sometimes, meetings with farmers are carried out in saw ah where there is a small hut 
located in sawah called a saung. At such a saung meeting there are generally four or five farmers 
from one farmers’ group as well as the Kontak Tani as their leaders. During the meetings there 
are discussions on problems faced by the farmers about which the PPLs then provide guidance.
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once a month.'*®
In addition, as also mentioned in Chapter Five, the PPLs are often summoned by 
the Camat to attend meetings in the kecamatan office or to assist the kecamatan in its 
activities, so that their main jobs were disrupted. When I stayed in the house of one of 
the PPLs around 17th August 1984, the kecamatan had been busy with many activities 
to celebrate that independence day. The PPL was also involved and he was absent from 
his duties for one week. In addition, they often have to work at other duties such as 
supplying of pesticides, which actually should be the duty of the Mantri Pertanian. 
Hence, when I went with one of the PPL one day to Desa Kebon Agung (only about 4 
kilometers from the capital of Kecamatan Pakisaji where the PPL lives) I found a farmer 
who did not know what the Bimas program was since he had never met the PPL.
The lack of mobility of the PPLs has made the development of farmers’ groups 
difficult. The difficulty in developing farmers’ groups is also aggravated by several other 
factors. First, in those groups in which some of the sawah owners live in other villages or 
in Malang town, difficulties arise because the PPLs are not able to assemble them at the 
saung meetings. The programs of the group, such as the tanam serentak program, are 
thus often disrupted by their absence.
Secondly, many farmers’ groups have tended to be passive if there is no motivation 
and support from the village government officials. It is difficult for the PPLs to gather 
the farmers for the saung meeting if there is a lack of support for the farmers’ groups 
from the village apparatus. Support from those officials for a farmers’ group is 
determined, among other things, by the relationship between the apparatus and the 
Kontak Tanis as chairmen of the groups. If the village government apparatus, 
especially the village headmen, have noiisympathy with the Kontak Tanis, they will not 
give their support to the development of the group. To overcome this problem, the 
PPLs sometimes propose that the groups should make an arisan (rotating credit 
association) such as I saw carried out in Dukuh Sidodadi of Desa Genengan in 
Kecamatan Pakisaji.
Thirdly, the activity of a farmers’ group is also affected by the economic condition 
of its members. Members of a group tend to be actively involved if their economic 
conditions are relatively similar.'*® Fourthly, the activity of the farmers’ group is also
According to their schedules, one PPL should visit two farmers’ groups every day from 
Monday to Friday. Saturday is used for meeting with, or attending training given by their 
coordinators (the PPM) in the WKBPP office. The PPLs should make notes on problems found 
during the visits to the farmers’ groups. The notes should be signed by chairman of the groups 
(Kontak Tam"), and these should then be sent to the PPM as a weekly report. Interview, PPL of 
Pakisaji, July 29, 1984. The practice was also seen by myself.
Interviews two PPLs of Pakisaji, July 12 and 29, 1984.
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influenced by the attitude towards them of the local government. The farmers’ group in 
Desa Permanu, for example, which has previously been one of the best groups in Malang 
Kabupaten, has reduced its activity because the kabupaten has not paid the Insus 
premium for them since 1981. This step was also taken by the farmers’ group in Desa 
Glanggang, which then resulted in the decrease in Insus production in 1983 as mentioned 
above.
Finally, the involvement of many small farmers in activities outside agriculture in 
alternative jobs has affected the development of farmers’ groups. As elsewhere in Java, 
small farmers’ lives are no longer dependent merely upon agriculture. Their activities in 
other fields, such as alternative jobs, have often hindered them from becoming actively 
involved in farmers’ groups. Many small farmers told me that they have insufficient time 
to attend meetings of the farmers’ group or to involve themselves in the activities of the 
group. However, there were actually several cases in which the small farmers have, 
intentionally or not, not been invited to the meetings. Many small farmers also explain 
that they do not know anything about the farmers’ group because the extension workers 
have never met them and the chairmen of the groups have never invited them to a 
meeting.
The chairmen of the groups themselves seem to have a kind of understanding that 
farmers’ groups are groups for the middle and big farmers only. Such an understanding 
has apparently been created by the local government apparatus. When the chairmen of 
the groups were asked ”Why are Mbok Darsini or Pak Daim (the small farmers) not 
involved in the farmers’ group or Bimas?” they generally answered that the small 
farmers who have less than 0.5 ha are not included in the Bimas or in the groups, or 
"because they (the small farmers) have only 0.1 ha or 0.275.”
Development of the farmers’ group is regarded by the government as one of the 
important programs in agricultural development in Indonesia because it is aimed not 
merely at increasing rice production but also at helping small farmers to solve their 
difficulties in working their land. One of the ways to increase rice production is through 
the INSUS program. This program needs a certain area of sawah in one compact block 
that is planted with only one variety during each season to minimize attacks from pests, 
especially the wereng?1 It is hoped that the farmers’ groups can be developed to carry
^®The premium was three rupiahs per kilogram of rice in 1981. The farmers’ group of Desa 
Permanu produced 120 tons of unhulled padi (gabah) while the farmers’ group of Desa Glanggang 
produced 118 tons through the Insus during that year. This meant that these groups should have 
received Rp 360,000 and Rp 354,000 respectively. Interviews, Village Headmen of Desa 
Permanu, and Desa Glanggang, June 27 and 28, 1983.
"^Determination of areas to be included in the INSUS should be carried out by the Camat, but, 
in practice, it is done by PPLs.
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out such a program. In relation to the INSUS there are some other conditions. First, the 
area of sawah of the groups must be more than 20 hectares. Second, all members of the 
groups must execute a complete program of Panca Usaha Tani. Third, their sawah 
should have a good system of irrigation.
Certainly in the INSUS area there are some small farmers. They can obtain 
expenses to work their sawahs from the Bimas program, but if they do not want to do so 
they can borrow from their groups. The group’s funds come from the contributions of 
their members, as much as 25 kilogram of unhulled rice for every harvest. Actually, this 
is a good policy for increasing rice production as well as helping the small farmers. 
Unfortunately, as I mentioned, there are various obstacles in developing the farmers’ 
groups, and only a small number has been developed.
The Decrease in Bimas Participation
Farmers’ participation in the Bimas programs in the five kecamatans has declined 
continuously, particularly since 1976. However, at the same time, participation in Inmas 
has increased (see Table 6-5 on page 148, Table 6-7 on page 150, Table 6-8 on page 151, 
and Table 6-9 on page 153).® The reduction in the Bimas participation cannot be 
separated from results of the government rice policy itself and the work of Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan, especially in its efforts to solve the credit arrears problem.
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the big farmers who own 0.5 ha sawah or more, 
now have the capacity to finance work on their lands without the need to take credits. 
Hence, when the government launched the Inmas, an intensification program without 
credit, most of these farmers then joined the program. In the five kecamatans, these big 
farmers have no objections toward the intention of the government to abolish Bimas 
program by 1985. On the other hand, many small farmers I interviewed said that 
although they actually still need the credit, they do not have the ability to repay it. This 
fact has forced them to quit the Bimas program.
In the five kecamatans I also met some farmers who complained about the work of 
Satlak Bimas Kecamatan, which are still pressing claims for credit from farmers who 
were freed from the duty to make repayment due to wereng attacks on their sawah in 
1976-1977 (dipusokan). This action increases the reluctance of the farmers towards the
®^Data on Bimas and Inmas of Kecamatan Jabung are not available either at the Kecamatan 
office in Jabung or at WKBPP in Tumpang, see explanation in page 9. However, according to 
PPL of Jabung, a similar tendency in the decline in Bimas participation and an increase in Inmas 
are also found in Jabung. Interview, PPL of Jabung, July 20, 1984.
®®On August 1984, the government announced its intention to abolish the Bimas program by 
1985, but the announcement then was corrected by the Minister of Agriculture, i.e. that the 
program itself would not be abolished and that the change would be conducted on the system of 
credit distribution.
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Bimas program. In addition, their reluctance was increased by cases of deception of the 
farmers by some staff members of the village bank. One of the victims of such deception 
is Pak T (41) of Desa G, Kecamatan Pakisaji. Pak T said that he had repaid his credit 
to the bank but in fact he was still being pressed to pay by the Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan. When the Satlak Bimas asked for the receipt, Pak T was unable to show 
it, but he persisted in saying that he had made the repayment to the office of the BRI 
Unit Desa in the capital of kecamatan.
In various cases of deception, there was, however, no action taken by the bank to 
remedy the malpractices of its staff members. In the case of Pak T, the staff member of 
the bank had been moved to another kecamatan on a regular tour of duty (not as a 
punishment). Only in August 1984, after the local daily, SUARA INDONESIA, 
published reports on the involvement of some BRI Unit Desa staff in credit 
manipulations, did the head of BRI in the Malang branch bring ten of these staff to 
court. ^
Economic motives have also become one factor behind the reluctance of farmers to 
join the Bimas program. Apart from the fact that the price of production inputs is 
cheaper in the private shops than in the KUD, they also have have to pay for the cost of 
transportation of the inputs from the KUD to their saw ah. Pak G.P., a farmer of Desa 
Kebon Agung, explained that when he joined the Bimas in 1982, he had to spend about 
Rp 1,000- for transportation to bring his fertilizers from KUD warehouses in Pakisaji to 
Kebon Agung (around 5 kilometers). Hence, the cost of Bimas for many small farmers is 
higher than if their sawahs are worked by themselves outside the scheme.
Fertilizer distribution, despite some efforts to improve it, still faces some obstacles 
affecting the accuracy of its distribution. The new pattern of distribution of the fertilizer 
mentioned in Chapter Five is one of the causes of many cases of delay in fertilizer 
distribution to farmers. This contributes to the decline in Bimas participation. Pak 
L.B.S, a Kontak Tani in Desa Kebon Agung said that members of his farmers’ group 
had to wait for the Bimas fertilizers for two months and so they decided not to join the 
scheme. A similar statement was also made by Pak Tgm, a revolutionary war veteran 
who has been a farmer since 1950, who explained that frequently the distribution of the 
Bimas fertilizer (or as he called it, mes) was very late. For example, he said that in 
1984, fertilizers were not distributed until near the harvest time. Pak Tgm also decided 
not to join the Bimas again.
^The ten persons came from several kecamatans.
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The Problem of Credit Arrears
Efforts to claim the arrears of Bimas credit have been carried out quite 
successfully in all five kecamatans. In 1984 the money still owing amounted to more 
than Rp 199 million in these kecamatans (see Table 6-11 on page 161, but it was only 
13.6 per cent of total credit advanced. However, the activities of the Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan in handling the arrears problem give rise to an impression that there is a 
lack of coordination among members of the body, and a common view in the regions 
that their claim activities are not really important to the government.
Table 6-11: Amount of Bimas Credit and Its Repayment at August 1984
(Cumulative from 1970, in Million Rupiah)
Kecamatan Amount of 
Credit (Rp)
Repayment
(Rp)
Balance
(Rp)
Percentage
Repaid
Tumpang 333 307 26 8.5
Jabung 274 237 37 15.6
Kepanjen 264 192 72 37.5
Sumberpucung 657 609 48 7.8
Pakisaji 133 117 16 13.6
Total 1,661 1,462 199 13.6
Source: ” Laporan Likuiditas Bimas Yang Telah Direalisasi Per Musim Tanam,
Keadaan per Tanggal 15 Agustus 1984,” of BRI Unit Desa in Each 
Kecamatan.
Not all claims have been successfully pressed because of the stubbornness or 
inability of farmers to repay their credits. On the other hand, however, it is also caused 
by the lack of determination on the part of the bank (BRI) to make any claim, which 
then gives an impression that there is a lack of coordination within the Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan in administering the activity between the BRI and other members of the 
Satlak Bimas.
Since the problem of credit arrears is generally regarded as a national matter and 
the duty to make the claim is given to the Satpel Bimas and is not just a task for the 
bank to carry out, there are many cases in which the village unit bank asks for the help 
of the Camat to summon the delinquents to come to the office of the bank to make the 
payment at a time determined by the bank. However, the bank has sometimes been
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careless about the time, and thus the kecamatan office has had to repeat the summons. 
This has caused annoyance to the Camat and his staff because, according to them, the 
prestige of the kecamatan will be diminished.33
In addition, although the government has issued the INPRES No.10/1981, a 
Presidential Instruction to Satpel Bimas in regions on Guidance about claiming the 
Bimas credits, it seems that the problem of credit arrears is not considered an important 
issue at the local level. The INPRES itself has a weakness that creates doubt among 
members of the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan in taking necessary actions against the 
delinquents. The sanctions to be applied to the delinquents who intentionally refuse to 
pay their debts are still not clear. There is no certainty whether or not the delinquents 
will be treated under the provision of the criminal law, or in what other way.
The uncertainty has often given rise to arguments between Camats and Police 
Commanders of the five kecamatans, who come together in the Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan, about the way to treat the delinquents. While Camats want to treat the 
delinquents as criminals, the Police Commanders have generally rejected this approach. 
The uncertainty about sanctions has also given rise to an impression among the 
kecamatan staff that these claims are not a serious matter and this has created a lack of 
determination to execute that task.
This lack of determination can be seen in the differences in the amount of 
attention given by the kecamatan officials to handling the credit problem and claiming 
the IPEDA land tax. It seems that they pay more attention to claiming the land tax 
which benefits the kabupaten budget rather than to the Bimas credit repayments. While 
the deputies of the Camat in the five kecamatans have a fixed schedule in claiming the 
land tax (two days in a week), they have no fixed schedule for claiming the Bimas credit.
The Satpel Bimas Kabupaten itself also seems to lack determination in this 
matter. Although the kabupaten has laid down that a TKPPKPM team will come to the 
kecamatans every week, the order has sometimes not been obeyed by the team itself. 
This was partly due to a lack of personnel to carry out the task (as mentioned in 
Chapter Five, there were only two staff members in the team who had the task of 
visiting the kecamatans) and also because there was no checking or continuous 
supervision from the chairman of the team over his subordinates. The Camats have 
complained that often the delinquents from the kecamatan have been ordered to go to 
the kabupaten office, as ordered by the TKPPKPM team, but there were no staff in the 
kabupaten office to handle their cases there.
The list of delinquents mentioned in Chapter Five indicates that most of the 35
35Interview, the Mantri Polisi of Kecamatan Kepanjen, September 19, 1983.
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money owed was in the hands of government officials. However, apart from the ten 
village headmen brought before the court, no government officials or army members in 
arrears have been sent to court. Apart from the uncertainty over sanctions, this fact 
indicates the lack of determination of the kabupaten officials to tackle the problem.
It should be emphasised, however, that from the point of view of the kecamatan 
level officials, failure to recover the Bimas credits has not adversely affected their 
primary objectives of increasing rice production. It may sometimes give rise to 
difficulties when BRI refuses to advance credit to a farmers’ group which is in arrears, 
but in general they regard this as a problem of the higher levels of the government’s 
financial administration, not as a problem of great concern to them.
Impact of Bimas Program on Farmers’ Incomes
In terms of their income, many farmers, especially those who have more than 0.5 
ha sawah, recognize that they have become better off since they became involved in 
Bimas. Some of them have even able to restore their houses, a few even to buy tractors, 
to hire more saw ah, or to establish rice mill units. I met many of them who told me of 
the benefits they received from joining the Bimas program. I quote here the stories of 
two of them. One farmer in Desa Sukopuro at Jabung has been able to buy 3.25 ha 
sawah since he joined the Bimas program. He began his activity in agriculture by renting 
0.6 ha in 1961 (before implementation of the Bimas program). He said that the 
production of his sawah had increased from 3.5 tons to 5.0 tons after he joined the 
Bimas and thus he was able to buy more land.
Another farmer who previously had no sawah before he joined Bimas in 1966, is 
Pak A1 of Desa Bokor at Tumpang. In 1965, he used to hire 0.70 hectares of sawah. 
After two years of involvement in Bimas, the production of his sawah increased by an 
average 3 or 4 tons per hectare. Today he owns 3.0 hectares. Apart from the sawah, he 
also had, in September 1984, one rice mill unit with a capacity of 4 to 5 tons a day and a 
pig breeding farm with 50 pigs.
Although they have had an increase in income, not all farmers have been able to 
save the additional money they have earned. Most of these are small farmers who own 
0.2 ha or less, which provides insufficient income for their subsistence, so that they are 
forced to find alternative jobs. The main cause of this is that the ownership of small 
plots of land does not allow a marketable surplus beyond the family’s subsistence 
requirements. Pak Rdi, one of several small farmers I interviewed, has only ”Sa'Cetet” of 
sawah.^
From 1971 to 1974, Pak Rdi joined the Bimas program and experienced some
36This term is used to describe a very small plot of approximately 0.10 hectare.
172
benefits from it. But after that, he decided to cease his involvement in the program, 
because the benefits were not sufficiently great to enable him to repay the credit; 
moreover his sawah was attacked by wereng. The total production of sawah by Pak Rdi 
was only around 700 Kg if the season was good. Hence, what he produced was used 
merely for consumption. Fortunately, his son is sometimes able to get a job working in 
the sawah as an agricultural labourer as well as selling tikar (palm leaf matting). Thus, 
the rice intensification program has increased the incomes of many farmers, but only to 
a lesser degree for the smaller farmers, since the program has in general been accessible 
mainly to big farmers. They are the group who have enjoyed most of the benefits.
To sum up, most farmers in the five kecamatans have planted the high yielding 
varieties, and this can be seen as a proof of the success of the government in proposing 
the new varieties to the farmers. This success is supported by facts that the HYV have 
good productivity and that the market seems favourable for most of the farmers. The 
spread of the new varieties has resulted in the continuous increase of rice production, 
although the increase cannot be separated from the government’s success in introducing 
the better farming methods through the Panca Usaha Tani.
Success in spreading the HYV and the better farming methods, however, does not 
necessarily mean that all farmers have had the same degree of access to extension 
services. Due to the limitation in numbers and the mobility of extension workers, only a 
small number of the farmers are really able to meet those workers. Farmers’ 
participation in applying the better farming methods and in planting the new varieties is 
mostly motivated by their own initiatives after they had heard and seen the practices of 
other farmers.
The immobility of the extension workers (PPL) is mainly caused by their lack of 
numbers and facilities, and also the fact that they are burdened with other duties 
outside agriculture imposed upon them by the Camats. In each kecamatan there are, on 
the average, two PPLs who are supposed to provide guidance to 16 farmers’ groups. In 
fact, each PPL is only able to give guidance effectively to five or six farmers’ groups. 
The majority of the PPLs were not provided with transportation by their offices, so they 
have had to buy motorcycles for themselves. Those who buy their own motorcycles are 
not even given subsidies for petrol and maintenance. Moreover, they are also not 
provided with housing; hence most of the PPLs live in the capital of their kecamatans or 
in Malang town, remote from most of the farmers.
This immobility has also caused difficulties in developing farmers’ groups, 
although such a difficulty could not be separated from other factors. Absentee farmers 
have very often created difficulties, also, in developing the groups, because they usually 
fail to attend meetings and fail to become involved in activities of the groups initiated
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by group leaders or by the PPLs. Support from pamong desa is crucial in developing 
farmers’ groups because in fact many of the members remain passive if no motivation is 
provided by the village apparatus. In some villages, the village headmen refused to 
support the farmers’ groups because they were in conflict with leaders of the groups. In 
this situation, it is difficult to develop a group.
The other factor affecting the performance of farmers’ groups is the economic 
condition of its members. In groups where their members are roughly similar in their 
wealth, the groups are usually well developed. Finally, the small farmers have particular 
obstacles in their efforts to become involved in the groups’ activities. Because of their 
secondary activities in jobs outside agriculture, which are necessary to provide additional 
income, many small farmers are not able to join in the activities of the groups. However, 
the attitude of the government apparatus has created an impression among the leaders 
of the groups that their organizations are set up just for the sake of the middle and the 
big farmers. Therefore, many cases have occurred in which the small farmers were not 
invited to participate in the group activities.
Twenty years after its introduction in 1965, the farmers’ participation in Bimas 
program is tending to decrease. Fortunately, the decline has been compensated by the 
increase in In mas and Insus participation so that the decline has not disturbed the 
government’s efforts to increase rice production. In fact, production has continuously 
increased. Several factors have contributed to the decline of Bimas participation. First, 
the ability of the big farmers to finance their rice cultivation has increased, so most of 
them have decided not to continue their participation in the rigid Bimas program and 
prefer to join the less restrictive In mas program.
Second, there has been an inability on the part of most small farmers to make 
repayments of their Bimas credit. This forces them to withdraw from the program even 
though they actually still need the credit. Third, some weaknesses in administering the 
program remain, and there is no action to remedy the weaknesses. Among the 
weaknesses are inadequacies in the administration of the credit repayment, financial 
corruption involving members of the Satlak Bimas Kecamatan, and delays in fertilizer 
distribution.
In attempting to resolve the problem of credit arrears, the Satlak Bimas 
Kecamatan in the five kecamatans have made some progress. However, their activity 
still indicates a lack of coordination among members of that body, especially between 
the bank and other members. Also, their activities leave the impression that credit 
arrears are not an important issue at the local level. There is no fixed schedule in 
activities for claims and no punishment given to the delinquents.
The Bimas program has, in fact, increased the income of farmers. However, data
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from the five kecamatans indicate that most of the benefits of the program are being 
received by big farmers. The small farmers, despite some increase in their incomes, still 
have no marketable surplus and are still forced to find alternative jobs for additional 
income. For them, it can be said that life remains much the same as it was before Bimas.
From the perspective of policy implementation, it can be concluded that in 
carrying out the Bimas program, the government has failed to give much attention to 
the interests of the majority of farmers, i.e. the small farmers. As mentioned above, no 
action has been taken by the government to eliminate various weaknesses in program 
implementation, such as lack of facilities for extension workers, delay in fertilizer 
distribution, sanctions against those who are deliberately involved in credit arrears, 
particularly officials, and in a greater equality of income distribution.
Therefore, it seems that after the HVYs had come to be in common use, the 
wereng attacks had been overcome, and the production of rice much increased at the end 
of the 1970, then the later workings of the government’s rice policies at the local level 
(the Satpem and Satlak Bimas, PPL etc.) have not been particularly important at all in 
the further increase of rice production since about 1980. The various institutions and 
processes which have brought about that increase were already in place and have not 
been working much better lately than they did earlier. The most important factor in the 
increase has been the demonstration effect among the farmers of the introduction of new 
and higher yielding varieties of rice, coupled with wider knowledge of new cultivation 
practices, as taught by the handful of PPLs.
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CHAPTER 7
Development of KUD in the Five Kecamatans
In this section I shall examine the development of KUDs in the five kecamatans. 
These KUD cooperatives are regarded as an integral part of the rice policy 
implementation process since they are conceived as an organization which serves as a 
channel for the distribution of agricultural inputs (especially of fertilizer in the early 
stages of the rice intensification programs) from the government to farmers, and as a 
farmers’ marketing organization (especially for rice, but also for various other 
commodities such as sugar, corn and soybean). The KUD system was set up by the 
government in 1973 and it was intended that the cooperatives would be utilised by the 
farmers as their own organizations.
According to government regulations, it is laid down that KUD should be run by 
farmers and should serve the interests of farmers. Management of the cooperative is 
undertaken by a board which is chosen by the members at an annual meeting. At this 
meeting, the members also choose members of the Supervisory Body which has the task 
of supervising the management of the cooperative. Thus, this meeting is considered the 
highest authority to which the board is held accountable by the members. A manager is 
appointed by the board to run the business activities of the KUD.
The regulation also determined that the profits from the business should be 
distributed to its members; that the welfare of the members should be given high 
priority; and that there should be open management. At the level of the kabupaten, the 
cooperative office has the task of developing the KUD under the coordination of the 
Bupati, while the Camats are supervisors of its development at kecamatan level. But 
are all these regulations in fact effectively implemented by the KUDs in the five 
kecamatans ? What are the roles of the Cooperatives Office and the Camats in 
developing the cooperative? The discussion below provides the answer to these questions.
It will be seen that in many cases, the KUDs in the five kecamatans do not 
function as effective instruments for advancing the major aims of the government rice 
policy. While they are generally successful in their rice procurement and business
"Pedoman Pelaksanaan Kebijaksanaan Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Koperasi/KUD.,” 
Official Document, Republik Indonesia, October, 1979, pp. iv, 12, 26, 70.
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activities, they have failed to serve the interests of farmers and are just dominated by 
some members of the elite in the kecamatans.
KUD ” AGUNG” of Tumpang
The officially stated objective of the KUD, as mentioned earlier, is that it should 
be an organization run for and by farmers. However, from the very beginning, the KUD 
of the rice-rich Tumpang area has been dominated by a few members of the Kecamatan 
elite, i.e. local government officials and a few wealthy villagers associated with them, 
and has became an arena for groups, competing to dominate the cooperative 
organization, to tap the various forms of financial resources provided by the government 
for their own personal purpose, manipulating support from their own groups in the 
process.
Some members of the KUD’s board are government officials in the kecamatan or 
retired government officials and ex-servicemen. Others are farmers, but they are always 
rich farmers who own more than 0.5 ha sawah and who also pursue other business 
activities. In terms of their party affiliations, we can find among them representatives of 
all three parties: Golkar, PPP and PDI. The political struggle between these groups for 
control of the KUD is one of the most interesting features of this KUD’s story.
In Tumpang, unlike other KUDs in Malang Kabupaten, the KUD has been 
dominated by Golkar since it was established in 1973. This has been a great success for 
Golkar in eliminating the influence of the PDI in the cooperative, since PDI actually had 
strong support in the kecamatan before the emergence of Golkar. Moreover, the KUD 
has been dominated since 1981 by rich farmers from one village only, all of whom are 
members of Golkar.
In August 1973, when the Camat of Tumpang was instructed by the Bupati to 
establish a BUUD, he simply appointed all the members of the former KOPERTA board 
(who were mostly members of Golkar), as members of BUUD’s board.2 An election to 
choose new members of the board, in accordance with the new KUD regulation, was 
carried out in 1974, but Golkar members were still a majority in the board (see Table 
7-1 on page 169).^
In 1975, the intervention of PEPABRI (an association of retired army staff which
2KOPERTA (Koperasi Pertanian), was a form of farmers’ cooperative established during the 
Bimas Gotong Royong period in 1968, but it was abolished in 1973 due to the failure of the 
organization to serve as a farmers’ organization when many of its board members were involved in 
financial corruption.
^Mangoen was a retired Wedana, while Handoyo was a farmer and also a dalang of wayang 
kulit.
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Table 7-1: Boards of KUD ” Agung” Tumpang,
1973 - 1984
1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1978 1978-1981
Chairman
First Chairman 
Second Chairman
Mangoen * Handoyo * Salwani **
H.Munafi #
Salwani ** 
Kartono + 
A.Azizi +First Secretary Sunarto* Sawandi * Sunarto * Handoyo *Second Secretary Sawandhi * - - Supri #First Treasurer Djatun + Djatun + Sukardi + Suwarno **Second Treasurer A.Syukri # A.Syukri # Handoyo * H.Munafi #
Manager
Supervisory
Body
Triatmojo + Triatmojo + Triatmoj o +
Sujono *
Insani +
Karim # 
Munardji + 
Wardoyo #
First Assistant - - - -
Second Assistant - - - -
1981-1984 1984 -
Chairman : H.Salami * Udiono *
First Chairman : H.Soekirno ** H.Salami *
Second Chairman : - - NOTES:
First Secretary : Sagimun * Syarief #
Second Secretary: Danarto # Handoyo * * = Golkar
First Treasurer : Suwarno ** Salbani # # = PPP
Second Treasurer: Samijo + - + = PD I
Manager : Muzaqqi */ Syarief # * * — PEPABRI
Sunarko *
Supervisory : Karim # Murali #
Body Suryadi * Sunoto *
Sunoto * Suparmoko **
First Assistant : Sunarto * Samianto #
Second Assistant: Ponimin +
Source: KUD ”Agung” Tumpang
is closely linked with Golkar)'* in the BUUD began when Salwani (a retired Army 
lieutenant) was elected as the new chairman. Golkar at that time placed three of its
^PEPABRI, Persatuan Purnaunrawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, is an 
Association of Retired Army staff. Among its activities is assistance for its members in seeking 
jobs after retirement.
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members including Salwani in the BUUD (the others were Sunarto and Handoyo). PDI 
at this period had two persons on the board (Sukardi and Triatmojo), while PPP had 
one (H.Munafi). By 1978, although Golkar was still able to maintain a degree of 
influence in the BUUD through the position of Salwani, Handoyo, Suwarno and Sujono, 
the PDI seems to have successfully maintained the influence it had established since 
1975, by retaining four of its members on the board (Kartono, A. Azizi, Insani and 
Munardji); the PPP also had two (Supri and H. Munafi). The success of PDI became 
apparent when it was able to create a new position on the board, i.e. the Third 
Chairman, which was then occupied by one of the PDI members (A. Azizi).
On April 9, 1979, the BUUD became a KUD and at that time the PPP made a 
political manoeuvre by making a proposal to the Camat that Insani be replaced on the 
grounds that he had an illness that made him unfit to do his job. This manoeuvre was 
successful and two of PPP’s members were appointed members of the Supervisory Body 
(Karim and Wardoyo.® However, the PPP’s efforts to take the position of first secretary 
that was previously occupied by Golkar, proved unsuccessful because the Camat and 
Salwani (as members of the selection committee) preferred to appoint Handoyo (a 
member of Golkar).® Yet, this period proved to be the beginning of an increase in PPP’s 
activity in the KUD and the beginning of the decline of PDI’s influence.
At the Annual Meeting (RAT, Rapat Anggota Tahunan) in 1981, a young teacher 
from Desa Wringinsono and a member of KNPI, H. Salami, was elected Chairman of the 
KUD. Apart from maintaining the power of Golkar, the election of Salami was 
considered the starting point for domination of the KUD by rich farmers from one 
village only, i.e. Desa Wringinsono (apart from Salami, there were four other members 
who came from the village, i.e. Muzaqqi, Sunarko, Sagimun and Sunoto) who all are 
members of Golkar. Prior to 1981 there was no one village dominating the KUD.
In 1983, the manager (Muzaqqi) was replaced by Sunarko, because there was an 
accusation that Muzaqqi was involved in financial corruption involving a sum as large as 
Rp 14 million. This accusation was made by a member of the Supervisory Body 
(Suryadi, Chairman of AMPI at the kecamatan),* 7 but no action was taken by the 
Chairman of the KUD or by the Camat either to charge Muzaqqi before a court or to 
examine the bookkeeping of the KUD. The only action taken was the replacement of
‘’Munardji was appointed Chairman of the Supervisory Body replacing Sujono, who moved to 
Malang town.
®The Annual Meeting usually just elects the chairman of the KUD who then sets up a 
committee including the Camat, Head of Organization Development Section of the Cooperatives 
Office, and some other persons, to choose members of the board as a kind of indirect election.
7AMPI — Angkatan Muda Pemba.ha.ruan Indonesia, Youth Group for Indonesian Reformation 
which is also backed by Golkar.
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Muzaqqi by his friend from the same village, Sunarko. Suryadi resigned from his position 
as a member of the Supervisory Body in protest.
The inability of Suryadi to counter the financial scandal in the KUD, points to a 
more general phenomenon of powerlessness on the part of all the Supervisory Bodies of 
the KUDs in preventing such financial scandals. Unless they can gain the support of the 
Camat, there is little they can achieve by themselves. There seems to be three reasons 
for this lack of power. First, the Supervisory Body generally has insufficient authority in 
law to take any action to remedy a scandal, especially to counter the authority of the 
Camat. Similar cases can be found in other KUDs.
Second, some members of the boards and members of the Supervisory Body come 
originally from similar groups or from similar villages. Thus, personal relationships 
between them and feelings of ”esprit de corps” have prevented the Body’s members from 
taking the necessary action regarding mismanagement by staff of the KUDs. Third, most 
of the members of the Supervisory Body have insufficient knowledge of management, 
accounting and bookkeeping to check the management carried out by the boards of the 
KUDs.
The domination of the KUD by rich farmers has created a situation in which the 
cooperative has been used to make them wealthy. For example, Sunarko used a rice mill 
unit which he owned personally to process padi before it was sold to his KUD. Sunarko 
did not merely sell his rice to the KUD of Tumpang but he also sold it on the open 
market; he was then accused of buying rice from the farmers when its price was below 
the floor price and later selling it to the KUDs at a high price. This rumour was again 
used by the PPP by way of appeal to the Camat to discharge Sunarko as manager of the 
KUD. This appeal was successful and at the Annual Meeting in April 1984 Sunarko was 
replaced by a member of PPP, Syarief, who also held another position as First Secretary 
(see Table 7-1 on page 169).
At this Annual Meeting, Udiono, retired Pembantu Bupati of Tumpang and also 
from Golkar, was appointed chairman, but he died 3 months after his appointment. 
Salami as the Second Chairman, took over the position. Udiono was strongly supported 
by the Camat and his candidacy was even proposed in the meeting by the Camat. This 
action conflicted with the KUD regulations that someone who was nominated as a 
member of the KUD board must be a member of the cooperative. Udiono at that time 
was not a member of the KUD. When this problem was put to the Camat, he said that 8
8Suryadi told me that his resignation was motivated by frustration because his objective to 
clean up the KUD received no response from the Camat. Interview, August 6, 1984.
180
he would be responsible for his decison.9 * *Thus, the regulations laid down by the 
government were simply by-passed, since the Camat knew he would have the support of 
the Bupati in the matter.
Though leadership of the KUD was still in the hands of Golkar members, the 
Camat seemed to offer more chances for members of PPP to obtain positions on the 
board of the cooperative than for PDI’s members, i.e. he was playing off PPP against 
PD1 to weaken the latter. This can be seen from Table 7-1 on page 169 which shows 
that in 1984 PPP had placed Five of its members on the board compared to only one 
from the PDI.
According to some informants in Tumpang, the Camat appointed in 1982 had a 
close relationship with the important figures of the PPP in the kecamatan. This Camat 
originally comes from Madura, an island in which the majority of the population are 
strong supporters of PPP, so there is a strong possibility that he was sympathetic to the 
Muslim party. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that Suryadi, Chairman of 
AMPI in Tumpang and an ex-member of the Supervisory Body of the KUD, complained 
to me that the Camat acted in an unconcerned way about the development of the AMPI 
and KNPI in the kecamatan. The attitude of the Camat was confusing because while 
he strongly support Udiono as chairman of the KUD, he also gave his sympathy to the 
PPP. However, it can be surmised that his support for Udiono was just to give the 
impression to the Bupati that he was a Golkar supporter.
Despite this intergroup competition, the KUD nevertheless made some progress in 
its business activities. The KUD of Tumpang has five units handling its various 
activities: TRI (Sugar Intensification Program), food stock, rice-mill, distribution of 
Bimas credit, and Candak Kulak credit. The TRI Unit has succeeded in increasing the 
number of farmers involved in sugar cultivation under the TRI system from 20 in 1976 
to 223 in 1983, while the area planted has increased from 10.5 ha in 1976 to 30.5 ha in 
1983 throughout the kecamatan area.*
The Food Stock Unit also increased in terms of the size of its contract with the 
Sub-Dolog.12 But despite the increase in Food Stock activities, the manager of the KUD
9This was explained by H. Salami who, together with the Camat, Head of Organization 
Development Section of the Cooperative Office of Malang and some other figures, had been 
selected by the RAT as members of a committee to elect members of the board. Interview, August 
6, 1984.
Interview, August 6, 1984.
*^This note is given by a member of staff of KUD Tumpang.
12The amount of the contract was increased from 500 tons in 1978 to 1,500 tons in 1982 while 
the amount of credit from the bank was increased from Rp 17,5 million in 1978 to Rp 42 million 
in 1982. This increase shows the confidence of both the Sub-Dolog and the bank in the ability of 
the KUD. Notes provided by Manager of the KUD.
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was still making rice purchases as far afield as Kabupatens Ngawi and Lamongan 
whenever there was not a sufficient stock of rice in Tumpang to fulfil the KUD’s 
contract with the Sub-Dolog (see also notes on KUD Pakisaji). In addition, the profits 
obtained by the KUD from its activities also increased impressively, i.e. from Rp 590 
thousand in 1977 to Rp 8,244 million in 1982.*^ So the participants in this KUD, drawn 
from a very narrow group, stood to gain very substantial benefits from it.
Who are the people who have enjoyed the progress and financial benefits made by 
the KUD? Apparently the only ones to know the full amount of the profit (SHU = Sisa 
Hasil Usaha) and the other financial benefits of the cooperative were those who actually 
attended the annual meeting, and those who have enjoyed the benefits are perhap only 
the Camat, members of the MUSPIKA and the KUD staff. H. Salami explained to me 
that most of the KUD budget was spent on the salaries of the KUD staff.
Furthermore, according to him, each Camat has always asked for 5 per cent of the 
benefit for the UDKP,*® or kecamatan budget. The Camats even tend to use the 
finances of the KUD for their own personal purposes. Once, a Camat asked for three 
trucks of sand to be used for his housing construction, while the members of MUSPIKA 
often asked for money for petrol and Rp 5,000 for each visit to the office of the KUD. 
These requests ’’sangat merepotkan KUD” (create headaches for the KUD), complained 
H. Salami.*®
Many farmers I met during my visits to villages around the kecamatan explained 
that the KUD staff do not become actively involved in rice purchasing during the 
harvest time. Hence, the farmers are reluctant to sell their rice to the KUD, especially as 
they need transportation to bring the rice to the KUD warehouse. Instead, they sell their 
rice to agents of private rice-mills who come into the sawah to buy the rice even though 
they know that the price at the KUD is sometimes higher. The most important reason 
given was that most farmers need the cash urgently at that time, but the KUD has 
usually no capacity to provide cash at the time of harvest for reasons explained below. 
The big rice mills in the kecamatan which are willing to pay cash are owned by four 
Chinese rice traders. This problem is not merely faced by the farmers in Tumpang but 
also by those who live in other kecamatans.
Quoted from a blackboard in KUD Tumpang.
**The KUD staff, except for the manager and the Supervisory Body members, are divided into 
two categories. Those who were categorized as activists received salaries of Rp 30,000 per month 
in 1984. These were the First Chairman, the Second Secretary, and the Treasurer. The less active 
received Rp 20,000 and Rp 15,000 per month. They were the First and the Second Assistant. The 
salary for the Manager was Rp 30,000 a month, while that for the Supervisory Body members was 
Rp 15,000 per three months in 1984.
*®UDKP = Unit Daerah Kerja Pembangunan, Unit of Job Area for Development. This is an 
institution set up tc discuss development projects needed by the kecamatan. At village level, the 
institution is called LKMD, while at kabupaten level there is BAPPEDA.
*®Interview, August 6, 1984.
182
The KUD itself has encountered various problems in its food stock activities. 
First, the KUD usually has no capital to purchase rice, so when it tries to obtain credit 
from the BRI, the credit very often comes only after the harvest, when much of the rice 
has already been purchased by rice traders. This occurs because of the complicated 
procedures which involve agreement by various offices such as the Cooperative Office 
and the Logistic Office (Sub-Dolog), before the bank agrees to give credit. All this 
complexity gives rise to numerous opportunities to create delays which enable traders to 
exploit the market situation because of the farmers’ need to sell their crops immediately.
Although the Tumpang KUD and other KUDs have reported this problem to the 
Cooperative Office and Sub-Dolog, no action has ever been taken to remedy this 
bureaucratic obstacle. By selling the rice to traders the farmers have found it hard to 
obtain the floor price laid down by the government and very often they have had to sell 
at a lower price. Moreover, many farmers told me that they had never heard about the 
floor price scheme, because there was nobody, neither staff members of the KUDs nor 
kecamatan officers, who provided information to them about the price level.
Secondly, quite in contrast with the financial success of the Tumpang KUD, it 
surprisingly has no rice-processing unit, so that the Sub-Dolog has sometimes refused to 
accept rice from the KUD because it is considered to be below quality.*7 This results in 
financial losses to the KUD; consequently the KUD decided to cooperate with rice 
traders in food stock activities in preference to Sub-Dolog, in order to minimize the risk 
(see also notes on the KUD of Kepanjen).
Beside the food stock problem, farmers also complain about delays in fertilizer 
distribution. This delay is not merely caused by delays in shipment from the PPK, but 
also by regulations in the Bimas program itself, e.g. about the way Bimas credit is to be 
distributed within the BPB system (see notes on the decrease in Bimas participation in 
Chapter Five). Insofar as the KUD is concerned, the system has not yet been carried out 
properly because the KUD does not yet have the ability to make close contact with all 
the farmers.
Furthermore, the KUD has insufficient facilities to take a role as a distributor of 
government credit. It lacks the managerial skills needed to distribute the credit and its 
facilities for the long-term storage of fertilizer are inadequate. A long period of storage 
will make the fertilizers lumpy and unable to be sold, yet the KUD still has to pay for 
them. This technical problem was confirmed to me by the Head of the Malang Diperta. 17
17KUD. Tumpang., "Laporan Pertanggung-Jawaban Pengurus KUD ’AGUNG’ Tumpang, 
Tahun Buku 1982.” Unpublished Report, p.4.
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The KUD has insufficient staff to accept the repayment of credits from farmers. 
As a result of these problems, when I visited the KUD, there were 50 tons of fertilizers in 
its warehouses that could not be distributed to farmers because the BRI and the Camat 
had prohibited their distribution until 60 per cent of farmers’ groups in the kecamatan 
had paid back their previous credits. Up to the end of my research, the Camat was still 
continuing his efforts to reclaim these credits and the fertilizer was still stored in the 
godown.
The KUD board, on the other hand, complained about the farmers’ refusal to buy 
production inputs at the KUD kiosks, while at the same time recognizing that the 
location of the kiosks, in places far from the villages, was faulty. According to the 
KUD staff this was caused by difficulty in finding land near the villages. They 
considered that this was due to the refusal of the farmers to support the KUD.
Some of these lands were in fact sold to other buyers for religious purposes, for 
example the establishment of mosques. Apart from the fact that the kiosks have been 
built too far from their houses and sawahs, the farmers have found that most of the 
kiosks have never been opened since they were built. The explanation of the Carik 
(Secretary) of Desa Slamet (about five kilometers from the KUD office) may give a 
clearer picture of the situation.
I am not a member of the KUD, and the cooperative has never taken my 
money for a contribution. I do not know who are members of the KUD board 
and I do not know what are the purposes of the cooperative. In this village 
there is one kiosk of the KUD, but its doors have always been closed since it 
was established.
The fact that this man was a leading member of the pamong desa and did not 
have close contact with the KUD suggests that ordinary members of the village 
community in the kecamatan would have been even more remote from it.
The staff of the KUD claim they are insufficient in number to manage the kiosks. 
Hence, there was a proposal from the KUD to hand over the kiosks as an activity for the 
PKK- This is an utterly different kind of women’s association, however, and has made 
no response to that proposal. Again, these last two problems are found not only in 
Tumpang but also in other kecamatans. * * *
*®In 1984, there was only one woman staff member in the Section of Credit who had the duty 
of administering distribution and repayment of credit. The staff member was paid only Rp
15,000 a month (around A$ 15) for her task of visiting villages to collect the repayment. A similar 
situation was found in the other KUDs.
*®KUD Tumpang., Ibid., p.5.
Interview, August 4, 1984.
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Development of KUD Jabung
Like the KUD of Tumpang, the KUD in the much poorer kecamatan of Jabung is 
also dominated by members of the kecamatan elite. But it differs in that whereas the 
former has been continuously controlled by members of Golkar, the KUD of Jabung has 
been dominated by members of the PPP. Since 1983 the leadership of the KUD has been 
taken over by a member of PEPABRI, but the majority of the members of the KUD 
board are still PPP members. This domination of the KUD by members of the PPP has 
given rise to rumours that the cooperative was no more than a family firm. This KUD is 
also an example of the lack of attention by the Government towards the development of 
the KUD in a non-rice producing area.
The BUUD of Jabung, like those in other kecamatans, was established in 1973. As 
the first members of its board, the Camat appointed some former members of a farmer 
cooperative board, Koperasi Konsumsi (established in 1956). At that time, the 
leadership was in the hands of a member of PDI, Susetyo, but all other members of the 
board were from PPP (see Table 7-2 on page 177).
In 1974, a member of PPP and former member of the supervisory body of the 
KUD, H. Muktari, was appointed chairman of the KUD. This appointment was the 
starting point of Muktari domination of the KUD from 1975 till 1983, which was the 
reason why the cooperative came to be widely regarded by the people of Jabung as 
merely the family firm of H. Muktari. His strong influence can be seen, for example, in 
the structure of the KUD board, in which the majority of members were from PPP and 
were friends of Muktari himself, especially from his village, Sukopuro. This structure 
resulted in the fact that many members of the cooperative did not know how the KUD 
was managed since they never received any accounting from the board regarding its 
operations; moreover, the board rarely even conducted annual meetings.
The above situation gave raise to suspicions that some members of the board were 
involved in financial corruption. In 1974, for example, the secretary of the KUD, 
Jamsari, was killed in a car accident. This gave rise to rumours and suspicions that the 
BUUD board was involved in financial scandals, because all evidence of the transactions 
of the cooperative, including its accounts and even lists of BUUD members, were lost 
after the death of Jamsari. These suspicions were strengthened when the manager, 
Susetyo, committed suicide in 1975.
The Camat of Jabung and some people in Jabung explained that the reason for the 
suicide might have been fear on Susetyo’s part that the scandal would be discovered by 21
21Jamsari was a former secretary of the koperasi in 1956 and 1967. H. Manufa was a former 
treasurer of the koperasi in 1956 who then became chairman of it in 1967. H.Muktan was a 
former coordinator of the koperasi in 1967.
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Table 7-2: Boards of KUD Jabung, 1973 - 1984
1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1979 1979-1983
Chairman Susetyo + H.Muktari # H.Muktaxi # H.Muktaxi #Second Chairman - - - Bahrum *Secretary Jamsari # H.Sunito # Bahrum * Khasiyat #Treasurer H.Manufa # H.Manufa # H.Abdul # H.Abdul #Ass.Treasurer Hof #Supervisory H.Muktaxi # Saptadi # H.Djuned # Masdaxi #Body Saptadi # - - Samadi #
- - - Kusni #
Manager Kusnidax # Susetyo + H.Manufa # H.Djuned #
1983-1984 1984-
Chairman Manan ** Manan **
Second Chairman Masdaxi # Fazlani * Notes
Secretary Suwandi # Subardi * * = Golkax
Treasurer Bahrum * Wahab * # = PPP
Ass.Treasurer Kasman # Iskandar # + = PDI
Supervisory Suradi # H.Muktari # * * = PEPABRI
Body Wahab * Suradi #
H.Sunito # H.Sunito #
Manager Rafiq # Maxuli #
Source: KUD Office of Jabung
the authorities. Before the death of Susetyo there had been an investigation by the 
Cooperative Office into the management of the BUUD. In the course of this 
investigation it was found that Rp 6 million worth of food stock had been corruptly 
handled by the BUUD board. This scandal was the reason given by the Cooperative 
Office for stopping distribution of food stock credit to this KUD until the debt was 
totally repaid.^ In August 1984, the secretary of KUD Jabung explained that the 
amount of the debt was only Rp 900,000.^
Up to 1983, the KUD was badly managed. For example, it had no lists of its 
members and no registration of profit. Apart from this, during the period of his * *
Apparently, according to some people in Jabung, Susetyo’s fear was also aggravated by the 
fact that he was a son of a member of the Communist party (PKI) who was killed in a massacre in
1965.
®Interview, Subardi, Secretary of KUD Jabung, August 11, 1984.
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chairmaship, H. Muktari was also able to prevent any intervention by the Camat and 
the Cooperative Office in the management of the KUD. Until 1979, no annual meeting 
was ever held by the cooperative. When one was finally held in 1979, it was just a 
ceremony to strengthen the position of H. Muktari and his supporters from the PPP, on 
the board of the cooperative.24 From 1979 to 1983, no annual meeting occurred and in 
1981, Khasiyat, the Secretary, escaped from Jabung to a place unknown with around 
two million rupiahs of the cooperative’s funds in his pocket. Some people in Jabung 
guess that Khasiyat returned to his kampung in South Sumatra.
The ability of the KUD under H. Muktari to avoid conducting the annual meeting 
is evidence of the inability of the Camat and the Cooperative Office to intervene in the 
management of this KUD in this situation. This powerlessness was due to at least three 
factors. In the first place, the Camat and some staff members of the Cooperatives Office, 
who have the task of supervising the development of the KUD, have often been also 
involved in the financial scandals of the KUD board members. It was reported by some 
members of the board that transfers of money from the KUD to government officials 
often occurred. This practice was followed in order to make all ” business” of the KUD 
run more smoothly.
Secondly, it seems that there has been a lack of interest from Secondly, it seems 
that there has been a lack of interest from kabupaten-level officials in the development 
of the KUD. Since Jabung is not a potentially rich rice area its contribution to food 
stock is small. Therefore, unlike the close attention given by officials to other KUDs in 
the main rice producing areas, the development of the KUD in Jabung tends to be 
ignored by them. During my stay in Malang, officials of the Cooperative Office often 
made inspections to other KUDs, but not to Jabung KUD.
Thirdly, it seems also that the lack of attention by officials in the KUD, was due 
to a deliberate attempt to weaken an organization in which Golkar had a lesser role than 
other parties (PPP in the case of Jabung). The Head of the Cooperative Office in 
Malang categorized the KUDs in which PPP or PDI members have a majority seat in 
the KUD’s board as ”KUD Rawan” (literally, "anxious,” i.e. a trouble spot) which 
means that such KUDs are in the wrong hands; hence efforts to replace their boards 
should be made.
24H. Muktari is village headman of Desa Sukopuro. He is around 60 and has been a village 
headman for about 15 years. The biggest house in the rice producing desa is his property. In his 
house there are some surat penghargaan (letters of recommendation), among other things, from 
President Sukarno for his achievement in developing the Koperasi Konsumsi in 1960. He is 
actually not a "conservative” man in front of the government. As a supporter of NU he does not 
refuse the development programs of the government. Even in 1982, he accepted the initiative of 
the KNPI in establishing an electrical network in his desa that makes Sukopuro one of the four 
desas in Jabung which enjoys electrical power.
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In 1983, through the intervention of PEPABRI, the chairmanship was taken from 
H. Muktari. A chairman from PEPABRI in Jabung, Manan (a retired warrant officer in 
the army), was appointed as chairman of the KUD. In this new board, the membership 
from Golkar was increased. Yet there was still no improvement in the management of 
the KUD. It still had no lists of its members, for example, and no registration of profit. 
In September 1983, when I asked a member of the KUD board about the management of 
the KUD, i.e. lists of membership, development of profit etc., he was unable to present 
them.
His inability to do so was not because he wished to conceal the information, but 
simply because the KUD did not have all the data. When I asked for it, he became 
confused and busily began to open a lot of files in his desk and cupboards, assisted by 
two staff of the KUD. Finally he admitted that the KUD actually did not have all of 
that information. When I returned to the KUD in August 1984 (after a change in the 
board), his statement was confirmed by the new secretary who said that until 1983, 
nobody knew about that information and this had made his task very difficult. In 1984, 
an annual meeting increased the number of board members from Golkar and reduced the 
number of members from PPP, but the PPP still retained its majority on the 
cooperative board.
The domination of the KUD by one person associated with a particular group 
resulted in a situation where most farmers in Jabung received no benefit at all from the 
KUD. Even the farmers in Sukopuro, the village of H. Muktari, had a cynical expression 
when I asked them what benefit they had obtained from the KUD. One of them, Pak 
Mlm, of Desa Sukopuro said cynically:
KUD here does not do anything for its members and its board is not active. 
Sometimes a distribution of fertilizer from the KUD has occurred but only if 
there is a report about lack of fertilizer. If there is a lack of fertilizer in this 
village, nobody takes the initiative to make such a report to KUD, so there will 
no distribution of fertilizer.
Development of KUD in Kepanjen
As in Jabung, the KUD of Kepanjen is also dominated by one person. But 
whereas in Jabung such domination was achieved by a member of PPP, in Kepanjen the 
KUD has been dominated by one retired army officer, a member of PEPABRI who is 
strongly backed by Golkar. Therefore Golkar, and especially the PEPABRI, has had a 
majority of members on the KUD’s board. In addition, unlike in Tumpang and Jabung, 
no farmers have become members of the board in the KUD of Kepanjen. They are either 
government civil servants or ex-servicemen. And the most interesting feature of the
25 Interview, September 20, 1983.
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KUD is the way in which it cooperates with rice traders in food stock activities like 
other KUDs, as will be outlined below.
The BUUD of Kepanjen was established in February 2, 1973, and became a KUD 
on January 1, 1980. As in other kecamatans, its first board was appointed by the 
Camat. During the years 1973 - 1975, the board of the BUUD failed to hold an annual 
meeting. The first annual meeting in 1976 was conducted after strong demands were 
made for the replacement of Manager Arnoto, who was accused of involvement in a 
financial scandal. This meeting appointed Sunoto, a retired Lieut.Col. of the Army, as 
a new chairman of the cooperative (see Table 7-3 on page 181).
The appointment of Sunoto was the starting point for his domination of the KUD 
up to the present day. Although annual meetings have occurred five times since 1976, 
there have been no significant changes in membership of the cooperative board. Some 
members have permanently occupied their positions for many years, right down to the 
present. It is important to note that the majority of members on the board of the KUD 
are members of Golkar.^®
The domination of the KUD by Sunoto has resulted in difficulties in developing
teamwork between himself and some of his colleagues in the KUD. This has been caused
by his attitude towards intervening in all the problems of the cooperative which fall
within the competence of his colleagues. In 1978, for example, Sunoto made a proposal
at the annual meeting to replace the manager of the KUD (Sukarno) because in his
opinion, Sukarno lacked the ability to manage the cooperative, whereas in Sukarno’s
opinion, Sunoto was a very ambitious man who wanted to dominate the KUD 
27management.
Sukarno was replaced by Nadzri, a retired army officer. However, Nadzri also 
failed to cooperate successfully with Sunoto. He too accused the latter of being a 
chairman who was always intervening in the management of the KUD. Such 
intervention, according to Nadzri, had undermined his position as manager of the 
cooperative because Sunoto had taken action appropriate to a manager of the KUD. 
Hence, Nadzri withdrew from his position in 1980 and was replaced by Witono, who also
^®M. Sadiko was a former staff member in the Kecamatan Office in Kepanjen who then 
became village headman of Desa Cepoko Mulyo. Djamsari (who died in 1979) and Kartono were 
both retired army officers while A. Sukoco was a staff member of the post office and Ramadi was 
head of an elementary school in Kepanjen. Arnoto was a businessman and also one of the leaders 
of Pemuda Marhaenis (a youth organization of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI) who later 
became actively involved in the KNPI and AMPI of Kepanjen. Witono was staff member of the 
Transmigration Office in Malang; Sumirah was the widow of an army officer; Pribadi, Gunawan, 
Manan, Aslam, Suradi, and Darnowo, all were retired army officers; Sukarno was a Post Office 
employee pensioner; Miss Tini was an activist in AMPI.
27 r -Intermews Sunoto and Sukarno, September 22 and 24, 1983.
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Table 7-3: Boards of KUD of Kepanjen, 1973 - 1984
1973-1976 1976-1978 1978-1980 1980-1981 1981-1982
Chairman : M.Sadiko + Sunoto ** Sunoto ** Sunoto ** Sunoto **Deputy
Chairman : - - - - Suradi **Secretary : Djamsari ** Witono * Witono * Manan ** Tini *Treasurer : Nario + Sumirah * Sumirah * Sumirah * Sumirah *
Suhdi ** Suhdi **
Supervisory
Body : A.Sukoco # Pribadi ** Pribadi ** Pribadi ** Pribadi**
Kartono ** Gunawan ** Gunawan ** Gunawan ** Gunawan**
Ramadi + - Aslam * * Aslam ** Aslam **
Manager : Arnoto * Sukarno * Nadzri ** Witono *
1982-1984
Chairman : Sunoto **
Deputy NOTES:
Chairman : - ** = PEPABRI
Secretary : Tini * + = PDI
Treasurer : Sumirah * # = PPP
Supervisory 
Body : Pribadi **
Manager :
Aslam **
Darnowo * *
Suradi **
Source: KUD of Kepanjen
made a similar complaint about the leadership of Sunoto. In 1981, Witono withdrew 
from his position and was replaced by Suradi.
Sunoto seems to have had sufficient power to be able to avoid control by the 
Supervisory Body, the Camat and the Cooperative Office. According to various 
informants in Kepanjen, before 1982 money belonging to the KUD was often borrowed 
by Sunoto or other staff without receipts and they were generally not repaid; but nobody 
publicized this malpractice. Only after Darnowo (a retired army officer of the same rank 
as Sunoto) became a member of the Supervisory Body in 1982, did any action against 
Sunoto occur.
28Intermew, Witono, September 19, 1983.
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In 1983, Darnowo discovered that as much as Rp 6,700,000 of the KUD’s money 
was missing. He suspected that several members of the board (whom he refused to 
mention by name) had used the money without any receipts. He sent a report on the 
findings to the Cooperative Office, but it met with no response and the office maintained 
silence on the financial scandal. A rumour then arose that the silence of the Cooperative 
Office was due to the fact that as much as Rp 200,000 had been given by Sunoto to the 
Office.29
The silence of the Cooperative Office resulted in a request by Darnowo to 
withdraw from membership of the Supervisory Body in early 1984. As his successor, the 
Camat appointed Arnoto (former manager of the BUUD in 1973-1974) to be the new 
chairman of the Supervisory Body. The appointment of Arnoto shows that the Camat 
actually did not pay any attention to his record, since he was a person accused of 
corruption when he became the manager of the KUD in 1973-1974, nor to the problem of 
the KUD as a whole. As in other kecamatans, the Camat seems to have connived at 
developments within the KUD until a serious problem occurred which required his 
intervention (see notes on KUD Sumberpucung). Sunoto himself had no objection to 
Arnoto and when I stayed in Kepanjen, Sunoto came nearly every day to Arnoto’s house 
to discuss problems facing the KUD.
Yet there were some improvements in the management of the KUD under Sunoto. 
For example, there are improvements in bookkeeping, registration of members and 
profits (SHU) as well as regular meetings of the KUD board. 9 When Sunoto replaced 
M. Sadiko in 1975, for example, the cooperative had a debt as high as one and a half 
million rupiah to the BRI, because it could not repay the food stock credit, and it also 
owed for 60 tons of fertilizer.
29This rumour is confirmed by Arnoto (Manager in 1973-1976) and also by Darnowo. The 
transfer of money from KUD to officials of the Cooperative Office is not limited to efforts to avoid 
control of the management of the KUD but extends also to the problem of helping the KUD 
receive credit from the bank. This occurs when the KUD makes its balance of payment report to 
the Cooperative Office. Due to the fact that most of the KUDs lack skilled staff, they usually ask 
for the help of the Cooperative Office in making their balance of payment. For this help, some 
money should be paid to the staff of the office. According to some staff of KUD Kepanjen, the 
transfer of money was needed so that the cooperative office could arrange for the balance of 
payment so that the KUD retained its profit. This is needed to enable the KUD to be classified as 
a KUD possessing sufficient credibility to receive further credit from the bank. Eligibility for 
credit will be advantageous for the KUD in terms of good evaluation from the authorities 
regarding performance of its board, and also in terms of the possibility of using the credit for the 
needs of the KUD or personal interests of its board. As an example, they said that in the last two 
years, the KUD had actually operated without profit, but the cooperative office still recorded a 
profit within the balance of payment, so the KUD was still eligible to receive the credit. This 
practice is found also in other KUDs.
^Meetings of the board occurred every Thursday; meetings between the manager and staff 
every Monday; plenary meetings of the board and manager and staffs once every three months; 
and checking on management of the KUD by the Supervisory Body was also executed once in 
every three months. KUD Kepanjen, "Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Pengurus KUD Kepanjen 
Tahun Kerja 1982.” Unpublished Report, p.7.
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The fertilizer was sold by the KUD but no money was sent to the bank. This 
occurred because the profits were used improperly. During the M. Sadiko period, there 
was no bookkeeping, while the use of profits was determined by the Camat. According to 
Arnoto, manager of the BUUD under Sadiko, there was a profit of six million rupiah in 
1974; however, as much as Rp 400 thousand of that money was taken by the Camat for 
his own purposes, and the balance was donated to various mosques and other social 
institutions. However, the KUD’s debts had been fully paid by the management under 
Sunoto.
As in other KUDs, it would be hard to say that the KUD of Kepanjen, on the 
basis of its membership, has been widely accepted by farmers as their own organization. 
There were only 838 members in 1983 while the total number of farmers in the 
kecamatan was 10,893. As in other KUDs, the members have been recruited merely from 
farmers who take the Bimas credit. Also many farmers in Kepanjen stated to me that 
they did not obtain any benefits from the KUD. There has been, for example, no 
distribution of profits to the members of the KUD and only those who are invited to the 
annnual meeting would know the size of the profit.
As in other KUDs, meetings have been effected by inviting the Kontak Tanis only, 
one Kontak Tani being considered the representative of ten farmers. It is widely 
known that Kontak Tanis do not automatically represent the opinions of farmers. Many 
farmers’ groups, are inactive; and Kontak Tanis, as chairmen of the farmers’ groups, 
have never contacted members of their groups. Therefore, information about the profits 
of the KUD and other information from the KUD have generally not been received by 
the majority of its members. In all five KUDs I investigated, it is widely known that the 
annual meeting is a mere formality held just to comply with the regulations. ^
The profits of the KUD, according to Sunoto, have been reinvested. He gave the 
example that, in 1983, the KUD established some warehouses in Kepanjen which cost 
around twenty eight million rupiah, without any credit from the government. ^ For this 
purpose, he used three million rupiah from profits and twenty five million rupiah from 
the food stock credit.
To repay this credit, Sunoto has used as much as ten million rupiah of his own
Interview, Arnoto, manager of BUUD Kepanjen 1973-1975, September 14, 1983. If the 
suspicion of Arnoto’s involvement in the financial corruption cited above is correct, it means that 
some percentage of the profits was also taken by him.
^Interview, Tini, Secretary of KUD Kepanjen, September 12, 1983.
^As a comparison with other KUDs, see Kompas, ”KUD Lebih Menyerupai Jawatan,” 
September 21, 1984.
*^He refused to take the credit in order to give the impression that his KUD was able to build 
the buildings without aid from the government.
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money, and borrowed as much as thirteen million and two million rupiah from the 
PUSKUD and a Chinese trader respectively. To repay this debt, Sunoto had a plan to 
cooperate with rice traders for handling the food stock in 1984 and 1985.35 The problem 
here was that the decision to make the reinvestment was not known by the KUD 
members and therefore Sunoto had given no accounting of his action to them. As 
explained by Sunoto, the decision was taken by the board of the cooperative only.
Cooperation with rice traders in food stock activities has occurred regularly since 
the cooperative was established in 1973 and, as in other KUDs, it is made necessary by 
several factors. First, the KUD lacks experience, staff and facilities to compete with the 
greater experience of rice traders in this activity. The KUD of Kepanjen has cooperated 
with many rice traders, but there were three Chinese traders in particular with whom 
the cooperative usually made contracts in relation to food stock.* 3®
From this activity, the cooperative benefited from the interest on the loan, that is, 
two per cent per month for six months, and from the transportation fee, two rupiah per 
kilogram from Kepanjen to Sub-Dolog warehouses in Malang in 1984.3^ The traders, on 
the contrary, will also benefit from the other transactions they make with the local 
farmers who generally have to sell their rice to them below the floor price, and from the 
freedom not to pay sales tax.
Secondly, as in other KUDs, the Sub-Dolog often refused to accept rice from the 
KUD on the ground that the rice from the KUD is below the quality control standards 
set by the office (they called it rendemen, i.e. conversion of milled rice from stalk padi). 
Determination of the rendemen was carried out by two testers, PT. SUCOFINDO and 
PT PAN ASIA. The process of testing was carried out without supervison by KUD 
staff. Thus, there was a suspicion that results of the test had been manipulated by the 
testers for the benefit of the Sub-Dolog.
This suspicion was enhanced by the fact that some transfer of money (called uang 
pelicin) had to be made between the KUD and the Sub-Dolog staff for the rice to be
33Interview, Sunoto, Manager of KUD Kepanjen, September 22, 1983.
3®In the cooperation with rice traders, the KUD provides the traders the money taken from 
food stock credit (Kredit Pengadaan Pangan). The traders then seek the rice wherever it could be 
found (although it should have been readily available in other kecamatans or other kabupatens). 
The traders will send the rice, in the name of the KUD, to Sub-Dolog warehouses.
3^The amount of the transportation fee differs between one KUD and another. This depends on 
the distance between each KUD and Sub-Dolog warehouses. KUDs which are located far from the 
warehouses receive more fees than those which lie close to the warehouses. This difference causes 
speculation by some KUD managers in food stock activities although the KUDs are located in 
non-rice producing kecamatans. The KUDs of Kasembon and Ngajum, for example, will receive 
seven rupiah per kilogram for the rice they sent to Sub-Dolog. Their managers then make 
contracts with traders in rice producing kecamatans particularly with those who stay near the 
Sub-Dolog warehouses. Or, the managers will wait for trucks carrying the rice near the 
warehouses then buy the rice and send it to the warehouses.
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accepted by the Logistic Office. Those who have the ability to carry out such a 
transfer of funds and who are in the habit of doing so were the rice traders. Hence, 
according to Sunoto, it is better to use them for this purpose because this will reduce the 
possibility of losses if the rice is refused by Sub-Dolog; at the same time, the KUD would 
be able to get some benefit without the need to do much work. Expenses for the uang 
pelicin were included under the heading of "man fee” in the bookkeeping of KUD 
Kepanjen.
Finally, the cooperation with the rice traders is facilitated by the attitude of the 
government itself, in that it tends to ignore the problem of the sources from whom the 
KUDs buy their rice. The fact that KUDs are allowed to buy rice as far afield as other 
kecamatans and even other kabupaten areas (see footnote 36), means that there is no 
instruction for the cooperative to buy the rice merely from from farmers within their 
areas of operation (kecamatan). This fact also indicates that the cooperative is not just 
established to give service to the farmers in its area (which most of them in fact have 
failed to do), but especially to help the government make rice purchases to fulfil the 
national rice stock.
KUD of Sumberpucung II in Ngebruk
There are two KUDs in Sumberpucung, since the area of the kecamatan is too 
large to be covered effectively by only one. These have been named KUD Sumberpucung 
I and II. The focus of this study is KUD Sumberpucung II, the office of which lies in 
Desa Ngebruk. The more effective development of this KUD and some interesting 
problems faced by it, especially in the last three years, are the basic reasons for its choice 
as the focus of this study.
This KUD was also dominated, before 1984, by a small group of elite villagers in 
Sumberpucung. Here the PEPABRI was not able to penetrate the KUD until after an 
internal conflict which terminated the control of the dominant group in 1983. This 
conflict provided an opportunity for the local government to intervene, and it then took 
over the management of the KUD, making it the only KUD in Malang Kabupaten which 
is officially run by local government officials. The conflict is also interesting as an 
illustration of the way in which the Camat attends to KUD affairs. It also represents a 
case where the corruptor goes free while the honest man is punished.
®Arnoto explained that he, in 1975, had asked his friend to give some money to the Sub-Dolog 
staff when rice from his KUD was refused for the reason that the rice was below quality. After the 
transfer of money, the same rice had been accepted by them. According to Sunoto, the money of 
uang pelicin has been increased from twenty cents per kilogram in 1973 to be two rupiahs per 
kilogram in 1984. Even the tukang timbang (man who operates rice scales) has to be paid in 
order to avoid the reduction of weight intentionally made by the tukang timbang.
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The troubles that occurred in 1983 in this KUD are of particular interest because 
this was one of the best-managed KUDs in the kabupaten. Moreover, attempts were 
made by various officials to deal with allegations of corruption; and the attempts were 
made in accordance with the regulations and through the appropriate channels. But 
political considerations relevant to the power relationships prevailing within the 
kecamatan created insuperable obstacles to the would-be reformers.
The cooperative had been dominated, ever since its establishment in 1973 as a 
BUUD, by H. Misan and his colleagues. H. Misan is one of the richest farmers in his 
village. His assets, together with his level of education, which is relatively good,^® 
have enabled him to be actively involved in kecamatan affairs and have thus given him a 
chance to be, at the same time, one of the most respected persons in Sumberpucung. The 
other leading men in the group were Drs. Suwarno, Dr (medical) Fadjri, and Pratomo.^
While this KUD has been dominated since 1973 by the group of H. Misan, other 
people have moved on and off the KUD board; but these four powerful figures managed 
to retain their positions continually from 1973 to 1983 (see Table 7-4 on page 187). 
However, an internal conflict developed between Misan and Fadjri in 1983, which ended 
the power of those two leaders of the KUD, leaving only Suwarno and Pratomo.
Under the management of H. Misan, the KUD had achieved some progress 39
39He has around 4.0 hectares of sawah. Although he is not the richest farmer, he is included in 
that small number of farmers in his village who have more than 2.0 hectares of sawah. Two other 
farmers in his village, Dukuh Kebonsari in Desa Senggreng, have around six and seven hectares of 
sawah. In 1984, there were only around five to seven farmers in the village who had 2.0 hectares 
or more of sawah. Beside that, Misan also has a rice mill (huller) and rice warehouses.
^He is a graduate from PGA (Pendidikan Guru Agama), Religious Teacher School at the 
level of Junior High School.
^*Drs. Suwarno comes from a farmer’s family in Sumberpucung. He got his Master’s degree 
from Universitas Brawijaya in Malang. Although he has around 4.0 hectares of sawah in 
Sumberpucung (mostly an inheritance), most of his time is spent in the KUD. Since 1982 he has 
occupied the position of chairman of PUSKUD of the East Java Province in Surabaya, the highest 
position in the cooperative organization at the province level. Beside that, Suwarno has also two 
medium-sized rice warehouses in Sumberpucung. Fadjri is not a farmer. He is a medical doctor 
graduated from Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya and he was sent to Sumberpucung in 1975 as a 
dokter INPRES and remains in the kecamatan until today. He has (as many other kecamatan 
officials and teachers in the kecamatan) rented two hectares of sawah, but his life is mostly 
dependent upon his activity as a medical doctor. In 1982, Fadjri was appointed Chairman of BKO 
in Malang. Pratomo is a village headman of Desa Ngebruk. He originally comes from Jakarta and 
was born there. He joined the Indonesian Army during the independence war and was sent to 
Malang in 1948. He retired as an army officer in 1953 and decided to remain in Ngebruk where he 
married a woman of the village. As a village headman, Pratomo has 3.5 hectares of bengkok 
sawah and two other hectares which he bought in 1971.
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Table 7-4: Boards of KUD Ngebruk, 1973 - 1984
1973-1975 1975-1977 1977-1980 1980-1982
Chairman H.Misan * Ismet ** Suwaxno * Suwaxno *First Chairman - H.Misan * H.Misan * H.Misan *Second Chairman - - Fadjri * Fadjri *First Secretary - Riwani + Riwani +
Second Secretary - - Asnowo #Third Secretary - - Ratna *Treasurer - Herman * Herman * Hadiman #Manager Suwarno * Suwarno * -
Supervisory
Body Pratomo ** Pratomo ** Pratomo ** Pratomo **
Manan +
Alimin *
1982-1984 1984 -
Chairman Suwarno * Sawito *
First Chairman H. Misan * Suwaxno *
Second Chairman Fadjri * - NOTES:
First Secretary Sukardi ** Sukardi **
Second Secretary - Musrofi * * = Golkax
Third Secretary - Purnomo * # = PPP
Treasurer Hard! # - + = PDI
Manager - - ** = PEPABRI
Supervisory
Body Pratomo ** Pratomo **
Manan + Sudito *
Alimin *
Source: KUD Ngebruk of Sumberpucung.
including continuous increases in profits from 1973 to 1982.^ The KUD has also been 
able to develop eight kinds of activities, called unit usaha. These included the food 
stock operations, sugar (TRI), shops, a rice mill, Kredit Candak Kulak, transportation, 
distribution of production input, and cattle breeding. The activities of the TRI and food
^In 1982, for example, the KUD was able to make a profit of around Rp 16 million. This was 
the highest profit it made between 1973 and 1983. KUD Sumberpucung II, ”Laporan Pertanggung 
Jawaban Pengurus Koperasi Unit Desa Sumberpucung II, Tahun Kerja 1982 Pada Rapat 
Anggota Tahunan”, Unpublished Report, February 10, 1983, and also from notes on the KUD 
profits given by the KUD staff.
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stock units have been the major sources of profit.4
On the other hand, the domination of the KUD by the local elite has resulted in 
most farmers being unable to participate in the organization or to enjoy its benefits. 
Moreover, their domination has also involved the use of the cooperative by these elite 
members for their own interests and enrichment, rather than for the ordinary farmers. 
The interests of the local elite in the KUD were revealed in the fact that they involved 
themselves in business contracts with the cooperative. These activities, although not 
prohibited by law or by the cooperative’s regulations, certainly provided profits for only 
some members of the KUD board.
The disruptions within the KUD have arisen not merely from the elite villagers 
dominating the body in order to enrich themselves, but also from those who have power 
in the kecamatan. The KUD, for example, has also had to put aside some of its funds 
(like many other KUDs) for various contributions to the needs of kecamatan officials. In 
the TRI program, the cooperative had to provide a contribution to the kecamatan office 
at the rate of one rupiah per quintal of sugar. In 1982 when production of sugar was 
214,256 quintals, this meant a contribution of over Rp 200,000 to the kecamatan.'*®
In addition, there were contributions for village headmen and the heads of the 
sugar farmers’ groups. These contributions were at the rate of two rupiahs and seven 
rupiahs per quintal respectively. In its INSUS activities, the KUD had to provide a 
rupiah donation to the Satpel Bimas Kecamatan. In 1982, for example, that donation 
was Rp 287 thousand.43 44 * 6 Apart from that, as in other KUDs, the KUD also had to make 
a donation for UDKP and social activities. These involve, for example, farewell parties 
for the Camat or commanders of the military and police, donations for the establishment 
of a new office for a village headman, for elections, and for the anniversary celebrations 
of the military and police.
The internal conflict in the KUD that led to the fall of H. Misan and his group 
dominating the cooperative arose out of a problem in the sugar intensification program
43In 1982, for example, the activities in food stock produced a profit of around Rp 24 million 
gross while the sugar provided Rp 30 million gross profit. KUD Sumberpucung II, 1982, op.cit.
44In food stock activities, for example, several of the KUD board were included. Haji Fuzan 
and Subari two staff of the KUD, have made a contract to send rice to Dolog as well as one 
Chinese rice trader in Sumberpucung, Kang Sioe. In 1982, Fuzan and Subari sent 19 tons and 30 
tons of rice to Dolog in Malang respectively, while Kang Sioe had sent 610 tons in the same 
year.KUD Sumberpucung II, 1982, Hid., lampiran 10. H. Misan himself has rented his 
warehouses to the KUD, and also used his rice mill to process rice for the cooperative. In addition, 
Suwarno also rented his warehouses to store rice for the KUD. KUD Sumberpucung II, 1982, 
Ibid., lampiran 13.
4®KUD Sumberpucung II, 1982, Ibid., Lampiran 20.
46KUD Sumberpucung II., Ibid., lampiran 20 and 23.
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(TRI). The conflict began when H. Misan, as First Chairman of the KUD, cancelled a 
decision by Fadjri in August 1983, to discharge Arso as a staff member of the KUD. 
Arso himself was a staff member of the Cooperative Office in Malang who was seconded 
to the KUD as a CPNS where his job was to handle all TRI matters. The discharge was 
signed by Fadjri (the Second Chairman of the KUD) in the name of Suwarno, who could 
not be actively involved in the KUD, since he spent most of his time in Surabaya where 
he was a Chairman of the PUSKUD.
In the middle of 1983, Alimin, a member of the KUD’s Supervisory Body 
conducted a check on the management of the cooperative. He found that some Rp 130 
million had been misused. This represented funds of the TRI section headed by Arso. 
Alimin became suspicious when he found that the number of farmers who had joined the 
TRI program did not match the amount of money that had been distributed by the BRI 
Unit Desa to the KUD for TRI farmers.
This practice of claiming funds for more than the area really planted has become 
known as the use of ” Areal Fiktif”. The misuse of the fund was reported by Alimin 
to Fadjri, who then took action to discharge Arso. The action of Alimin was not 
endorsed by Pratomo, chairman of the Supervisory Body, and this disagreement soon 
divided the board into two groups: the Misan and the Fadjri groups.
The conflict between Fadjri and Misan was actually a mixture of a personal 
conflict and a political problem. For some years, Fadjri had been in disagreement with 
Misan on the matter of how to manage the TRI program. Fadjri suspected that there 
was a deal between Misan and some staff members of the KUD, particularly those who 
ran the TRI section, to use the funds of the program improperly, but he had no proof of 
that. Various meetings had been called by Fadjri to remind staff members of the KUD 
to manage the program carefully, since it was considered an important government 
program and because many cases of mismanagement in the implementation of the TRI 
program had been found in other KUDs.
Fadjri worried that such mismanagement would also occur in the KUD and would 
lead to a decrease in the good performance of the cooperative. Hence, when Alimin 
reported his findings, Fadjri took what he described as harsh measures against the 
corruptors to give them a lesson. Thus, in addition to Arso, whom he had already 
discharged, he ordered four other staff, who had also been involved in the affair 
(Asnowo, Haji Fuzan, Suri and Sardi), to repay the funds they had used in the six 
month period or they would be reported to the police.1*®
^This practice often found also in the Bimas programs for rice as the Bimas Fiktif. 
Interview, Fadjri, July 16, 1984.
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H. Misan, however, felt that the action of Fadjri was too tough, particularly as it 
was made without consultation with him (although Fadjri stated that some discussions 
with Misan had occurred prior to the ”punishment”).^® I myself was given the 
impression in the course of discussions with other people in the kecamatan, that the 
counter-action of Misan in cancelling the decision by Fadjri was taken in order to 
protect Asnowo and Haji Fuzan, who were family relatives of his in Sumberpucung.
The cancellation, moreover, also aroused suspicions that Misan and the others in 
his group, including Pratomo, were involved in these corrupt transactions. Although the 
amount of money misused by Misan and Pratomo was not exactly known, from a report 
at the annual meeting (RAT) in 1983, it was stated that Arso had used Rp 36 million, 
Haji Fuzan Rp 31 million, Asnowo Rp 41 million, while two other staff members (Sardi 
and Suri) had used Rp 4 million and Rp 6 milion respectively.^
The affair was then published in the local Malang newspaper, SUARA 
INDONESIA, which had interviewed Alimin. When the scandal became publicly known, 
the PEPABRI conducted a manoeuvre to change the board of the KUD, especially to 
topple Fadjri from his position. This was done by making proposals to the Camat and 
also to the Bupati in Malang that the KUD board be replaced. The organization also 
spread a rumour that Fadjri was a member or supporter of the PSI (Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Socialist Party which was banned by Sukarno in the early 
1960s), this being an effective way of arousing suspicions against him in some circles, 
including Golkar.^
According to some informants in Sumberpucung and Kepanjen, the PEPABRI had 
for a long time wished to place its men in the KUD, but it had always been blocked by 
Fadjri. The appointment of Sukardi, Chairman of PEPABRI of Sumberpucung, as First 
Secretary in 1982 was successful through the lobbying of Suwarno, after Fadjri had 
previously refused to agree to it. Fadjri himself explained that he personally had no 
objection to any members of the PEPABRI participating in the KUD, provided they had 
the capacities necessary to run the cooperative. His refusal, according to Fadjri, was 
based on the fact that most of the men proposed by PEPABRI as staff of the KUD did 
not, in fact, have the necessary qualifications. Hence he suspected that PEPABRI just 
wanted to dominate the KUD.
The effort of the PEPABRI to change the board of the KUD and to place its 
nominee on the KUD board was successful. The Bupati of Malang ordered the Pembantu
^Interview, H. Misan, July 14, 1984.
®®KUD Sumberpucung II, 1983, op.cit., p.lO-b.
** 1 When I was in Kepanjen I also heard such a rumour from Darnowo, a former member of the 
Supervisory Body of KUD Kepanjen and a member of PEPABRI in Kepanjen.
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Bupati in Kepanjen, Sanoto, to take over the management of the KUD. This official 
then established a new board, under his own chairmanship, in order to resolve the 
problem and settle the internal conflict within the cooperative. The majority of the new 
board consisted of local government leaders of Sumberpucung.®^
^hat is interesting here is that no action was taken there by the village unit bank 
or by the extension workers of Dinas Perkebunan (PPL Disbun, extension workers of the 
Plantation Office) to prevent such corruption. They must have known about the 
mismanagement because they would have had to conduct a check on the areas registered 
on the registration forms and put their signatures on them before the credit was 
distributed to farmers. Therefore, there was also a suspicion in the kecamatan that the 
Mantri BRI (chairman of the village bank) and the PPL Disbun were also involved in 
the scandal. This was strongly supported by the fact that the problem became known 
only after the report of Alimin to Fadjri, while at the same time a new Mantri BRI 
refused to become involved in the mismanagement.®**
This episode and the story of the KUD’s earlier development has several 
interesting features. First, it is significant that the Camat rarely or never made any 
check on the management of the KUD, although he is officially designated as a pembina 
(supervisor) of the cooperative and responsible for its development. In addition, he 
intervened in the case only when it was publicised in the newspaper. Either he had 
received no prior information about TRI mismanagement or he knew of it but took no 
action, until it became unavoidable. This is an illustration of the lack of determination 
on the part of the Camat in supervising the program. In the implementation of the 
program, continuity of supervision and serious commitment in undertaking it are crucial 
for success.
Many examples show that the failure of programs is not caused merely by 
weaknesses in the planning and monitoring systems but also by a lack of serious and 
continuous supervision. There may be a good plan and system of monitoring (for 
example, reports on the program development may be conducted periodically), but a 
weakness is sometimes found in the lack of commitment in the supervision. Insufficient 
attention towards reports, for example, can be interpreted as lack of serious supervision 
by those who are responsible for it. This will produce failure in the programs or serious 
obstacles for them. In the case of the KUD, the lack of serious supervision by the Camat 
can be regarded as contributing to the occurrence of the mismanagement.
^Musrofi was Camat of Sumberpucung, Purnomo was the Mantri Polisi of Sumberpucung, 
Sudito, village headman of Desa Senggreng. All the village headmen in Sumberpucung have been 
appointed as assistants of the KUD board (See Table 7-4 on page 187).
®Prior to the finding of the mismanagement, there was a transfer of personnel in the BRI Unit 
Desa of Sumberpucung.
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Secondly, it is also clear from this case that the farmers generally had no voice 
with regard to the problems that arose in the cooperative, although it is often declared 
that the KUD is a farmers’ organization. Thus, it is a fact that farmers have generally 
stood outside the cooperatives and have allowed the problems to be solved by the 
management of the KUD itself without feeling any need to intervene.
Thirdly, it can happen that someone who has given good service to his 
organization will get no reward but even suffer because his work does not conform with 
the will of the local authorities. Alimin, Fadjri, and the new Mantri BRI are all 
examples in this case. Alimin was discharged as a member of the Supervisory Body of 
the KUD on the charge that he made a serious error in giving an interview to the local 
newspaper so that the affair became known to the public in Malang and throughout East 
Java. (It was said to have brought shame to the kecamatan.) He was called to the 
kecamatan office and reprimanded by the Camat, and then forced to withdraw from his 
position in the KUD.*^ Fadjri, apart from being discharged as the Second Chairman of 
the KUD, was also removed from his job as Chairman of the BKO by the Bupati. 
Although no action was taken against the new Mantri BRI, whose action in the matter 
had contributed to the revelation of the corruption, he did not receive any reward for his 
service in helping Fadjri expose the scandal.
On the other hand, this was a case where none of the guilty persons except Misan, 
who had been ousted from the KUD, were punished. No action whatever was taken 
against Arso himself; he was allowed to return to his office in the Cooperative Office in 
Malang without any effort to charge him in court or to discharge him as an employee of 
the office.
The KUD of Pakisaji
Although the KUD of Pakisaji is also dominated by members of the kecamatan 
elite, here we have a story of domination by its manager and not its chairman. The 
domination resulted here in group conflict between Golkar and PDI. As in the case of 
the KUD of Kepanjen, where the KUD was dominated by non-farmers, the KUD of 
Pakisaji is also dominated by government civil servants and retired army members.
From its establishment in 1973 until 1981, the KUD was dominated by its 
manager, Wardjono (from PDI).*’*’ His experience as former chairman of the KOPERTA 
gave him sufficient experience to run the KUD. Also, his position as a member of DPD
Interviews, the Camat of Sumberpucung, August 6, 1984; and Alimin, July 31, 1984.
*’*’Sartomo was a village headman; Tamrin as a staff member of Bank Pasar; Sudjono was 
Village Headman of Desa Karangpandan; Nirman was a trader; Sardi was a pensioner of 
Information Office; Marno was a teacher; Ruskandi was a retired Camat; and Sapto were was a 
retired Army member.
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(Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, Local Leadership Council) of PNI Malang enabled him to 
establish good relationships with the Camats of Pakisaji. ® The strong domination by 
Wardjono in that period, however, resulted in a lack of checking of the management of 
the KUD. Various financial scandals were reportedly perpetrated by Wardjono and 
some of his colleagues in the KUD.
Table 7-5: Boards of KUD Pakisaji, 1973 - 1984
1973-1975 1975-1977 1977-1981 1981-1984
First Chairman Rasyid ** Sartomo # Sukarman # Hadri **Second Chairman Tamrin + Sudjono ** - Sukarman #First Secretary Sudjono ** Nirman # Marno + Marno +
Second Secretary - Marno + Sard! + -
Treasurer Nirman # Tamrin + Ruskandi + Muryono #
Manager Wardjono + Wardjono + Wardjono + Haris M. *
Supervisory
Body
Sulandra ** 
Sudjono ** 
Sapto **
NOTES: Source: KUD of Pakisaji.
* = Golkar
** = PEPABRI
# = PPP
+ = PDI
Rasy id and the chairmen of the KUD after him, had no capacity to prevent the 
defalcations carried out during Wardjono’s managership and they might also have been 
involved in them.**® At the end of 1981, some KUD members, particularly those from 
PEPABRI, took the initiative to report their suspicions to the Bupati, since the Camat 
and the Cooperative Offices had failed to take the necessary action to tackle the
Wardjono was an ex-soldier during the struggle for Indonesian independence in 1945. After 
he retired from the army he established a coffee factory in Malang and became director of the 
factory.
^In 1980, for example, he was suspected of using money from TRI transactions for himself. 
The suspicion occurred when Wardjono made a report that money received from sending sugar to 
PG Kebon Agung was only Rp 350,000 while in the estimation of some KUD members the money 
should have been around Rp 17 million. It was also found in the bookkeeping of the KUD that 
there was no registration of money taken from farmers as their savings, simpanan pokok. In 
1981, 1300 farmers had established Rp 1000 per person in savings and this meant that around Rp 
1.3 million had been manipulated by Wardjono.
Interview, Sulandra, former Chairman of Supervisory Body of the KUD and now Chairman 
of the KUD, September 22, 1983.
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problems. The Bupati ordered the Camat to call the annual meeting of KUD members. 
He then persuaded the meeting to take the decision to discharge Wardjono. The meeting 
was held under tight control by army and police officials and was also attended by 
DPRD II members of the PDI and PPP factions.®®
The effort to discharge Wardjono was successfully carried out and Hadri, a 
civilian, but also chairman of an army cooperative organization, PRIMKOPAD (Primer 
Koperasi Angkatan Darat), was appointed the new Chairman of the KUD. The 
nomination of Hadri was actually not accepted by most members of KUD, but strong 
support from the PEPABRI and Golkar, through the Bupati and the Camat, resulted in 
his appointment. This marked the beginning of military intervention in the KUD. 
Wardjono himself was later replaced by Drs. Haris, a graduate of Universitas 
Brawijaya, Malang, and subsequently a lecturer in economics at Universitas Merdeka, 
also in Malang.
However, an internal conflict between Hadri and two members of the Supervisory 
Body of the KUD (Sudjono and Sapto) (see Table 7-5 on page 193 resulted in the refusal 
of these two men to involve themselves actively in the KUD. At the beginning of 
1983, Sudjono and Sapto retired from their positions on the Supervisory Body leaving 
only Sulandra, a retired captain of the army, who was then elected as the new chairman 
of the KUD in March 1984.^ The appointment of Sulandra then gave rise to a rumour 
that the KUD of Pakisaji had just conducted a formal election by electing someone from 
the internal circle of the KUD, or in their words: ” memilih orang yang itu-itu juga
The domination by members of the local elite in this KUD has not always 
produced negative effects; much has depended on the abilities of those who have 
managed the cooperative. The ability of the KUD staff in running the cooperative can be 
seen, for example, in their capacity to manage food stock credits (Kredit Pengadaan 
Pangan) which is entrusted to KUDs able to participate in food stock activities.
^Interviews with Sulandra, September 22, 1983; and Radi, staff member of the KUD, 
September 15, 1983.
^Interviews with Subandi Wardi (teacher), Khusin (Information Officer at the Kecamatan, 
and Hasim Tohari (farmer) on 10 and 12 September 1983.
According to them, there was no official appointment of them as members of the Supervisory 
Body because they have no official letter of appointment (Surat Pengangkatan). They were only 
informed informally that they were appointed as members of the Body. Beside that, they knew 
that KUD had been run down by mismanagement and they felt they had the power to stop it. 
Interviews, November 1 and 7, 1983.
®^Sulandra retired from the army in 1976, and then become a farmer in Pakisaji. He has 1.8 
hectares of land, most of it planted with padi. Sulandra was elected as a Kontak Tani Teladan 
(Model of Contact Farmer) in Malang Kabupaten and had been appointed as representative of 
Kabupaten Malang in Mimbar Sarasehan Kontak Tani Nasional (National Conference of 
Contact Farmers) in Lampung, 1982, and in Banjarmasin, 1983.
Interview, Alimin, a teacher of Sumberpucung, July 31, 1984.
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Although there had been some decrease in the credit distributed between 1977/1978 (Rp 
15 million) and 1976/1977 (Rp 12.5 million), followed by stagnation from 1978/1979 to 
1981/1982 (Rp 10 million respectively),64 there was no occasion on which the 
Cooperative Office had stopped or cancelled the distribution of credit, as occurred in 
other KUDs.65 In addition to the food stock activity, KUD Pakisaji has also carried out 
various activities such as the TRI, a rice-mill unit, chicken breeding, simpan pinjam 
and candak kulak credits and Transportation. Some of these activities have brought 
financial benefits to the KUD.66
Obtaining the financial benefits and distributing them to KUD members are two 
quite different propositions. Apparently many farmers in Pakisaji who have registered as 
members of the KUD know nothing about these benefits and have never received any 
distribution of them. Most of them, as in other KUDs, have never been invited to attend 
the annual meeting, except for a small number selected by the KUD’s board. As Pak 
Sulandra said:6'
Although farmers are registered as members, they do not feel like members, 
because anyone who obtains (Bimas) fertilizer is automatically a member of the 
KUD. They are never invited to the annual meeting.
Moreover, other benefits to the cooperative have also not been felt yet by the 
farmers, apart from those who live near the KUD office or in the same village as the 
staff of the KUD. In the food stock activities, for example, the KUD has bought most of 
its padi from rice traders and not from farmers directly. Hence, as explained by one 
village headman: ”The KUD is not the property of farmers, but farmers are the property
4Data from Cooperative Office of Kabupaten Malang.
65The decrease and the stagnation indicate that there was no improvement in the capacity to 
handle food stock activities.Interview, the Head of Binagram Section of the Cooperative Office of 
Malang Kabupaten, August 10,1983.
66Activity in the TRI has now became a priority in this KUD because it provides many 
financial benefits. As an example, the benefit to the KUD from the TRI in 1982 was Rp 41.7 
million and it had increased in 1983 to Rp 44.6 million. In the same period, benefits to the KUD 
from food stock activities were Rp 4.5 million in 1982 and Rp 1.4 million in 1983. The KUD has 
been involved in transportation of sugar from sawah to sugar factory, which has provided some 
increases in benefits to the KUD, from Rp 2000 in 1982 to Rp 2.0 million in 1983. The KUD has 
one rice-mill with a capacity of 8 tons per day; two machines of pemisah kulit padi with a 
capacity of 1.5 tons a day and two dryers with a capacity of 5 quintals a day. However, the 
benefits from these activities had decreased from 4.0 million in 1982 to Rp 1.4 million in 1983. 
Chicken breeding did not produce any benefit because there were only 10 breeders who were 
actively involved in the KUD and they are all small breeders with a maximum of 1000 chickens. 
The activity of the KCK has indicated a sharp improvement in which government credit of as 
much as Rp 1.0 million in 1982 had been increased to be Rp 7.0 million in 1983. Quoted from 
"Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Pengurus KUD Pakisaji Tahun Buku 1982 & Tahun Buku 
1983,” Unpublished Report, pp. 13, 16-17; and from interviews with staff of the KUD of each 
section, July 9-15, 1984.
6^Interview, July 29, 1984.
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of the KUD".68
Farmers also complain about the delay in fertilizer distribution. But beside the 
kinds of problems noted in the section on KUD Tumpang, there was also another form of 
mismanagement here that affected the delay of distribution in Pakisaji. According to a 
PPL in Pakisaji, some farmers came to his house in 1982 asking for fertilizer. Together 
with the Camat they checked the fertilizer stock in the KUD warehouse and found that 
the warehouse was empty. They then went to PPK office in Malang and were given the 
information that the PPK had sent 18 tons of fertilizers to KUD Pakisaji several weeks 
before.
Hence, the PPL and the Camat concluded that the KUD had sold the fertilizers on 
the free market. The Camat himself failed to take any action to remedy this 
manipulation, however, because he had a Rp 600 thousand debt to the KUD which had 
still not been paid, even when he later returned from the kecamatan to the Kabupaten 
Office. Fortunately, the PPK was prepared to send more fertilizers to Pakisaji. The PPK 
itself, according to some kabupaten staff, still owes Rp 3 million to the PUSKUD in 
Surabaya in 1984, due to its inability to send money for fertilizer distributed to the 
KUDs in 1981/1982. Hence, PUSKUD has sometimes simply cancelled further 
distribution of fertilizer, which has in turn affected the timing of their distribution to 
farmers.
To sum up, from the stories of these five KUDs, several conclusions can be drawn 
here. First, farmers in fact have no role at all in the KUDs, and the cooperatives have 
been dominated in each case by a handful of elite members of the kecamatan from 
various groups who have then been vying with each other to dominate the management 
of the KUDs. Hence, most farmers have not had access to the KUDs and they have not 
obtained much benefit, if any, from their existence.
Second, due to this elite domination, all of the KUDs have failed to execute a 
system of open management and this has resulted in financial scandals regarding board 
members.
Third, the annual meeting, which is intended to be an arena for farmers’ 
participation, is in fact conducted merely as a formality, because those who are invited 
are selected farmers only. Apart from that, some KUD boards have intentionally not 
arranged an annual meeting at all, since it is widely believed that, even without such a 
meeting, the boards will be permitted by the authorities to run the KUD.
Fourth, most members of the Supervisory Body have no capacity to supervise the
68 Interview, July 29,1984.
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KUDs’ management, which then aggravates the financial corruption within the KUDs. 
This is caused by lack of knowledge about cooperative management among members of 
the Supervisory Body, and by personal and informal relationship between them and the 
other members of the KUD board.
Fifth, the cooperation of the KUDs with rice traders in food stock activities gives 
an indication that the cooperative is set up primarily to serve the interests of 
government in building up the national stock of rice, but tends to ignore the interests of 
farmers.
Finally, the Camats and officials of the cooperative office have in fact not given 
serious attention to the development of the cooperatives as institutions to advance the 
common interests of all of farmers; in fact, they have often been involved in 
mismanagement of the KUDs. There is also the fact that development of KUDs in the 
non-rice producing area has in general been ignored by the government, although Golkar 
seemed to be making an effort to dominate those KUDs.
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion
In Chapter One, various general questions were posed which have relevance to our 
investigation of rice policy implementation in Indonesia, such as the means by which the 
government’s overall policies have been translated into effective action at the local level, 
the ways in which officials at various levels have functioned in relation to these programs, 
the obstacles to their implementation, the responses of the farmers concerned, and so on. 
It is hoped that the last three chapters have thrown some light on these questions in 
varying degrees; but it is worth emphasizing in conclusion several factors which are 
particularly important in Indonesia’s circumstances.
The character of the regime and the pattern of power distribution between the 
national and regional levels seem to be especially influential elements in any explanation 
of the workings of the administrative system here. Other studies of policy 
implementation in the Third World have already emphasized this point, as mentioned in 
Chapter One, and it seems to me to be one of the most important general conclusions to 
be drawn from this study. Solutions to the problem of how to improve public policy 
implementation in Indonesia are not likely to be found through purely ”administrative” 
reforms; i.e. the problems are not capable of being resolved simply by the application of 
better principles of public administration and public policy formulation or 
implementation. They must be sought in relation to the working of the broader political 
system itself, and especially in the distribution of effective power between the central and 
local authorities.
The Suharto government has been able to accumulate far greater power in its hands 
than any previous Indonesian government. On the other hand, it has not yet been very 
successful in translating its enhanced political authority into more effective 
administrative capability; there are many things it just has not been able to accomplish. 
The regime has been able to weaken the opposition parties, the local representative 
bodies, and the press. More importantly, it has also been able to make local government 
bodies highly dependent on the centre, politically, administratively and financially. The 
central government was successful in pushing through the 1974 law on local government 
which enabled it to carry out direct supervision and tight control over most regional
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government activities. This was also made possible in part by the power of the central 
government to appoint regional heads from compliant members of the pamong praja 
corps and military officers, in most cases, without much regard for the preferences of the 
DPRD.
Various other stipulations were also introduced that ensured the subordination of 
low-level local officials to higher-level central government officials. Moreover, the budgets 
of the regional government have also been kept heavily dependent on subsidies from the 
centre. And in the political sphere, the central government has introduced various 
regulations prohibiting local officials from becoming members of political parties, while at 
the same time requiring them to support the government-backed party, Golkar. Yet this 
does not mean that the central government had the capacity to exert direct and effective 
control over all the activities of the pamong praja and other local officials. It is true that 
the government’s success in increasing rice production has been due mainly to its much 
greater ability since 1970 to require local government officials to execute the instructions 
of the central government in such matters, including the use of both persuasion (perintah 
halus) and blatant coercion upon the peasants to induce them to accept the new HYV 
technology in rice cultivation. However, the failure to achieve various other policy 
objectives (e.g. the promotion of cooperatives, the strengthening of small farmers as well 
as rich ones) and the weaknesses in administration of the program at the local level are 
due in part to the sheer inability of the higher-level central government officials to 
exercise effective supervision over the actions of their subordinates or to ensure that their 
actions conform fully with the government’s intentions.
In implementing its rice policy the government has, it seems, primarily given 
attention to the over-riding objective of increasing rice production. This was of 
paramount importance in order to reduce the inflationary pressures of the 1960s, to 
eliminate the need for costly imports of rice and to ensure that ample rice was available 
at moderate prices for the urban communities whose political loyalty to the New Order 
regime was critical in its early years, especially the armed forces, the civil servants and 
various other important groups of urban dwellers, such as students and the technocrats. 
So it has been essential for the government to meet the expectations of these groups for 
reasonable rice prices; hence the need for adequate stocks of rice to meet unexpected 
shortages or sudden price rises, which in the past have given rise to speculation, hoarding 
and attempts to corner the market.
This situation has created a tendency for the central government to give only 
secondary consideration to the views of the farmers themselves, and to disregard some of 
the other administrative problems that have arisen in the course of implementation of 
various rice policy programs, so long as the production targets can be achieved. The local
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officials themselves, because their careers are dependent upon their superiors tend also to 
be unresponsive to the interests or expressed views of the farmers themselves. Yet as we 
have seen in Chapter One, the responsiveness of local implemented of government policies 
to their target constituencies is normally considered one of the most important factors 
underlying the success of any policy’s implementation.
The importance of this factor, responsiveness to the target groups in the 
implementation of public policies, has been stressed by various writers on public policy 
implementation in the Third World. For example, in explaining the failure of the 
military regime in Brazil to open up resettlement opportunities for squatters, Perlman 
argues that its resettlement schemes failed because the government disregarded the needs 
of the squatter inhabitants and their living conditions.* Likewise, a study of public 
housing policy in Kenya by Frederick and Nelle Temple condemns it because most of the 
benefits of that policy were enjoyed by the middle- and high-income groups, although the 
policy was ostensibly aimed at helping the poor to rent or buy the houses.2 In Mexico the 
failure of a rural development program was due in part to ignorance on the part of local 
officials regarding the demands of low-status groups, because these officials simply gave 
attention to the central government’s orders, which put priority on stability and the 
maintenance of political support from important sectors of the society, rather than on the 
aspirations of the low-status groups.** Similarly, we can say that many of the problems of 
public policy implementation (in various fields) have been due to the inclination of low- 
level officials to be more concerned with making a good impression upon their superiors 
and never appearing to contradict or oppose them (the ABS phenomenon) than with 
standing up for the interests of their target group in the community. In Indonesia, 
because the fate of the local officials lies in the hands of central government, there is a 
tendency for them to report simply whatever will keep their superiors happy, even to 
conceal the truth if it is likely to create difficulties or discontent with or for their 
superiors. Hence, the many ”Laporan ABS”, which say only what the superior officers 
want to hear and serve the primary object of enhancing the careers of the local officials by 
making it seem that all is well at the local level. Reports of this kind have resulted, 
among other things, in the serious unreliability of information about the Bimas and KUD 
programs available at the higher levels of the administrative hierarchy.
* Janice Perlman, ” The Failure of Influence: Squatter Eradication in Brazil , in M.S. Grindle 
(ed), op.cit.
2Frederick T. Temple and Nelle T. Temple, ”The Politics of Public Housing in Nairobi”, in M.S. 
Grindle (ed), Ibid., pp.224-249.
**M.S. Grindle, ”The Implementor: Political Constraints on Rural Development in Mexico , in 
M.S. Grindle (ed), Ibid., pp.197-223.
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In addition to the shortcomings created by the local officials’ lack of responsiveness 
to the "target groups” to which various public policies are meant to be directed, another 
problem which deserves attention is their sheer lack of accountability. This is an 
important element in effective public policy implementation, but it has rarely been given 
sufficient attention in discussions of policy implementation in Indonesia, where it is 
simply assumed that subordinate officials are accountable to their superiors and 
effectively supervised by them. As was mentioned in Chapter One, such accountability 
could be required either in the form of regular reports to superior officers, or through 
accountability to a local representative body. However, in the former case, what matters 
most is the quality and reliability of any such reports, since they will be used by higher- 
level government planners to evaluate the impact of their policies. Thus, the real 
situation brought about by the implementation process ought to be presented in all such 
reports in order to enable top-level decision-makers to make accurate assessments of what 
is happening at the grass-roots level. But here again the ABS mentality has had adverse 
consequences for effective policy implementation in Indonesia.
Another factor that has contributed to the unreliability of the information reported 
upwards by subordinate officials has been the lack of serious supervision by the superior 
officers responsible for the implementation of Bimas and KUD programs. However, an 
even worse result from their lack of commitment to that task has been the sheer inability 
of the government to reduce the corruption that has been widely associated with the 
Bimas and KUD programs. This corruption has not only adversely affected the 
performance (and the moral authority) of the lower-level officials, but has also reduced 
the willingness of the farmers to join the programs.
This lack of commitment to any effective, vigorous supervision over such programs 
derives, inter alia, from the inability of higher government officials to exercise any 
effective control over the actions of local officials who manipulate the government’s 
policies and financial resources or their own personal ambitions and benefits. It also 
derives in part from the fact that administratively there have been too many development 
programs for local officials to implement simultaneously; and this kept them so busy they 
have failed to concentrate effectively on any particular program. Apart from that, 
amongst all these various programs they are responsible for implementing, there have 
been some, such as INPRES programs, which have given greater incentives to the local 
officials than have the rice policy programs, so that they have been more attractive to 
them and more thoroughly executed. Moreover, because the rice policy programs have 
now been carried out for many years, many of the officials have lost interest in them and 
treat them in a rather formalistic, routine fashion.
The considerable formal power of the central government over its subordinate
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authorities does not in itself guarantee that the tasks of coordinating the implementation 
of verious government policies will necessarily be carried out easily or well. One of the 
factors behind the failure to coordinate the various agencies and offices involved in the 
program implementation is the considerable fragmentation of tasks. As Edwards has 
pointed out: Fragmentation implies diffusion of responsibility, and this makes
coordination of policies difficult.”^ In the implementation of the various rice policy 
programs, numerous agencies have been involved. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the 
central government has made the Bupati and the Camat the ”solc administrators” within 
their regions, they still have great difficulty in coordinating the various agencies and 
offices involved in the Bimas and KUD programs, especially the vertical offices of the 
central government (instansi) at the regional level. This provides further evidence that 
the authority of the regional heads cannot be assumed to have been exercised merely on 
the basis of the formal decisions made by the central government.
The local government authorities, as we have already seen, are the key instruments 
in the implementation of rice policy. Policy analysts are generally agreed, as mentioned 
on Chapter One, that a bureaucracy must have well qualified personnel who are able to 
work efficiently; but at the local level in Indonesia this has not always been the case. 
Nakamura and Smallwood mention that the competence of the bureaucracy is an 
important factor underlying the success of policy implementation. However, as many 
policy analysts have recognized, bureacracies in developing countries frequently lack 
qualified and efficient personnel.
In Indonesia, the government has made various efforts to increase the number of 
well-qualified personnel in the local government offices involved in the Bimas and KUD 
programs, and has carried out various training courses to increase their skills. However, 
thse efforts have still not been sufficient to cope with the demand for an adequate number 
of personnel and a more efficient local bureaucracy. Also, on the matter of resources, it 
seems that the central government has not given much attention to this in the 
implementation of rice policy. We can see from the way rice policy programs were 
implemented that the enthusiasm of officials to carry out those policies declined after the 
government abolished the Bimas program incentive payments in 1980. Furthermore, 
many extension workers have in fact not carried out their tasks effectively because they 
have lacked facilities such as housing in the rural areas or transportation.
We have seen that adminstrative obstacles such as red tape and corruption have 
constituted serious limitations upon the government’s efforts to overcome the problems
^G.C. Edwards III, 1980, op.cit., p.137. 
^Nakamura and Smallwood, op.cit., p.56.
211
adversely affecting the implementation of the Bimas and KUD programs. The 
government itself always gives as one of the reasons the excuse that its efforts to solve 
these problems have been hampered by lack of funds. This excuse must be questioned, 
since Indonesia has had abundant government revenues during the oil boom period, 
particularly since 1974. The excuse is commonly given simply to shift attention away 
from the fact that the government has not given any real priority to efforts to make the 
bureaucracy more efficient at the local level.
Finally, the implementation of Bimas and KUD programs has also suffered from the 
government’s disregard for adequate rewards, incentives and sanctions for its local policy 
implementers. These two matters are also critical to effective implementation of 
government programs. Adequate incentives for local officials are important to maintain 
their enthusiasm in implementing the pgorams. However, many local officials involved in 
the Bimas and KUD programs have been hampered in obtaining promotion by 
bureaucratic red-tape. On the other hand, the sanctions against those who break the rules 
and become involved in corruption have in fact very rarely (or never) been carried out 
firmly. This has given many oficials the opportunity to become involved in corrupt 
practices; and many cases of such corrupt practices that can be seen in the 
implementation of rice policy programs, especially in the KUD program, seem to have 
been tolerated by the government, without any serious attempts being made to remedy or 
prevent them.
It is obvious that all the problems observed in the process of the implementation of 
rice policy have been caused, on the one hand, by the excessive amount of power wielded 
by the central government vis-a-vis the local communities. Yet despite their great power, 
the government officials have not been able to handle all of those problems. On the other 
hand, the centralized system of rice policy implementation has also caused the policy to 
suffer from a lack of popular participation, especially in the case of the KUD program. 
Various suggestions might be put forward about how to overcome the administrative and 
technical problems within these programs; but from both an administrative and a 
political point of view, attention needs to be concentrated above all on the problem of 
how to increase the farmers’ participation in the programs, and their capacity to exercise 
a greater degree of supervision over it.
Greater participation by the farmers in the implementation of those programs is 
particularly needed, not only to overcome the lack of adequate supervision from above 
over the program implementation, but also to achieve the growth- with-equity objective 
of the government, which has often seemed to be ignored in the implementation of rice
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policy. As Cheema and Rondinelli point out:®
Greater equity in the distribution of income and wealth ... required wider 
participation in the economic, social, and political processes through which 
wealth was generated and distributed.
If it is to increase the farmers participation, there will have to be some willingness 
on the government s part to reduce its own interventions in the program implementation 
process. The farmers, for example, should be given greater freedom to choose the rice 
varieties and even the commodities they want to plant. However, government 
intervention is still needed in order to maintain the rice price at levels that are suitable to 
induce farmers to continue to plant padi. Government intervention in the KUD programs 
also needs to be minimized. At present, as mentioned in the previous chapters, there is a 
widespread popular impression that the KUDS are just government agencies (Jawatan 
Pemerintah) and not real cooperatives. This is because most of the KUD activities 
simply revolve around the government’s programs. Hence, the impression has already 
become widespread among farmers that the KUD is simply an organization introduced 
and sponsored by the government. This impression needs to be modified or abolished.
In this respect, the government should give the farmers greater opportunities to set 
up and manage the KUDs by themselves. If they are reluctant to do so, the government 
could play a part in providing information to them about what a KUD is and does, or 
what benefits would be obtained if they joined one. The role of the government is then 
simply to improve the managerial skills of KUD managers and boards, not to harness 
them as agents in the rice purchase or credit distribution policies.
As this study has revealed, one of the weaknesses found in the implementation of 
the KUD program (also in the Bimas credit program) has been the inadequacy of 
supervision of the program. Effective supervision has not been carried out by the 
Supervisory Bodies (Badan Pengawas) of the KUD boards as constituted at present, and 
also not by the Camats, since they have had neither a direct interest in the cooperatives 
nor the time to devote to them.
Effective supervision should best be carried out by members of the KUD itself; but 
for that purpose they would have to be real members, not just "formal” members as in 
the present situation. These "formal” members have emerged because local officials have 
needed to achieve the membership targets set by the central government. If the KUDs 
were to be reestablished at the initiative of the farmers themselves, they could feel that 
the organization is owned by themselves, and then their own supervision over KUD staff 
could be expected to be carried out effectively and actively by them.
®G.S. Cheema and D.A. Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development, Policy Implementation 
in Developing Countries, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983, p.13.
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However, a greater part of the task of supervising the KUD and the Bimas 
programs could also be given to the public. In other words, participation of the public in 
rice policy program implementation should be increased. This study has indicated that 
the supervision carried out only by government officials has not been sufficient to purify 
the programs of various malpractices and corruption, or to enable the small farmers to 
enjoy the benefits of the program. This kind of supervision can only be carried out if the 
local representative body (DPRD) is given a greater role as the supervisory body over the 
local executive, and given the freedom to voice the aspirations and criticisms of the 
people. The position of this body would have to be changed from its present subordinate 
position as a junior partner of the local executive, which would thus lose some of its 
power, to a more nearly equal position as a real representative body.
But greater decentralization of power is not in itself the whole answer to the 
problems mentioned above, because a complete decentralization of authority over local 
level policy implementation to the regional authorities and DPRDs might result in little 
more than vesting even greater powers in hands of local officials, who might not 
necessarily be committed to the successful implementation of central government policies. 
But what can be said here is that the pendulum has been allowed to swing too far in the 
direction of reducing the powers of the DPRDs since 1960 and strengthening the position 
of pamong praja. In order to allow it to swing back at least some way towards greater 
autonomy for the DPRD - e.g. in such matters as scrutiny over the financial affairs of the 
kabupaten and kecamatan officials - there needs to be a more effective requirement of real 
disclosure to the DPRD of accounts and more effective public accountability by officials 
who handle public funds, as well as provisions for greater accountability of officials 
responsible for the implementation of government programs, so that the DPRDs do not 
function simply as a rubber stamp, as at present.
The regional press could also have an important role to play in some parts of the
country in reporting on the implementation of government policies at the local level and
. A-
investigating any malpractices or deviations that occur. There is no doubt tht local 
officials do give serious attention to any such press reports because they know they could 
affect the career prospects of the officials concerned. Hence, it is necessary to allow 
greater freedom for the press to report the real facts about program implementation, 
without being subjected to threats or repercussions, either to the newspapers or the 
journalists or their informants. Press reports could be utilized as one of the most effective 
(and least expensive) monitoring systems upon program implementation.
For the government to concede that degree of autonomy and freedom at the local 
government level would, of course, entail a very substantial change in the character of the 
political system: but it need not necessarily involve a major transfer of powers from
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centre to regions, although it would represent a step in that direction and the limits may 
have to be defined very carefully. Above all, it would require putting much more trust in 
the capacity of the local people to manage their own affairs, which should also increase 
their self-confidence that they can do so - and at the same time create a feeling among 
them that the government’s programs are intended for their benefit, not just for the 
officials. Such a transfer of greater responsibility to the local level could be achieved 
without sacrificing the overall political stability of the nation, which has by now been 
securely established for many years. Moreover, it will increase the maturity of the local 
people and the local government authorities in serving both national interests and 
national unity better. However, it should also be stressed that since the implementation 
of an elaborate, ambitious rice policy program also involves many complex administrative 
and technical problems at both the national and regional level, it is almost impossible to 
separate the latter from the overall political issues mentioned above.
Finally, greater attention might also be given to the possibility of enhancing the 
role of the agricultural extention workers (PPL); this study wants to propose an 
improvement in PPLs’ capability to play a wider role as the main agents or spokesmen of 
the farmers in channelling their interests and demands up the administrative hierarchy. 
As shown in Chapters Five and Six, the PPL has been considered one of the main 
channels of communication with farmers, either to show them new techniques or seed 
types or to report difficulties and problems facing them. Their discussions with the 
farmers frequently range more broadly than just agricultural problems to cover also other 
kinds of social problems. The personal relationships built up between them could enable 
them to establish valuable links as spokesmen for the farmers. The latter are not 
accustomed to coming to their local DPRD members to report their difficulties or to 
discuss ways to overcome any problems confronting them, for most of the DPRD 
members, as mentioned in the previous chapters, are not known personally to the farmers. 
Hence, it could be advantageous if the PPL were given a more effective role as spokesmen 
for the farmers’ interests in communications with the regiohal authorities and DPRD.
Because the PPLs are employees of a government department, the Agricultural 
Ministry, it is also worth noting an alternative possibility of improving the roles played 
by various government departments (instansi) at the local level as the government’s 
main channel of communication with farmers and other target groups in the community. 
It is a fact that the staff members of these various ”vertical” offices have often proved 
more effective at delivering services to the farmers than have the staff members of the 
local government agencies themselves (dinas daerah). The Cooperative Office and 
Information Office are two examples of such vertical offices which are directly involved in 
providing services for farmers; hence their staff members at the local level (the PKL of
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the Cooperative Office and the Jttru Penerangan of the Information Office) also have 
opportunities for direct contact with the farmers. It is true that their services have 
hitherto had various limitations, but what might be done is to provide for a greater role 
for such officials (or others) and more incentives and facilities for their staff members in 
order to enable them to improve their services. By opening up to the farmers (particularly 
in the more remote rural areas) greater opportunities for access to a diversity of 
administrative hierarchies(a state of affairs which has been only a relatively recent 
development in the history of modern Indonesia), at least something might be achieved to 
reduce their complete subordination to the pamong praja and pamong desa, which 
currently tend to work in collusion to monopolise power and the effective control over the 
implementation of government expenditure programs below the kabupaten level.
To summarise, in this study I have tried to stress the need to formulate policies 
which have better goals, by which 1 mean policy objectives which give higher priority to 
the increase of welfare for the bulk of small farmers and other disadvantaged groups in 
the rural areas, not just to the local elites and officials. I believe that at the national level 
there are still a lot of individuals in government circles and the various departments who 
have a basically populist ideology and want to see their ideals implemented. There is, in 
fact, still room for them to become involved in the formulation of better policies through 
the authority they exercise in the various government offices. Above all, I believe that 
what is needed here is the will to formulate and then implement better and more 
practicable policy objectives.
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